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This dissertation tracks the epistemological precursors, what I call the “pragmatic attitudes,” of 
William James’s pragmatism as they appear in liberal evangelical culture from the time of 
Jonathan Edwards to the postbellum Social Gospel movement. I examine what I take to be three 
major epistemological underpinnings of this tradition of evangelical theology – the privileging of 
direct experience, the practical identification of essence and praxis, and the emergent belief in 
God’s pervasive affection toward Creation – and their role in the shaping of a distinctively 
pragmatic ethos in American evangelical culture. By juxtaposing two different traditions – one 
putatively “secular” and one “sacred” – I offer an interdisciplinary bridge between American 
religion and philosophy while challenging assumptions that American history can be divided 
along secular or sacred lines.  
I begin with Jonathan Edwards’s “latent pragmatisms,” certain epistemological attitudes 
toward religious conversion and the nature of God that lead Edwards to justify these ideas on 
logics fundamental to modern pragmatism, namely the integration of the “separate” faculties 
feeling and volition and the justification of religious experiences by their practical effects. The 
second chapter explores the antebellum revivalist Charles G. Finney and his interpretation of 
these Edwardsean pragmatic attitudes, making the case that Finney and the evangelical culture he 
represents merit a place in our understanding of the history of American pragmatism. Chapter 
three looks directly at the theology of William James’s father, Henry James Sr, and the extent to 
which its decidedly Swedenborgian influence reflected the pragmatic attitudes I outline in the 
first two chapters. The fourth and final chapter deals with the transatlantic Social Gospel 
movement, a self-consciously pragmatic evangelical reform movement whose theology and 
literature most visibly brought the realms of the sacred and the secular together for the common 
goal of bettering the condition of people here and now. The epilogue broadly addresses the 









Adequacy for everyday life must be the test of all true religion. If it does not bear this test, then it 
simply is not religion. We need an everyday, a this-worldly religion. All time spent in connection 
with any other is worse than wasted. The eternal life that we are now living will be well lived if 
we take good care of each little period of time as it presents itself day after day. If we fail in 
doing this, we fail in everything.  
 
Ralph Waldo Trine, In Tune with the Infinite (158) 
 
The reason why the American New Thought philosopher Ralph Waldo Trine felt this way in 
1897 has to do with shifts in American evangelicalism stretching back to the colonial theologian 
Jonathan Edwards. To our eyes, Trine’s conception of “true religion” as “this-worldly,” as 
subject to the “test” of everyday experience, and sensible to this life as anagogically continuous 
with eternity may not seem unusual. For Trine, however, and many nineteenth century believers, 
the “truth” of religion seemed to call for new criteria not necessarily discoverable in tradition or 
explicable by orthodoxy. How can we account for this shift to the practical consequences of 
religious belief? My suggestion for how these criteria of “adequacy for everyday life” emerged 
in liberal circles of American evangelical Protestantism is not separate from the story of 
American pragmatism, what Edward C. Moore called, in his memorably arguable terms, “the 
only unique contribution American philosophy has made to the tradition known as Western 
philosophy” (vii).    
This is not an origin story of American pragmatism. It is a recontextualization of 
pragmatic logics and attitudes within the arena of American evangelicalism from Jonathan 
Edwards to the postbellum Social Gospel movement. As a work of intellectual history, this 
dissertation traces a series of ideas - and justifications made for those ideas - through a range of 
largely Protestant contexts, across nearly two centuries of American history. It is my goal to 





dealing with experience, action, and the nature of the divine that coalesces in the pragmatic 
philosophy of William James. Reconstructing this narrative will, consequently, also ask us to 
rethink the relationship between the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, as it is 
experienced in America.1 
 Though there has been some progress made in the last fifteen or so years concerning 
studies of religion in academia, what Tomoko Masuzawa said in 2005 about the state of the 
subject still holds some truth: “[i]n the social sciences and humanities alike, ‘religion’ as a 
category has been left largely unhistoricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed immune or 
inherently resistant to critical analysis” (1-2). My feeling is that the assumption of religion as a 
monolithic or universalized domain of human experience constitutes the somewhat uneasy 
relationship between religion and academic studies Masuzawa points to. This dissertation works 
against assumptions of religion as monolithic and against any sense that the historicizing of 
belief is an inherently disrespectful exercise. Knowing how belief systems have shaped and have 
been shaped by historical events is not a reduction of their value, but an invitation to other ways 
we understand human history and experience. By situating the history of American 
evangelicalism in relation to that of pragmatism, I aim to show how the study of religion can be 
made relevant in a cross-disciplinarian context.  
Unless otherwise specified, the pragmatism I refer to throughout is the pragmatism 
advocated by William James in the 1870s and developed in his later works such as Pragmatism, 
Varieties of Religious Experience, and A Pluralistic Universe.2 I stress several elements of 
                                                             
1 “Protestantism” broadly refers to a variety of Reformed or sectarian denominations that emerged out of 
the sixteenth century Reformation; evangelicalism is a more modern, transdenominational movement 
within Protestantism that emphasizes the experience of conversion, Christ’s saving atonement, activism, 
and biblicentrism (see Bebbington’s “quadrilateral” in his Evangelicalism in Modern Britain). Neither is 
necessarily liberal, though both are often associated with liberalism to some degree. The margins of 
overlap are complex and not always distinct, especially when scrutinizing a wide period of time.  
2 It will be apparent that the founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, plays a walk-on 
role in the narrative I’m reconstructing. This choice has everything to do with the nature of the 
dissertation, which forefronts themes like Protestantism, individualism, and experiential immediacy. 
Peirce’s pragmatism - an unfortunately under-represented facet of American philosophy - was designed to 
clarify ideas for their predictive values, aligning it more with science than James’s individualistic and 
radically empirical pragmatism. Unlike James, Peirce was also a Christian theist who viewed his method 
as solely for intellectual elites, less open to the idea that pragmatism could be a democratic enterprise. For 
Peirce, the fundamental rule of pragmatism, that “by their fruits ye shall know them,” should never be 





James’s method of clarifying the practical consequences of our abstract ideas: the practical 
identification of being with doing, the focus on human experience as the privileged zone of 
epistemological inquiry and verification (a trait pragmatism shares with Baconian induction, yet 
enhances in important ways), the sensitivity to a humanistic view of psychology as variable and 
unpredictable and the interpretation of this uncertainty as grounds for human endeavor, and the 
pragmatic conception of truth as not something existing in an abstract and timeless realm 
accessible through prodigious efforts at subjective reasoning, but as something susceptible to 
experiential and historical flux determined by how well it, to use James’s word, works for us.3 
Because in pragmatism a thing’s working - making a concrete difference in experience - 
is the process of its justification, a critical epistemological term with its own storied history in 
Protestantism.4 What mattered for Reformed theologians and lay practitioners – those who did 
                                                             
some of the same influences as James. I discuss in chapter three, for example, how Peirce explicitly links 
pragmatism to the Swedenborgian theology of Henry James Sr, sometimes from the very same texts 
William James was reading. Cornel West’s account of Peirce’s “pragmatic swerve” in American 
philosophy is still cogent and relevant. See especially Ch. 2 in The American Evasion of Philosophy.  
 The other obvious gap in this dissertation is the palpable absence of John Dewey. This is due less 
to any intellectual contradictions between his pragmatism and James’s (there were few), than it is to an 
effort to streamline the narrative. I also do not speak about the successors to pragmatism in the American 
academy, logical positivism, or the neopragmatists.  
3 This understanding of “pragmatic” as fixated on what “works” for us to the exclusion of more “noble” 
concerns haunted, as it continues to haunt, what we mean when we say pragmatism. Peirce, Dewey, and 
James had their own reservations about the name. Pragmatism was frequently mischaracterized by such 
intellectual leaders as Bertrand Russell, Alfred E. Taylor, and F.H. Bradley as coopting the hallowed 
name of philosophy to justify caprice and avarice. Russell repeats a common misconception of Jamesian 
pragmatism by labelling “the pragmatist definition of truth as that which has fruitful consequences” (279), 
which is only partly true. Confusing pragmatism with positivism, Martin Heidegger reportedly felt that 
pragmatism was “nothing but a ‘Weltanschauung for engineers and not for human beings in the full sense 
of the word’” (Oehler 33). About the selection of the word “pragmatism,” James wrote to Dickinson S. 
Miller that “a most unlucky word it may prove to have been” (LWJ, 2 295). In a way, he was right. In a 
curious turn, the philosophy that was designed to rescue faith from outright dismissal became subject to 
the same line of criticism. To walk by capricious faith and not by empirical sight is virtually the same as 
acting “pragmatically” - in other words, in whatever way you like regardless of the moral consequences. 
An assumption still with us today, when the word pragmatist is more likely to call up, not James or Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr or Eugene William Lyman, but Machievelli’s prince or Shakespeare’s Iago. I’m very 
much of the opinion of Hunter Brown when he says that “[s]uch readings are as deeply erroneous as they 
are widespread. On the contrary, James was deeply committed to the importance in principle of 
restraining belief, or to the importance of evidence in the responsible conduct of the life of reason” (4).  
4 The Reformed doctrine of sola fide, or “by faith alone,” was and is widely held by many Protestant 
denominations, following the Pauline dicta, popularized by reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin, 





not let their salvation rest exclusively on adherence to creeds, doctrines, or sacraments – was the 
question of how one knew one was saved. If it was true, as Calvin argued, that we can never 
grasp the foreknowledge of God to determine who was saved and who wasn’t, alternative 
epistemological criteria emerged to detect, even if only approximately, one’s salvific status. This 
tension led to the longstanding dispute between justification by faith and by works. “The works 
of a man do not conciliate God’s favour to his person” (113), Calvin asserted, leaving 
generations of the Reformed faithful uncertain about the usefulness of pious actions. For Calvin, 
practical action alone could never unequivocally certify one’s salvific stance in the eyes of God, 
an epistemic rupture between behavior and being that pragmatism consistently seeks to close. 
For pragmatists of the Jamesian vein, positing a realm of ultimate truth to which the senses are 
our only available guides is little more than an outmoded Platonic rationalism. Rather, 
pragmatism argues, the significance and justification of what we call truth is sought in what that 
truth enables us to achieve for our own interests and values.5 For this reason, the “truth” of a 
thing rests in the actions it produces, not in its approximation to some greater, if dimly perceived, 
reality “behind” phenomena. While it would be misleading to claim that justification by works 
emerged victorious in the dispute, pious works did indeed become a standard of truth-telling, 
however tentative, for both pragmatists and evangelical culture in the periods with which this 
dissertation is concerned. From Jonathan Edwards’s insight that an atom is essentially what an 
atom does to the Social Gospel’s linkage of Christian status to Christian conduct, we’ll see how 
                                                             
ascribed to Paul), that “by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of 
God” (KJV Eph 2:8). Calvin himself leaves no room for debate: “[m]en, being subject to the curse of the 
law, have no means left of attaining salvation but through faith alone” (108). To be justified by works, on 
the other hand, was to place the task of salvation in the hands of sinners themselves, an antinomian 
doctrine that stemmed largely from the New Testament James: “Ye see then how that by works a man is 
justified, and not by faith only” (KJV James 2:24), but more commonly from Christ’s words: “Ye shall 
know them by their fruits” (KJV Matt 7:16). 
5 Rorty has suggested that where James used the word truth, he might have done better to use the term 
“justification:” “he could have gone on to say that we have no criterion of truth other than justification” 
(Truth 2). I am not conflating Rorty’s use of justification with its theological definition, but drawing 
attention to the shared ambivalence of ultimate reality or “truth” between pragmatism and evangelical 
cultures. Whereas Rorty focuses on linguistic justification for pragmatic truths, evangelical and other 





the Calvinist theory of truth succumbed in practice to the nonrepresentational and antidualist 
attitudes of evangelical practice and Jamesian pragmatism.6 
This isn’t to say, as Richard King does, that pragmatism “can be considered as a 
secularized version of justification by works” (55). Though provocative, this sounds like 
suggesting that the mere evacuation of religious content from putatively secular forms can 
sufficiently explain historical change. While the pragmatic conception of truth and justification 
by works both link truth to action, secularization theses like this lead to more distortion than 
clarification. One of my goals is to rethink what we mean when we say “religious” or “secular,” 
and how falling on either side of this binary leads not only to historical and cultural 
misrepresentation, but more insidiously to the binary’s hierarchization. It doesn’t give us an 
account of belief as a human activity with appreciable historical effects on par with race, class, or 
gender; it gives us H.L. Mencken’s notorious antireligious vituperations and the final scene in 
George Schuyler’s Black No More (1931), which unabashedly links the ignorant superstition of 
Mississippi fundamentalists to the racist bloodlust of a lynch mob.   
In many ways, Hilary Putnam’s announcement in 1992 that “it is high time we paid 
attention to Pragmatism, the movement of which James was arguably the greatest exponent” 
(Pragmatism 6), inaugurated an entire field of study from which this dissertation takes 
inspiration. In the introduction to 1998’s The Revival of Pragmatism, Morris Dickstein celebrates 
the return of “the most distinctive American contribution to philosophy” (1). Interest in the 
origins of pragmatic thought has generated a wide range of accounts in literary and cultural 
studies over the last several decades. In 1986, Myra Jehlen suggested that pragmatic thinking is 
commensurate with the discovery of America itself.7 In 2001, Amanda Porterfield noted the 
“[t]he persistence of [a] Protestant-based fusion of spiritual idealism and pragmatic concern in 
                                                             
6 I use Calvin as an example here, but he was by no means the only figure who subscribed to the idea that 
the ultimate truth of our salvific destinies was locked up solely in the mind of God.  
7 Jehlen takes as symptomatic of his American identity James’s anecdote of a camping trip in which he 
pragmatically addresses the question of whether, in the course of chasing a squirrel around a tree, a man 
goes around the squirrel or not. What is special to Jehlen about this episode is how abstract discussion is 
eschewed in favor of treating the concrete facts of the case. She concludes, “the first act in knowing 
‘America’ is acknowledging it as a concrete fact. [...] [T]he decisive factor shaping the founding 
conceptions of ‘America’ and of ‘the American’ was material rather than conceptual; rather than a set of 





American religious thought” (5). In 2002, Scott Pratt offered a “history of pragmatism that traces 
its origins along the border between Native and European America in a context significantly 
conditioned by Native American thought” (xi), implying that American pragmatism was not 
invented, but discovered. In 2006, Joan Richardson argued that an aesthetic “form of thinking 
brought by the Puritans to the New World” encountered “the pressure of conditions on the 
American strand” (1). And most recently, Giles Gunn has linked the development of pragmatism 
to what he calls the “spiritual imaginaries” of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century American 
religion and the American Enlightenment.8 These varied accounts agree in one essential point: 
pragmatism is a uniquely American phenomenon. 
 But that’s not what James thought. He did give public credit to Charles Peirce, once in his 
essay “Reflex Action and Theism” (WB 124), once in Pragmatism (23), and again in a footnote 
in The Meaning of Truth (40). But he really thought the basic logic of pragmatism originated 
from across the Atlantic, specifically with English and Scottish empiricism and French 
philosophy. The lectures that became Pragmatism were dedicated to John Stuart Mill, “from 
whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind.” James regularly labeled the philosopher 
Shadworth Hodgson as one of the “forerunners of pragmatism” (Pragmatism 25).9 And from the 
French philosopher Henri Bergson, as biographer Robert Richardson has shown, he found a 
rationale for refuting static concepts in favor of process and possibility (424-28). In Varieties, 
James was more explicit about “the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers:” “[t]he guiding 
principle...has in fact been that every difference must make a difference, every theoretical 
difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing 
points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one 
alternative or the other being true” (443). My adding to the chorus of modern academics 
                                                             
8 In his work on the pragmatist turn in post-Revolutionary American writing, Gunn suggests that “if 
seventeenth-century American religion and the eighteenth-century American Enlightenment had managed 
to influence nineteenth- and twentieth-century American writing, they had succeeded in doing so...by 
undergoing what might be called a pragmatist refashioning” (1).   
9 James repeats this association in other works throughout his career. In Meaning of Truth, he asks 
“[w]hat is the precise fact that the cognition so confidently claimed is known-as, to use Shadworth 
Hodgson’s inelegant but valuable form of words?” (43). In Varieties, James cites him alongside Dugald 
Stewart, Thomas Brown, James Mill, and Alexander Bain: “Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle 





interested in rethinking the intellectual ancestry of pragmatism doesn’t intend to dismiss James’s 
origin story, but offers another perspective on a frequently retold tale.10 My method of 
recontextualizing pragmatic attitudes within the history of American liberal evangelicalism is at 
once a contribution to that chorus and an argument that the emergence of pragmatism features a 
much more complicated history than perhaps even James was aware, and that its basic 





Because it would be misleading to cite pre-Jamesian moments of American history as instances 
of authentic pragmatism, I use the phrase pragmatic attitudes (or in some cases pragmatic logics) 
to identify these epistemological maneuvers in evangelicalism that address problems by referring 
them to experience and practical consequences. There are several reasons why I choose the word 
“attitude,” rather than categorical terms like “Enlightenment philosophy” or even “pragmatism,” 
as a more suitable candidate for explanatory work. Attitude’s Latin root of aptus, “fitness” or 
“posture,” seems appropriate considering that much of the narrative I will be reconstructing has 
to do with attitudinal changes toward the world that “fit” its shifting contexts.11 This word in fact 
seemed natural to James, for whom pragmatism was “[t]he attitude of looking away from first 
                                                             
10 This also isn’t to say that James was wrong in his assessment. While he looked virtually exclusively to 
European sources, and while modern scholars make the case for American sources, the argument can be 
made that European sources like Locke, Berkeley, Scottish Common Sense, and anti-Humean sentiment 
were imported to America’s intellectual landscape long before James pondered the origins of pragmatism 
and had traceable effect on important figures in the history of the method. In this sense, James and 
modern scholars are both right.  
11 “Fit” and “fitness,” like “work,” are words in the Jamesian lexicon that provoke seemingly endless 
discussion, if only because they all seem analytically vague. Nevertheless, James felt the word central to 
the pragmatic maxim, “that, to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is 
fitted to produce” (Pragmatism 23). Elsewhere, James says that pragmatism’s “only test of probably truth 
is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best” (38). The Darwinian echoes 
of “fitness” weren’t lost on him: “Darwin opened our minds to the power of chance-happenings to bring 
forth ‘fit’ results if only they have time to add themselves together. He showed the enormous waste of 





things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts” (Pragmatism 27). The philosophical quality of your engagement with the 
world, in other words, depends on your posture, which way you’re “looking.” Insofar as “[t]he 
history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments” (6), 
stressing how American evangelicalism can also be seen as a history of attitudes toward 
salvation and the divine will illuminate its intellectual connections to pragmatism and the ways 
both demonstrate a rise in liberal humanism.12 My guess is that it wasn’t insignificant that 
Dewey, too, equated what he called the “religious” with faith-based “attitudes.”13 
 Denying the label of “pragmatist” to figures prior to James or Peirce may satisfy a 
tendency to historical accuracy or a theoretical faithfulness to “real” pragmatists. But it doesn’t 
help us understand these figures as participating in a history that clearly reflects the gradual 
emergence in America of a pragmatic way of solving problems, nor does it encourage us to 
consider these figures’ contributions to fields outside of philosophy. If we assume that 
pragmatism “belongs” to philosophy, that assumption doesn’t invite us to make interdisciplinary 
efforts. A too-stringent fixation on nomenclature, it turns out, reinforces the separation of the 
religious and the secular that this dissertation actively works against. As a pragmatist might say, 
the words used to differentiate “real” from “proto-” pragmatists are not as important as their 
practical differences. In this sense, emphasizing “attitudes” sustains focus on the human 
engagement with the world while rendering more visible the transit of ideas across ideological 
and institutional divides.   
 By isolating attitudes rather than citing broad historical and intellectual movements as the 
engines of historical change, this method forefronts individual human behavior and action 
without reducing these attitudes to any particular tradition or ideology. References in this 
dissertation to categories like “Enlightenment,” “liberal Protestantism,” “naturalism,” and even 
                                                             
12 Pragmatism and humanism share some central features: an understanding of doubt as a common human 
experience, an emphasis on action and works that enable progress, rejection or at least a distrust with 
metaphysics or theology for their own sakes, respect for individual human experience, and an openness to 
melioristic reform.  
13 Dewey’s A Common Faith (1934) is his memorable statement on a pragmatic approach to a non-
individualized understanding of the “religious” as experientially valuable, when it’s contrasted with 
“religion,” which Dewey aligns with institutionalization, authoritarianism, tradition, and possibility-





“pragmatism” to some extent, should be taken with a grain of salt. What I’m trying to avoid is 
the slippage involved in taking periodizations for granted, and to avoid equivocal historical 
claims like Garry Wills’s that “[w]ithout the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, with its 
emphasis on reason, benevolence, tolerance, and secular progress, there would have been no 
Disestablishment of religion in America” (2). This sentence implies that reason, benevolence, 
tolerance, and secular progress belong exclusively to a slice of western history referred to as the 
Enlightenment and, more problematically, suggests that American religious freedom could not 
exist without them. I’m not advocating a wholesale abandonment of these categories. Their 
unselfconscious use, though, especially in broad historical accounts like this one, can 
misrepresent the stories we want to tell. I have no doubt an august scholar like Wills is already 
aware of this; less historically astute readers, however, are another story. I aim to show how, its 
acknowledged limitations notwithstanding, intellectual history may still avoid charges of 
reductionism and generality while still making worthwhile contributions to our understanding of 
the historical transit of ideas.   
 The pragmatic attitudes I identify in American evangelical culture are not at all 
independent from their historical context, nor are the philosophers, theologians, novelists, or 
journalists I cite involved in the same philosophical project. I am more interested in tracking 
what I believe to be a pervasive trend shared by evangelical and philosophical cultures in 
America, rather than making judgments about where they got their ideas, or exposing “secular” 
thinking as essentially “sacred,” or vice versa.    
 As such, and in the spirit of pragmatism, I avoid making arguments about origins and 
causality. My starting point of Jonathan Edwards and colonial revivalism is more a matter of 
convenience than an argument that “pragmatism starts here” (which it doesn’t). Likewise, my 
choosing to end at the beginning of the twentieth century should be taken as intrinsic to the 
nature of a project like this, and not some implication that pragmatism emerged full and 
complete at the turn of the century (which it didn’t). Those expecting an explanation of the 
“roots” of pragmatism may come away with a fair amount of disappointment. My interest is in 
calling attention to the as-yet underappreciated elements of pragmatism in American evangelical 








Practical Theologies and Pragmatism 
 
At first glance, the connection between theology and pragmatism might seem suspect. The 
former’s apparent tendency toward doctrinal refinement designed to subordinate the interests of 
this world to the glories of the next seems to have less to do with practical experience than 
pragmatism would depend on. But for James, theological arguments on the nature of God or 
eschatology weren’t necessarily contrary to pragmatism: “[o]n pragmatistic principles, if the 
hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true” (Pragmatism 
131). The apparent discrepancy between religious eschatology and how believers actually 
behaved was observed by de Tocqueville, who, in his correspondence with American believers, 
noted that “it is often difficult to ascertain from their discourses whether the principal object of 
religion is to procure felicity in the other world or prosperity in this” (127). While it is true that a 
majority of Christian faiths warn against the temptations of worldliness, exemplified in the 
smooth-talking Mr. Worldly-Wiseman of Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, it isn’t true that 
evangelical culture fixates exclusively on the life to come, overlooking terrestrial concerns. As 
we’ll see, the concept of Christian worldliness itself underwent a revaluation, from a cardinal 
pitfall of conversion narratives to the very grounds of practical Christian action which American 
liberal theology went to great lengths to defend.  
In fact, it has been observed for some time that religious practice in America has always 
carried a hint of pragmatism’s emphasis on practical effects over the origins, motives, or causes 
of those effects.14 In the liberal tradition, fruits, not roots, are the primary justifiers of theological 
or abstract claims. Writing in 1928, the Dutch theologian Willem Visser ’t Hooft wrote that 
Puritanism’s “[e]mphasis on conduct leads to emphasis on the objective activity rather than on 
                                                             
14 I address the influence of pragmatic attitudes on theology more directly in chapters three and four. 
Theologians such as Henry James Sr, Walter Rauschenbusch, Lyman Abbot, and Eugene William Lyman 
adopted these attitudes - some more explicitly than others - in efforts to make theology appropriate for 





the motive which causes it” (74). If ’t Hooft’s interpretation about Puritanism is dependable, it 
would seem that even from its Puritan beginnings a wide cross-section of American Christian 
practice endorsed a theory of action whose justifications depended on the differences those 
actions made in experience.15  
 This emphasis on the practical became especially concerning for American theologians 
from the eighteenth century on. The common criticism against theology alleged that it focused 
too much on abstruse intellectual distinctions without addressing their practical value.16 (This 
was also the same charge James and many of his like-minded contemporaries levelled against 
rationalistic philosophies, like monistic idealism.) Despite this criticism, however, Christian 
theological traditions weren’t ignorant of the worldly utility of their conclusions. The sixth 
century philosopher Boethius’s subordination of speculation to practicality, the Reformed 
theologian Petrus van Mastricht’s assertion that every speculative claim has a practical 
application, or Richard Baxter’s reminder to Christian saints that their everlasting rest depended 
on both grace and works, alert us to the fact that, historically, Christian theologies have only 
rarely pursued metaphysical speculation for its own sake.17 The charge of theology’s 
impracticality and obsession with logical accuracy, then, may suggest that it wasn’t theology’s 
content that failed to provide practical direction on the application of its principles, but that those 
directions were no longer sufficiently applicable in the shifting contexts of American culture.18 
                                                             
15 The alternative is that ’t Hooft, who looked at liberal Protestantism from a twentieth century post-
pragmatism perspective, had simply read the pragmatic character of that Protestantism back into its 
history.  
16 We will see more clearly in chapter two how philosophy and theology were frequent targets of a wide-
ranging assault against abstract speculation throughout the nineteenth century.  
17 In his Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius opposes two kinds of philosophy: the speculative and the 
practical, allegorized by the Greek letters Theta and Pi, respectively (36). For the influence van 
Mastricht’s Theoretica-Practica Theologia had on Jonathan Edwards, see E. Brooks Holifield’s Theology 
in America (103 and 117). In Baxter’s enormously popular devotional, The Saints’ Everlasting Rest 
(1650), he touches on the longstanding Protestant dilemma between grace and works: “it hath been the 
ground of a multitude of late mistakes in divinity to think that ‘Do this and live’ is only the language of 
the covenant of works. It is true in some sense it is; but in other, not. The law of works only saith, ‘Do 
this’ that is, perfectly fulfil the whole law, ‘and live,’ that is, for so doing’ but the law of grace saith, ‘Do 
this and live’ too; that is, believe in Christ, seek him, obey him sincerely, as thy Lord and King” (30). 
18 Take for example the Unitarian minister William Ellery Channing’s frustration with hell-fire 
homiletics. Channing grew to reject the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity as productive only of misery 





 It will become clear that the differences between theology and pragmatism are less 
impactful than their similarities. Though American theologians never surrendered their 
commitments to absolute truth, preordained eschatologies, or the critical acceptance of Christ’s 
sacrifice as necessary for conversion - concepts that, taken by the letter, are virtually alien to 
pragmatism - the ways evangelical theology addressed things like conversion, the experience of 
living in historical flux, and what it means to be a “true” Christian were conducted on and 
justified by largely pragmatic logics.  
My inclusion of a wide range of Protestant theology in this dissertation is 
motivated by an awareness that an aura of exclusion from the humanities seems to linger 
around it. (When my interest studying American religion in a literature department comes 
up, I find the general response is some quizzical version of “what are you doing in an 
English department?” or ”why don’t you join a divinity school?”) The rise of theological 
seminaries and divinity schools in the early American nineteenth century seemed to 
reinforce the view that theology belonged outside conventional university-wide 
curricula.19 Historically, however, theology wasn’t understood to be a discipline unto 
itself, but informed by and invested in the contemporaneous innovations in other 
disciplines like philosophy and science. I share the view of E. Brooks Holifield, that 
“[r]are was the discourse in early America in which theology had no role” (viii). It’s not 
the intention of this dissertation to argue a return of theology to the humanities (though 
that possibility isn’t completely off the table), but to assume that it has no proper place 
there is, I think, misguided and limiting to certain avenues of inquiry.  
                                                             
shepherding them to salvation. Gary Dorrien provides a useful biographical examination of Channing’s 
transformative experience with a “noted revival preacher” who painted a “lurid picture of ‘the lost 
condition of the human race rushing into hell’” (8). In more general terms, the voluntarism of antebellum 
America, and the rise of social reform societies encouraging active human involvement in the destiny of 
God’s country, contributed to the winnowing of deterministic Calvinist doctrines like predestination, total 
depravity, and limited atonement.  
19  The first theological seminary in America, Andover Theological Seminary opened in 1807, following 
the controversial appointment of Unitarian minister Henry Ware to Harvard’s Hollis Chair of Divinity in 
1805. The non-denominational Harvard Divinity School opened in 1816. A training school for 
Congregationalist ministers since its establishment in 1701, Yale formed its own separate theological 
seminary in 1822. While many of these establishments were conservative responses to liberal 
encroachments on academic curricula, this isn’t to say that all seminaries and divinity schools remained as 







Direct Experience and the Practical Identification of Being and Action 
 
One of the major proximities between theologies of evangelicalism and pragmatism I 
cover is the attitudinal change toward experience. Though the category of “experience” 
has enjoyed sustained attention in histories of religion in America, and is absolutely 
central to discussions of pragmatism, few scholars have noted the ways in which 
experience provides an analytical bridge between the two fields. The late professor of 
divinity Randolph Crump Miller began The American Spirit in Theology (1974) by noting 
the dominance of “an appeal to experience, often more emotional than intellectual” (13) 
pertaining both to American theology and Jamesian pragmatism. This dissertation 
explores this epistemological bridge in more detail.  
American evangelical practice and Jamesian pragmatism sought to reconfigure 
experience as a fundamentally irreducible phenomenon emerging in concert with the 
living body and prior to any attempt to categorize it.20 Unlike Cartesian dualism, which 
assumed a fundamental divide between an experiencing mind and a material body, 
pragmatism’s antifoundationalist attitude interpreted experience as continuous with 
matter. This epistemological move, though, wasn’t taken as self-evident to lay or 
educated philosophers or theologians in the time period I cover, a fact our modern 
insistence on the primacy individual experience – in terms of race, class, or sexuality – 
can mask. As Jim Egan argues in his study of the category of experience in colonial 
America, “experience [is] a rhetorical category in need of legitimation” (7). Experience, 
then, isn’t exempt from the need to argue its claims as valid experience, nor are such 
                                                             
20 James’s assumption that religion is most “pure” only in those intense “original experiences which were 
the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct” (VRE 6) has seen its share of 
criticism, most notably by Charles Taylor, mainly on the grounds that James seems incapable of seeing 
experience in terms other than individualistic. Taylor argues that “[w]hat James can’t seem to 
accommodate is the phenomenon of collective religious life, which is not just the result of (individual) 





strategies of legitimation ideologically neutral or interest-free. The fraught nature of these 
zones of legitimation will become much clearer in the focus on conversion experiences in 
American revivalism and in James’s reconfiguration of experience as the bedrock of 
philosophical investigation.  
 One of the great contributions of William James’s writings on religion is the 
rejection of naturalistic or rationalistic attempts to explain religious experience. In 
Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion, Michael Slater valorizes Jamesian 
pragmatism for “its rejection of essentialist and sui generis views of religion, its 
principled anti-reductionism, and its attention to the psychological complexity and highly 
personal nature of religious belief, experience, and practice” (5). Variety, uncertainty, and 
idiosyncrasy became central features of the definition of experience with which 
pragmatism and American liberal evangelicalism deal. In calling attention to the forms of 
uncertainty in evangelical conversion models from Edwards to the Social Gospel, I offer 
a counter interpretation of what Paul Jerome Croce refers to as the “eclipse of certainty” 
as a uniquely Darwinian effect.  
 One of the reasons we’ll see such a sustained emphasis on direct experience from 
Edwards to the Social Gospel has to do with a suspicion of mere intellectualism to effect 
change in individuals or institutions. The recurrence in religious literature, theology, and 
pragmatism of scenes of and appeals to direct experience are an immediate result of the 
idea that linguistic or intellectual acts like reasoning are, by their very attempts to 
universalize, prone to disconfirmation by individual experience. As Helen, the heroine of 
Margaret Deland’s popular novel John Ward, Preacher (1888), put it, “argument never 
can result in conviction…for belief is a matter of temperament’” (74). Far from being a 
mere method for clarifying practical outcomes, Jamesian pragmatism assumes that direct 
experience, undergirded by radical empiricism, should be the grounds of epistemological 
validity.21 What will become apparent is that figures like Jonathan Edwards, Charles G. 
                                                             
21 Radical empiricism was James’s attempt to forge a metaphysics that would once and for all do away 
with a philosophical reliance on any form of a foundational psychological dualism. This empiricism is 
radical in that it respects the relations between empirical terms and not - as in classical empiricism - only 
the terms themselves. It was James’s attempt to bypass the rationalist insistence on a “third term” 
artificially constructed to make sense of apparently disconnected particulars. Despite James’s assertion in 





Finney, Emanuel Swedenborg, and Jacob Riis employed a strikingly similar 
understanding of experience as justificatory of the truth of religious faith and a powerful 
motivator of pious action. Examining these sites of immediate experience will 
demonstrate how liberal evangelicalism and Jamesian pragmatism’s ideas of experience 
are cut from the same epistemological cloth.22  
 Related to questions of immediate experience is the complex relationship between 
theory and practice (or in other terms, being and action). In some ways this distinction 
has always been philosophically fraught, but it was in the antebellum era when it became 
a common complaint among philosophers, theologians, and other writers. As chapter two 
will point out, it was philosophers like Francis Bowen and authors like Nathaniel 
Hawthorne who began in earnest to call into question – and at times to satirize – the 
utility of any theory that couldn’t show its fruits in practical action. One of the ways 
pragmatism sought to overcome this hurdle was to posit a virtual identification of theory 
and practice, ontology and behavior, or as I’ll periodically refer to it, the is and the does. 
Put another way, pragmatism does not trouble itself with abstract distinctions or 
speculations about “essences,” but locates the justification for any ontological claim 
about a thing in how that thing acts. In other words, you are what you do.  
This valuation of action (as opposed to mere cognition) forms the basis for much of 
James’s psychology and shapes pragmatism in no small way. At the end of the “Habit” chapter 
                                                             
empiricism’” (4), due to the shared features of their epistemology, I will in the course of this dissertation 
make occasional reference to James’s metaphysics of radical empiricism. To that end, I trust to some 
extent in Nancy Frankenberry’s memorable simile that “pragmatism without radical empiricism is like a 
menu without food: appetizing but not digestible” (88).  
22 Even though, in the Jamesian-Protestant matrix I’ll be exploring throughout this dissertation, immediate 
experience was appreciated for its epistemological value, this view didn’t go unchallenged. Not just from 
the obvious corner of religious conservatism, but even those from James’s own camp, like the American 
philosopher and theologian Henry Nelson Wieman. Drawing from Jamesian philosophy of religion but 
repudiating the validity of immediate experience, Wieman argued for a return of religious experience to 
the scientific method: “[i]mmediate experience never yields knowledge. [...] To cling still to such a view 
with respect to discernment of God is to put the knowledge of God outside the field of scientific 
knowledge, where it can be neither tested nor examined. Such a position is fatal to religion. [...] [W]e 
believe it is precisely because this view has prevailed that knowledge of God has been so widely ignored 





in Principles of Psychology, James memorably describes the interplay between action and 
ontology using one of his favorite examples: alcoholism:  
 
[t]he drunken Rip Van Winkle, in [Joseph] Jefferson’s play, excuses himself for 
every fresh dereliction by saying, ‘I won’t count this time!’ Well! he may not 
count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. 
Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering 
and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing 
we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. [...] As we become 
permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints in the 
moral, and authorities and experts in the practical and scientific spheres, by so 
many separate acts and hours of work. (131) 
 
Just as a drunkard becomes a drunkard by his actions, so a saint achieves the status of saintliness 
by sustained moral behavior. The insistent materialism of the passage - its insistence that 
cumulative actions are registered and stored in the very body of the actor - reinforces the 
pragmatic reasoning that all we know of being and becoming is, pragmatically, reducible to our 
actions. Implicitly, in a way significant for Protestant theologians, the passage is also a rationale 
for spiritual conversion. One may justify their status as a saint by acting like one.23 
 
 
A Suffering God: Reimagining the Divine in Liberal Evangelicalism 
 
One of the most persistent theological tendencies in the Reformed tradition has been to deny God 
any attributes deemed limiting to His absolute sovereignty. The refusal to assign “finite” factors 
to the nature of the almighty ensured God’s eternal remoteness from the moral pollution of fallen 
Creation. This radical ontological separation, central to American Calvinist theology, had 
                                                             
23 It’s no stretch to say that James is referring to “saints” not in the Catholic sense - as the chosen 
exemplars of Christian duty celebrated on feast days - but in a modified Protestant sense of the 
predestined elect. Modified, because though Calvinism asserts that one cannot behave their way into 





important implications for human action on earth, since it was alleged by many liberal 
theologians and James himself that meaningful action is impossible without some sense of 
affectionate connection to whatever we nominate as the divine. As we’ll see, nineteenth century 
evangelicalism emphasized a notion of God not as the exacting Calvinist sovereign of Edwards’s 
sermon “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” but a God of love, a predominantly affectionate 
deity immanent in history and who cares intimately for the destinies of His creatures.  
But this doctrine of affectionate immanence had another consequence: a God who loves 
can also suffer. In 1910, Christian pragmatist Eugene William Lyman cited this doctrine as 
having implications for meaningful human work: “[l]ife has its grinding toil...but the immanent 
God who toils and suffers with us has unmeasured resources for the accomplishment of his 
purposes” (17-18).24 What does it mean that God can suffer with us? Along with tracking the 
historical shift expressed by Trine above, this dissertation also tracks an accompanying shift in 
the reimagining of God as capable of human-like suffering and the implications of that doctrine 
for human action. The concept of a God who loves and suffers with us, I show in chapter three, 
becomes central to James’s pragmatic logics through the Swedish divine Emanuel Swedenborg 
and Henry James Sr’s extensive collation of his spiritual system. The profound effects of this 
radical theological shift I explore more fully in chapter four. A God, immanent in human history 
and capable of love and suffering (even as that suffering was relayed through Jesus Christ via the 
Incarnation), energized and made meaningful human endeavors to establish God’s kingdom on 
earth.  
So in a significant way, this reimagining of the divine as invested with a human-like 
sensorium was not a mere theological development separate from the emergence of pragmatism. 
Its central logic, that meaningful Christian action is made so because that action is taken within a 
universe that responds to our affections, is also central to Jamesian pragmatism, which sees no 
                                                             
24 Elsewhere Lyman praises the Christian philosopher Josiah Royce for explaining how a struggling God 
made our own struggles meaningful: “Royce renders a most valuable service to religion and theology, 
when he insists...that God is a sharer in all our struggles with evil…. From such a view-point our moral 
struggles gain a significance which transforms them” (178). Josiah Royce, a Christian philosopher and 
close friend of James, often receives an unfairly scant share of attention in histories of American 
philosophy and religion. Unfortunately, like Peirce and Dewey, an appreciation of Royce’s role in the 
history of American pragmatism exceeds the boundaries of this dissertation, though some of my 





significance in any action taken in a lifeless, interest-free universe. Their primary goal was to 
demystify the intellectual remoteness of abstruse concepts, subjecting them, as Trine advised, to 
the test of “[a]dequacy for everyday life.”  
 
 
Rethinking the Secularization Thesis 
 
Because this dissertation scrutinizes two particular traditions within American liberal 
evangelicalism and philosophy, it is also a project that scrutinizes the religious and the secular. 
Until recently, there has been throughout the twentieth century a somewhat uncritical acceptance 
of the notion that culture, especially western culture, was or is undergoing some degree of 
secularization. In 1976, for example, the historian Paul Johnson could get away with saying that 
“[d]uring the past half-century there has been a rapid and uninterrupted secularization of the 
West” (516). Five years later, David S. Reynolds identified in American religious fiction what he 
believed to be a “pattern of secularization” (71), an argument that, as reviewer Amy Lang was 
right to point out, “is presented in terms so broad that it offers no new insight into religious 
culture” (92). That broadness began to be addressed critically. Another five years - and not 
insignificantly right in the middle of the Reagan presidency - the tide had changed considerably: 
“[t]he truth is that we do not live in an uncomplicatedly secular age” (117), R. Laurence Moore 
reported. Indeed, even a cursory familiarity with religious cultures strongly suggests a more 
complicated story than the secularization thesis lets on. (Even more insidious is the perfunctory 
identification of secularization with progress.) Nowadays, it’s a familiar mantra for those in 
Religious Studies and American Culture departments that claims to America’s progression into 
some all-inclusive secularity are quite overblown. 
 Because this dissertation tries to rethink the distinction between “religious” and 
“secular,” my use of these terms shouldn’t be taken as uncomplicated. To my understanding, 
they function as a convenient shorthand for highly imbricated historical transformations and 
exchanges, whose “religious” or “secular” distinctiveness vanishes upon close-enough scrutiny. 





of defining that religion seems to slip away” (3). It is almost always the case in the history of 
what was and still is referred to as secularization that religious and secular thinkers borrowed 
freely from one another. The boundaries between these terms and the cultures they are purported 
to represent are not as stable - nor quite as illuminating - as the secularization thesis would have 
us believe. This point holds true, I submit, for a pragmatic philosophy often deemed secular and 
for the faithful commitments of evangelicalism.  
 My own position regarding the role of faith in other aspects of a culture takes the same 
temperament from R. Laurence Moore: “[t]he notion that religious commitment is escapist, a 
faute de mieux strategy for the weak...is nonsense” (Religious Outsiders 120). Seeing religious 
belief as, at best, an impediment to understanding the broader culture, any explanation of which 
would do well to ignore citizens’ faith-based contributions to that culture, seems to me not only 
ideologically misguided but also prone to misrepresentations of a variety of cultural zones - 
political, economic, academic - as rigidly secular enterprises dismissive or mistrustful of 
anything religious. My primary goal on this head is to join other current attempts to disabuse 
ourselves of the notion that not only is the world not rigidly divided into religious and secular, 
but that the category of “secular” and its popular use as “nonreligious” has failed to provide an 
adequate explanatory framework for a historical or cultural understanding of faith. I will return 
more thoroughly to the issue of secularity in the epilogue, but readers should bear in mind 
throughout that the history I move through is no triumphalist tale of either what seems religious 
or secular. This dissertation, in fact, is deeply skeptical of accounts that suggest history, religious 




                                                             
25 This skepticism lies in tension with even recently published histories of western secularity. To take one 
very recent example, Margaret Jacob’s The Secular Enlightenment (2019) surveys the eighteenth century 
movement for how it sought “answers in secular terms – even to many religious questions – [and] vastly 
expanded the sphere of the secular” (1). Taking “secularization” as an undiluted process, Jacob repeats 
twentieth century scholarly presumptions of religion’s taking little part in post-Enlightenment history, as 





Interdisciplinarity and Methodology 
[A] religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, 
things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions - beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in 
a single moral community called a church. 
    Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (46) 
 
Durkheim’s well-known definition of religion makes several assumptions, few of which will 
come to bear on the kinds of religious experiences and practices I’ll be looking at in this 
dissertation. I quote him here because, as a project cognizant of current debates about the 
appropriate nature of religious studies, much of my discussion will involve questions of what 
counts as religion and how those accounts are justified.   
Another reason I quote Durkheim is to alert readers to highly contested efforts to define 
religion, to isolate its essence, or at least its essential features. A sociologist, Durkheim saw 
religion as an inherently social phenomenon, bound up with moral prescription and conformity 
for the good of common ends. It is unclear, if, for example, modern individualistic interfaith or 
nondenominational groups would qualify as religions in Durkheim’s estimation. The 
shortcomings of definition are immediately clear, then - even for immoderately broad ones like 
Alfred North Whitehead’s, that “[r]eligion is what the individual does with his own solitariness” 
(16). Even James’s definition of religion, which I discuss in chapter one, doesn’t fully satisfy me 
(even in spite of its self-conscious arbitrariness).26 I personally have little investment in 
definitions like these beyond their historical values, and find it far more useful to pay close 
attention to how the coterie of historical figures I’m interested in understood their relationship to 
whatever they felt was sacred in life. My only methodological assumption on this head is that 
religious belief has exerted considerable force - as it continues to do - on historical events, and in 
order to understand those events the best we can do is to take those expressions of belief at face 
                                                             
26 The reason being is that James’s definition of religion, while nuanced, seems oblivious to the ways 
religion can be for some a distinctly social experience: “[r]eligion...shall mean for us the feelings, acts, 
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in 





value, without reducing them to things like denominational affiliation or to a reductive “medical 
materialism.”27 
With its emphasis on the theology behind practical effects of direct religious experience 
and sensitivity to belief as a human activity not necessarily reducible to ideological or 
denominational affiliation, this dissertation also, incidentally, provides an intellectual 
background for the practice theory of historians and sociologists like David Hall, Meredith B. 
McGuire, and Robert Orsi.28 Phenomenologically and empirically oriented, “[p]ractice theory 
enjoins historians to see the Christian life within a dense pattern of cultural actions, dispositions, 
regimens, hierarchies, habits, resistances, and appropriations” (3), explains the introduction to 
Practicing Protestants. According to McGuire, scholarly “concepts for describing and analyzing 
individuals’ religions simply fail to capture how multifaceted, diverse, and malleable are the 
                                                             
27 What James called “medical materialism” refers to a set of reductive scientific theories that he is quick 
to disparage. As he memorably put it, 
 
[m]edical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to 
Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out 
Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George 
Fox’s discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats 
as a symptom of a disordered colon. (VRE 13) 
 
Regardless of James’s innovatively empirical approach to religion, the twentieth century seemed deaf to 
the explanatory potential of his approach. Modern scholars like Russell McCutcheon, as Michael Slater 
points out, “have even gone so far as to argue that methodological naturalism - the view that only 
naturalistic explanations should be admitted for the purposes of doing scientific or scholarly inquiry - 
should be a basic commitment in the academic study of religion” (Pragmatism 27).  
28 In the introduction to his volume Lived Religion in America, David Hall calls attention to the fact that, 
“while we know a great deal about the history of theology and (say) church and state, we know next-to-
nothing about religion as practiced and precious little about the everyday thinking and doing of lay men 
and women” (vii), a gap in scholarly knowledge that the field of lived religion attempts to close. In his 
contribution to that volume, Robert Orsi agrees that “‘religion’ cannot be neatly separated from the other 
practices of everyday life, from the ways that human beings work on the landscape, for example, or 
dispose of corpses, or arrange for the security of their offspring. Nor can ‘religion’ be separated from the 
material circumstances in which specific instances of religious imagination and behavior arise and to 





beliefs, values, and practices that make up many...persons’ own religions” (5).29 This emergent 
focus on religious practice as lived - rather than explanatory gestures toward denominational 
allegiance or ethnic background - is an effort to recover the practical substance of religious 
belief.  
The fact that “religion-as-lived...needs to make sense in one’s everyday life, and…needs 
to be effective, to ‘work’” (McGuire 15), highlights the impact pragmatic attitudes have had on 
the development of modern critical attempts to understand religious practice.30 Lived religion’s 
focus on practical effects of beliefs and not the origins or essentials of faith, and the method’s 
openness to a multiplicity of perspectives whose validity is judged based on their “workings” 
makes the field the rightful heir to Jamesian pragmatism, a legacy that this dissertation explores 
in the imbricated proximities between American evangelicalism and pragmatism.31 While its 
intersection with the methodology of lived religion is intellectual and not sociological or 
ethnographical, this dissertation does draw from the wealth of empirical research conducted in 
the sociology of religion and related fields. 
 But this is not to suggest that some of these practices are necessarily Protestant in nature, 
though they have often been routinely associated with Protestantism broadly conceived. 
Revivalism, which I focus on in the first half of the dissertation, has often been understood to be 
a distinctly Protestant phenomenon, but as Jay P. Dolan has shown, revivalism was just as much 
                                                             
29 This focus on lived religion, headed by such disciplines as sociology, anthropology, and economics, is 
the latest phase in the development of scholarly interest in “popular religion,” religion as experienced by 
the historical actors who shaped current religious landscapes. In his introduction to Religion and 
American Culture, David G. Hackett points out that the “new area of ‘popular religion’” emerged around 
the 1960s and 70s when scholars began to realize that church history - until that time the major sources 
for our understanding of religious history - provided insufficient and potentially skewed explanations of 
social change (ix-x). 
30 For those who visit the grotto at St. Lucy’s in the Bronx, as Orsi shows, the source of the water or the 
fact that the grotto is a replica is irrelevant to pilgrims’ beliefs that the water is, indeed, invested with 
curative powers. The ritual of gathering water works for those who believe in it (“Everyday Miracles” 4-
7).  
31 The relationship between Protestant traditions and current trends in religious studies and American 
spiritual practice has been recognized by Amanda Porterfield: “[w]hile neither religious studies nor 
current American interest in the therapeutic benefits of spirituality is by any means limited to people 
identify themselves as Protestants, they carry important vestiges of Protestant thought and thus exemplify 





a part of Catholic cultures in the nineteenth century.32 And modern movements that seek to 
reinvigorate people’s commitments to faith - such as Jewish Renewal and Islamic tajdid - 
challenge prevailing assumptions that religious efforts at personal or social renewal are innate to 
Protestantism alone. The same Protestant normativity has been noted in James, specifically 
regarding the emphases in Varieties on conversion, a higher power that responds (potentially) to 
human desires, the curious celebration of religious individualism, and the largely Protestant 
sources he uses to argue his claims.33 This dissertation situates itself alongside recent efforts to 
understand the often staggering complexity of religious affiliations and devotional practices, 
while being sensitive to the reality that many of these affiliations can be conducted in the blind 
spots of our academic radars.  
 If there are in fact moments in which James took Protestant to stand for religion in 
general, as it seems most James scholars think he did, tracking Protestant theology alongside the 
development of Jamesian pragmatism would just be taking the next step in providing a historical 
account of how Protestant evangelicalism exerts influence on the culture that informed 
pragmatism. What is needed, and what I aim to provide with this dissertation, is an account of 
exactly what these attitudes are and how they transform over time. My opening gambit is that 
attitudes can be located, specifically in the Protestant evangelicalism of Edwards and Finney, the 
utility-based cosmology of Swedenborg and Henry James, Sr, and most self-consciously in the 
evangelical reforms of the Social Gospel movement.  
In an effort to get a comprehensive sense of an emerging pragmatic temper from Edwards 
to the Social Gospel, I quote widely and across a variety of fields: theology, literature, 
philosophy, psychology, biography, diaries, and others. In this sense, this dissertation is an 
interdisciplinary intellectual history, though one that is wary of the method’s pitfalls of 
generalization, simplification, and the ever-present threat of mistaking a case of multiple 
discovery for a possible historical causality (take Edwards and Swedenborg’s pragmatizing of 
                                                             
32 In his Catholic Revivalism, Jay P. Dolan focuses on the evangelical crusades of the Catholic 
denominations of the Jesuits, Redemptorists, and Paulists. See his introduction.  
33 Several commentators have noted the striking Protestant character of the Varieties. David Hollinger 
provides a useful examination of this aspect of the Varieties. See “Damned for God’s Glory: William 
James and the Scientific Vindication of Protestant Culture” in William James and a Science of Religions, 





space and time, which I discuss in chapter three). Though I cite compelling biographical 
connections between religious and philosophical domains where I deem them important, I’m as 
overall uninterested in causal arguments as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr was when he deliberately 
neglected to tell us the ultimate cause of Elsie Venner’s hypnotic power over snakes.34 Like 
pragmatism and Holmes, Sr’s tale of concealed causes, it’s the effects we now live with that 
matter.  
This dissertation will also be useful to those interested in the intellectual background of 
pragmatism as it pertains to other aspects of American life and history. While I steer clear of 
causal claims regarding religion’s role in the shaping of pragmatism, I don’t think it’s a tenable 
position to claim that religious phenomena had zero impact on the kinds of ideas and methods - 
and their limits - that constitute the pragmatic method. “Although James was not a Christian in 
any traditional sense,” Michael Slater reminds us, “his thinking about religion was shaped in 
important ways by the predominantly Protestant culture and society of his time” (Philosophy 10). 
                                                             
34 In Holmes, Sr’s “medicated novel” Elsie Venner (1861), the cause of Elsie’s power over snakes is only 
hinted at. A woman in a relationship of hypnotic seduction with snakes - obvious Garden of Eden 
imagery - points to original sin as a potential cause. But there is also the fact Elsie’s mother was bitten by 
a snake while pregnant, suggesting a medical explanation. Perhaps Elsie is one of those gifted 
“magnetizers” who, like spirit-rappers and clairvoyants, could bridge the gap between the natural world 
and the spiritual, and who filled the pages of commission reports, popular magazines, and scientific 
journals. The novel is candid about its purpose - “to test the doctrine of ‘original sin’ and human 
responsibility for the disordered volition coming under that technical denomination” (xii). 
It seemed common in American nineteenth century fiction to conceal the specifics of the very 
thing that sets the narrative in motion. In Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland (1798), the spontaneous 
combustion of Wieland, Sr is the first major event in the novel. Yet Brown and his characters are less 
interested in solving that mystery than the one that comes in the form of Carwin, a ventriloquist whose 
own motives are as ambiguous as the thing that led to Wieland Sr.’s death. Nathaniel Hawthorne would 
deploy a similar narrative technique. What sets the moral drama of The Scarlet Letter (1850) in action is a 
crime we never see, which is only referred to obliquely, and whose definitive proof is the preternatural 
“little elf” (90), Pearl, a figure infamous for her symbolic ambiguity. Hawthorne seems less interested in 
the lurid details of an adulterous liaison exposed than in the very real social and psychological effects 
produced by it. While Brown was interested in the limits of knowledge and Hawthorne in the human 
relationship to symbols, both attempted to deal with a world in which knowledge of motive, causation, or 







This dissertation is an effort to appreciate those formative influences without reducing them to 
dubious causalities.  
 
 
A Note on Limitations and Some Implications of Pragmatic Attitudes 
 
Though this dissertation is an intellectual history that tries to focus on attitudes and ideas, it 
recognizes the complications in sustaining such a focus. One of the criticisms of intellectual 
history is its tendency to sidestep contexts in pursuit of irreducible ideological components, “unit 
ideas,” as Arthur Lovejoy called them. So an intellectual history about pragmatism that ignored 
context - without which a pragmatic account of experience could not exist - would be a 
contradiction. Feminist scholarship, recognizing pragmatism’s contextual limitations, has 
performed a great service in reminding pragmatism that such contexts include race, gender, class, 
and sexual preference in the interpretations of experience.  
 The most obvious limitation of this dissertation is that it tends to repeat the white male 
canonicity of intellectual histories of old. Jonathan Edwards, Charles Finney, Lyman Beecher, 
Henry and William James, Jacob Riis, Charles Sheldon are the major players. But this hardly 
unfamiliar cast of white male characters has enjoyed the privilege of being seen as the 
intellectual and religious backbone of American history for some time, to the exclusion of 
historically documented contributions of other groups.35 This dissertation is not ignorant of the 
cultural implications in which evangelicalism and pragmatism are entangled, and each chapter 
makes an effort to account for how problematic those entanglements have been and still are to 
this day.  
                                                             
35 See Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy for a consideration of pragmatism and race. 
For a still-relevant examination of the contributions of women and feminism to pragmatism, see Charlene 
Haddock Seigfried’s Pragmatism and Feminism (17-66). For follow-up attempts to forge a feminist 
pragmatist perspective that self-consciously builds on Seigfried’s work, see Erin McKenna’s The Task of 
Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective (2001), Richard Rorty’s “Feminism and Pragmatism” in 
Truth and Progress (1998), and Sean Epstein-Corbin’s “Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Sentimental 





 Though James and other first-wave pragmatists deeply respected the role of context in 
shaping knowledge, these contexts tended not to include race, gender, or class. James’s major 
works on the epistemology behind pragmatism - Pragmatism, Essays on Radical Empiricism, A 
Pluralistic Universe - say next to nothing about such cultural categories as formative of 
individuals’ experiences. He is, for example, virtually silent on race. For Peirce, the “practical 
bearings” of his pragmatic maxim seem to belong exclusively to trained (male) specialists. In 
Dewey’s writings, too, Charlene Seigfried observes, “[w]ith the exception of [his] brief 
polemical addresses supporting women’s issues, women as such do not figure much in 
pragmatist writings, not even in those of women writing in the pragmatist tradition” (31).36 
Considerations of class as well tend to appear only as occasional anecdotes in James’s writings, 
when he isn’t being outright dismissive of the impoverished.37 Moreover, the radical part of 
radical empiricism includes the suggestion that experience itself can be detached from human 
actors. In that case, not only are cultural contexts irrelevant to experience, there aren’t even any 
people to experience them.  
                                                             
36 Self-consciously writing against the virtual silence on women pragmatists in works like Cornel West’s 
The American Evasion of Philosophy - an influential work that nevertheless heavily suggests the 
emergence of pragmatism to be a male-dominated history beginning with Emerson - Charlene Seigfried 
pays homage to the women who made significant contributions to pragmatism: Louise M. Rosenblatt, 
who developed reader-response theory in 1938 (30); Charlotte P. Gilman (41); Christine Ladd-Franklin, 
who studied under Peirce at Johns Hopkins (completing the requirements for but not receiving her PhD) 
(45-6); Elsie Ripley Clapp, who served as graduate assistant to Dewey from 1911-27, and, like Jane 
Addams, demonstrably influenced Dewey’s form of pragmatism (51); and several others.  
37 There’s a marked ambivalence in James’s writings on how he viewed the issue of class. On the one 
hand, he seems grateful for the (somewhat) direct experience of manual labor shocking him out of a 
romanticized sense of heroism. While on a “train toward Buffalo...the sight of a workman doing 
something on the dizzy edge of a sky-scaling iron construction brought me to my senses very suddenly. 
And now I perceived, by a flash of insight, that I had been steeping myself in pure ancestral blindness, 
and looking at life with the eyes of a remote spectator. [...] Not in clanging fights and desperate marches 
only is heroism to be looked for, but on every railway bridge and fire-proof building that is going up to-
day” (Talks 175). On the other hand, James fails to see the same kind of heroism in the struggle to 
survive, even after a literal earth-shattering cataclysm. Surveying the damage following the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake, James reports that “[t]he only very discreditable thing to human nature that 
occurred was later, when hundreds of lazy ‘bummers’ found that they could keep camping in the parks, 
and...even in some cases getting enough of the free rations in their huts or tents to last them well into the 
summer. This charm of pauperized vagabondage seems all along to have been Satan’s most serious bait to 
human nature” (“Some Mental Effects 283). This aversion to the poor in the midst of disaster sounds like 
a moral misstep from the same man who claimed that “[t]he solid meaning of life is always the same 
eternal thing, - the marriage, namely, of some unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, 





One would also be remiss to be tight-lipped about James’s own Victorian views of the 
roles of women and men.38 His criticism of Horace Bushnell’s mealy-mouthed liberation politics 
toward women, for example, focused more on the minister’s “redundant and careless” writing 
style than his posing a kind of halfway membership for women interested in government 
positions (ECR 247). Citing the same review, Seigfried comments that James “actually believed 
that ‘the universal sense of mankind’ confirms such subordination in women as an ideal” (116). 
When faced with the challenge that a living, breathing wife and an “automatic sweetheart” (what 
we might call a robot clone) would be pragmatically identical, James retreated to a “masculine” 
perception of what a woman provides a man: “[w]ould any regard her as a full equivalent? 
Certainly not, and why? Because...our egoism craves above all things inward sympathy and 
recognition, love and admiration” (MT 189).39 Furthermore, it’s no secret in James scholarship 
that the invigoration of the human will was decidedly one of masculine virility.40 
Nor is pragmatism’s theory of “the transformation of genius into practical power” 
(“Experience” 262), as Emerson envisaged it, without its racial implications. The tendency to 
hitch biology to ability, as Cornel West has shown, was true of Emerson, who linked the capacity 
of one’s power or “genius” to one’s race.41 My own disclosure of a tradition of practically 
identifying the is and the does - pragmatism’s linkage of being to action - also carries the 
makings of the insidious logics of determinism and essentialism. If it is true that one’s alleged 
essence necessarily manifests in action, it follows that action necessarily manifests essence. 
Behavior provides the signature account of one’s “essential” interior. Misapplied, the 
                                                             
38 It was true that James admired women writers and activists like Jane Addams, Annie Payson Call, and 
the clairvoyant who mystified his scientific sensibilities, Leonora Piper. But his “explicit support of the 
ideology of separate spheres,” as Charlene Seigfried puts it, situates James within a tradition that 
deliberately excluded women from, or left tenuously susceptible to male power, their hard-won academic 
positions (111-13).    
39 Seigfried calls this episode in James’s writing his “imaginary anticipation of ‘The Stepford Wives’ 
(119), citing it as one example of James’s underexplored sexism.  
40 See for example West. James’s essays, such as “The Energies of Man,” ”The Powers of Man,” and 
“The Moral Equivalent to War” “reveal the degree to which James promotes notions of martial spirit and 
masculine virility in order to reinvigorate and regenerate individuals for moral purpose” (58). It is unclear 
how women would figure into this conception.   
41 Nonetheless dubbing Emerson a “liberal ‘racist,’” West concludes in his reading of Emerson’s English 
Traits (1856) that “Emerson’s notion of power [is] inextricably bound with...personality and racial 





identification of the is and the does can reinforce stereotypes, justifying policies that further 
discrimination and disenfranchisement. What pragmatism seems to offer in the way of an 
essentialist doctrine, however, is curtailed by its abiding respect for variable experience and the 
human capacity for self-making (though as I address in the epilogue, neither is this respect for 
individual experience free of complications). Rorty has already noted how easy it is for culture to 
look like nature, a problematic conflation exposable as disingenuous by those who can articulate 
compelling counter-theories to naturalized oppression.42  
But James’s wasn’t completely silent on these issues. He does, in fact, suggest that the 
distinction between a philosophy of elite rationalism and a philosophy appropriate to everyday 
life can be understood as a distinction of class. During the composition of the second lecture of 
Varieties, James wrote to Frances R. Morse that “[t]he problem I have set myself is a hard one: 
first, to defend (against all the prejudices of my ‘class’) ‘experience’ against ‘philosophy’ as 
being the real backbone of the world’s religious life” (LWJ, 2 127). Here, James clearly sides 
with non-academics in legitimating the particulars of “experience,” whereas “philosophy” 
(presumably the elite version separate from lived experience) belongs to the “vicious 
intellectual[s]” (PU 60). The radical empiricism bolstering the pragmatic method is a philosophy 
for the people. Not only that, James’s writing style, drawing as it does from well-known 
literature and personal anecdotes and distrustful of esoteric philosophical jargon, is a style 
                                                             
42 It’s probably no surprise that Rorty makes this argument in his chapter on “Feminism and Pragmatism,” 
and his commentary on the feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon’s point that normalized 
inequality of women is overcome when we listen to “what women as women would have to say.” See 
Truth and Progress: “injustices may not be perceived as injustices, even by those who suffer them, until 
somebody invents a previously unplayed role. Only if somebody has a dream, and a voice to describe that 
dream, does what looked like nature begin to look like culture, what looked like fate begin to look like a 
moral abomination. For until then only the language of the oppressor is available, and most oppressors 
have had the wit to teach the oppressed a language in which the oppressed will sound crazy - even to 
themselves - if they describe themselves as oppressed” (202-3). Emancipation politics depend on 
compelling arguments to disabuse the “naturalness” of oppression. However, the caveat needs to be 
addressed that, while Rorty does side with MacKinnon and other feminists to some extent, he doesn’t go 
so far as claiming emancipation politics are goods in the hard realist sense: “I hope that feminists will 
continue to consider the possibility of dropping realism and universalism, dropping the notion that the 
subordination of women is intrinsically abominable, dropping the claim that there is something called 
‘right’ or ‘justice’ or ‘humanity’ that has always been on their side, making their claims true” (210). 
Rorty’s point is that feminists’ claims to a universal or intrinsic humanity risk repeating the essentialist 





accessible to a broad audience. It certainly makes his mammoth 1100+ page Principles of 
Psychology more readable than tomes of comparable bulk.   
James, along with many of the classical pragmatists, had a complex relationship with the 
cultural issues that today we find so urgent. I don’t excuse James or any of the figures I examine 
for what seem like objectionable views. But neither do I denounce them. As Rorty put it, “[w]e 
have to stop talking about the need to go from distorted to undistorted perception of moral 
reality, and instead talk about the need to modify our practices so as to take account of new 
descriptions of what has been going on” (Truth and Progress 206). A faithful account tells us far 
more than measuring the past for its “truth” or “goodness.” I don’t pose this history of pragmatic 
attitudes against any moral backdrop, any monolithic surround of rightness or wrongness 
approximated more or less by the claims of a given generation. What I think is more important is 
appreciating these figures for the ways they sought to tackle problems specific to their own 
complex moments. 
James existed before cultural studies departments, before it became customary to see 
experience as inseparable from the race, gender, or class of the experiencer. Dewey was a little 
more explicit about why he didn’t talk about it; A Common Faith, for example, was intended to 
identify the “elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race” (87). 
If the separating out of experience from cultural categories is a blind spot on the part of classical 
pragmatism, it’s incidental to its epistemological project, to get down to the substrate of 
experience, beyond the explanatory categories that gave experience communicable coherence, 
yes, but such categories that also threatened to distort its pure, empirical validity. Of course, the 
obvious tension here is the one Charles Taylor points out in James’s stress on preconceptual 
experience, that “one might make the more radical...point, that the very idea of an experience 
that is in no way formulated is impossible” (26), that experience and interpretation of the 
experience are operations so proximate that any distinction urged between them is meaningless.43 
That may be the case, but James’s concern - along with pragmatists in general - isn’t that people 
aren’t having pure experiences, but that the categorization of those experiences become, almost 
                                                             
43 The extent to which direct experience is preconceptual and what possible evidential value that 
preconceptual state could proffer is one of the most well-known debates in criticism about James. See 
Slater’s Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion for a lucid synopsis of the major figures in this 









Summary of Chapters 
 
In chapter one, I begin with the colonial theologian Jonathan Edwards, arguing that his adoption 
of pragmatic attitudes provides American evangelical theology with a logic for justifying 
religious experience based on its effects, putting him in direct conversation with later revivalists 
and Jamesian pragmatism. As such, this chapter’s thesis challenges Cornel West’s claim “that 
Emerson is the appropriate starting point for the pragmatist tradition” (6). Rather than focusing 
on his staggeringly voluminous “sermon mill,” as Wilson H. Kimnach memorably put it, I give 
more space to Edwards’s defense of the types of religious experience he encountered during the 
revivals of the Great Awakening as well as his less-read late theology. In works such as 
Religious Affections and the posthumously published Two Dissertations, Edwards retools 
Lockean sensory psychology and Calvinist orthodoxy to legitimate a model of experience and 
action that enabled believers’ interactive commerce with God. My claim isn’t that Edwards is a 
pragmatist, but that, in his attempt to wrest human experience away from the limitations of 
Lockean psychology and Calvinist determinism, he found himself making pragmatic moves. The 
elements of Edwards’s theology I highlight will provide a convenient origin point for tracking 
these pragmatic attitudes through nineteenth century evangelicalism to the Social Gospel 
movement.  
Chapter two brings the discussion to antebellum revivalism, focusing on the ministry of 
Charles Grandison Finney. In almost all histories of American pragmatism, this space would 
normally be filled by Emerson, whose inheritance from Edwards and legacy for James has been 
extensively written on. I don’t challenge that genealogy; rather, I make the case for Finney’s 
inclusion in it. I find useful William G. McLoughlin’s still-relevant assessment of Finney, in his 
introduction to the latter’s Lectures on Revivals: “[h]e believed...that a Christian nation must be 





this respect it might justly be claimed that he was more truly a spokesman of his age than any of 
the religious liberals or churchly Whigs who have commonly been granted that role” (vii).44 To 
my mind, Finney embodies a distinctively pragmatic form of revivalism drawn from Edwards, 
but also from the intellectual climate of antebellum America - a climate that was becoming 
increasingly impatient of philosophical verbiage at the expense of immediate action and practical 
consequences of speculative claims.  
Chapter three puts William James front and center, examining the extent to which 
religious movements in his proximity - specifically Swedenborgianism, Unitarianism, and Mind 
Cure - reflected pragmatic logics. As Ann Taves writes, “[i]n his effort to mediate between 
religion and psychology, James shared much with new religious movements, such as 
Spiritualism, Theosophy, and, especially New Thought” (272). Two figures will stand out as 
exemplary in the shift I want to explore: Emanuel Swedenborg and James’s father, Henry James, 
Sr, a largely understudied figure in American intellectual history. This chapter makes the case 
that there are clear threads between the theology of Swedenborg - which Henry James, Sr 
thoroughly absorbed - and William’s budding pragmatic philosophy.  
 In chapter four, I examine the pragmatic attitudes of the postbellum Social Gospel 
movement, a transatlantic phenomenon whose proximity to Jamesian pragmatism - and not least 
that of Peirce and Dewey - gives us perhaps the clearest picture of the relationship between 
pragmatism and the postmillennialism that largely defined many aspects of evangelical culture. 
In my view, the interdenominational movement - relatively underexplored outside of religious 
studies and histories of American religion - exerted tremendous influence on many aspects of 
American culture into the twentieth century, and it did so by adopting a self-consciously 
pragmatized Christianity. The question driving chapter four will ask: what if we were to think of 
Jamesian pragmatism not as a phenomenon separate from nineteenth century evangelicalism, but 
as a branch of the postmillennial spirit that so captivated Social Gospel audiences?  
                                                             
44 McLoughlin wasn’t the only scholar who thought so. Mark Noll alleged - and I’m inclined to agree 
with him - that “a good case can be made that Finney exerted a more significant influence on American 
life, and certainly on American religion,” than figures like Emerson, Daniel Webster, Horace Mann, and 





 As I elaborate in the epilogue, this dissertation is more broadly an exploration of what I 
take to be the permeable boundary between the sacred and the secular. What scholars have 
referred to as the secularization thesis has seen a good amount of criticism over the past few 
decades, and to my understanding, there is still some distance to travel.45 Beginning with a 
rejection of the rigid sacred/secular binary, the epilogue looks at some of the ways the category 
“secular” not only fails to explain non- or anti-religious aspects of American culture, but, once 
spoken, its polysemantic nature tends to produce more confusion and caricature of just what the 
person using it means. The epilogue will also discuss the fate and lingering implications of some 
of the key ideas and attitudes I will track in this dissertation.  
 The story I will tell is about pragmatic attitudes in American Protestant evangelical 
theology and practice from Edwards to the Social Gospel. In broad strokes, we will see the 
mobilization of these attitudes as defenses against the delegitimation of certain kinds of religious 
experiences, up until the Social Gospel movement, when theologians began invoking 
pragmatism by name and using strategies familiar to Edwards, Finney, and Henry James Sr. 
“American theology after James...began to take science seriously, to test ideas according to 
pragmatism, to appeal to experience, to develop an empirical methodology, to accept a degree of 
risk and tentativeness in their beliefs, to stress the importance of the individual, and to call upon 
some consensus of the community of leaders in formulating a theology” (14), said Crump Miller. 
All of this is true, except that “American theology” - by which I take Miller to intend a liberal 
Protestant, evangelical theology - didn’t have to wait for James to arrive. As we’ll see, each one 
of these theological shifts was operative in some degree from the period between Edwards and 
the Social Gospel.   
 
                                                             
45 The sociologist Steve Bruce, a proponent of the secularization thesis, argues that “modernization 
generates secularization except where religion finds or retains work to do other than relating individuals 
to the supernatural” (62). Intrinsically, then, religion’s work is supernatural. Other sociologists like Peter 
Berger have called for a complete abandonment of the term secularization, replacing it with what he calls 
a “new paradigm...with two pluralisms - the co-existence of different religions and the co-existence of 
religious and secular discourses” (ix). While Bruce has a nuanced understanding of secularity - one that 
doesn’t reduce it to simply mean “not religious” - Berger’s “two pluralisms” paradigm is sensitive to the 
complexities of coexisting and ambiguously compatible discourses while avoiding the internal 










The Pragmatic Attitudes of Jonathan Edwards and Colonial Revivalism 
 
 
Introduction – Edwards Scholarship Through the Twentieth Century 
 
 
[W]hen William James reverted to ‘the good Locke’ in order to rescue the empirical method from the 
Spencerian charnel house and attempted to restate the psychological relation of subject and object in 
terms that would discount a whole century of preoccupation with the thing-in-itself, he was unwittingly 
resuming where Edwards had been forced to leave off.  
Perry Miller, “Jonathan Edwards on the Sense of the Heart” (124-5) 
 
 
Perry Miller, the historian perhaps most associated with Edwards scholarship in the twentieth 
century, saw Edwards and James participating in the same intellectual endeavor - to “discount” 
the philosophical “preoccupation with the thing-in-itself.” No stranger to a variety of fields of 
philosophical inquiry since Kant, the thing-in-itself - a concept referring to the ideal, transhuman 
ultimate “being” of a thing independent of human interaction or observation – came under 
scrutiny in American philosophy. The question for James, as it was for Edwards, seemed to be: 
of what use was a concept whose very nature was beyond human apprehension? Miller wasn’t 
wrong to put Edwards and James on the same philosophical team. This humanistic approach to 





essay, which in no small way helped establish the intellectual genealogy between Edwards and 
James, gives us a view of where we begin and where we’re going, as this chapter will explore.46   
Miller wasn’t the only one who saw Edwards as patient zero of Jamesian thought. In 
1939 Paul Anderson and Max Fisch described what H.S. Thayer simply referred to as Edwards’s 
“latent pragmatisms” (6).47 William Dean, writing in 1982, in language clearly echoing Miller’s, 
felt that James had unconsciously channeled the Edwardsean spirit: “[radical empiricism] was in 
large part an unwitting resumption of Edwards’ own epistemology” (115).48 The historian 
William A. Clebsch wrote that the philosophical concerns shared by Edwards and James made 
them “eponyms of American religious thought and experience” (4), while San Hyun Lee drew a 
connection between Edwards’s “dispositional ontology” and the ways Peirce and James 
conceived of habitual behavior as constitutive of identity.49 Gregory Jackson observed that it was 
                                                             
46 While Miller’s pivotal role in Edwards scholarship is virtually undisputed, his assessments of certain 
areas of Edwards’s thought are not. Conrad Cherry’s 1966 intervention The Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards: A Reappraisal, for example, rued the fact that “Miller frequently minimizes themes of Calvinist 
thought which were at the forefront of Edwards’ reflective concerns” (3). Unconvinced by Miller’s 
insistence that Edwards was a Lockean empiricist, Paul Helm argued that Miller’s view was “an 
exaggeration of Locke’s acknowledged influence over Edwards” (54). James Hoopes - more forceful than 
most - saw Miller’s interpretation of Edwards’s intellectual context as not just “oversimplified,” but 
“grossly inaccurate” (850). Like these scholars, I understand Edwards’s theistic beliefs to be inseparable 
from other aspects of his thinking.  
47 Anderson and Fisch make much of Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin’s respective departures 
from Calvinism. See 74-81 and 124-29. Edwards considered himself a Calvinist, but with certain 
reservations: “I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a Calvinist, for distinction’s sake: though I 
utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and 
taught them; and cannot justly be charged with believing in every thing just as he taught” (Freedom 13).  
48 There are reasons to agree with William Dean’s claim here. Edwards does try to revise classical 
empiricism in order to tackle epistemological problems surrounding religious experience, though a more 
thoroughgoing examination of that connection is beyond the scope of this chapter. I’m inclined, however, 
to agree with James’s student and early biographer Ralph Barton Perry, who, in his preface to James’s 
Essays in Radical Empiricism (quoting James’s own words no less), observed how pragmatism and 
radical empiricism shared a common epistemology: “if pragmatism be defined as the assertion that ‘the 
meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future 
practical experience,...the point lying in the fact that the experience must be particular rather than in the 
fact that it must be active’…; then pragmatism and [radical empiricism] come to the same thing.” (xxi-ii).  
49 “Dispositional ontology” is Lee’s phrase for the philosophical system Edwards develops as a means of 
getting away from classical theism, the doctrine of God’s immutability and remoteness from Creation. 
According to Lee, “Edwards departed from the traditional Western metaphysics of substance and form 





Edwards’s “reconfiguration of Lockean epistemology” that “[reappeared]...in William James’s 
defense of the pragmatism of faith” (69). Joan Richardson tied Edwards to William James via a 
series of stylistic turns in the American confrontation with an infinitely variable natural world.50 
Andrea Knutson traced how the Puritan conversion process “established the epistemological 
contours” (4) of what she refers to as “conductive imaginaries” from Edwards to James.51 Most 
recently – though emphasizing less James than Charles Peirce – Ryan White explores a similar 
trajectory concerning these figures’ interest in psychology.52 Despite what must seem like a 
crowded field of scholars who can at times take Edwards as the undisputed progenitor of a 
variety of American intellectual traditions, my aim in this chapter is to manifest some of these 
“latent pragmatisms” in Edwards’s theology and considerations of what counts as true religious 
experience.53  
                                                             
forces and habits. Dispositions and habits, conceived as active and ontologically abiding principles, now 
play the role substance and form used to fulfill” (4). See also Lee’s Ch. 2.  
50 Richardson’s argument deals more heavily with Edwards’s reading of Newton, especially his Opticks 
(1704), than mine, which focuses largely on Edwards’s theological writings. But she is right, I think, to 
indicate the ways Edwards’s sense of natural variability and his sense of individual conversion were 
catalysts for an epistemology not unlike that bolstering James’s pragmatism and radical empiricism: 
“[a]stutely aware and respectful of the infinite variety of natural forms, including minds, Edwards 
understood that true conversion could only be an individual, idiosyncratic experience, dependent, like the 
myriad varieties, shades, hues and tones of color perceived, on the accidental composition of each being. 
His was, in other words, a naturalized version of election” (25).   
51 Knutson defines a “conductive imaginary” as “a conscious space organized, or that self-organizes, 
around the dynamics and tensions between emergent and stored up truth, uncertainty and certainty, and 
perception and objects perceived.” These conductive imaginaries are, in Knutson’s view, essentially the 
engines of perceptive power, drawn from the Puritan ordo salutis (“order of salvation”), in Edwards’s 
“sense of the heart,” Emerson’s “transparent eyeball,” and James’s “uncertain universe,” that express the 
“advancing spirit” in American religious and philosophical culture (3-4). 
52 In The Hidden God, White links Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce to a tradition characteristic of 
modernity, “that a paradoxical incorporation of the negative, hidden, or excluded side of the distinction” 
(8) between the revealed and the hidden God is what “modernity must evade in order to posit the 
necessity of its own claims to knowledge in the absence of divine guarantees” (3). 
53 Not that I believe situating Edwards at the helm of these traditions is unwarranted. But it’s also worth 
pointing out the sources of Edwards’s own thought. Locke, Berkeley, and the Cambridge Platonists are 
usually the most cited. See Holifield (102-26) for a useful review of the complex and largely European 





The goal in doing so isn’t to nominate Edwards as a pragmatist.54 Instead, I want to look 
closely at certain of his reinterpretations of Enlightenment psychology and Calvinist theology 
that lead him to conclusions that introduce into evangelicalism a series of pragmatic logics, 
logics whose reemergence in various contexts throughout nineteenth century American 
intellectual and evangelical cultures give rise to what will become Jamesian pragmatism. In this 
way, I join other scholars like Conrad Cherry, Sang Hyun Lee, Douglas A. Sweeney, and more 
recently Amy Plantinga Pauw in reappraising Edwards’s theology for its role in the shaping of 
evangelical thought in America.55 Doing so will not only illuminate this theology’s intellectual 
connections to pragmatism, but – more to the broader purposes of this dissertation – help to 
reinstate the role of religion within a putatively secular history. Edwards’s writings on the nature 
of God, the experiential dimensions of spiritual conversion, and his radical reinterpretation of the 
relationship between action and being are the primary – and to my mind underexplored – threads 
that will occupy this chapter.  
 
 
The Reconciliation of Science and Religion 
 
In addition to their preoccupation with calling the thing-in-itself to practical account, a key 
thread linking Edwards to James is the effort to reconcile scientific and religious modes of 
experiencing the world. As did many of his day, Edwards followed close on the heels of Newton, 
                                                             
54 Though my interest here is to identify Edwards’s pragmatic attitudes, it would be misleading to call 
Edwards a pragmatist. In his day, “pragmatic” still held onto its pejorative connotations of officious 
meddling and an excessive worldliness that could, in fact, endanger one’s chances at salvation 
(“pragmatic”). A copy of a letter sent by “an association of ministers” to Edwards concerning how best to 
promote religion warns against “pragmatical, factious spirits, fomenting division” (Letters 280).  
55 Amy Plantinga Pauw’s The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards 
(2002) argues that “in [Edwards’s] trinitarian thought the various facets of his life and genius – his 
philosophical explorations, his vital interest in discerning true religious affections, his critical 
appropriation of the Reformed tradition, and the affective, mystical element in his faith – moved toward 
harmonious resolution” (3). For the shaping of an antebellum theological culture shaped largely by 
reinterpretations of Edwards, see Sweeney’s Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology, and the Legacy of 





but also William Whiston, a strenuous advocate for what James E. Force has called the 
“Newtonian rapprochement between science and religion” (2).56 To modern ears cued to the 
presumed incompatibility of scientific and religious epistemologies and accustomed to the 
specialization of professional disciplines, the endeavor to find the common thread linking 
disparate disciplines may sound counterintuitive.57 Exploring Edwards’s position at the nexus of 
what today we refer to separately as philosophy, theology, and science will help us see how his 
position as an intellectual broker incentivized the adoption of pragmatic attitudes in addressing 
theological disputes. By attempting to reconcile these seemingly disparate offices of thought, 
Edwards joined an intellectual movement centered on the irreducibility of experience and 
committed to the recovery of a unified world sundered by Cartesian dualism.  
 Consequences of suturing science to religion include viewing the natural world as a field 
in which material facts are seen not as isolated, atomistic phenomena, but as meaningful 
manifestations of underlying divine action. Read rightly, according to the dictates of Reason and 
Revelation, the natural world manifests or justifies divine truths, making them practically 
apprehensible by human actors. 58 Because Jamesian pragmatism justifies the abstract truths of 
concepts by their empirically verifiable effects, the existence of this attitude in early eighteenth 
century Edwardsean theology reminds us that such theology had a hand in the shaping of 
                                                             
56 Edwards’s absorption of Newtonian science is often cited in Edwards scholarship. Less noticed, though, 
is Edwards’s research on Newton’s student and successor to Cambridge’s Lucasian Chair of Mathematics, 
William Whiston. An inspection of Edwards’s reading lists at Beinecke Rare Books and Manuscript 
Library reveal that the eighteenth century divine had read Whiston at about the same frequency as he did 
Newton (“Reading List”). See also Wallace E. Anderson’s introduction to Edwards’s Scientific and 
Philosophical Writings (19).  
57 Considering the word “Newtonian” tends to call up images of a mechanical universe driven by 
inexorable laws, it seems surprising to some to learn of Newton’s theism. Locke, too, is known more for 
his innovations in philosophy than for his Christian faith, two poles of his thought whose questionable 
compatibility resulted in his attempt to reconcile them in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). 
Another figure known less for his interest in the natural sciences than for his uncompromising Puritanism, 
Cotton Mather sought a similar reconciliation in The Christian Philosopher (1720).   
58 That James himself thought pragmatism could also be called naturalism is telling. In yet another place 
where he pits pragmatism against rationalism (this time critiquing the English Hegelian F.H. Bradley), 
James writes, “Mr. Bradley...turns his back on finite experience forever. Truth must lie in the opposite 
direction, the direction of the Absolute; and this kind of rationalism and naturalism, or (as I will now call 
it) pragmatism, walk thenceforward upon opposite paths” (ERE 99-100). My aim here isn’t to make the 
dubious claim that pragmatism and revelatory naturalism are in reality identical, but only to note that they 





American intellectual culture. I am interested in looking at Edwards via Jamesian pragmatism for 
just this reason: his rejection of the idea that some ultimate reality lies “behind” the observable 
universe and which is essentially distinct from human apprehension leads him, like Newton, to 
view force (his word was “habit” or “tendency”) as meaningful only in relation to matter, and 
which is of a piece with his incredulity toward rational absolutes and things-in-themselves. As 
we’ll see when we consider the pragmatic logic of his theory of atoms, Edwards confined the 
significance of a force to its manifestation in experience. 
Arbitrating between science and religion demands that one rethink what counts as 
legitimate evidence. Paul’s epistemological dictum that “we walk by faith, not by sight” (KJV 2 
Cor. 5:7) doesn’t also mean that one walks without evidence. To the problem of how sincere 
faith was related to experience, James suggested an answer. At a time when atheism became a 
social possibility, James appreciated the evidentiary possibilities for believers: “the active faiths 
of individuals in [religious hypotheses], are the experimental tests by which they are verified, 
and the only means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought out” (WB xii). 
Experimental (i.e., experienceable) evidence can be made hospitable to the evidence of faith. 
Beliefs being rules for action, according to Peirce, James cited action in the “objective” world as 
the best evidence we have to garner the “truth” of our condition.59 A guiding belief for both 
Edwards and James is that belief compels us to act, that belief can be pragmatically justified by 
those actions. “[W]e may undoubtedly infer,” Edwards professed, “that mens works...are the 
highest evidences by which they ought to try themselves” (RA 410). Here, as elsewhere, Edwards 
makes practice itself constitutive of being; how a thing behaves is the best test of what a thing is, 
a conclusion that is the result of reconciling different modes of epistemological inquiry.60 This 
                                                             
59 In “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce writes that what “distinguishes doubt from belief...is a practical 
difference. Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions” (9-10), an idea whose origin he was quite 
transparent about. Depicting a meeting of the Metaphysical Club, Peirce relates that one of the members, 
the lawyer and “disciple of Jeremy Bentham,” Nicolas St. Green, “often urged the importance of applying 
[Alexander] Bain’s definition of belief, as ‘that upon which a man is prepared to act.’ From this 
definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him as the 
grandfather of pragmatism” (CP 5:12). See also Max H. Fisch’s “Alexander Bain and the Genealogy of 
Pragmatism” (413).   
60 The question of how to certify inner grace occupied Edwards’s grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, whose 
influence shows in his sermon The Tryal of Assurance (1698): “[i]f there be no act of grace, there is no 
sincerity; therefore if he sees no act of grace, he sees no sincerity; when there is no act of grace, there is 





relaying the claims of various disciplines to the substrate of experience is the primary logic by 
which Edwards and James sought to harmonize the various faculties of human knowledge. And 
while the question of salvation certainly meant different things for Edwards and James, they 
pursued their destination using remarkably similar paths. “[P]ragmatism,” James says, “may be 
be a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking with the more religious demands of human 
beings” (Pragmatism 33), but pragmatism’s relay through experience could also be applied to 
fields beyond empiricism and religion. 
On its surface, the conjunction between the anti-rationalism of pragmatism and religion 
would seem counterintuitive, considering the latter’s historical allegiance to theological 
absolutes and predetermined eschatologies. This apparent incompatibility though is disarmed by 
Protestantism’s authorization of individual experience over and against institutional and 
dogmatic means of salvation. Respect for the possibilities of human experience is the diplomatic 
link between ostensibly irreconcilable systems. As James put it in a letter to his friend Thomas 
Davidson, “I sometimes find myself wondering whether there can be any popular religion raised 
on the ruins of the old Christianity without the presence of that element which in the past has 
presided over the origin of all religions, namely, a belief in new physical facts and possibilities” 
(LWJ, 1 236). To James’s mind, popular religion in its origin is conducive to an empiricism that 
respects “facts and possibilities” pursued independently of the dogmas of “the old Christianity.” 
The effort, then, to reconcile separate domains of thought – science, nature, the material world; 
and human faith – lead both Edwards and James to their common epistemological denominator: 
the field of direct experience in all its variability and possibility. Idiosyncratic religious 
experiences, the practical effects of heterodox belief, the potential for new truths to reshape a 
past conversion – to name a few – become epistemologically valid. This is not to ignore the clear 
historical differences between Edwards and James, but exploring this denominator highlights the 
ways in which Jamesian pragmatism and the evangelicalism tradition I am scrutinizing should 
not be seen as entirely distinct.  
 
                                                             
the human soul: “all grace leads to practice” (EW 294). The genuine meaning of grace - God’s active 






James’s on the Will and Edwards’s “Sense of the Heart” as Intuitive Experience 
 
God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind 
immediately from the fountain of light. 
    John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (533).  
 
One interpretation of how the concept of experience developed in America is deceptively simple: 
the Puritans simply carried Baconian empiricism over the Atlantic.61 But the experience with 
which Jamesian pragmatism concerns itself is a far cry from that which provides the empirical 
data for Baconian science. For one, the radical empiricism informing pragmatism accepts a much 
wider view of experience than science. And while both science and pragmatism stress 
empirically verifiable effects, science does so in order to make more refined predictions, whereas 
pragmatism would consider such predictions forever in a state of revisability according to 
shifting contexts. Pragmatism, too, has room for highly individualized or faith-based accounts of 
reality – visions of the afterlife, for example – that make practical differences in the lives of 
believers, whereas the same cannot be said for scientific validation that rests on the repeatability 
of experimental phenomena. In Baconian science, experience is commensurate with the five 
senses, while rejecting the overemphasis on syllogistic logic.62 But James’s exponential 
                                                             
61 This is true, in part. But as Sarah Rivett has shown, the sense-based epistemology of Bacon encountered 
challenges of its own on the American strand, specifically in the process of disclosing the validity of 
conversion experiences of colonists (see Science of the Soul, Ch. 1, especially 40-4).  
62 In Novum Organum (1620), Bacon established the epistemological groundwork for what would come to 
be the scientific method: “[o]ur method...consists in determining the degrees of certainty, while we, as it 
were, restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject that operation of the mind which follows 
close upon the senses, and open and establish a new and certain course for the mind from the first actual 
perceptions of the senses themselves” (6). James hoped to radicalize this empiricism, greatly widening the 
field of what counted as experience, even beyond the five senses. “To be radical,” James declares, “an 
empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor 





amplification of the field of experience argues that the possible repository of experiences 
confirmed by the senses or individual faith does not exhaust our notion of reality.63 
 James recognized the distinction between the criteria of scientific empiricism and those 
of the supernatural claims of religious experience. The latter don’t necessarily conform to the 
former. In many Protestant denominations, for example, authenticity of devotion is linked to its 
privacy. “[L]et us never forget,” Rev. James Bennett said in his 1818 tract Religion of the Closet, 
“that the secret devotion of the closet is so essential to the life of our public services, that without 
it the most specious appearances are but splendid hypocrisy” (1). Hence, the most important 
religious experiences are not necessarily subject to corroboration, unrepeatable outside of 
individual reportage and secondhand accounts. The fact that “[t]rue religion disposes persons to 
be much alone in solitary places,” as Edwards puts it, tends to instantly marginalize religious 
experiences as being exempt from verification by consensus, a hallmark of scientific empiricism. 
This separation between the scientific and the religious/metaphysical would have satisfied 
Chauncy Wright, James’s intellectual confrère and fellow member of the Metaphysical Club. For 
Chauncy,  
 
the whole nature of the modern civilized man includes both these opposing 
tendencies in speculation, the metaphysical and scientific…. A conflict between 
them arises, however, only where either disposition invades the proper province 
of the other. (249)  
 
In response to this epistemic segregation, James posits a “system that will combine...the 
scientific loyalty to facts…, but also the old confidence in human values and the resultant 
spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type” (Pragmatism 12).64 The emergence 
of pragmatism in the postbellum moment is an indication that the longstanding nineteenth 
                                                             
63 This is why Michael Slater (in agreement with Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam) calls James a 
metaphysical realist (659). See also James’s Meaning of Truth (190-97). I return to the Jamesian account 
of reality and its connection to the Social Gospel movement in chapter four.  
64 Not that James wasn’t influenced by Chauncey in powerful ways. In a still relevant examination of 
Chauncey’s contribution to the founding of pragmatism, Edward Madden notes the ways in which 





century conflict between scientific empiricism and the claims of religious experience had come 
to an insurmountable head.  
Another problem that arose for James was one that concerned Edwards: the segregation 
of the senses themselves. A hallmark of Enlightenment psychology argued that faculties existed 
in discrete forms with their own particular functions, linked in a unidirectional and rational chain 
of causality.65 In his examination of the affections’ role in religious experience, however, 
Edwards refuses to accept this interpretation at face value: 
 
[t]he will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not 
essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the 
will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of 
exercise. (RA 17)66 
 
What distinguishes a faculty from others is its particular “liveliness and sensibleness of 
exercise,” its sensorially felt function in experience. The only warrant we have for distinguishing 
between faculties is with reference to the effects they produce, not in reference to an abstract 
psychological model imposed on experience and independent of human action. Belief is 
meaningful only with respect to how we act on it. 
 James too made affections central to how we understand the will. In his effort to move 
beyond the limitations of faculty psychology, James understands humanity’s “willing nature” as 
fundamentally entangled with our “passional nature:”  
                                                             
65 As James points out in Talks to Teachers (1892), “Locke introduced this theory in a somewhat vague 
form. Simple ‘ideas’ of sensation and reflection, as he called them, were for him the bricks of which our 
mental architecture is built up” (31). Rightly or wrongly interpreted, Locke’s sensory psychology was one 
of James’s obstacles in his attempt to formulate a system of how direct experience works - not by discrete 
mental entities, but by an irreducible substrate of “pure experience” to which we apply the categories of 
will, reason, etc.  
66 Edwards’s use of the key term “affection” can be easily misunderstood, as “affect” ranges variously 
from deeply rooted feeling to the mere performance of such, from a fondness of a thing to the sensory 
impressions of that thing upon the mind. McClymond and McDermott gloss Edwardsean affections as 
“the source and motivating power of thoughts and feelings” (32), without being the thoughts and feelings 
themselves. Instead, the affections “represent the fundamental disposition and inclination of the human 






When I say ‘willing nature,’ I do not mean only such deliberate volitions 
as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, - I 
mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, 
imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set. (WB 9) 
 
That James felt the need to clarify what he meant by “willing nature” indicates some of 
his audience were thinking of the mind in the terms of Enlightenment psychology, as a 
container for discrete mental faculties. What this means for pragmatism is that the 
practical distinctions of a conception must be felt distinctions, that the “deliberate 
volitions” that shape our conduct are inseparable from the affectional matrix. Exploring 
how James and Edwards understood the will as a faculty whose operation is entangled 
with feeling will illuminate the ways in which they represent the tradition I’m disclosing.  
What we are seeing – and what will become central to pragmatism later in the nineteenth 
century – is the assessment of human affections, not as the fallen sensorium irrevocably polluted 
by original sin, but as that which connects us to whatever it is we call divine, the chief conduit 
between the creature and the creator. A cornerstone of American revivalism, the valorization of 
the affections as a litmus test of true religion will also come to occupy a central place within 
pragmatic attitudes regarding religion; it’s the felt distinctions of a belief that make it significant 
and, for James, “true.” The way to God is through the heart of human believers. Though Edwards 
very nearly comes to the opinion of his revivalist descendants, he always remained committed to 
doctrines that sustained the insurmountable divide between human and divine natures, such as 
original sin and total depravity.67 But if recognizably Calvinist texts like Original Sin Defended 
and Freedom of the Will kept closed the door between the corporeal and divine, the material and 
                                                             
67 After exhaustively arguing against Arminian notions of a self-determining will in Freedom of the Will, 
Edwards makes sure to remind his readers that his argument has left intact the five pillars of Calvinist 
orthodoxy: total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, efficacious grace, and perseverance 
of the saints (282-87). While I’ve noted the similarities between Edwards and James on their rethinking of 
the human will, a crucial difference rests in Edwards’s insistence on necessity. The same cannot be said 
of James, for whom the will always involved an element of risk, and which scientific skepticism tended to 
enervate: “[t]o preach skepticism to us as a duty until ‘sufficient evidence’ for religion be found, is 
tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of 





spiritual, it was Edwards’s most enduring and influential text, Religious Affections, that left it 
unlocked. 
It did so by articulating a theory of direct experience Edwards called the “sense of the 
heart,” a concept that Perry Miller made much of and which has been a staple of debates in 
Edwards scholarship.68 In his 1734 sermon, A Divine and Supernatural Light, Edwards describes 
it like this: “a true sense of the divine excellency of things revealed in the Word of God,” 
contrasting it with “speculative or notional” knowledge (Smith 111). It is “a kind of intuitive and 
immediate evidence” (113) unobtainable by natural means yet “makes use of...human faculties” 
(114) by sanctifying the reason and clarifying judgment. Its central function is the purification of 
the understanding so that ideas flourish in their full reality unclouded by the fallen human 
sensorium: “that notion that there is a Christ, and that Christ is holy and gracious, is conveyed to 
the mind by the Word of God: but the sense of the excellency of Christ by reason of that holiness 
and grace, is nevertheless immediately the work of the Holy Spirit” (115). The Holy Spirit, then, 
operates as the affectional contact between divinity and human subjectivity. The sense of the 
heart vitalizes the rational architecture of the mind, providing an epistemologically valid form of 
knowledge linked directly to the affections.69 
The sense of the heart as an intuition is foremost a feeling of radical conviction. Rather 
than keeping separate the various faculties in their respective mental compartments, Edwards’s 
                                                             
68 For a concise history of the variety of theories surrounding the sense of the heart in Edwards 
scholarship, see McClymond, “Spiritual Perception” 195-97. 
69 And vitalize is the right word, since this intuitive power functions the same for James: 
What really exists is not things made but things in the making. Once made, they are dead, 
and an infinite number of alternative conceptual decompositions can be used in defining 
them. But put yourself in the making by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing and, 
the whole range of possible decompositions coming at once into your possession, you are 
no longer troubled with the question which of them is the more absolutely true. (PU 263-
64) 
By inserting oneself “in the making” of an ongoing, living, shifting reality, James argues, “a stroke of 
intuitive sympathy” will animate one’s senses so that the apprehension of truth will be possible. James 
doesn’t tell us how one should activate this intuition aside from putting oneself in the way of it. James’s 
language of decomposition and death to describe a purely rational world is one side of the antithesis; the 
phenomenon of intuition, whenever it comes, puts us in commerce with living realities and grants us what 






sense of the heart functions as the affectional space within which faculties likes the senses and 
the understanding are blended into an original singularity in which the elements of experience 
have yet to be differentiated into subject/object, idea/thing, creature/creator: 
 
I say, a sense of heart; for it is not speculation merely that is concerned in this 
kind of understanding; nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two 
faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately, in this 
matter. (215, my emphasis)   
 
We remember: “the will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections 
are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the 
will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise” 
(17). Edwards’s “sense of the heart,” then, functions as a form of intuition powerful 
enough to maintain the original homogeneity of faculties prior to their rational 
partitioning into specialized faculties. For saints elected by the Spirit for this spiritual 
sight – and it was most certainly the elect for whom this intuition was reserved – there is 
no difference between understanding and volition, as the sense of the heart overcomes 
any faculty imbalance by aligning human affections with will and, ultimately, aligning 
the human will with God’s to manifest one’s sanctified status in pious behavior.  
“Not speculation merely,” since the sense of the heart relies on intuitive perception rather 
than ratiocination. In other words, you can’t reason your way into a flash of intuition. The sense 
of the heart’s hyperacute spiritual discernment exceeds what reasoning is capable of: “[t]his holy 
relish is a thing that discerns and distinguishes between good and evil, between holy and unholy, 
without being at the trouble of a train of reasoning.” (RA 226). Breaking with the Enlightenment 
emphasis on the use of reason, Edwards’s sense of the heart carries the force of immediacy, of 
radical intuitive conviction superior to the philosophical tools with which Edwards and his 
fellow intellectuals were trained.70 The truth felt in an instant, intuitively and without the 
                                                             
70 As the epigraph to this section indicates, though Locke didn’t deny the possibility of immediate 
revelation to certain persons, he was deeply suspicious of it. His psychology accepted both reason and 
revelation as coimplicated modes by which we come to knowledge, but denounced “enthusiasm: which, 





deliberative effort of ratiocination is anterior to our attempts to systematize it. Thus, Edwards’s 
sense of the heart is an explicit attempt to provide an epistemological psychological model 
unhampered by the rigid empiricism of Enlightenment rationalism. In this way, James and 
Edwards, by seeking a way out of such rationalism, authorize intuitive perception as a means of 
garnering truth.     
The sense of the heart is also a contextualist and non-foundationalist perception, as David 
Jacobson has shown. According to Jacobson, Edwards’s “theory of affections adumbrates a 
pragmatic logic, which implicates the demands of reason and will in a broad theory of action” 
(384). In another example of his effort to revise the empiricism of the time, Edwards reconceives 
human psychology along pragmatic lines, linking the significance of affections to the 
contextualized conduct they produce. In opposition to Harold Bloom’s assertion that the 
“American difference” in western philosophy began with Emerson, Jacobson contends – as does 
this chapter – that this pragmatic difference “begins at least with Edwards, who already 
recognized the inadequacy of universals models of epistemology” (384).  
In his discussion of the new spiritual sense imparted to the saints by the Holy Spirit, 
Edwards is careful to distinguish between that sense and the “ordinary influences” (RA 139) 
specific to natural, i.e. unsanctified, men:  
 
so many...ways might be mentioned wherein the Spirit acts upon, assists, and 
moves natural principles; but after all, it is no more than nature moved, acted and 
improved; here is nothing supernatural and divine. But the Spirit of God in his 
spiritual influences on the hearts of his saints, operates by infusing or exercising 
new, divine, and supernatural principles; principles which are indeed a new and 
spiritual nature, and principles vastly more noble and excellent than all that is in 
natural men” (140). 
 
                                                             
revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded fancies of a man’s own brain, and assumes 
them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct” (532). Though Edwards tended to follow Locke 
closely, he sought the epistemological means by which conversion activated by immediate revelation and 





The insoluble uncertainty about what is truly supernatural and what is merely natural dogs 
Religious Affections. But because “it was never God’s design to give us any rules, by which we 
may certainly know who of our fellow professors are his” (123), what Edwards is describing is 
something for which there can be no conclusive evidence apart from grace-laden intuition and 
the actions it produces. This new spiritual principle exists in an epistemological limbo - 
unfalsifiable, but undismissable.71 Importantly, however, Edwards’s attempt to reconcile the 
Calvinist doctrine of election and the science of sensory psychology leads him to adopt 
pragmatic attitudes in order to approach a reasonable - yet never fully guaranteed - assurance of 
the state of one’s soul. 
 Unfalsifiable, undismissable, but definitely not a miracle. Edwards goes to a curious 
amount of effort to insist that “this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but 
it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same 
faculty of understanding” (RA 137-8). What difference it makes whether this “new spiritual 
sense” is a “new faculty” or a “new foundation” has to do with the convention in Reformed 
theology that God discontinued miraculous works after the apostolic age – or at least allowed 
them to continue in a highly qualified manner. But it has more specifically to do with Edwards’s 
assertion that the supernatural cannot be made manifest in a merely natural vessel: “God is 
pleased often to make use of men as instruments in working miracles. But when he makes use of 
intelligent voluntary agents in such an affair, he will use ‘em in a manner that is agreeable to 
their nature, not as senseless, lifeless instruments” (M 1150). Edwards doesn’t deny that miracles 
can take place, but he importantly makes them limited to the operations of the human sensorium 
already in place. Accentuating the natural part of supernatural and making the potency of a 
miracle commensurate with the Lockean conception of the mind as a “container” with limited 
sensory parameters, Edwards shows the extent to which he can imagine the reconciliation of 
faculty psychology with Christian theology.   
                                                             
71 There are strong parallels between the elusiveness of Edwards’s sense of the heart and James’s 
references in Varieties to the subliminal self, a concept he draws from Frederic W.H. Myers. “If the grace 
of God miraculously operates, it probably operates through the subliminal door” (270). Though its 
existence has been questioned in modern psychology, the subliminal region of the mind was an attempt, 
like Edwards’s, to explain experiences that seemed to exceed ordinary human consciousness. Both the 
sense of the heart and the subliminal self, both imperceptible to empiricism and knowable only by their 





 So in what way can a saint have a reasonable assurance of their election status? For 
Edwards, the answer to that question is simple: 
 
The strong and lively exercises of a spirit of childlike, evangelical, humble love to 
God, give clear evidence of the soul’s relation to God as his child, which does 
very greatly and directly satisfy the soul. (RA 178) 
 
Invested with a greater immunity to falsification, intense love is the primary conduit between the 
saint and the divine, and the “strong and lively exercises” vitalized by that love are the “clear 
evidence” of its truth. Note that in this claim - as well as throughout Religious Affections - 
Edwards says nothing about the intellect as a means to a union with God. While Richard 
Hofstadter was accurate to maintain that “[i]t is to certain peculiarities of American religious 
life...that American anti-intellectualism owes much of its strength and pervasiveness” (56), 
Edwards’s turn toward the affections wasn’t a populist revolt against intellectualism, but an 
argument that the intellect could not by itself serve as the primary conduit between human 
thought and the intuition that led to holiness. In this way, the anti-intellectualism that Hofstadter 
is right to see characteristic of American evangelical religion may have less to do with a 
perceived populist disdain of academic elites than with theological attempts to make personal 
conversion an affair of the heart.  
But Edwards then makes a further refinement to his theory of the affections’ relation to 
intuition: 
 
though it be far from being true, that the soul, in this case, judges only by an 
immediate witness, without any sign or evidence...yet in this case the saint stands 
in no need of multiplied signs, or any long reasoning upon them. And though the 
sight of his relative union with God, and his being in his favour, is not without a 
medium, because he sees it by that medium, viz., his love; yet his sight of the 
union of his heart to God is immediate. (178) 
  
Edwards has tossed aside “multiplied signs” and “long reasoning” in favor of an unmediated, 





shift that reemerges in his later writings and will become central to James’s epistemological 
project. Simplifying the formulation, that “the sight of his...union...is not without a medium…; 
yet his sight of the union of his heart to God is immediate,” exposes what sounds like a 
contradiction.72 The saint’s relation to God is both immediate, yet conducted by a medium 
(love). As it would be for popular evangelicalism, the heart is the locus of immediacy that puts 
the saint beyond intractable doubts indivisible from lukewarm affections and mere ratiocination: 
“[l]ove, the bond of union, is seen intuitively: the saint sees and feels plainly the union between 
his soul and God; it is so strong and lively that he can not doubt of it” (178). This is what Perry 
Miller referred to when he spoke of Edwards and James’s reconstitution of “the psychological 
relation of subject and object.” By situating love as the “bond of union,” a medium unmediated, 
Edwards provides an experience-based alternative to the subject/object distinction so problematic 
to efforts to get beyond Cartesian philosophy. 
But this Edwardsean conception of religious experience wasn’t accepted wholesale by 
either the clerical elite or lay believers; its claims to immediacy and productive uncertainty 
required justification. James too attempts to dismantle the dualism he felt had plagued western 
philosophy. In his reinterpretation of consciousness, James resolves the dualism of idea and thing 
with an empiricism more “verifiable and concrete:” 
 
The entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the dualism was 
fashioned by Locke when he made the word ‘idea’ stand indifferently for thing 
and thought, and by Berkeley when he said that what common sense means by 
realities is exactly what the philosopher means by ideas. Neither Locke nor 
Berkeley thought his truth out into perfect clearness, but it seems to me that the 
conception I am defending does little more than consistently carry out the 
‘pragmatic’ method which they were the first to use. (ERE 10-11) 
 
For James, Locke and Berkeley apparently unwittingly originated the pragmatic method when 
they saw no practical distinction between idea and thing, between realities and ideas. But James 
                                                             
72 I take Edwards’s tortuous syntax here as an effect of what James Lilley refers to as Edwards’s attempt 
to think a “possibility of a new mode of ‘imagining’” (32) that seeks to reconcile apparent disparities, 





did not have to look across the Atlantic. He identifies a linguistic ambivalence in Locke and 
Berkeley that, in fact, was a theological implication followed out by Edwards.73 
 Recently, Gregg Crane has argued that the “unseen thread” connecting James to Emerson 
was their shared understanding of the human capacity for intuition. While it’s unlikely James 
absorbed Edwards to the extent he did Emerson, I have tried to show how this interpretation of 
intuition also links James to Edwards.74 Edwards’s sense of the heart was an attempt to formulate 
a doctrine of direct experience that would enable a meaningful connection between God and 
humanity, exciting the potential for meaningful and vital action in the process. By orienting the 
extent of human knowledge within the field of direct, intuitive, and fundamentally variable 
human experience, emphasizing the practical effects of those experiences, Edwards’s sense of 
the heart as intuition turns the acquisition of truth in a recognizably pragmatic direction.  
 
 
Justifying Religious Experience and the Function of Uncertainty 
 
Religion...shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far 
as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. Since the 
relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which 
we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily grow.  
James, Varieties of Religious Experience (31) 
 
                                                             
73 Both Locke and Berkeley, incidentally, were avid readers of William Whiston’s scientific works. See 
Force, Ch. 1.  
74 As Crane notes, James’s voluminous marginalia of Emerson’s works reveals that “James’s sympathy 
for intuition...turns out to be the key for opening up the Emerson-James relation” (66), as both attempted 
to address “the problem of modernity - the problem of locating a source of value that is both of the self 
and beyond the self” (69). James did, in fact, copy out a large portion of Edwards’s Original Sin 
Defended, and puzzled over the possibility of justice for people’s de facto moral condemnation 





What is striking in James’s highly diplomatic definition of religion is its indebtedness to what 
some have identified as a Protestant understanding of religion. Protestant, because James’s 
definition treats religious institutions as secondary to the personal and immediate experience of 
one’s spirituality. Protestant, especially, because a salient feature of this experience is its 
individualist nature. It’s clear that James has in mind the religious experiences found in 
conversion narratives such as John Bunyan’s Grace Abounding (1666) and Edwards’s Life of 
David Brainerd (1749) – no less because the Quaker George Fox is James’s ur-convert 
throughout Varieties – in which the spiritual journey to grace is a deeply personal endeavor 
tailored to individuals’ salvation.75  
James’s understanding of religion is also uncannily Edwardsean. The central thesis of 
Edwards’s Religious Affections argues that “true religion lies very much in religious affections” 
(51), adding that “[t]rue religion disposes persons to be much alone in solitary places, for holy 
meditation and prayer” (332). One longstanding feature of evangelical experience in America is 
its intensely individualistic nature, a legacy of Edwardsean revivalism that respects the infinite 
variety of personal experiences while citing those experiences as potential justifiers for a sincere 
state of grace. “Experience plainly shows,” Edwards writes, “that God’s Spirit is unsearchable 
and untraceable, in some of the best of Christians, in the method of his operations, in their 
conversion” (90). While in practice, Protestant religion does take a powerfully social character - 
in the form of meetinghouse prayer, election sermons, and feast days - the beginning of one’s 
conviction, the originary moment when one “gets religion,” is understood to occur on a one-to-
one basis between the potential convert and the divine, whose access to the convert consists, 
importantly, in purposive affections. 
Purposive, because feeling unmanifested in action carries no genuine meaning. In 
Varieties, James suggests that “if you wish to grasp [religion’s] essence, you must look to the 
feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. It is between these two elements 
that the short circuit exists on which she carries on her principal business” (504). This connection 
between vitality and conduct was critical for Edwards: “[t]rue grace is not an unactive thing; 
                                                             
75 James’s uncompromising individualism has been noted by commentators such as John J. McDermott 
and James O. Pawelski. Pawelski, especially, has scrutinized James’s “dynamic individualism” across the 
philosopher’s career, analyzing how he treats individuals in “social,” “psychological,” and “metaphysical 





there is nothing in heaven or earth of a more active nature; for it is life itself, and the most active 
kind of life…. [...] Godliness in the heart has a direct relation to practice” (RA 359). That relation 
for Edwards consisted in action and conduct as the best justifiers of salvific grace. Edwards’s 
contribution to American Protestantism, as William Clebsch recognized, “turned the attention of 
Americans to the outward manifestation, the sensibility, the palpability of religious experience in 
concrete human lives” (20).  
In Religious Affections, Edwards is not only out to determine what a distinguishing mark 
of conversion is, but to make the affections the key feature of conversion experiences. In this 
scheme, any distinction between things and thoughts becomes less important than the sensible 
effects they generate: 
 
[w]hen the mind is sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that 
implies a sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it: 
and this sensibleness of the amiableness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the 
very nature of it the sense of the heart. (215) 
 
It is entirely possible Edwards had read the same passages that led James to conclude Locke left 
ambivalent the difference between idea and thing. That the sense of the heart could be activated 
by either idea or thing, as Edwards thinks it can, casts any distinction between them as 
insignificant considering the certainty garnered by newfound spiritual perception. What is 
ultimately valuable, as he put it in “The Mind,” is the “sensibleness” which prepares the 
individual convert to receive spiritual truths. Edwards’s logic for this is quite simple: “[t]he truth 
that is in a mind must be, as to its object, and everything pertaining to it, in that mind; for what is 
perfectly without the mind, the mind has nothing to do with” (SPW 340). 
Yet perhaps not so simple. Edwards’s assertion that “what is perfectly without the mind, 
the mind has nothing to do with” isn’t quite a defense of subjectivism. Edwards doesn’t deny the 
possible existence of an out-there that exceeds our sensory apparatus, only that our apparatus - 
fallen as it is – has no practical commerce with it. All that we can know of “what we call ‘truth’” 
(340) are the relations between ideas that come to us in experience, and only in experience. This 





evidential capacities of experience and history.76 Far from banishing the potential reality of 
extra-sensory concepts, he merely suggests that their practical utility in reference to our minds is 
not immediately justified. Whatever “truth” they can have for us, in other words, carries a 
pragmatic tentativeness.  
To accept experience as such isn’t the same as accepting experience tout court as self-
authorizing. On the contrary. The bulk of the 400+ pages of Religious Affections is occupied with 
what doesn’t count as a sure sign of grace. “Very high” (50) religious affections such as intense 
love and joy, “great effects on the body” (55), and an uncontainable glibness about “the things of 
religion” (59) may for Edwards be evidences of grace but are by no means incontrovertible 
proofs. Indeed, “false affections, if they are actually strong, are much more forward to declare 
themselves, than true” (62). The intellectual drama of Religious Affections lies in the 
philosophical effort of hunting down just what we can be sure of concerning outward effects, 
effects which may truly signify the presence of the Holy Spirit, or the masquerades of Satan.77 
“‘Tis evident that there may be great religious affections, that may in show and appearance 
imitate gracious affections, and have the same effects on their bodies, but are far from having the 
same effect in the temper of their minds, and course of their lives” (LPW 126). For Edwards, it 
isn’t only the outward effects of affections that certify their “gracious” status, but the effects on 
interior psychology as well. An insistence on interior sincerity alongside outward behavior and 
habits is key to this pragmatic attitude’s defense against accusations that it merely endorses crass 
or unscrupulous materiality.  
In this way, Edwards’s intellectual context was not too different from James’s. Edwards 
sought to harmonize the particulars of religious experience with the empiricism, inherited from 
Locke and Hume, that informed much of his thinking and practice. Importantly, though, Edwards 
articulated these pragmatic attitudes to justify certain religious experiences, not, as James does, 
                                                             
76 See also Pauw’s introduction to The Supreme Harmony of All for a discussion on how Edwards 
redirects proofs of trinitarianism from rational argument to historical evidence (10).  
 
77 The laborious mining for credible evidences of grace is a longstanding Puritan tradition. The diaries of 
early New England figures like Sarah Osborn, Thomas Hooker, and Cotton Mather depict the relentless 
self-examination and searching for possible evidences of grace that would seem to testify to their election. 
See Catherine A. Brekus’s “Writing as a Protestant Practice: Devotional Diaries in Early New England,” 





to democratize religious expression and challenge secular science’s tendency to dismiss belief.78 
Edwards was very much a Calvinist who believed in the divine election of predetermined saints 
to salvation. While his intellectual endeavor to justify these experiences echoes James’s, his 
revision of this scientific empiricism was a particular response to the epistemological problems 
encountered during the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 40s, namely the problems of how to 
explain divine manifestation with reference to the human sensorium.79 His debate with the 
Boston Old Light minister Charles Chauncy centered on what ultimately counted as the 
legitimate evidence of the Holy Spirit’s work in the process of conversion. 
The New England revivals of the 1730s and 40s weren’t the first revivals in the colonies, 
but they did signal the rise of American popular revivalism.80 In addition to being a profound 
shift in the American practice of Christian religion, revivals were also focal points for debates on 
human psychology. How the human mind experienced a state of grace, what constituted a right 
reaction to divine promptings, and, ultimately, what counted as a legitimate religious experience, 
were the crucial questions orbiting the revivals and the theological, philosophical, and scientific 
domains that sought to account for them. The hermeneutic tradition to which Edwards belongs 
views experience - specifically religious experience - as original and autonomous, most 
authentically known via the immediacy of the affections. Tracking this individualistic tradition in 
                                                             
78 For a useful overview of intellectual parities between Edwards and James, see Richard Hall’s “Jonathan 
Edwards and William James on Religion.” Published in 2012, articles and book chapters like this tell us 
that there are still vibrant areas of study between these two thinkers worth exploring.  
  
79 In using the phrase “Great Awakening,” I’m cognizant that Edwards himself never did – not in the 
periodizing sense modern academics tend to use. His descriptions of the revivals ranged from “general 
awakening,” “flourishing of religion,” “revival of religion,” “awakenings and encouragements,” among 
others. While he does use “great awakening,” at no point does he capitalize it, nor would he have viewed 
it as anything but a uniquely religious phenomenon consequential for professing Christians. Though I’m 
skeptical of periodizing schema, my use of the phrase is purely for the sake of convenience. 
80 The spiritual “refreshings” of Edwards’s grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, represented an earlier 
movement of revivalism. Likely because of the stature of Edwards himself, the revivals surrounding 
Northampton, Massachusetts have received the most scholarly attention. It would be difficult anyway to 
find a generation in American history that didn’t see some form of revivalism: the New Jersey revivals of 
the 1720s spearheaded by the Presbyterian Tennent clan and the ministers of their Log College; the tent 
revivals organized at Cane Ridge, Kentucky in 1801; the western New York camp meetings engineered 
and promoted by Charles Grandison Finney throughout the 1820s; another revival movement in the late 
1850s; the postbellum urban revivals of Dwight L. Moody; the Asuza Street revivals of Los Angeles in 
1906; and the calls for renewed spiritual awakenings by twentieth-century preachers like Billy Sunday, 





Protestantism, Wayne Proudfoot observed that such religious experience “cannot be understood 
by representation but only by participation” (51). The question surrounding the Edwards-
Chauncy conflict centered on justifying how that participation should be conducted and precisely 
what kinds of experience were legitimate in the conversion of souls to Christ. 
 Minister of Boston’s First Church, Charles Chauncy is known to history as Edwards’s 
leading opponent in the war on religious enthusiasm that swept the first decades of the eighteenth 
century. Memorably satirized in such works as Hogarth’s Credulity, Superstition, and 
Fanaticism (1762), religious enthusiasm wasn’t associated with possible evidence of conversion, 
but violent religious delusion and potential social disorder.81 Though Chauncy would gradually 
turn toward the more democratic doctrine of universalism, he was a staunch Congregationalist, 
the namesake of his grandfather who served as second president of Harvard.82 Chauncy’s 
commitments to the Congregationalist standing order ran deep. 
 Published three years before Religious Affections, Chauncy’s Seasonable Thoughts set 
out “to exhibit...a distinct and clear Idea of a Work of God, with the Appearance it will make; 
especially, when it is remarkable” (4). In response to reports of frontier enthusiasm (and likely 
still haunted by the memory of French Camisards and overzealous Methodists), he shows little 
more than incredulous pity for 
 
                                                             
81 Hogarth’s target in his famous satirical print is the Methodist movement, known for its style of popular 
preaching. The print depicts a zealous minister in a garishly ornate pulpit preaching to a congregation 
whose members are in various states of swooning, fainting, indulging in sexual immorality, or suffering 
from physical disorder bordering on the bizarre (including one ragged man vomiting on an unconscious 
woman while rabbits dash from her undercarriage). One cross-eyed minister - an obvious caricature of the 
itinerant Methodist George Whitefield - stands with a distorted face while “Whitfields Journal” sits in a 
bucket atop a book of “Demonology” by “K. James 1st,” a reference to the Catholic king’s belief in the 
occult. The image’s carnivalesque depiction of “enthusiasm” was precisely the kind of display Old Light 
theologians and ministers denounced as counterfeit expressions of religious fervor no different than mob 
insanity.  
82 Chauncy is best known for opposing the “liberal” strain of revivalism represented by Edwards, but his 
relationship to the changing tide of doctrine in the eighteenth century is somewhat more complex. We 
know, for example, that he harbored the democratic view of universal salvation decades before his 
Salvation for All Men (1784) was published. Several New England clergymen, too, shared the belief, but 
due to cultural constraints, were bound to adhere to Reform doctrine (see McClymond and McDermott 





the Terror so many have been the Subjects of; Expressing it self in strange Effects 
upon the Body, such as swooning away and falling to the Ground, where Persons 
have lain...speechless and motionless; bitter Shriekings and Screamings; 
Convulsion-like Tremblings and Agitations, Strugglings and Tumblings, which, 
in some Instances, have been attended with Indecencies I shan’t mention. (77)83 
  
Chauncy’s argument against religious experience of excessive variety implies that God, the most 
immutable force in the universe, logically will not manifest himself in mutable ways. Whereas 
“habitual Conduct” would denote the state of a person’s soul, the spontaneity of “strange Effects 
upon the Body” look to Chauncy more like the fits and starts of a broken machine, leading the 
fallen human form to the commission of acts, at best, indecent and, at worst, too foul to mention. 
More the pluralist (to a point) and adopting an attitude of productive skepticism, Edwards faults 
Chauncy with not giving the ruler of the universe enough credit: why can’t the divine manifest 
himself as he sees fit? 
 The New Light embrace of variety and productive uncertainty was implicitly a means of 
getting around the problem of latent error and skepticism in Enlightenment rationalism. If this 
rationalism were the generator of skepticism, how do we account for the phenomena of intuition 
and apparently innate moral knowledge? Generations after Edwards would meet this same 
challenge in the face of Scottish Common Sense’s claim of a universal moral sense and the 
objectivity of truth. But the vaunted reliability of common sense and objective truth was 
undercut by the persistence of error. Edwards’s acceptance of experiential variety introduced a 
liberalized understanding of individual conversion that didn’t reject the possibility of reason so 
much as it left open the possibility of its idiosyncrasy.   
 Like Chauncy’s Seasonable Thoughts, Edwards’s Religious Affections ventures to ask: 
what are “the distinguishing notes of that virtue and holiness that is acceptable in the sight of 
God?” (iii). Whatever qualifies as a note, Religious Affections interprets them outside of 
                                                             
83 A writer known only as “anti-enthusiasticus” penned a 1742 tract entitled A Faithful Account of the 
French Prophets, their Agitations, Extasies, and Inspirations, with an appendix that compared the 
“excesses” of the Camisards to those of the New England revivals. By some accounts, “anti-ethusiasticus” 





conventional models of conversion, emphasizing instead the experienced particulars.84 By 
definition, these “notes” stand in ambiguous relation to common experience - not interventions 
of the miraculous (as we’ve seen) or the delusive bodily exaggerations described by Chauncy, 
and not the conventional behaviors associated with proper religious practice: performing of the 
sacraments, prayer, paying church taxes, etc. A distinguishing mark is distinguished from 
mundane experience just enough to trigger faith in its supernatural provenance, but not so much 
that the mark cannot be cycled back to experience in the form of justifying conduct.  
But for all its fixation on what is and what is not a “distinguishing note” of saving grace, 
Edwards reminds us that the experience of conversion is, at bottom, shrouded in uncertainty:  
 
The manner of the Spirit’s proceeding in them that are born of the Spirit, is very 
often exceeding mysterious and unsearchable: we, as it were, hear the sound of it, 
the effect of it is discernible; but no man can tell whence it came, or whither it 
went. [...] Experience plainly shows, that God’s Spirit is unsearchable and 
untraceable, in some of the best of Christians, in the method of his operations, in 
their conversion. Nor does the Spirit of God proceed discernibly in the steps of a 
particularly established scheme, one half so often as is imagined. (RA 89-90).  
 
“Experience plainly shows” our incapacity to determine beyond doubt God’s methods of 
enlightening his elect. This staggering degree of uncertainty, while endemic to Edwards’s 
Calvinism, is reinterpreted here as a productive means of opening the possibilities for individual 
conversion.85 What Edwards does is take a theological mainstay and turn the field of experience 
                                                             
84 William Perkins, the highly influential sixteenth century English divine, outlined a ten-stage process 
whereby a believer could ascend to a state of faith. Prominent Puritan divines like Thomas Hooker and 
John Cotton also mapped out complex processes of regeneration in such works as The Application of 
Redemption (1637) and The Unbeleevers Preparing for Christ (1638). Such elaborate systems were often 
simplified to a three-step process of “awakening” to one’s true relation to God, “humiliation” for 
backsliding into a sinful relation, and, finally, “regeneration” into habits of faithful works. For a 
discussion of this three-step conversion process inherited not only by Edwards, but by his father and 
grandfather, see Marsden 26-28. For the Puritan inheritance of conversion morphologies, see Alfred 
Habegger’s “Preparing the Soul for Christ.”   
85 Because we have no grounds to refute any particular experience, because of the endemic haze of 
uncertainty surrounding every joyful outcry or cataleptic fit or episode of glossolalia, Edwards’s 





into a zone of salvific possibility. The incapacity for systematic knowledge about one’s salvific 
status here does not produce debilitating ambivalence or sterile skepticism, but a productive 
uncertainty that, while it gives very little to go on, at least does not foreclose every possibility 
that the Holy Spirit may, in fact, act for our salvation in ways we can’t predict.86  
 Nor can believers depend solely on some “particularly established scheme” that suggests 
spiritual certainty can be achieved by adherence to predetermined conversion models. What 
Edmund S. Morgan refers to as the Puritans’ “morphology of conversion” (69) becomes 
destandardized in Edwards - less morphology than amorphism. Since no two cases of spiritual 
transformation can be the same, the process of conversion becomes personalized according to 
individuals’ idiosyncratic experiences.87 There are no guides to the truth of the heart; it must be 
known “experimentally,” in other words, by experience. The insufficiency of Puritan conversion 
models inherited by figures like Edwards and Brainerd throws the emphasis of valid spiritual 
knowledge onto the flux of experience itself. One need only recall Edwards’s attempt in his most 
famous sermon, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.” The thrust of that sermon was to 
generate a visceral experience of a yawning hellscape ever ready to swallow parishioners whole. 
In other words, doctrine took a secondary role to that of providing a virtual experience with the 
intent of frightening believers back into the spiritual fold. Willing but frustrated colonial converts 
                                                             
origin, incentivizes the creation of a space of radical empiricism, a space knowing no absolute origins but 
founded on what James calls “pure experience.”  
86 Rather than an irresolvable gap in knowledge awaiting a proper solution, uncertainty in Edwards and in 
the Protestant-evangelical tradition I’m disclosing functions as a productive category that doesn’t cancel 
the possibility of human action, but grants it a field of actionable potential. If the imaginable substance of 
a concept - such as the kingdom of God, as I discuss in chapter four - persists in uncertainty, balking 
believers’ attempts to realize it, its vagueness nevertheless renders it workable by human thought and 
action. Importantly, however, Edwards’s postmillennialism differs from the human-oriented eschatology 
of later revivalist movements in that Edwards was still committed to a view of compatibilism regarding 
the human will. In this scheme, the human will is divided into natural and moral necessity, both of which 
reject any possibility that volition can be self-determining. See Freedom of the Will (32-33).     
87 There are biographical reasons why Edwards finds the tripartite scheme of Puritan conversion 
inadequate. We know from his diary that one of the major spiritual quandaries undergone by the young 
Edwards was his “not having experienced conversion in those particular steps, wherein the people of New 
England, and anciently the Dissenters of Old England, used to experience it” (Dwight, Life 93). Edwards 
could speak with the spiritual exemplar and his future son-in law David Brainerd, who after reading 
Solomon Stoddard’s Guide to Christ (1714) lamented that “I was not effectually and experimentally 
taught, that there could be no way prescribed, whereby a natural Man could, of his own Strength, obtain 





like Edwards and David Brainerd found themselves in a position similar to James’s, whose chief 
criticism of western philosophy was its consistent failure to account for experience as it is really 
lived in the here and now.  
Because of this recruitment of uncertainty, I’m arguing, consequences that make some 
practical difference in the lives of converts function as the justifiers of “gracious affections.” 
Action is the best defense against the imposition of counterfeit affections. This validation of 
ambiguous interiors by practical effects is another reason why Perry Miller thought James “was 
unwittingly resuming where Edwards had been forced to leave off.” In order to determine the 
validity of an experience, Edwards subordinated ratiocination to an epistemology based on the 
practical equivalence of action and being. The next section will explore the logical corollary of 
this understanding of conduct: whatever we can know about a thing’s essential nature is 
inseparable from how it behaves. 
 
 
Edwards’s Atom and a Realist Limbo 
 
As early as the 1720s, and about the time he began having intense religious experiences of his 
own, Edwards wrestled with the apparent disjunction between ideas and things. Just how are 
these constituents of reality related? As we saw before, there existed the possibility for Edwards 
that, “[w]hen the mind is sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that implies a 
sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it. (RA 215, my emphasis). In 
“The Mind,” Edwards allows the linguistic ambiguity between idea and thing to stand: 
 
we are to remember that the human body and the brain itself exist only mentally, 
in the same sense that other things do. [...] Therefore things are truly in those 
places, for what we mean when we say so is only that this mode of our idea of 
place appertains to such an idea. [...] [T]he case is the same...whether we suppose 






The real target of this passage seems to be Berkeley’s immaterialism, thought by some at the 
time to be the outright denial of the existence of material substance.88 Pragmatically considered, 
“the case is the same” whether we’re talking about objects in the external world independent of 
our perception or our ideas of them. There is a short step from this correspondence of idea and 
thing to their practical equivalence. The claim “that the human body and the brain itself exist 
only mentally, in the same sense that other things do,” drives Edwards’s understanding of 
psychology into territory familiar and conducive to pragmatism. 
 “The case is the same” for praxis and ontology as well. In his analysis of what it means to 
be an atom, Edwards argues that, in principle, a thing cannot be understood apart from its 
idiosyncratic and nonfungible activity. We need not trace the labyrinthine turns of logic that get 
Edwards to this quasi-pragmatist conclusion in “Of Atoms;” it is enough to say that  
 
[s]ince...solidity is the resisting to be annihilated, or the persevering to be of a 
body, or to speak plain, the being of it…, it follows that the very essence and 
being of bodies is solidity….  [...] [A]nd since...indivisibility and solidity are the 
same, it follows that the solidity of bodies and the being of bodies is the same, or 
that body and solidity are the same” (SPW 211).  
 
The language of resistance and perseverance was for Edwards characteristic of the Newtonian 
universe he saw himself and his parishioners inhabiting. Importantly, it views a thing’s qualities 
as active - not passive or abstract - properties. Existence, “the very essence and being” of a thing, 
is inseparable from its actions within a matrix of relations.89 A quality can only be understood in 
relation to others; solidity is a meaningless concept apart from its palpable activity of “resisting” 
and “persevering.”   
                                                             
88 The English man of letters Samuel Johnson famously rejected what (he thought) was the implication of 
Berkeley’s claim that there is no such thing as matter, only minds and ideas. Kicking a stone to disprove 
Berkeleyan immaterialism, Johnson is reported to have exclaimed, “I refute it thus,” an episode that gives 
western rhetoric the ad lapidem fallacy.  
89 This is a version of an argument Edwards will put forth in “Of Being:” “if there is no solidity, there is 
no extension, for extension is the extendedness of the solidity. Then all figure and magnitude and 
proportion immediately ceases.” In other words, a universe in which there was no movement or action of 





All the way down to its indissoluble and indestructible components, matter is 
indistinguishable from the way it acts in relation to the things around it. This practical 
identification of the is and the does is a variation on pragmatism’s central theme of truth being 
inseparable from its relations to the surrounding context: “[t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant 
property in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events” (Pragmatism 
89). What truth is can only be understood as a process of dynamic relations unfolding in human 
experience, a process preserved in Edwards’s atom, which doesn’t just resist, but is in a state of 
continuous resisting and persevering. Edwards’s practical identification between a thing’s 
ontology and its praxis provides him with a pragmatic logic that transcends Cartesian dualism 
while at the same time vindicating a model of conversion that could both respect idiosyncratic 
variety and justify sincere religious conduct.  
 Edwards makes a second attempt at linking existence to action in “Of Being,” written one 
or two years after “Of Atoms.” An uncompromising bid for the sheer impossibility of conceiving 
of absolute nothing - a feat of imagination akin to thinking of what “the sleeping rocks dream of” 
- “Of Being” ends with the unambiguous statement that “[a] state of nothing is a state 
wherein...all...eternal truths are neither true nor false” (SPW 206). About a decade later, though, 
Edwards softens his youthful certainty, adding a final paragraph that demonstrates the extent to 
which his thinking had moved in a more pragmatic direction. He still believes that “[w]hen we 
go to inquire whether or no there can be absolutely nothing we speak nonsense.” But he makes 
an important distinction that a younger Edwards hadn’t considered: 
 
[t]here is no other way, but only for there to be existence; there is no such thing as 
absolute nothing. There is such a thing as nothing with respect to this ink and 
paper. There is such a thing as nothing with respect to you and me. [...] But there 
is no such thing as nothing with respect to entity or being, absolutely considered. 
(SPW 207) 
 
During the ten or so years before Edwards returned to amend his former essay, he developed an 
appreciation for the role of language in our perception of reality. In his emendation, he no longer 
considers the absoluteness of nothingness abstractly, but relatively. “There is no such thing as 





respect” to other things in experience does it have any meaning. The attempt to define “nothing” 
requires a pragmatic clarity, not at all dissimilar from the clarity James sought in his anecdote of 
whether or not someone circumambulates a squirrel while it spirals up a tree.90 For the more 
mature Edwards, the significance of abstract concepts depends on their relation to things of 
experience. The difference between the “Of Being” of Edwards’s youth and that of a decade later 
is the difference between strict metaphysics and a burgeoning pragmatic attitude toward rational 
abstractions. 
 Edwards apparently found a formidable philosophical tool in this pragmatic attitude, 
since he tended to repeat it in his denser philosophical works. In his discussion of the word 
“action” in relation to the freedom of the will, he argued that “the word Action is frequently used 
to signify something not merely relative, but more absolute, and a real existence; as when we say 
an Action; when the word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of 
body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect” (FW 202). For Edwards, the use of a 
term of abstraction independent of any anchoring in experience is one of the primary reasons 
why he believed metaphysics and rationalism alone were insufficient to cultivate one’s 
understanding.   
 Edwards’s relational ontology is of a piece with his reluctance to grant merely rational 
concepts the status of intrinsic reality. Just as it is impossible for us to imagine nothing, it is 
impossible for us to imagine what “the sleeping rocks dream of” – in other words, their ideas 
apart from the person who exists in relation to them. But even on this point Edwards finds a 
reason to hedge. In his reading of the category of the impersonal, James D. Lilley argues that 
Edwards keeps open “the possibility of a new mode of ‘imagining’ that preserves the impossible 
austerity of the impersonal [i.e., imagining what sleeping rocks dream of] at the same time that it 
makes a home for and a community of the singular” (32). We’ve seen how, in his attempts to 
reconcile seeming disparities such as subject and object, Edwards is often at pains to argue their 
fundamental compatibility. To Lilley’s argument, I would add that Edwards is inclined to do so 
because of his openness to the plural realities of human experience, that what is truly impossible 
                                                             
90 At the beginning of the second lecture of Pragmatism, James relates the anecdote drawn from a 
camping trip. If a man, trying to get sight of a squirrel circling a tree, “[d]oes the man go round the 
squirrel or not?” In an effort to resolve the metaphysical dispute, James’s answer is that “[w]hich party is 





to imagine – epistemologically or ethically – is a system that outright cancels the potentials for 
human experience.91 Why I think it’s worth calling this a pragmatic attitude is because of its 
refusal to foreclose possibilities whose practical significance for us remains in a tentative state, a 
realist limbo of as-yet pragmatically justified abstractions.  
 Edwards’s insistence on the practical equivalence of a thing and its action has more than 
just an intellectual value. The justification of a thing’s identity or essence by how it behaves is 
crucial to the legitimation of conversion experiences conducted in a zone of epistemological 
ambiguity. It was not the degree to which a spiritual experience corresponded to prefabricated 
conversion models that leant credence to the experience, but the practical differences made and 
the conduct shaped by undergoing it. We saw in the section on Edwards’s defense of revivalism 
how it was the change in practice of religious affections that gave them their strongest 
accreditation as aspects of a successful conversion. Whereas Jamesian pragmatism attempted to 
suture action to being so as to make materiality relevant to philosophy, Edwards was invested in 
justifying the practical consequences of saints’ conversions and the meaningfulness of God’s 
engagement with Creation.  
 The Edwardsean innovation of the practical identification of the is and the does will 
become more explicit in the nineteenth century.92 As such, it’s easy to miss the wider 
consequences of this ontological turn. If good works provide reasonable evidence of one’s 
interior essence, it’s also true that evil works can be ascribed to the same source. In other words, 
evil acts belong not to an inherited sinful nature to which we all may succumb, but to one’s 
individual interior state. Edwards does not go so far as to say we’re individually accountable for 
willing such evil acts - as later revivalists would - but we can witness in his thoughts on the atom 
an important shift away from a communal understanding of sin to one that emphasizes personal 
responsibility. Whereas popular execution sermons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
                                                             
91 In chapter two, we’ll see how Charles Grandison Finney continues this tradition of resisting 
philosophical or psychological attempts to exhaust the possibilities of experience. For Finney, as it was 
for Edwards, there can be no system that excludes the variety of means with which God may induce 
conversion in believers, an embrace of possibility that calls for pragmatic assessments of their effects 
when they emerge. 
92 In chapter two, I discuss the ways in which the muscularization of the will in Charles Finney’s 
revivalism and Nathaniel Taylor’s New Haven theology led to the identification of sin not with an inborn, 





focused attention on the crime itself, ontologically distinct from the criminal because rooted in a 
common sinful nature, the philosophy of Edwards exemplifies an emergent shift toward sin as 
applicable to the individual - inseparable, in fact, from their unique and nonfungible nature. 
Edwards’s atom, put another way, demonstrates the beginnings the judiciary preoccupation with 
criminal motive and the rise of what Karen Haltunnen calls the “moral monster” (5).93 
Edwards wrote “Of Atoms” early in his life. But the essay’s central idea – the practical 
identification of action and being – remained an abiding concern even into the last decade of his 
life. God’s being is constituted by His actions, a theme he articulates in one of his final works 
whose theology is as imposing as its name, A Dissertation Concerning the End for which God 
Created the World (hereafter simply DCE, and not to be confused with its companion piece The 
Nature of True Virtue, published together in 1765 as Two Dissertations). It is in this dense and 
often abstruse text - some passages of which could rival the notorious opacity of Hegel - where 
Edwards reconceives the Calvinist God, not in the terms of jealousy or wrath that made him 
famous in works like “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” but in the terms of abundant, 
overflowing, and affectionate creativity. I argue that Edwards’s central point in the Dissertation, 
that the purpose of Creation is to manifest the attributes of God, is grounded in a pragmatic logic 
that unless an essence issues in visible and distinct action, it is as good as insignificant. If it was 
Religious Affections that left unlocked the door between God and His saints, the Dissertation 




                                                             
93 For a discussion on the New England cultural shift from communal sin to individual motivation to sin, 
especially as it was depicted in execution sermons of the time, see Karen Haltunnen’s Murder Most Foul: 
“if the crime of murder tended to evoke statements of shock and outrage in New England execution 
sermons, the murderer himself generally did not; execution sermons drew a clear distinction between the 
sin and the sinner. No matter how terrible the crime, New England clergymen believed that its underlying 
cause was the same as that of every other sin known to postlapsarian humanity: innate and total 
depravity” (13). I complement this argument by adding that the emergent pragmatic identification of the 
is and the does had a powerful hand in decoupling sin from a common nature and identifying it with the 





Consent, Proportion, and an Immanent God  
 
This is an universal definition of excellency: The consent of being to being. 
Edwards, “The Mind” (SPW 336) 
 
In addition to a model of how to reconcile science and religion, Edwards inherits from Newton 
and Whiston a model for describing how God interacts with Creation. In the Dissertation, 
Edwards makes the case for God’s effectual and ongoing communicativeness with his 
“creatures,” and the purposive creativity that is inseparable from his being.94 This idea of 
“communications” - holy emanations of virtue and happiness to his elect - is central to the 
Dissertation and constitutes one of the more underappreciated ways Edwards reinterprets his 
otherwise stalwart Calvinism.  
 But at certain points in the Dissertation, it becomes apparent that Edwards is attempting 
to straddle the boundary between a possible contradiction. “For tho’ these communications of 
God...are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change” (DCE 35). The God 
Edwards describes maintains his timeless, omniscient character while his “communications” 
operate in the temporal and finite realm.95 Edwards’s balancing act of logic - sometimes 
                                                             
94 As we will see in chapters three and four, belief in a divinity that establishes and maintains contact with 
Creation - as opposed to the changeless and remote deity of classical theism - is a crucial component of 
the pragmatic justification of human action. The Social Gospel takes Edwards’s scarcely recognized 
theological contribution and turns it into a transatlantic program of Christian renewal.  
95 Compare these two passages that exemplify the fine line Edwards is walking between God’s absolute 
sovereignty and what that sovereignty means for human actors: “it is evident, by both scripture and 
reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy; that he 
stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be 
the subject of any sufferings or impair of his glory and felicity from any other being” (DCE 12). God 
seems to have no real need of any created thing. But that isn’t totally conceivable to Edwards: 
“communication of virtue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God’s holiness; so that 
hereby the creature partakes of God’s own moral excellency. [...] And then it must be considered wherein 





tortuously so - throughout the Dissertation is between this transcendent God, whose sovereign 
majesty is preserved, yet a quasi-immanent one who can emanate his glory directly to his elect.96  
 The Dissertation, then, finds Edwards attempting to reconcile Calvinism and novel 
theological conceptions that both preserve Calvinist orthodoxy while keeping open the 
possibilities of human experience. The ultimate purpose of Creation is God’s uncontainable 
expressivity infinite goodness and holiness, a communication it is possible for us (i.e., the elect) 
to be sensible of and that can make real differences in our conduct. This is not the notorious God 
of “Sinners,” whose mere pleasure holds back a threateningly unsympathetic universe from 
devouring incorrigible sinners. This is a God of quasi-pantheistic presence, no longer inscrutable 
and no longer residing hidden on the other side of an insuperable cosmic divide.97 
 How the creature can partake in God’s “moral excellency” is possible because, to 
Edwards, the underlying structure of Creation isn’t absolute, but relative. In “The Mind,” 
Edwards defined “excellency” as “[t]he consent of being to being,” reframing the nature of being 
(or existence) as constituted by the relation, or “consent,” among entities. Edwards’s highly 
specialized use of this word is one of the key ideas linking his thought to Jamesian pragmatism.98 
                                                             
96 The extent to which God is immanent in Creation grew out of an Enlightenment debate on the nature 
and function of God’s providence - His direct intervention in human history. In Enlightenment parlance, 
“general providence” referred to God’s cosmic power in sparking the universe into existence. Whereas 
Deists stopped here, thinkers like Newton and Whiston sought to explain the function of God’s “special 
providence,” His active engagement in the world and concern for individual lives. Edwards’s explanation 
of this kind of providence involves, I will show, a decidedly pragmatic logic. For an examination on how 
Newton and Whiston aimed to synthesize general and special providence, see Force (123-37).  
97 Perry Miller once claimed that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that the whole of Edwards’ system is 
contained in miniature within some ten or twelve pages of [‘A Divine and Supernatural Light’],” an 
overstatement this chapter has hopefully helped to undercut. The changing conception of the possible 
attributes of God pointed out here should remind us that it was simply not the case that “[h]is whole 
insight was given him at once, preternaturally early, and [that] he did not change: he only deepened” 
(Jonathan Edwards 44). Aside from Miller’s questionable suggestion that a “deepening” doesn’t qualify 
as change, it’s reasonable to assume that, like most people, Edwards underwent great change throughout 
his life.     
98 As we’ll see in chapter two, the freedom of human agency to contribute to its own salvation becomes a 
critical component of the antebellum revivalism of Charles Grandison Finney and characterizes a major 
distinction between Unitarianism and Calvinism. As Finney understood it, the salvation of one’s soul 
depends specifically on voluntarily consenting to the conversion: “God first draws, the sinner yields” (ST 
513). This centralizing of volition in the conversion process even affects the very nature of sin: “there is 





His notion of consent implicitly rejects the Scholastic-rationalistic preoccupation with forms and 
substances, the thing-in-itself, and absolutes as having a specialized existence apart from the 
finite world. A thing’s true nature, in other words, rests not in an absolute essence independent of 
its relations, but in its manifold relations, its degree of proportions with the remainder of 
existence. 
Edwards’s system of how this communication works is onerously elaborate, but its 
fundamental logic is pragmatic: “[a] sufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than 
the work or effect is valuable” (DCE 20).99 Here, it’s effects that determine the value of 
sufficiency, not the sufficiency that determines the value of the effect. The Protestant doctrine of 
God’s sufficiency - His complete adequacy for performing divine acts independent of outside 
assistance - is here questioned as to its pragmatic value. The outcome of the action (providential 
intervention, for example), Edwards argues, governs the scope of our knowledge about the force 
that induced it, or as Peirce, using similar logic, would say, “our conception of these effects is 
the whole of our conception of the object” (31). 
Edwards goes on:  
It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of 
God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by other 
beings besides himself. If it be fit, that God’s power and wisdom, &c. should be 
exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it 
seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and 
unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above purpose, as if 
they were not. (DCE 21) 
 
If one were to try to argue that Edwards was a pragmatist (in a much stronger sense than I’m 
doing) this would be the passage to substantiate that claim. The core idea of this passage 
suggests that “God’s power and wisdom” have a fitness to be known. Had these attributes 
remained “eternally dormant,” not “seen by other beings besides himself” – hence unrealized in 
human experience – “it will be just the same...as if they were not.” Edwards makes the existence 
                                                             
99 Edwards wasn’t the only one who thought so. He footnotes Gilbert Tennent, who says as much: “[t]he 
end of wisdom...is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose 





of these attributes dependent on their perception by beings other than the divine. This is not the 
same as saying that the “glorious perfections of God” are not “true” in the Jamesian sense, but 
Edwards’s reduction of divine attributes to their practical effects shifts evangelical theology in a 
more pragmatic direction.   
Whereas the God of the Calvinist scheme Edwards inherited remained aloof from the 
fallen corruption of His creation, the God of the Dissertation cannot but interact with it.100 In the 
Dissertation, Edwards recovers a practical meaning of divinity by coimplicating God and 
Creation. Unmoored from a dependence on the rationalists’ Absolute, Edwards’s notion of 
excellency preserves the empiricist’s respect for experiential variety and openness to relativity:  
One alone, without any reference to any more, cannot be excellent; for in such a 
case there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore, no such thing as 
consent. Indeed, what we call “one” may be excellent, because of consent of 
parts, or some consent of those in that being that are distinguished into a plurality 
some way or other. But in a being that is absolutely without any plurality there 
cannot be excellency, for there can be no such thing as consent or agreement. 
(SPW 337). 
 
For Edwards a thing’s excellence is a measure of its proportionate relations to other things, and 
not in its unqualified or abstract singularity.101 Just as he made it a condition of understanding 
spiritual experience, so Edwards made pluralism a condition of excellence by insisting that the 
meaning of a thing consists in its relations to other things.102 For a single entity to stand apart 
                                                             
100 One version of this view is the Deists’ conception of a God who had created the universe and left it in 
the keeping of his immutable laws. Edwards’s problem with this view is its suggestion that the universe 
did not actually require God to sustain it. His concept of excellency, with its systems of relations and 
proportions stitched together by consent, was intended to avoid separating God from His Creation.   
101 Etymologically, the congruence Edwards makes between excellence and existence makes sense, given 
that the general meaning of both is to stand out, rather than remaining undifferentiated and nonrelational. 
Importantly, though, this standing out is an entry into a matrix of relations that constitutes experience (yet 
another word whose etymology denotes a movement outwards).    
102 There’s an important caveat to this. Edwards doesn’t give up the idea that attributes can exist and 
retain meaning independent of human experience. Discussing the “wonderful and unparalleled grace of 
God” in Religious Affections, Edwards quickly points out that such grace “is infinitely glorious in itself…. 
This would be glorious, whether it were exercised towards us or not” (188). A pragmatist would go the 
extra mile to claim that the glory of God, unless practically useful for humans, isn’t pragmatically 





from the matrix of relations that constitute being is to remove itself from the possibility of 
consent, hence foregoing participation in excellency.103 This is all very abstract, but its practical 
implications become apparent when Edwards uses it as a model for understanding God’s 
relationship to Creation. William McLoughlin observed years ago, this new light theology 
“found the world open to the miraculous - unconditioned, full of new possibilities and unrealized 
potentials” (75). And as I’ve tried to show, these features of Edwards’s metaphysical realism - 
excellency and consent - provide the logic for a pluralistic universe, that the possibilities of 
human experience are practically inexhaustible. That Edwards did in fact believe in deterministic 
causality and Christian teleologies is beside the point when we consider his receptivity to the 
variability of conversion experiences and the pluralistic nature of divine excellence.   
 But, again, Edwards believed in a Christian teleology whose cosmic finale, while 
undatable, is nevertheless predetermined. If the finite world’s relation to God’s infinity can be 
called pluralistic, it’s a tentative diversity that will eventually issue in an ultimate monistic unity. 
For all its openness to variety and productive uncertainty, Edwards’s notion of excellency never 
forgets the eternal creative entity to which it refers:  
[God’s various communications to his creatures] at first view may appear entirely 
to be distinct things: but if we more closely consider the matter, they will all 
appear to be one thing, in a variety of views and relations. They are all but the 
emanation of God’s glory; or the excellent brightness and fullness of the divinity 
diffused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, existing ad extra. 
(DCE 116) 
 
Many in the one. Edwards’s account of excellency resists the strict empiricist move of perceiving 
discrete phenomena as isolated events having no explicable unity.104 They “may appear entirely 
                                                             
103 Ethically considered, standing apart from the relations of being is a form of self-love: “the consent of 
spirits consists half in their mutual one to another, and the sweet harmony between the various parts of the 
universe is only an image of mutual love. But yet a lower kind of love may be odious, because it hinders 
or is contrary to a higher and more general” (SPW 338). Aesthetically considered, such isolation from 
being in general is a counterfeit beauty: “[t]hat which is beautiful considered by itself separately...or 
beautiful only with respect to itself and a few other things, and not as a part of that which contains all 
things - the universe - is false beauty, and a confined beauty” (344).    
104 James himself never tired of tackling this abiding philosophical problem, and his radical empiricism 
was designed to overcome it. “Because the names of finite things and their relations are disjoined,” he 





to be distinct,” but properly trained spiritual sight - a mature sense of the heart aligned with 
divine holiness - can discern the cosmic unity of Creation and its ultimate purpose. Despite this 
reminder of the ultimate unity of God’s providential design, the terms on which the Christian life 
is lived in the finite material world are pragmatic, pluralistic ones. Human action is meaningful 
because of the whole of Creation reflects divine animation; not one part is void of potential 
significance. The diffusion, overflowing, and enlargement of loving glory are the actions of an 
immanent God perpetually active not only in the maintenance of Creation, but in its ever-
increasing development into new possibilities.105 This is not Wordsworth’s “spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings,” but, in Edwards’s description of hypercharged affections, that of 
Jeremiah: “[h]is word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones.”106 The God-in-
nature paradigm, I’m suggesting, is traceable to Edwards’s posthumous theology, and 
furthermore to antebellum Transcendentalism and the liberal Christianity of Unitarianism, both 
of which provided the intellectual climate in which James developed his ideas on pragmatism. 
“For we are anew created every moment” (M 18), Edwards wrote soon after graduating from 
Yale,107 and that perpetual revitalizing of the world is what cathects the meaningfulness of our 
actions in it.  
                                                             
deus ex machina from on high to conjoin them” (PU 66). He faulted idealists like Josiah Royce and F.H. 
Bradley for inventing “transexperiential agents of unification” (ERE 43) like the Absolute and Substances 
that would harmonize the finite events and experiences of an apparently disconnected empiricist universe.   
105 The idea of God’s progressiveness saw considerable duration in Edwards’s thought. In “Miscellanies” 
547, dated at 1731, he argued that “Providence makes a continual progress, and continually is bringing 
forth things new in the state of the world, and very different from what ever were before.” Importantly too 
for an older Edwards, this progressiveness in individuals’ attempts to unite with God proceeds toward an 
infinitely receding point: “[w]e may judge of the end that the creator aimed at, in the being, nature and 
tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they constantly aim at in their tendency and 
eternal progress, though the time will never come, when it can be said it is attained to, in the most 
absolutely perfect manner” (DCE 114). Because one of God’s divine attributes is infinity, it follows that 
the aim of uniting with such an entity for non-infinite creatures must remain indefinitely asymptotic. 
106 The imagery of fullness and levee-breaking overflow has less to do with - even predates - the 
Romanticism that made its way to American shores several decades later. As Ryan White “calls into 
question the interpretation of American pragmatism...as an extension of romanticism” (18), so too does 
my reading of Edwards’s anticipation of Jamesian pragmatism question the extent to which that 
pragmatism was indebted to European sources.  
107 This idea of perpetual Creation was a consequence of unmooring the historical event of Creation from 





 And if “we are anew created every moment,” history and time are then not static concepts 
in the field of experience, but living realities in which the pluralistic variety of human experience 
and action is made consequential. By revaluing temporality in this way, Edwards gives credence 
to the sanctification of action both human and divine. The difference between a God that 
transcends Creation, remaining distant (except in cases of punitive measures) and a God of 
immanence, remaining close and intimate, is not insignificant for how Jamesian pragmatism 
understands the potential power of human agency. James was no theist, but he understood that 
meaningful human action isn’t - can’t be, rather - performed in an interest-free vacuum or in a 
void populated by mere intellectual abstractions. When whatever we term the source of our 
interests and values is rendered inaccessible to us - or worse, punitive in nature - we lose not 
only the motivation to act, but the ability to see how our action can make any significant 
difference in the world. “A God who gives so little scope to love, a predestination which takes 
from endeavor all its zest with all its fruit, are irrational conceptions, because they say to our 
most cherished powers, There is no object for you” (WB 126).108 There is then a direct 
correlation between pragmatic action and a theistic conception of divine indwelling. 
 Not that Edwards was a pantheist any more than he was a pragmatist. My claim here is 
that one of Edwards’s pragmatic attitudes is his view of Creation as an infinitely complex and 
living Cosmos whose sheer immensity is suffused with God’s positive attributes and is 
responsive to our personal actions. Theologically, however, the wide-scope of God’s regard and 
His identification with overflowing love leaves the Dissertation ambivalent on the role of those 
predestined to damnation. Michael J. McClymond points out that “the Calvinist distinction 
between the elect and the reprobate, the saved and the damned, does not readily find a place in 
End of Creation” (63). God’s infinite goodness to the whole of Creation turns out to be a little 
selective. Edwards, otherwise so adept at anticipating counter-arguments to his positions, does 
not directly address the complications to the doctrine of election when put next to the universal 
disinterested benevolence alleged to be inherent in divinity. Edwards did maintain the orthodox 
position of God’s absolute foreknowledge (as Freedom of the Will relentlessly insists), but the 
                                                             
how Henry James Sr proposes that any God who isn’t immanent and any Creation that isn’t perpetually 
ongoing are concepts as good as meaningless to human actors.  
108 More precise historical connections between an immanent God and Jamesian pragmatism will be 





view that God’s “excellence” manifests as disinterested benevolence toward Creation gave 
credence - likely to Edwards’s chagrin - to the budding universalism that would come to 
characterize late eighteenth century theology and nineteenth century revivalism in a country 
whose political temper was becoming increasingly democratic.109 
 As Edwards strove to reconcile disparate modes of thought, he discovered means 
recognizable in a pragmatic epistemology. Though he retained the belief in the sovereignty of a 
Christian God, that certain people were predestined to eternal damnation, and that human history 
and the world were designed for a specific teleological purpose, his reappraisals of experience, 
essences, and divine presence oriented his thought around their practical consequences and not 
their abstract natures. The theological determinism that radiates throughout Edwards’s oeuvre 
may logically short-circuit pragmatism’s openness to plurality and experiential variety; indeed, 
it’s a major reason why I don’t think Edwards is a pragmatist in the hard sense. However, teasing 
out the places where Edwards resorts to practical means of addressing theological problems puts 
us in a good place to see how these attitudes were taken up by later generations of Protestants 
and evangelicals. The upshot of isolating Edwards’s “latent pragmatisms” is not only to 
illuminate a relationship of greater intimacy between theology and philosophy, but also between 
that of what we might call the sacred and the secular.   
 Scholarship on science and religion in the nineteenth century tends to assume the 
postbellum emphasis on variety, pluralism, uncertainty, chance – features intrinsic to pragmatism 
– as logical extensions of Darwinism and evolutionism. “For pragmatists,” Charlene Seigfried 
goes so far to say, “Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859 was a watershed event, one that would 
forever change the way human beings understand their place in the universe” (177). Richard 
Rorty, pondering why foundationalism in philosophy from the nineteenth century on seemed 
increasingly irrelevant, concurs: “Darwin...convinced most of us that we were exceptionally 
                                                             
109 What got Edwards expelled from his Northampton ministerial post was just this resistance to a more 
democratically-minded inclusion. As a means of drawing more people into the church, the Halfway 
Covenant (1662), sponsored by Solomon Stoddard, was intended to allow church membership - 
participation in the sacraments - to those without conversion experiences. Edwards’s attempt to reverse 
some of his grandfather’s efforts to make the rules of church membership more relaxed disaffected many 
of his parishioners. His denial of the Eucharist and Baptism - the sacramental pillars of Reformed 
theology - to anyone except full members resulted in a committee or neighboring churches voting 





talented animals, animals clever enough to take charge of our own evolution” (Truth and 
Progress 174). There seems no historical reason to doubt this narrative. James himself believed 
it: “in the psychology of our own day, the emphasis is transferred from the mind’s purely rational 
function...to the so long neglected practical side. The theory of evolution is mainly responsible 
for this” (Talks 33). So did his son, Henry: “the tide of contemporary inquiry, driven forward by 
the storm of the Darwinian controversy” called on philosophy to “embrace the new reality” (LWJ 
I 54). Modern commentators like Hilary Putnam continue the trend: “the pragmatists came after 
and were deeply influenced by the discoveries of Charles Darwin” (46). All of this makes sense, 
since the 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species coincides with the emergent interest in 
Anglo-American intellectual culture in probability, in the reality of growth and variety as 
constituents of identity, and in the physical struggle for existence as it comes to bear on mental 
development. And it seems natural to read the (mis)perceived pragmatic defining of “truth” as 
that which satisfies our arbitrary desires as an extension into philosophy of the (mis)perceived 
Darwinian emphasis on “survival of the fittest.”110 “Mainly responsible,” James says, but, I’m 
arguing, not entirely. An amplified induction and an openness to possibility characteristic of 
pragmatism emerges in Edwards’s theology in response to epistemological pressures surrounding 
the uncertainty of spiritual conversion.111 The notion of Christian progress and adaptation was a 
staple of American evangelical culture long before Darwinism gave the idea scientific currency, 
though it can be argued that the latter helped to reinforce the former.   
In the next chapter, I take up the threads laid down by Edwards’s endeavors to reconcile 
the disparate strands of theology, science, and philosophy as they reappear in a later episode of 
American revivalism. As we’ll see, the evangelical landscape of antebellum America became a 
                                                             
110 Incidentally, if Darwin ever used the words “survival of the fittest,” he did so by way of Herbert 
Spencer, who coined the phrase.  
111 The muscularization of individuals’ faculties and the meliorism of social realities in Jamesian 
pragmatism might be better understood if we situate that method within a much longer tradition of 
religious postmillennialism. As opposed to premillennialism, which understood human and sacred history 
- i.e., the coming of Christ’s thousand-year kingdom - to be less susceptible to human intervention, 
postmillennialism “postulated a gradual improvement in society before the thousand years rather than a 
disruptive cataclysmic event. Postmillennialism’s gradual approach meant that Christians could either 
slow down or speed up progress toward the millennium” (Curtis, Redeeming America 157). For a more 
in-depth discussion of the shaping influences of pre- and postmillennialism in American evangelical 
culture, see Curtis, Ch. 5, as well as its relationship to the rise of the twentieth century’s premillennial 





zone of contestation not only over the legacy of Edwards, but also over the very issues he 
labored to articulate. To conservatives - especially at Princeton and Andover seminaries - he 
represented the height of Calvinist orthodoxy. To liberals, Edwards’s Calvinism was an 
unfortunate obstruction that blinded an otherwise brilliant theologian to the democratic 
possibilities of his thought.112 How Edwards’s pragmatic attitudes were taken up by this later 
generation of revivalists is the subject of the next chapter, focusing on its most famous preacher, 

















                                                             
112 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr certainly thought the latter was true, and of Calvinism more generally. His 
novel Elsie Venner had the self-conscious “aim...to test the doctrine of ‘original sin’ and human 
responsibility for the disordered volition coming under that technical denomination” (xii). The novel, 
however, is about Calvinism’s inability to adequately explain the presence of suffering in the world. 
Likewise, Holmes’s “wonderful one-hoss shay,/ That was built in such a logical way” (ll. 1-2), lasts for 
one hundred years until 1755, when it suddenly falls to pieces at the exact moment of the Lisbon 










A Pragmatic Piety: Experience, Uncertainty, and Action in Charles Grandison Finney’s 
Antebellum Revivalism 
 
Introduction - An Antebellum Moratorium on Abstractions  
 
To bring down philosophy from its high places is to enhance its real dignity by adding to its 
usefulness. This service was performed by Locke. 
      Francis Bowen, Critical Essays (5) 
 
American philosopher and teacher of William James, Francis Bowen wasn’t fond of German 
metaphysics. The first chapter of his Critical Essays, “Locke and the Transcendentalists,” 
celebrates the empiricist thinker while decrying Transcendentalism’s Germanized philosophy as 
little more than incoherent speculation divorced from concrete life. “Transcendental reasoning,” 
he writes, “can only be answered by a Transcendentalist. There is nothing tangible for a common 
person to strike at; even Don Quixote never thought of contending against a cloud” (24). 
Bowen’s desire for tangible concepts and his frustration with abstractions, it appears, wasn’t 
uncommon at the time. Equally unintelligible was “Giant Transcendentalist,” a murky figure, 
“German by birth,” of Hawthorne’s Bunyan-inspired spoof “The Celestial Railroad:”  
 
as to his form, his features, his substance, and his nature generally, it is the chief 
peculiarity of this huge miscreant, that neither he for himself, nor anybody for 
him, has ever been able to describe them. [...] He shouted after us, but in so 
strange a phraseology that we knew not what he meant, nor whether to be 






Hawthorne lampoons Transcendental phraseology as so removed from human comprehension 
that it fails to make a meaningful difference in the affections, neither encouraging nor 
affrighting. Brief as the American Transcendentalist moment was, the ridicule aimed at its use of 
language and meaning exposes something important about American intellectual culture at the 
time: that demands were being placed on abstract claims to show their practical consequences. It 
isn’t my intention here to critique Transcendentalist writers, but by way of preface to 
demonstrate that it was a common theme in nineteenth century philosophy and theology that 
patience for linguistic obscurantism was wearing thin.113 
The service Bowen claims Locke performed is the making of philosophical abstraction 
practically useful for a “common person.” What Bowen, quoting the Scottish jurist Sir James 
Mackintosh, likes about Locke is the pragmatic element of his philosophy: 
 
[Locke’s] writings have diffused throughout the civilized world...the disposition 
to reject whatever is obscure, fantastic, or hypothetical in speculation, to reduce 
verbal disputes to their proper value, to abandon problems which admit of no 
solution, to distrust whatever cannot be clearly expressed, to render theory the 
simple expression of facts, and to prefer those studies which most directly 
contribute to human happiness. (17) 
 
What Mackintosh identifies in Locke - his rejection of anything “obscure” or “hypothetical” not 
grounded in an experiential reality, his attention to clarity in language to avoid “verbal disputes,” 
and his preference for studies that work toward “human happiness” - are some of the central 
concerns of a pragmatic method whose primary goal is to identify the practical consequences of 
philosophical claims.114 For Bowen, Locke is praiseworthy precisely because his philosophy 
                                                             
113 These examples also ask us to reconsider Hofstadter’s emphasis on religion as being “the first arena for 
an anti-intellectual impulse” (55). While it’s not inaccurate, Hofstadter’s claim seems to miss that the 
“anti-intellectualism” in American life was generated by those whom we don’t typically see as religious 
as much as it was by the religious themselves.   
114 Recall James’s reason for why he thought Locke was one of the first to use pragmatism, as Locke 
“made the word ‘idea’ stand indifferently for thing and thought” (ERE 10). If the idea could stand in for 





rectifies that of the Transcendentalists, who “have deepened the gulf between speculative and 
practical men, and, by their innovations in language, they are breaking down the only bridge that 
spans the chasm” (19). Linguistic obfuscation, the very thing pragmatism was designed to dispel, 
is the wedge driven between philosophy and the interests of common people.115 
I chose to begin this chapter with a brief overview of this one criticism of 
Transcendentalism because, even though histories of American pragmatism frequently cite this 
movement and its most famous practitioners (Emerson, Orestes Brownson, Sampson Reed) as 
prelude to pragmatism, they often neglect a parallel development in liberal antebellum Protestant 
evangelicalism. This latter discourse too became less focused on abstract creeds and received 
doctrines than the action produced by sincere belief. Emerson’s statement at the end of 
“Experience,” expressive of a pragmatic frame of mind – that “the true romance which the world 
exists to realize, will be the transformation of genius into practical power” (262) – reflected an 
emphasis on action current in evangelical culture. As one reviewer of the antebellum periodical 
Spirit of the Pilgrims put it, “[t]he spirit of religion in this country is active rather than 
contemplative” (524). By the same token, the Kentucky revivalist Barton W. Stone 
discountenanced the “unfathomable mysteries” of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, 
preferring instead to “[confine] myself to the practical part of religion, and to subjects within my 
depth” (Life 59). Christian youths were likewise cautioned against an exclusive reliance on 
theoretical orthodoxy. Congregationalist Jacob Abbott’s highly popular Young Christian book 
series was “designed to enforce the practice, not to discuss the theory of religion” (5).116 But 
                                                             
convert had never had a direct experience of a thing, that thing’s idea, made vivid to the imagination, 
could theoretically induce a conversion. See Jackson, Ch. 1 (37-88) 
115 As it did in Edwards’s time, the rearticulation of Lockean epistemology achieved a new currency in 
antebellum philosophical discourse. The erstwhile Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson argued that 
progress happens when culture returns from the “philosophy of abstractions...to the philosophy of reality, 
the philosophy of life, which presents to the mind the first principles of life and of all knowledge as 
identical” (The Convert 390), a sentiment voiced by Coleridge: “Christianity is not a theory, or a 
speculation; but a life” (Aids 201). These utterances all reflect a growing need to replace a philosophy of 
abstractions with one more appropriate to the needs and interests of human life. 
116 The preference for the practical remained a common interest throughout the century. John Robert 
Seeley’s transatlantic bestseller Ecce Homo (1865), a survey of Christ’s historical life, omitted theological 
aspects of that life entirely: “[n]o theological questions whatever are here discussed” (xxii). Even the 
theological implications of Christ became less important than the life he had led. And in his 1870 series of 
lectures delivered at Yale College, published as Kingdom of Christ on Earth, Professor of Systematic 





rather than citing these as evidence of early pragmatism, focusing on how faith related to practice 
for antebellum evangelicals will highlight how the adoption of pragmatic attitudes were deployed 
to address philosophical problems and religious faith.  
The figure I am most interested in exploring in this chapter, Charles Grandison Finney, 
seems to me to be largely missed in scholarly discussions of the period beyond cursory 
acknowledgements of his revival practices. Allen Guelzo wasn’t overstating it when he said, in 
the forward to Hambrick-Stowe’s Charles G. Finney and the Spirit of American Evangelicalism 
that “[v]ery few biographers have found much of interest in Finney as a theologian, and even 
those who hang his importance on his fame as a preacher of mass religious revival usually find 
little that was permanent of even admirable in Finney’s revivals” (vii). This is surprising, 
because Finney’s theology reflected many attitudes with other figures of the time. His directions 
for converting sinners, for example, exhorted ministers to “[b]ring up the individual’s particular 
sins. Talking in general terms against sin will produce no results” (154), echoing Bowen and 
Hawthorne’s desires for specification and practicality over abstractions and generalities. It’s not 
saying anything new in the history of American religion to refer to Finney as the heir of 
Edwardsean revivalism. Yet while most agree that Finney is the undisputed carrier of the 
Edwardsean flame, no substantial critical essay or scholarly work examines Finney’s theology or 
its pragmatic approach to revivalism in depth. Seeing how Finney reinterpreted Edwards’s 
pragmatic attitudes will give us a better understanding of their transit through antebellum 
evangelicalism as well as making a case for including Finney in histories of American 
pragmatism, histories largely deemed to be secular in nature and inherently distinct from 
surrounding religious contexts.  
One major reason for the oversight that figures like Finney are subject to is that the pre-
Jamesian history of American pragmatism is usually dominated by Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Cornel West’s claim “that Emerson is the appropriate starting point for the pragmatist tradition” 
(6) is symptomatic of this pervasive trend. Joan Richardson begins her 2007 A Natural History of 
Pragmatism with Jonathan Edwards, but continues the genealogy with Emerson. I see no reason 
                                                             
speculation, but practical action: “[t]his interest in Jesus is not speculative, but practical” (2). 
“Christianity,” he continued, “is not dogmatic, but historical; not speculation, but action” (4). In chapter 
four, we will see how this effort to envision true Christianity as a living practice was narrativized in 





to discredit this genealogy, but I do want to offer an alternative perspective that appreciates the 
role of Finney – and more broadly American evangelicalism – in our understanding of the 
historical development of pragmatism. Even though pragmatism is not often considered from 
outside its secular orientation, and even though Finney’s role in American history is usually 
confined to historical studies of revivalism, I argue that evaluating Finney’s theology for its 
pragmatic attitudes forces us to reconsider the hitherto marginal role of evangelical culture in the 
shaping of nineteenth century American philosophy as well as the putatively secular origins of 
Jamesian pragmatism. 
I’m not the first to note Finney’s pragmatism. Perry Miller characterized the famous 
revivalist as a pragmatist when he put into his mouth the words “‘the results justify my 
methods’” (27). James E. Johnson argued that Finney’s “early successes in attaining conversions 
led him to adopt a pragmatic approach to the problems of theology” (338). Following Johnson, 
Leonard I. Sweet has observed Finney’s “pragmatic philosophy of revivalism” (211). Recently, 
biographer Keith Hardman explains that Finney’s popularization of a “new, pragmatic, and 
optimistic approach to evangelism” (19) makes him the “‘pragmatist’s pragmatist’” (100), while 
Marianne Perciaccante notes that Finney’s revival methods reflected a “pragmatic understanding 
of the best way in which to reach the mass of people” (161). Yet, in many of these sources, 
Finney’s pragmatism is represented as being of the naive, Machiavellian sort - getting what you 
want by any means necessary. But Finney importantly would not have seen his approach in that 
light, as he believed his revival strategies came from divine decree: “I have always and 
everywhere used all the measures I used in these revivals, and have often added other measures 
such as the anxious seat whenever I have deemed it expedient. [...] And let me not be understood 
to take credit to myself. [...] I had no doubt then nor have I ever had that God led me by His 
Spirit to take the course I did” (Memoirs 180-81). Expediency and use value were Finney’s 
primary tools, but an appreciation of his faith and a focus on his theological beliefs should also 
be considered in discussing his role in the history of American pragmatism.117 
                                                             
117 This isn’t to suggest that beliefs operate in a vacuum, but can and do reflect the cultural specifics in 
which they emerge and are practiced. For a penetrating study of Finney’s immediate context in which his 
theology and practice were developed, Perciaccante’s deftly and thoroughly researched Calling Down 
Fire is a useful guide. I also share the school of thought to which Iain H. Murray - who is an evangelical 
scholar - belongs. In Revival and Revivalism, he criticizes Bernard Weisberger’s attempt to “‘interpret 





Nor was Finney alone in his moral crusading. Though little is known about her, Finney’s 
wife Lydia Root Andrews was active in several reform and social betterment causes. An 
outspoken proponent of abolition (unlike her taciturn husband) and a member of the Oberlin 
Maternal Association, the Female Society of Oberlin for the Promotion of Health, and the 
Oberlin Female Moral Reform Society, Lydia Andrews helped maintain communication with 
revivalist and reform correspondents as well as spearheading the organization of several of 
Finney’s revivals. It’s quite possible Andrews had mobilized similar pragmatic attitudes to her 
husband, but the extent to which this may be true remains to be seen.118  
Yet, as was true for Edwards, calling Finney a mere pragmatist, as many seem to suggest 
he is, would be a mistake. His novel approach to revivalism was a recognition of the 
obsolescence of Enlightenment epistemologies, which led him to make pragmatic incursions into 
revival psychology, but some of Finney’s theological commitments complicate naming him a 
pragmatist in the same way James was. Also true were the charges of enthusiasm levelled against 
Finney, a reminder that the Second Great Awakening was a resurrection of the first in more ways 
than one. Edwards was not far from the minds of antebellum revivalists. For many, the 
awakenings at Cane Ridge, Kentucky in 1801 and those of western New York in the 1820s were 
a sequel to the awakenings of the 1730s and 40s, yet all more or less celebrated the pious 
champion of respectable revivalism, “President Edwards.” What they differed on was what 
“proper” meant. Images - of the itinerant firebrand James Davenport conducting a mass book 
burning in New London, Connecticut and stripping himself nearly nude in protest of clerical 
materialism; of Gilbert Tennent’s direct assault on “the danger of an unconverted ministry;” and 
of George Whitefield’s “fanatical” compassing of both America’s backwaters and cityscapes - 
were frequent exemplars of how more conservative leaders believed Finney-esque revivalism 
                                                             
lies outside the bounds of serious historical discussion. Such a standpoint seeks to open a door into the 
meaning of history when the key to its significance has already been discarded” (xx).  
118  For an appreciation of Lydia Root Andrews Finney’s role in Finney’s ministry, until her death in 
1847, see Hambrick-Stowe’s Charles G. Finney and the Spirit of American Evangelicalism. Aside from 
her letters, the archive is noticeably laconic on Lydia Finney’s role in the promotion of revivals. An 
examination of that role exceeds the bounds of this dissertation, but the accounting for women’s roles in 
American revivalism, along the lines of Rosalind Rosenberg’s recovery of women pragmatists in Beyond 





could go dangerously awry, endangering unsuspecting souls in the process.119 To some, Finney 
wasn’t so much a sincere evangelist as a pompous showman who “thunders away with his 
anathemas against all who will not bow and do him reverence, terrifies weak-minded women and 
children half out of their senses” (17), as the Evangelical Magazine reported. It was certainly the 
expectation that the leading Boston Congregationalist Lyman Beecher had of Finney: 
 
Finney, I know your plan, and you know I do; you mean to come to Connecticut 
and carry a streak of fire to Boston. But if you attempt it, as the Lord liveth, I’ll 
meet you at the State line, and call out all the artillerymen, and fight every inch of 
the way to Boston, and then I’ll fight you there. (Autobiography 75) 120 
 
Though Beecher would eventually invite Finney to preach in Boston in 1831, he at first seemed 
adamant at keeping the revivalist upstart out of the historical bastion of Calvinist orthodoxy.121 
Finney’s approach to conversion was foremost a simplification of evangelical 
soteriology. To the perennial Protestant question, “how do I know I am saved,” Finney responded 
with an emphasis on doing - though exchanging the question “what shall I do?” for a compulsive 
“this is what you must do.” As the suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton recalled him saying, 
“‘[r]epent and believe,’ said he ‘that is all you have to do to be happy here and hereafter’” (42). 
Conversion takes only a simple act of will, not the relentless introspection of Bunyan’s Grace 
Abounding or the merciless self-excoriation of Michael Wigglesworth’s diary. By rethinking the 
voluntary capacities of the suffering soul in the process of conversion, advocating a strenuous 
                                                             
119 The Presbyterian Albert Baldwin Dod, one of Finney’s most vocal critics, in his lengthy October 1835 
review of Finney’s works, claimed that “[i]t is well known that [James] Davenport, against whose 
extravagant fanaticism [Jonathan] Edwards wrote at length, is redivivus in Mr. Finney, and that the same 
scenes over which he grieved and wept have been re-acted in our day under Mr. Finney’s auspices” (657).  
120 For Beecher’s many reservations against “Finneyism,” its “uncontrolled emotionalism” and Finney’s 
open acceptance of women preachers, see Hardman (123-32).  
121 Though the most famous revivalist preacher at the time, Finney was by no means the only one, nor the 
most exuberant. Other popular preachers like Jedidiah Burchard, Daniel Nash, and Jacob Knapp promoted 
their own revivals while drawing the conservative ire of orthodox ministers. See Perciaccante’s Calling 
Down Fire (42-49). See also Hambrick-Stowe’s observation that “Finney downplayed the effectiveness of 
the itinerant preachers who worked the villages of Oneida County and the North Country during his 
youth” (8-9). For Beecher’s gradual warming toward Finney and eventual invitation to Boston, see 





mode of living that would justify spiritual sincerity, and rearticulating the relationship between 
the human and the divine, Finney endorsed a distinctly practical evangelicalism built on what I 
have been pragmatic attitudes. An exploration of those attitudes will highlight the ways in which 
Finney departed from the Edwardsean tradition while adapting religious expression and faith to 
his particular historical moment.  
 
 
Redefining the Supernatural and Causality  
 
A minister should understand the philosophy of the human mind, so as to know how to plan and 
arrange his labors wisely.  
Finney, Lectures on Revivals of Religion (169)  
 
We saw in the last chapter how a reconciliation of science and religion was an objective of some 
prominent Enlightenment figures like Newton, Locke, and Edwards, and the same can be said of 
Finney. Calling for religious leaders to have a grasp of human psychology, Finney sought a 
ministerial method that accounted for the irreducibility of experience. For ministers – indeed 
anyone whose office involved people – the successful exercise of their duties relied above all on 
a grasp of human psychology. 
True to the Edwardsean tradition that limited the potency of a miracle to the parameters 
of human psychology, Finney makes revival strategies and the theologies that inform them 
dependent on the limits and current “truths” of human psychology. “All theologians do and must 
assume the truth of some system of psychology and mental philosophy,” because without a 
tentative pragmatic assumption of the functional truth of a “philosophy of the human mind,” it 
would be impossible “to construct a science of any kind, or to attain to certain knowledge upon 
any subject” (ST 12; my emphasis). Human experience becomes the irreducible common 
denominator to which psychology, philosophy, and religion must shape themselves in order to be 





justify the utility of assumed truths that provided the logic of those models; in order to save the 
eternal soul, you first had to deal with the finite body and the fallible mind.  
 Finney’s evangelical approach to conversion aligns him with the methodology of 
pragmatism, which “has no dogma, and no doctrines save its method” (Pragmatism 27). In 
Finney’s antebellum context, according to him and like-minded revivalists, there was a growing 
impatience with strict loyalties to dogmas that, as the revivalist Barton W. Stone put it, “have 
driven many into opposite extremes, and kept them from that happy medium, where truth 
commonly lies” (“Address” 10). Subscribers to Joshua Leavitt’s New York Evangelist 
complained about “too much doctrinal discussion” (McLoughlin 76). Lewis Tappan, attempting 
to recruit the Finney-convert Theodore Weld to the pastorship of New York City’s Free Church, 
griped to the young abolitionist that there was “too much ‘theology’ in the church now and too 
little of the Gospel,” announcing that “this is the field for ardent and practical men” (52).122 This 
emphasis on practicality over dogmatism, prioritization of experiential method over a 
preoccupation with getting your logic as clean as possible, and reorientation of religious duty 
around effort and effects rather than intellectual rigor, I’m arguing, are some of the ways in 
which antebellum revivalism cultivated novel conceptions of truth and practice that helped shape 
evangelicalism around the aborning logics of what would come to constitute Jamesian 
pragmatism. When Barton Stone called for “that happy medium, where truth commonly lies,” he 
was essentially asking for the same thing Joshua Leavitt was: a practical approach to religion 
grounded in experience. In other words, Finney’s attempt to make theology and philosophy 
functions of human psychology was a direct result of his reconciliation of various modes of 
thought, and it led him to assert the irreducibility of immediate experience, a fundamental 
epistemological tenet of Jamesian pragmatism.  
 The naturalizing of religious experience was of a piece with Finney’s reluctance to 
ascribe revivalism to supernatural forces. His well-known description of what a revival is makes 
it impossible that the miraculous can intrude on religion: 
                                                             
122 The brothers Arthur and Lewis Tappan were Finney’s most well-known and influential benefactors. 
For their endorsement of his evangelical crusade in New York City, see Hardman (175-78). For the 






A revival of religion is not a miracle [in the sense of] suspending the laws of 
nature. [..] All the laws of matter and mind remain in force. [...] There is nothing 
in religion beyond the ordinary powers of nature. It consists entirely in the right 
exercise of the powers of nature. It is just that, and nothing else. [...] It is a purely 
philosophical result of the right use of the constituted means - as much so as any 
other effect produced by the application of means. (LR 12) 
  
Not so much denying the existence of miracles, Finney banishes them from revivalism for the 
very reason that they are suspensions of natural laws.123 Instead, revivals are the “philosophical 
[i.e., scientific] result of the right use of the constituted means,” a sentence Hambrick-Stowe 
described as “one of the most controversial…in American religious history” (156). A revival is 
just like any other necessary outcome of specifically arranged causes. But it was that middle 
phrase - “right use” - that got Finney in the most trouble, since by “use” he was largely referring 
to human agency. The suggestion that mere humans had the power to effect their own 
conversions, to orthodox ears, risked diminishing the sovereign power of God. While his belief 
in the causal necessity of human action was hardly offensive (it had been Edwards’s position 
after all), Finney’s extension of human will to the production of revivals smacked of 
Arminianism, resurrecting the heretical shades of the seventeenth century Puritan dissenters 
Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams.   
 In readying sinners for the impingement of spiritual truth by the Holy Spirit, Finney 
revises another Christian theological tradition: the distinction between chronos and kairos. 
Referring to diachronic, ongoing time, chronos forms the basic stream of experience which 
kairos, crisis or opportunity, intersects.124  
                                                             
123 Passages like this reflect the tension in antebellum theology’s relationship with miracles. On the one 
hand, the idea of God’s providence stipulated an ever-present possibility of divine intervention in human 
affairs. On the other, such an intervention seemed to diminish the meaningfulness of human agency. In 
Finney’s case, the existence of miracles complicated humans’ ability to consent to conversion. But Finney 
doesn’t so much deny the existence of miracles as he leans on a theological reading common at the time – 
that the “apostolic age” of miracles is long over.  
124 This understanding of kairos as its own peculiar time distinct from chronos is a Christian innovation on 
the older Greek word for “target,” “opportunity,” and “opening.” For the etymological history of the word 







[C]onversion is not itself a miracle, nor do miracles themselves ever convert any 
body. They may be the means of awakening. Miracles are not always effectual 
even in that. And if continued or made common, they would soon lose their 
power. What is wanted in the world is something that can be a sort of omnipresent 
miracle, able not only to arrest attention but to fix it, and keep the mind in warm 
contact with the truth, till it yields. (LR 134-5). 
 
These passages reflect the tension in Finney’s thought between preserving the miraculous (and 
by extension avoiding challenging their role in the Gospels) and insisting on the natural self-
sufficiency of the human will. While suggesting that miracles “made common…would soon lose 
their power,” he immediately follows this by imagining that an “omnipresent miracle” may be 
useful in capturing the mind in preparation for conversion. What Finney seems to be conceiving 
of here is a field of supernatural influence subordinated to the far more important natural and 
“philosophical result” of a conversion experience.  
Finney’s assertion that miracles could never convert anyone echoes Emerson’s contention 
in his “Divinity Address” that “[t]o aim to convert a man by miracles is a profanation of the 
soul” (115), since “the word Miracle...is Monster” - monstrous because irreconcilable “with the 
blowing clover and the falling rain” (113-14).125 The antebellum redefinition of what constitutes 
a miracle derived less from the Romanticist interest in the transformative powers of nature than 
from the growing sense that nature and its laws and forms were sufficient for themselves, not 
dependent on transhuman or supernatural interventions to effect change. Put another way, the 
supernatural status of miracles comes under question because they by definition fall outside the 
only available field of empirical inquiry: concrete human experience. Finney’s desire for “a sort 
of omnipresent miracle” reflects his emphasis on a convert’s natural will being sufficient for 
itself, if kairos could be made to sanctify chronos and the spiritual benefits of crisis be made 
ever-present. In this sense, kairotic time becomes indistinguishable from diachronic flow.126  
                                                             
125 Emerson is perhaps more consistent in his rejection of miracles than Finney, who seems at times to 
overstate the naturalism of revivals and conversions while being somewhat ambiguous about whether or 
not miracles exist and what use they can serve.  
126 In chapter four, I discuss the ways in which liberal evangelicalism - of which many nineteenth century 
revivals were expressive - exchanged a conception of progressive, ongoing time for one that emphasized 





 But the conflation of kairotic and diachronic time comes with an unforeseen 
consequence. By minimizing the radical interjection of the miraculous into human affairs, and 
exchanging it with the sanctification of diachronic time, Finney opens the possibility of denying 
any significant difference between the sacred and the secular. Or, more precisely, in his desire 
for an “omnipresent miracle,” he allows that the miraculous (the sacred) occupies no special 
place apart from the temporal – secular – field in which humans live. The distinction between the 
sacred and the secular is thus flattened. Whereas Finney suggests that such a homogenized 
sanctification may be possible, his critics saw it the other way, as a swallowing - hence 
assimilation, hence elimination - of the sacred in secular time.127 This is one of the reasons why 
so many could, without any cognitive dissonance, align Finney, one of the nineteenth century’s 
most tenacious believers, with atheism. 
Finney’s rethinking of these theological distinctions was one of the major reasons 
Beecher wanted to keep him as far away from Boston as possible. It was also why, in his review 
of Systematic Theology, the orthodox Presbyterian Charles Hodge essentially accused Finney of 
a too-secular humanism. According to Hodge, the logical conclusion of Finney’s empowering of 
the human will is that “[t]here is and can be no allegiance to God as God, and hence Mr. Finney 
substitutes perpetually, ‘obedience to the Intelligence,’ to an ‘idea of the Reason,’ as 
synonymous with obedience to God…. In his whole system and of necessity God is subordinate 
to the universe” (“Art. VI” 266-67). The raising of human experience to epistemological 
respectability threatens to fracture God’s absolute authority. Hodge’s censure, it has been noted, 
was less a fair assessment of Finney’s theology than an effort to assert Calvinist dominance by 
representing detractors as intellectually misguided.128 The significance of this theological dispute 
                                                             
precipitous act of consent, he is the rightful ancestor to how religious reform movements like the Social 
Gospel conducted their reformist programs.  
127 The challenge Finney is up against in this desire for an “omnipresent miracle” is the theological 
mainstay of a sharp divide between the sacred and the secular, which many Reformed traditions like 
Calvinism held to. In this moment, we may see an example of the emergence of a concept of time 
belonging to Charles Taylor’s understanding of “secularity,” which isn’t necessarily an absence of 
religion, but a shift in our understanding of ourselves as occupying this temporal zone in which the sacred 
and secular have been flattened. See Taylor’s A Secular Age (54-61).  
128 Finney never actually refuted the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, but he did try to argue that 
sovereignty consisted not in any abstract quality, but in God’s will: “[b]y absolute, I mean, his expressed 





rests in the shift Finney promoted in treating a revival not as a spontaneous intervention of a 
sovereign God, but as a fully realizable event that could be engineered by human actors.129  
But this exclusion of supernaturalism has a practical purpose; even the possibility of 
God’s miraculous intervention would leave the impression that sinners may not be able to choose 
salvation. “We now have all the powers of moral agency,” Finney assures his audience, “we are 
just as God made us, and do not need any alteration in the substance of soul or body. [...] The 
alteration lies in the manner in which they are disposed to use, and do actually employ, their 
moral and physical powers” (“Sinners” 4-5). Finney’s abiding contention throughout his ministry 
was that reliance on an abstract absolute sovereignty offered no incentive for religious practice; 
rather than creating faithful Christians, it promoted spiritual inertia. Because there is nothing 
standing in the way of one’s turning to God, the urgency of acting now was central to Finney’s 
conversion model, a theological shift that had lasting effects beyond Finney’s ministry. 
Katherine Mortimer, the Christian agonist of Elizabeth Prentiss’s popular Stepping Heavenward 
(1869), tells her dying friend Amelia, “[g]ive yourself to Christ right now. [...] A thousand years 
would not make you more fit to die” (176). Not only is religion commensurate with the “ordinary 
powers of nature,” but those very powers are what must be instrumentalized by the “right use of 
the constituted means.”  
 But by that last phrase, Finney wasn’t also saying that the ends justify the means (the 
common accusation of amorality of which pragmatism and James are often the victims). For 
some of his critics, Finney’s fixation on ends and effects was actually an attempt to have the ends 
sanctify the means. If it is true, as one reviewer of Systematic Theology inquired, that “the ends 
sanctify the means,” then “it is right to do evil, that good may come.”130 Finney concedes that 
                                                             
129 Hodge draws several conclusions from Finney’s theology that don’t necessarily follow from Finney’s 
own views, such as emptying the atonement of any meaning and diminishing the sovereignty of God. And 
Hodge’s conservative rebuttal to Finney’s humanism didn’t remain in historical isolation. What Professor 
of Systematic Theology and minister Michael Horton finds so “destructive” about Finney’s theology is 
that it “revolved around human morality” and his emphasis on “self-salvation” (“Life”). For the ways 
Finney shifted contemporaneous understandings of what a revival was, see Murray’s Revival and 
Revivalism, Chs. 10-11. 
130 Finney’s early biographer George Frederick Wright identifies the anonymous reviewer as the orthodox 
Presbyterian Charles Hodge (216-17). Hodge is essentially charging Finney with an unscrupulous 
expediency associated with utilitarianism. However, compare what Finney actually says in Systematic 
Theology. The “doctrine of expediency...is this, that whatever is expedient is right, for the reason, that the 





“[t]he mere outward act has no moral character except as its character is derived from the end or 
design of the mind,” but his refuge lies in an argument of necessity: “if he chooses an end in 
accordance with the dictates of reason and revelation, he can not but choose the means by the 
same rule. [...] If honest in his end, he will be and must be honest in the use of means” 
(“Princeton Review” 19). For Finney, there is a necessary moral causality between the right 
selection of an end and the means used to bring it about. As he put it in his sermon “Can Two 
Walk Together Except They Be Agreed?,” “the more pure and holy the means are that are used 
to promote a revival of religion...the more like God they are, so much the more, of necessity, will 
they excite the opposition of all wrong hearts” (12).131 Far from justifying evil acts, Finney’s 
pragmatic piety knits the morality of the means to that of the effects, adopting the Scottish 
Common Sense position expressed by the Baptist educator and contemporary president of Brown 
University Francis Wayland: “as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of His 
enactment, an order of sequence, once discovered in moral, is just as invariable as an order of 
sequence in physics” (5). Because physical means and ends are logically consistent, it follows 
that the “right use of the constituted means” will produce morally consistent results as well. 
According to this causal logic, a justified saint as well as a justified sinner will act like one. 
We’ll see in the next section how Finney employed this theory of moral necessity in his 
extemporaneous preaching.  
 This defense against Machiavellian pragmatism should strike us as familiar, since it also 
echoes James’s argument in his defense of pragmatism’s conception of truth. In The Meaning of 
Truth, James devoted an entire lecture to “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its 
Misunderstanders.” Admitting that “[t]he name ‘pragmatism,’ with its suggestions of action, has 
been an unfortunate choice” (184), James challenges the misconception that pragmatism is “a 
sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally 
hates theory and wants cash returns immediately” (185). Returning to his claim that pragmatism 
considers ideas just as real as things, James connects motivating ideas to their actionable effects:  
                                                             
that measure. [...] But...utility, tendency, expediency, is only a condition of the obligation...but never the 
foundation of the obligation” (96). In other words, there can be no moral distinction between ends and 
means in a truly pious pragmatism.  
131 See also Finney’s sermon, “Doctrine of Election:” “[f]oreknowledge and election are not inconsistent 






To a certain extent our ideas, being realities, are also independent variables, and, 
just as they follow other reality and fit it, so, in a measure, does other reality 
follow and fit them. When they add themselves to being, they partly redetermine 
the existent…. This pragmatist doctrine, exhibiting our ideas as complemental 
factors of reality, throws open...a wide window upon human action, as well as a 
wide license to originality in thought. But few things could be sillier than to 
ignore the prior epistemological edifice in which the window is built, or to talk as 
if pragmatism began and ended at the window. [The critics] ignore our primary 
step and its motive, and make the relation to action, which is our secondary 
achievement, primary. (MT 185-6) 
 
The issue here is really about sincerity, a match between inner ideas and outward action, a 
dynamic signified by the figure of the window. Countering the critics who deem pragmatism to 
be a mere justification for immediate action, James asserts that the action performed by a 
pragmatist is not done independently of its motivating ideas – the materials of a constructed 
“edifice” always subject to reconstruction – which are just as real as the “reality” beyond the 
window. Ideas “fit” their realities in such a way that any account of reality would be 
“incompletely definable unless ideas also are kept account of.” James is not specifically 
addressing morality here to the extent that Finney does, but the argument of a “fitness” between 
ideas and their realized actions provides a safeguard against charges that pragmatism appeals 
only to “engineers, doctors, financiers, and men of action...who need some sort of a rough and 
ready weltanschauung” (185) that will justify action to the exclusion of motivating ideas or 
psychological sincerity.132  
                                                             
132 The field of pragmatic ethics hears more from John Dewey than James on the matter of pragmatism’s 
moral obligations. James did say, in a famous passage from Pragmatism, that “[t]he true is the name of 
whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. [...] 
If there be any life that it is really better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, 
would help us to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to believe in that idea, unless, indeed, 
belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits” (36-7). This passage is one of the reasons 
why James is usually taken to mean we can simply will ourselves to believe in things that make our lives 
better, but that’s not exactly what he’s saying: “it would be really better for us to believe in such ideas.” 
Furthermore, James does seem to equate the goodness of an idea with its individual utility, which makes 
his pragmatism - unlike Dewey’s - far more amenable to the individualism that characterizes much of his 





Finney’s emphasis on the connection between effects and means is important for another 
reason. Influenced as he was by Scottish Common Sense philosophers like Dugald Stewart and 
Thomas Reid, Finney rejected the implicit arbitrariness of Hume’s empiricism: “[f]rom the first 
appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it” (Enquiry 46). 
We cannot perceive any necessary connection between cause and effect, only the sequences they 
seem to habitually make. The effects of a conversion experience, then, would have no implicit 
justification. Finney’s “right use of constituted means,” on the contrary, enables a revival to 
achieve its philosophical result if the means God has enjoined are put to their “right exercise.” 
To Finney, no doctrine about cause and effect was more pernicious than “that there is no 
connection of the means with the result, and no tendency in the means to produce the effect” (LR 
13). To render the rational connection between means and effects arbitrary or in any way 
disconnected would be to rob volition of its properly effective role in conversion. To Finney, this 
salvifically lethal doctrine excuses spiritual indolence on the grounds that all one needs to do to 
be saved is wait God’s time.133 
And what is true for the individual is also true of the cosmos. “There is no natural event 
in which [God’s] own agency is not concerned. He has not built the creation like a vast machine 
that will go on alone without his further care. He has not retired from the universe, to let it work 
for itself. This is mere atheism” (LR 19-20). Finney is talking about deism, but his description of 
it as atheism is a result of his pragmatic loyalty to practical differences. Because the deist’s 
central claim is that God has absconded from Creation, deism is practically atheism. There is no 
part of the natural world that isn’t connected to divine agency, and to suggest God isn’t actively 
implicated in Creation is to practically promote the moral inertia and salvific stagnation implied 
                                                             
133 Finney regularly insisted that waiting God’s time was detrimental to salvation. In Systematic Theology, 
he suggested Edwards was at least partly to blame for it: “[t]he moral inability of Edwards is a real natural 
inability, and so it has been understood by sinners and professors of religion. [...] They desired me to say 
to sinners, that they could not repent, and that they must wait God’s time…. [...] To attempt to effect the 
conversion of a sinner, or to promote a revival, was an attempt to take the work out of the hands of God” 
(330-31). The same was true for many new measure revivalists. Reflecting on the state of religion in New 
England, the Baptist Jacob Knapp lamented “those hyper-Calvinistic tenets” that encouraged spiritual 
laziness by teaching that “[w]hen God wanted to convict or convert a sinner, he knew where to find him, 






in atheism.134 The same logic applies for the quality of “right:” “[r]ight is objective or subjective. 
Objective right is a mere abstraction or an idea of the fit, the suitable, and of that choice which is 
subjectively right or constitutes virtue. Can this abstraction impose obligation to will itself as an 
end? What is it? Why it is an abstraction. It is nothing in the concrete - nothing actual or 
possible” (“Princeton Review” 32). Deism is atheism for the same reason that “objective right” 
cannot impose moral obligations - abstractions and absconded deities can have no practical 
significance independent of the concrete conditions of human actors or the natural world. .  
The signification of the abstract by way of practical effects has further implications, and 
ties Finney to Jamesian thought in more compelling ways. This move to make the condition of 
meaning its manifestation in the concrete is one strategy to get beyond Cartesian dualism, the 
consequence being that mind becomes an embodied phenomenon. If we consider pragmatism’s 
condition that for abstractions to have significance they must make some difference in 
experience, there is a clear connection among Finney, James, and the twentieth century 
emergence of phenomenology, the description of faith as a totalizing embodied experience, and 
later theories of extended mind like embodied cognition and Clark and Chalmers’s “active 
externalism.”135 Finney’s insistence that religious affections be embodied experiences can help 
us rethink the potential degrees of overlap among revival theology, philosophies of mind, and the 
empirical sciences.   
                                                             
134 Finney’s attempt to make nature and God commensurate was one of the reasons why the Princeton 
theologian Benjamin B. Warfield claimed that Systematic Theology “’gives us less a theology than a 
system of morals. God might be eliminated from it entirely without essentially changing its character. All 
virtue, all holiness, is made to consist in an ethical determination of will’” (James Johnson 351). The 
anonymous reviewer of Systematic Theology too, according to Finney, “repeatedly insinuates that I 
confound God with the universe and make good will to the universe instead of love to God the great thing 
in religion” (“Princeton Review” 59). Criticisms like these, as much as Finney denied their accuracy, are 
a measure of how embedded in Calvinist orthodoxy was the theological insistence that God, though the 
creator of nature, is radically separate from it.  
135 The twentieth century theologian Paul Tillich has described acts of faith in which “every nerve of 
man’s body, every striving of man’s soul, every function of man’s spirit participates. [...] In every act of 
genuine faith the body participates, because genuine faith is a passionate act” (106). Philosophers of mind 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers are perhaps the most well-known proponents of the anti-dualist extended 
mind thesis. Their theory of “active externalism” - clearly inspired by Dewey’s idea of experience as a 
transaction between a subject and the environment - considers the role of the environment in the shaping 
of cognitive processes, seeking to explain the extent to which the “out-there” is implicated in how we use 





 The next section discusses Finney’s conversion model in detail., as well as highlighting 
the ways Finney employs the epistemological categories of variety, uncertainty, and possibility 
for productive use in the saving of souls. 
 
 
Conversion as Process - Epistemological Values of Variety, Uncertainty, and Possibility 
 
[N]o individual or school of thought could equal experience as Finney’s teacher. His doctrine, in 
fact, grew out of actions which met the pragmatic test; success could be measured only in 
numbers of converts and in the apparent intensity of their convictions. Thus it was that Finney’s 
chief contribution in the New York campaigns was not a theology but a set of practices.  
 
Whitney Cross, The Burned-Over District (160) 
 
Finney was, according to most accounts, an imposing figure. “He had a magnificent physique,” 
Cochran recalled, “and walked with a quick elastic step that made people instinctively turn and 
look at him” (13).136 One famous image of him depicts a bracing posture with piercing, deep-set 
eyes that make it easy to imagine why so many accounts of his preaching frequently mention rapt 
audiences stricken with excruciating fear for their souls. Recalling her girlhood in Troy during a 
Finney revival, the future suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton remembered him as “a terrifier of 
human souls” (41), describing his oratory in the fashion he became known for: 
 
I can see him now, his great eyes rolling around the congregation and his arms 
flying about in the air like those of a windmill. One evening he described hell and 
the devil and the long procession of sinners being swept down the rapids, about to 
make the awful plunge into the burning depths of liquid fire below…. He 
                                                             
136 For a glowing description of Finney’s intellectually and athletically vigorous youth, see Cochran (13-
18). See also Robert Aikman’s memorial article in The Independent two weeks after Finney’s death: “[h]e 
was a very striking figure in the pulpit . About six feet in hight [sic], erect and long-armed, with a lofty 
forehead and a large gray eye, whose gaze seemed now to sweep over a whole audience and then to pierce 





suddenly halted and, pointing his index finger at the supposed procession, he 
exclaimed: 
  ‘There, do you not see them!’ 
 I was wrought up to such a pitch that I actually jumped up and gazed in 
the direction to which he pointed…. [...] Fear of the judgment seized my soul. 
Visions of the lost haunted my dreams. Mental anguish prostrated my health. 
Dethronement of my reason was apprehended by friends. (Eighty Years 42-3)137 
 
 
Stanton’s recollection of Finney’s fiery, reason-smiting oratory illustrates the preacher’s 
radical use of direct address, appeals to immediate experience, and rhetorical sundering 
of the boundary between the worlds of matter and spirit, a Lockean conflation of thing 
and idea.138 Her affections raised to the utmost pitch, Stanton gained a clarity of spiritual 
sight that realized the world beyond matter yet consequentially bound to it. Where 
Edwards described his sense of the heart as a new yet somewhat vague understanding of 
spiritual truth, Finney described hellscapes of unthinkable suffering whose anxiety-
inducing hyper-reality was practically indistinguishable from parishioners’ lived 
                                                             
137 Compare Stanton’s account with Cochran’s description of his late grandfather: “[w]hen in the full tide 
of his eloquence, [his eyes] swept his audience like search lights, fascinating, compelling attention, yet 
producing strange, uneasy feelings” (16). He continued: “[i]t was an exposition of merciless justice; of 
what guilt men had the right to expect...and of the terrors that would overtake them when judgment was at 
hand. Then, right before our eyes, he conjured up such a fearful storm of wind, rain and hail that I grew 
chilled through and through. I shivered and buttoned my coat up tight and I saw uneasiness and 
apprehension depicted on the faces of all around me” (68-9). Rev. Charles Bush recalled Finney’s ample 
use of vocal energy and homiletic realism: “[a]s the preacher uttered this sentence, he stood at his full 
height, tall and majestic - stood as if transfixed, gazing and pointing toward the emblazoned cloud, as it 
seemed to roll up before him; his clear, shrill voice rising to its highest pitch…. [T]here were no sleepers 
within the sound of that clarion voice” (Reminiscences 12).  
138 One easily overlooked innovation of Finney’s preaching is his regular use of the second person 
pronoun “you” in addressing his congregations, a small alteration in conventional sermonizing that 
produced large effects: “[w]hat is personal preaching? No individual is ever benefited by preaching unless 
he is made to feel that it means him. [...] It often appears so personal, to wicked men, that they feel as if 
they were just going to be called out by name before the congregation” (LR 219). See also Finney’s 
Memoirs: “I could name ministers who...were greatly ashamed of me when I first began to preach because 
I was so undignified in the pulpit, used language in such common use, addressed the people with such 
directness, and said ‘you,’ and because I aimed not at all at ornament, or at supporting the dignity of the 





realities.139 Where Edwards gently excused reason from his sense of the heart, Finney 
blasted it right out of the mind.  
 The violent dethronement of Stanton’s reason and her subsequent prolonged 
illness (which she attributed to Finney’s preaching) was shocking to more moderate and 
conservative revivalists, who saw less of proper religion in Finney’s preaching than a 
theatrical assault on the senses.140 Yet the deployment of a radical homiletic realism in 
provoking the affections was in keeping with the Edwardsean stress on the fundamental 
parity of human faculties. According to this theory, raising the affections to the level of 
ironclad conviction would naturally be accompanied by a corresponding muscularization 
of a will primed for consent. A dethroned reason was a small price to pay when what 
mattered was the activation of a will that could consent to an offering of grace.  
Whitney Cross’s portrayal of Finney as a diligent student of experience is true for how he 
gauged the success of his ministry, and for the efficacy of ministers attempting to initiate 
conversions. In his Memoirs, he made direct experience a crucial qualification for a successful 
preacher: “[w]ithout the direct teaching of the Holy Spirit, a man will never make much progress 
in preaching the Gospel. The fact is, unless he can preach the Gospel as an experience, present 
religion to mankind as a matter of consciousness, his speculations and theories will come far 
                                                             
139 Henry B. Stanton corroborates his wife’s depiction of Finney’s visceral homiletics: “[h]e painted in 
vivid colors. He gave his imagination full play. [...] As he would stand with his face toward the side 
gallery, and then involuntarily wheel around, all the audience in that part of the house toward which he 
threw his arm would dodge as if he were hurling something at them. In describing the sliding of a sinner 
to perdition, he would lift his long finger toward the ceiling and slowly bring it down till it pointed to the 
area in front of the pulpit, when half his hearers in the rear of the house would rise unconsciously to their 
feet to see him descend into the pit below” (26). This provocation of the affections in an effort to activate 
the will was the practical application of Finney’s psychological theory of the intrinsic interplay of the will 
and the affections. 
140 Traveling in America, the English novelist Frances Trollope related her shock at witnessing young 
girls on the anxious bench at a Cincinnati revival: “[y]oung creatures, with features pale and distorted, fell 
on their knees on the pavement, and soon sunk forward on their faces; the most violent cries and shrieks 
followed. [...] More than once I saw a young neck encircled by a reverend arm. Violent hysterics and 
convulsions seized many of them…. It was a frightful sight to behold innocent young creatures...thus 
seized upon, horror struck, and rendered feeble and enervated for ever. One young girl...had every 





short of preaching the Gospel” (43; my emphasis).141 Mere intellectualism is ineffective in 
achieving the requisite conviction of a sincere conversion. The primacy of direct, unmediated 
experience, sensitive to the infinite variability of human consciousness, is the epistemological 
core of Finney’s revivalism. The stipulation that, in order for the Gospel to have an appreciable 
effect it must show its “cash value in experiential terms” (Pragmatism 88), makes Finney’s 
preaching one of the first examples of nineteenth century evangelicalism’s emerging pragmatic 
character.  
So crucial was the immediacy of experience to a successful revival, in fact, that 
any attempt to introduce mediating measures threatened to curtail the work of the Holy 
Spirit. Finney’s correspondent and Presbyterian minister Daniel Nash cautioned Finney 
over the use of his sermon skeletons - outlines of basic homiletic points used to assist 
ministers in extemporaneous preaching.142 “I should advise you to be careful about using 
skeletons in preaching. Whatever may be the effect on you, I am persuaded they would 
injure my spirituality. [...] [W]hen you preach, throw yourself entirely on God” 
(Hambrick-Stowe 123). Any reliance on tools that distracted from the immediate 
experience risked diluting the power of the Spirit.  
Another possible disruption to a personal conversion experience was a reliance on 
standardized conversion models. One of the reasons Mark Noll declared that “[b]eyond 
                                                             
141 The question of ministerial qualifications in leading a revival or facilitating conversions had been 
pondered by clergymen since the time of Edwards. Solomon Stoddard stipulated the importance that 
professors of religion “get experience of this work in their own hearts. If they have not experience, they 
will be but blind guides” (Guide 27). The Presbyterian minister Gilbert Tennent’s notorious 1742 sermon, 
“The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry,” was intended as an assault on the legitimacy of ministers who 
themselves had not undergone the experience of conversion (or whose claims to conversion were 
questionable). His sermon generated no shortage of controversy, especially among the Presbyterian and 
Congregationalist elite. 
142 In the Charles Grandison Finney Presidential Papers archive at Oberlin College, one can find 
Finney’s “commonplace book,” a small notebook featuring examples of Finney’s sermon skeletons. Such 
methods were not uncommon at the time, and were valued because of the immediacy and spontaneity 
they lent to a minister’s preaching. The English nonconformist Jabez Burns’s Five Hundred Sketches and 
Skeletons, for example, prescribed that “the profit of our auditory should ever be first, - ever pre-eminent. 
Compared with this, every thing else is trifling an unimportant” (iv). By “profit,” Burns was emphasizing 






doubt, [Finney] stands as the crucial figure in white American evangelicalism after 
Jonathan Edwards” (176), is because, like Edwards, Finney’s conversion methods 
reflected a sensitivity to experiential variety and possibility. “To suppose that...because in 
some instances, sinners have had those horrors of conscience, and fears of hell, before 
they would yield, that therefore they are necessary, and that all sinners must experience 
them before they can change their hearts,” is “unwarrantable” (“How to Change” 31). 
These pragmatic methods were a challenge to Calvinist predestination, a doctrine that 
some revivalists felt outright canceled incentives to pursue the epistemological values of 
possibility and uncertainty. The intellectual proximity to Jamesian pragmatism’s 
epistemology is apparent in Varieties of Religious Experience:  
 
[n]o two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to 
work out identical solutions. Each, from his peculiar angle of observation, 
takes in a certain sphere of fact and trouble, which each must deal with in 
a unique manner. (487)  
 
The radical relativity of experience translates into the idea that the true spiritual life is 
lived idiosyncratically. The individual mind, with its “peculiar angle of observation,” not 
transcendent categories or abstract concepts, becomes the measure of the “truth” of a 
conversion. Like Edwards and David Brainerd’s complaints with the shortcomings of an 
overly paradigmatic conversion morphology, Finney privileges the infinite possibilities of 
experience over doctrine, individual discovery over received opinion.143 New Light 
revivalists explicitly instructed camp meeting attendees, during worship, to “not take 
your particular experience as the standard for others” (Penuel 264). The epistemological 
outlook that respects individual human experience as such, and that can handle a 
                                                             
143 In Lectures on Revivals of Religion, Finney mentions David Brainerd by name, using him as an 
example of the dangers of any strategy of conversion that focused on the affections to the exclusion of an 
energizing act of will: “Sinners are often wholly taken up with looking at themselves, to see if they cannot 
find something there, some kind of feeling or other, that will recommend them to God. Evidently...David 
Brainard [sic] was a long time taken up with his state of mind, looking for some feelings that would 
recommend him to God. [...] Thus, the poor man, for want of correct instruction, was driven almost to 
despair…much impaired by the false philosophy he had adopted on this point” (358). Where Edwards 





seemingly endless proliferation of empirical data motivates in turn the development of an 
empiricism radical enough to account for it.144 Why Finney can be seen as the historical 
mediator between Edwardsean revivalism and the activist evangelicalism of the 
postbellum era is a direct consequence of his defense of a pluralistic appreciation of 
experiential variety, the fundamental fact that no two conversions are necessarily the 
same.  
Nascent in this attention to the unpredictability of individual subjectivities is a 
respect for uncertainty. Contrary to more conservative approaches to revivals, such as 
those of Lyman Beecher, revivalism under Finney had at its center an irresolvable 
unpredictability about the “proper” measures, an uncertainty remedied by an appreciation 
of the practical circumstances surrounding the revival. As he puts it in Lectures on 
Revivals, “God has established no particular system of measures to be employed and 
invariably adhered to in promoting religion.” He considers this open-endedness to be 
particular to Christianity, as the “forms” under the “Jewish dispensation” “were all 
typical, and were designed to shadow forth Christ…. [...] Therefore they were fixed, and 
all their details particularly prescribed by Divine authority. But it was never so under the 
Gospel” (238). Unlike Judaism, epistemological uncertainty is endemic to Christianity.   
Finney went further: 
 
[w]e are left in the dark as to the measures which were pursued by the apostles 
and primitive preachers, except so far as we can gather it from occasional hints in 
the book of Acts. [...] When Jesus Christ was on earth, laboring among his 
disciples, he had nothing to do with forms or measures. He did from time to time 
in this respect just as it would be natural for any man to do in such cases, without 
anything like a set form or mode of doing it” (238-39). 
 
                                                             
144 This amplification of empirical data in Finney’s epistemology is another reason why I believe James’s 
radical empiricism itself can be viewed in relation to changes in American Protestantism. This isn’t to 
suggest that Finney can be called a radical empiricist by any stretch. What has yet to be disclosed in 
American intellectual history is the way in which James’s radical empiricism comes to be thinkable and 





Finney employed a productive uncertainty regarding the measures of revivals. It’s no obstacle if 
we know little about the circumstances of ancient Christian practice; Christ - who in this passage 
comes across as a practical man of experimental action - is the enduring model that will shape 
that uncertainty to human interests. In Finney’s account, “[w]hen Christ came, the ceremonial or 
typical dispensation was abrogated, because the design of those forms was fulfilled, and 
therefore themselves of no further use” (238). The “forms” having “no further use,” Christ does 
the “natural” thing - to adopt a pragmatic tentativeness toward the utility of forms and to preach 
“the Gospel in the most effectual way, to make the truth stand out strikingly, so as to obtain the 
attention and secure the obedience of the greatest number possible” (239). It’s little wonder why 
William McLoughlin noted that “[t]he new criteria of religious fervor were quantitative, to be 
measured by the number of days a revival lasted and by the number of conversions obtained” 
(129). For Finney, a revival was true if it worked. 
Emphasizing the pragmatic attitudes of Christ’s preaching, Finney interpreted religion as 
a practical endeavor that must be prepared to adjust itself to a variety of more or less 
unpredictable circumstances. The only legitimate function of forms and measures are as 
heuristics, provisional measures that may enhance the success of religious practice, but are never 
equivalent to or sufficient replacements for it. As Finney put it, “[w]henever the churches get 
settled down into a form of doing things, they soon get to rely upon the outward doing of it, and 
so retain the form of religion while they lose the substance” (LR 255). The substance of religion, 
in other words, was an experience in the Jamesian and Deweyan vein: a process.  
Among Systematic Theology’s many revisions of Old Light Calvinist theology, the 
embrace of process over closed system is its most original, and one that links antebellum 
revivalism epistemologically to Jamesian pragmatism. From the outset, what Finney calls 
“Christian consistency” attempts to blend Christian practice with scientific empirical inquiry:  
 
The discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there 
is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world. True 
Christian consistency does not consist in our stereotyping our opinions and 
views…. [...] Christian consistency implies continued investigation and 







Finney’s scientific conception of truth as ever-evolving adopted the Edwardsean 
appreciation for ongoing experiential flux. His argument that truth for “finite minds in 
any world” is an ongoing process turns the experience of garnering that truth into an 
open-ended experiential journey of discovery evacuated of predetermined teleology. Heir 
to that tradition, James made flux and variability a fundamental condition of 
pragmatism’s epistemology: “[s]o far as reality means experienceable reality, both it and 
the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mutation - mutation towards a 
definite goal, it may be - but still mutation” (Pragmatism 99). By accepting the 
irreducible flux of “experienceable reality,” Finney at once delegitimized loyalties to 
traditions for their own sakes and argued that Christian practice was equivalent to 
scientific inquiry.  
Significantly, furthermore, Finney does not say “discovery of the truth.” His 
remarks on “Christian consistency” are an effort to reconcile scientific inquiry with 
Christian practice, but not to associate either with pretensions to absolute claims to truth. 
In doing so, he maintains his loyalty to experiential variety while avoiding the suggestion 
of a monolithic unified order of truth, an order that practically doesn’t exist for “finite 
minds,” but only in the eternal reality of God. He would say as much to ministers who 
challenged his preaching methods: “‘[s]how me a more excellent way. Show me the fruits 
of your ministry; and if the fruits of your ministry so far exceed mine as to give me 
evidence that you have found out a more excellent way than I have, I will adopt your 
views” (Memoirs 66). The common thread between being Christian and being a scientist - 
the only one Finney thinks is significant, at least - is the humility to change one’s views 
in the face of new data, a pragmatic approach to saving souls that puts Finney’s 
evangelicalism in immediate epistemological proximity with Jamesian pragmatism.   
Interestingly, Finney has mapped these two conceptions of truth - one tentative 
and subject to modifications from new experiences, the other codified and closed - onto 
denominational affiliation. The ossification and institutionalization of truth and 
uncompromising adherence to doctrine, in fact, is the mark of that longstanding 





to frame for the church an authoritative standard of opinion which shall be regarded as an 
unquestionable exposition of the word of God, is not only impious in itself, but it is also a 
tacit assumption of the fundamental dogma of Papacy” (ST 3).145 Catholicism represents 
the stultification of progress; “Christian consistency,” and its covenant with open-ended 
scientific inquiry and respect of individual experience, represents the progressivist pursuit 
of new knowledge. Bear in mind, Finney does not say “Protestant,” but uses the more 
ecumenical “Christian” to denote progressive truth seeking - a rhetorical move signaling 
not only that “Papists” cannot be true Christians, but that the association between 
Christianity and a pragmatic tentativeness toward truth is a normative one.146 
 This uniquely “Christian” experimentalism toward conversion demands, in turn, 
something that a “standard of opinion” effectively cancels: the muscularization of the 
human will. In the next section, I discuss Finney’s most controversial psycho-theological 






                                                             
145 Finney was by no means alone in his treatment of Catholics as obsessed with traditionalism and whose 
doctrines were antithetical to American values of freedom and self-determination. Highly popular 
narratives like Maria Monk’s Awful Disclosures (1836) and Rebecca Reed’s Six Months in a Convent 
(1835) are staples of the anti-Catholic propagandistic literature of the American nineteenth century. 
Depicting convents as Catholic methods of polluting the minds of young women, murdering the 
illegitimate offspring of priests, and indoctrinating superstitious beliefs in unvigilant (usually female) 
Protestant minds were only some of the images these narratives helped to popularize. For what is perhaps 
the definitive study on anti-Catholic literature and sentiment of the time, see Jenny Franchot’s Roads to 
Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter with Catholicism.  
146 In the epilogue, I discuss the ways in which liberal evangelicalism, over the course of the nineteenth 
century, assumed a normative cultural dominance whose effects we still feel today. Finney’s antithesis 
between “Catholic” and “Christian” is also implicitly between “Catholic” and “Protestant,” the latter of 
which will increasingly come to be identified with “American” to the extent that the invocation of the one 





Willing Converts in Antebellum Revivalism 
 
The water of life is really as free as natural water; and this we all know is the common gift of 
Providence to man and beast. But the condition is, that we should will to receive it - that we 
acknowledge it to be the water of life.  
    Sampson Reed, Observations on the Growth of the Mind (vi) 
 
Six months before the New Lebanon Conference where Finney’s new measure revivalism 
encountered the scrutiny of New England orthodoxy, the Congregationalist pastor and fierce 
Finney critic Asahel Nettleton sent a letter to the minister of Utica, New York, Samuel Aiken, 
admonishing Finney on challenging the authority of settled pastors and charging the revivalist 
with brewing a “civil war in Zion - a domestic broil in the household of faith” (Tyler 249).147 
Nettleton allegedly intended Aiken to have Finney see the letter.148 Finney did indeed see it, and, 
rightly nettled, snubbed his theological opponent directly from Aiken’s Utica pulpit, doubling 
down on the revival strategies that made his name notorious throughout western New York’s 
“burned-over district.” 
One of these strategies was to continue the Edwardsean emphasis on the role of the 
affections in a conversion experience.149 At Troy in March, 1827, not long after he read 
Nettleton’s denunciatory letter, Finney preached one of his most well-known sermons: “Can 
Two Walk Together Except They Be Agreed?” The sermon reads like an antebellum version of 
                                                             
147 For Finney’s account of what transpired at New Lebanon, see his Memoirs (169-77).  
148 For the account of Nettleton’s obstructive actions leading up to the New Lebanon Conference, see 
Hardman, Ch. 6. Finney touches on the letter briefly in his Memoirs (174). Bennet Tyler’s memoir of 
Nettleton claims that, while Nettleton sought a diplomatic solution to pastorate schisms, “[h]e found that 
Mr. F[inney] was utterly unwilling to abandon certain measures” (247). Yet throughout his own memoir, 
Finney consistently asserts that these apparent contentions had been exaggerated. For an account of this 
epistolary controversy between Nettleton and Finney, and Nettleton’s criticisms of Finney’s Edwardsean 
sermon, see also Wright (75-81) and Murray (230-31).  
149 As Hardman points out, Finney had direct access to Edwards’s Religious Affections while he stayed in 
the home of Samuel Aiken in 1827 (117). Though, considering the reputation of Edwards’s text in 
theological and revivalist circles, it is very unlikely that Finney would have been ignorant of even its 





Edwards’s Religious Affections. “All pleasure and pain,” Finney intoned, “all happiness and 
misery, belonging to the mind - all sin and holiness, have their seat in, and belong to, the heart or 
affections” (1). The sermon’s central thesis, that the agreement of affections between people is of 
more concern than their intellectual or theoretical agreement, is also implicitly an argument that 
feeling is knit to voluntary action in ways the intellect isn’t. 
“For two to be agreed,” Finney began, 
 
implies something more than to be agreed in theory, or in understanding: for we 
often see persons who agree in theory, but who differ vastly in feeling and 
practice. Their understandings may embrace the same truths, while their hearts 
and practice will be very differently affected by them. Saints and sinners often 
embrace in theory the same religious creed, while it is plain that they differ 
widely in feeling and practice. (1)  
 
Across three similarly sounding sentences, this passage insists that theory/understanding/creed 
occupy one side of the religious life, while feeling (or heart) and practice are aligned on the 
other. Internal affections are signified by practice. “We are to know each other by our fruits,” 
Finney says elsewhere. “This is expressly given in the Bible as the rule of judgment in the case. 
[...] It seems difficult to rid men of the prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in 
experiences in which they are altogether passive” (ST 302). James had the same idea: “[i]f your 
feeling bear no fruits in my world, I call it utterly detached from my world; I call it a solipsism, 
and call its world a dream-world” (MT 23). Finney’s emphasis on how affections make us more 
willing to act is not so much an example of his patronizing his audience as it is a marker of the 
orthodox formalism he felt himself going up against. When, at the end of the sermon, Finney 
referred to the “lukewarm and ungodly,” he was talking about Beecher and Nettleton, both of 
whom didn’t fail to catch the implication.  
Part of that formalism advocated an approach to conversion that kept the potentially 
volatile affections in check while using reasoned arguments to reach an intellectual 
understanding of spiritual truth. But again, Finney went to some length to countermand this 





understanding of the ineluctable variability of human experience. The sermon typifies Finney’s 
use of psychological openendedness as a justification for a humanistic conversion model: 
 
These different effects, produced in different minds by the same truths, are owing 
to the different state of the heart or affections of the different individuals. Or, in 
other words, the difference in the effects consists in the different manner in which 
the person receives these truths, or feels and acts in view of them. It is to be 
observed, also, that the same things and truths will affect the same mind very 
differently at different times. This, too, is owing to the different state of the 
affections at these times. (1) 
 
Following the Edwardsean dictum that true religion consists in the affections, Finney made 
radical contingency of the affections a powerful - if unpredictable - agent in the conversion 
process. Conversion is not a one-size-fits-all process, but one in which the affections are 
powerful modulators of spiritual sight. The fact that minds are “different” - a word appearing 
nine times throughout the paragraph - and respond differently to the “same truths” is not only a 
consequence of the Fall (or the scattering of Babel), but a fundamental psychological condition, 
necessitating a model of conversion that is flexible and tailor-made to individual sinners 
according to their peculiar subjectivities. “Human experiences differ as human countenances 
differ” (ST 409), and that difference is inextricable.  
 The central reason orthodox formalism was so stultifying to Finney, though, was that it 
provided no rationale for Christians to convert. Along with the doctrine of total depravity, 
absolute sovereignty marked the human will as congenitally defective, incapable of producing 
any good acts - the “old terrorism,” as Washington Gladden called it (Recollections 428). Finney 
continued the liberal revivalist challenge to the regnant Augustinian notion of good as positive 
creation and sin as negation or absence.150 
 The volitional gridlock inherent to total depravity came in conflict with the growing 
voluntarism of antebellum America, and Finney and many New School ministers sought to 
                                                             
150 Augustine’s influential theodicy (which he learned from the third century A.D. Neoplatonic 
philosopher Plotinus) is a simple formulation: “evil is not a positive substance: the loss of good has been 





invest conversion processes with a volitional component that would manifest beliefs in 
practice.151 A more liberal interpretation that affected a variety of traditional orthodoxies and 
denominations, the New School – spearheaded by figures like Joseph Bellamy, Timothy Dwight, 
and Nathaniel William Taylor – sought to make human agency central to the conversion process. 
One of Finney’s so-called “new measures” was to centralize consent, the primary volitional act 
Finney learned from his own conversion struggle at Adams, New York, in 1821:  
 
I had become very nervous, and in the night a strange feeling came over me as if I 
was about to die. [...] [S]omething seemed to confront me with questions...as if an 
inward voice said to me, “What are you waiting for? Did you not promise to give 
your heart to God? [...]  
 [...] Indeed, the offer of Gospel salvation seemed to me to be an offer of 
something to be accepted, and that it was full and complete; and that all that was 
necessary on my part, was to get my own consent to give up my sins, and give 
myself to Christ. (Memoirs 11) 
 
“What are you waiting for?” was indeed the question, as antebellum revivalism frequently used a 
discourse of crisis that framed conversion not as a series of predetermined steps that would 
incrementally lead one to God, but as an immediate choice. A question that is also a call to 
action, “what are you waiting for?’ enhances the immediacy of the decision one must make. Of 
course, what certified Finney’s revival strategy was that he had firsthand experience of its 
salvific efficacy. 
Consent, then, became the key to successful conversions. Finney essentially brought 
legalism into the realm of religion. Recalling his legal training, “I bought my first Bible as a law-
book, and laid it by the side of my Blackstone” (SGT 273). The English jurist Sir William 
                                                             
151 This inclusion of the positive affordances of volition is another area where Finney reworks Edwards’s 
conception of freedom. After quoting his thoughts on “natural ability” from Freedom of the Will (38-9), 
Finney interjects that Edwards’s “definition of natural ability, or natural liberty, as he frequently calls it, 
wholly excludes the power to will, and includes only the power or ability to execute our volitions. Thus it 
is evident, that natural ability, according to him, respects external action only, and has nothing to do with 
willing” (303-4). Finney interprets Edwards’s “freedom” of the will to consist in its negative nature. 
Finney believes that the human will can be a positive force. For a record of the extent to which New 
School ministers strove to overcome the orthodox mandate of God’s exclusive initiative in effecting 





Blackstone - required reading for any Anglo-American jurist in training - was highly influential 
in making voluntary acts the logical basis for their punishment: “[a]n involuntary act, as it has no 
claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its 
choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human 
action either praiseworthy or culpable” (Commentaries 20). We’ll see the further implications of 
this passage, but what it told Finney was that the inaction of waiting God’s time doesn’t render 
the convert morally exculpable; what mattered in the valuation of an act was the consent of the 
will. One couldn’t will oneself into a conversion state, but, by following the promptings of the 
Holy Spirit, one could consent to it.  
 But even that for some was going too far. The Princeton theologian and mathematician 
Albert Baldwin Dod’s scathing 1832 review of Finney’s Lectures and Sermons targeted the 
suggestion that the human will could in any way affect the power of God. According to Dod, 
Finney 
 
speaks of a “state of things, in which it is impossible for God or man to promote 
religion but by powerful excitements.” [...] Then may we rightly teach...that God, 
thwarted in his wishes and plans by the obstinacy of the human will, is literally 
grieved by the perverse conduct of men; and sinners may properly be exhorted...to 
forsake their sins from compassion for their suffering Maker! (491)152 
 
The eighteenth century language of enthusiasm has been dampened, but the same suspicion of 
“powerful excitements” remains to contest the proper conduct during a revival. Followed to its 
logical conclusion, Dod argued, Finney’s muscularization of the will had the effect of 
diminishing the infinite power of God, thereby exonerating sinners from seeking repentance. 
                                                             
152 Dod seems to be exaggerating Finney’s focus on the excitability of the affections here. In Systematic 
Theology, Finney explained that promoting excessive enthusiasm isn’t exactly a sustainable practice: “[a] 
high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without producing inflammation of the brain, and 
consequent insanity. And the law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental excitement, 
inconsistent with life and health. [...] [H]ere is one grand mistake of the church. They have supposed that 
the revival consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in conformity of the human will to 
the law of God. [...] Excitement is often important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will 
are infinitely more important” (130). See also Finney’s sermon “How to Change Your Heart:” “you 





Dod’s review constituted the basic “old school” counterattack to Finney’s revivalism and its 
disastrous implications for God’s sovereignty, predestination, total depravity, and the 
atonement.153 Giving even an inch to the human will, it seemed, threatened to topple the entire 
Calvinist edifice.  
But Dod was right about Finney’s attention to producing excitements, and he would have 
been right in the same way about James, who argued that the best way to understand an 
experience was to look at its extreme manifestations: “it always leads to a better understanding 
of a thing’s significance to consider its exaggerations and perversions, its equivalents and 
substitutes and nearest relatives elsewhere” (VRE 22).154 An experience’s adherence to 
convention tells you nothing about it beyond the social creeds and customs to which it adheres. 
Whatever personal or social significance it may have is buried under external forms that distort 
its original “purity.” The underlying assumption in Finney and James’s preference for radical 
excitation is that the truth of an experience rests in its idiosyncrasy, its bursting beyond 
conventional boundaries, and an implicit argument that forms or disciplines that attempt to bridle 
the rawness of experience threaten to corrupt its truth-bearing immediacy. Not that extremes of 
experience are necessarily the only means by which an experience can be understood, but it does 
indicate the degree to which these writers believed lived experience had been – or was threatened 
to be – supplanted by obedience to a variety of orthodoxies and social conventions. A distrust of 
                                                             
153 I have no doubts Dod was sincere in his criticisms of Finney, whom he believed was simply repeating, 
“without any qualification, the doctrine which the New Haven school was at first understood to teach” 
(486). Popularized by Nathaniel W. Taylor, who helped found the Yale Divinity School, New Haven 
theology eschewed such Calvinist mainstays as imputed sin and physical depravity, rejected the notion of 
the atonement as a sacrifice, and emphasized the moral responsibility of sinners over a state of depravity. 
Charles Hodge worried that “this mode of preaching, is to keep the Holy Spirit and his influences out of 
view; and we fear a still more serious objection is, that Christ and his cross are practically made of none 
effect. [...] The specific act to which the sinner is urged as immediately connected with salvation, is an act 
which has no reference to Christ” (301). For a discussion on the impact of Dod’s lengthy review, see 
Hardman (286-92).  
154 This is a nicer way of what James’s father said about criminals: “[t]he liar, the thief, the adulterer, the 
murderer, no doubt utterly perverts the Divine life which is latent in every human form...but he 
nevertheless does all this in the way of a mute unconscious protest against an overwhelming social 
tyranny [and] I am profoundly convinced that if it had not been for these men...the underlying life and 
freedom of humanity...would have been utterly stifled, and we should now be a race of abject slaves” 
(CLC 105-106). In his later works, Henry James Sr scaled back such commentary that would have 
shocked his Boston neighbors, but the principle remained that extremes of experience demonstrate their 





creeds in favor of direct, idiosyncratic experience is yet another reason why I argue Finney and 
Emerson can be seen to occupy parallel positions in the history of American pragmatism – 
indeed, asking us to reconsider its hitherto presumed secular narrative.  
I mentioned that Finney’s conversion experience in the woods of Adams, New York was 
important for its immediate, personal character, whose “working” for Finney gave him a method 
of conversion that didn’t rely on mere intellectual assent to God’s glory, but a direct experience 
of its unquestionable reality. But it was important for another reason, as it provided the evidence 
for a radical redistribution of the faculties and their relation to one another. To properly actuate a 
conversion process, sinners 
 
ought to be made to see that what God requires of them is to will right. If they 
obey and submit with the will, the feelings will adjust themselves in due time. It is 
not a question of feeling, but of willing and acting. (LR 356).  
 
 
Whereas conventional Enlightenment epistemology understood experience to begin in the senses 
and passions, filtered through the reason, and ultimately issuing in an informed act of will, 
Finney reverses the sequence, making an act of will the initiating factor in the epistemic chain in 
which “the feelings will adjust themselves in due time.” It isn’t enough, as some antebellum 
audiences were told by Harriet Beecher Stowe, that “[t]here is one thing that every individual can 
do, - they can see to it that they feel right” (404). To Finney, feeling isn’t doing, as Stowe’s oft-
cited appeal to the emotions implies. The only thing that will make any meaningful difference is 
an act of will. To Stowe, Finney would have retorted, as Perry Miller tells us he did to his 
converts, “[d]on’t wait for feeling, DO IT” (33).155 
Another proximity is William James’s conception of the will in one of his more 
controversial essays, “The Will to Believe.”156 His goal in the essay is to refute the claim of 
                                                             
155 Though Miller claims Finney said this, it’s unclear where he got it from (he gives no citation). In any 
case, the statement stands as a neat encapsulation of Finney’s revival methods.  
156 Despite James’s careful attempts to obviate misunderstandings about the “will to believe” (which he 
later felt he should’ve called the “right to believe”), the essay is still one of those pieces of evidence 





“pure intellectualism” that, in cases where we are not in possession of all the facts or where logic 
is insufficient to get at truth, we ought to take the safer course in suspending our will to engage 
the unknown. “[T]his command,” James thinks, “seems to me the queerest idol ever 
manufactured in the philosophic cave” (30), because it removes what for James is the best 
verification for truths that work for us: action, even if that action results in our being duped. 
“I...for one,” James writes, “cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, 
or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game” (28). For James, the risk is inherent 
in the game, and no amount of intellectual caution, logical prudence, or obedience to 
preestablished forms can replace the criterion of action.   
The Blackstonian legal turn had its theological consequences for the doctrine of imputed 
guilt. Reflecting in 1843 on his disagreements with the Presbyterian Confession of Faith decades 
earlier, Barton Stone believed that “according to the law, every soul was to die for his own sins; 
even a son should not die for the father, nor the father for the son” (Life 88), repudiating the 
scriptural promise - often used to justify original sin - that God will “[visit] the iniquity of the 
father upon the children, and upon the children’s children, unto the third and to the fourth 
generation” (KJV Exod 34:7). Evacuated of the imputation of guilt, the doctrine of original sin 
becomes not a metaphysical attribute but a disposition to will sinful acts. It has been argued by 
scholars like Jay Fliegelman, Gregory Jackson, and Karen Haltunnen that the hammer blow to 
the doctrine of original sin was most powerfully wielded by Locke’s tabula rasa, the absolute 
cognitive vacuity into which all minds are born.157 However, we can also say that the 
reinterpretation of original sin and total depravity and the rise of American antebellum optimism 
owed as much to the emergence of consent as a factor in conversion. Since no one really - as in 
                                                             
does James make the case that it is psychologically possible or ethically permissible to arbitrarily select 
our own beliefs.  
157 Jay Fliegelman’s argument about colonial American childhood pedagogy fixes Locke as the virtual 
progenitor of this sea change: “Locke argued that a child’s character is not inherited at birth but rather is 
‘created’ by the sum total of sense impressions and experiences written on the blank slate of his mind” 
(2). By a similar token, Gregory Jackson argues that colonial Protestants developed an “inoculation 
theology” that could ensure moral protection for children born without knowledge of sin: “[w]ithout 
inspiration, intuition, revelation, or innate moral values - all banished from Locke’s epistemology - 
learning was a mechanistic process badly adapted to the spiritual survival of the inexperienced” (57). In 
her study of the birth of horror in eighteenth and nineteenth century New England, Karen Haltunnen 
alleges that “Locke’s view of the mind as tabula rasa...struck the first serious blow to the doctrine of 





historically - consented to the fall, fortunate or not, no one could be legitimately charged with 
Adam’s fall in a realist sense. Unmoored from its immemorial biblical past, sin becomes 
uniquely about individual human choices in the here and now. Finney would be the last to deny 
the existence of sin, but it doesn’t obviate the fact that we choose depravity; it is not chosen for 
us. The stunning implication of this, as the theologian and Finney contemporary Nathaniel W. 
Taylor points out, is that “[n]ot a human being does or can become thus sinful or depraved but by 
his own choice” (30). Why this seeming theological quibble over the nature of sin and the extent 
to which humans can be held culpable of sinning is so important is because the challenge to 
orthodox theodicy was also the zone in which the relationship between acting and being was 
played out in antebellum revivalism. 
 
 
Sin Is in the Sinning - Action and Being in New Haven Theology 
 
The theological disputes in antebellum revivalism demonstrate that the volitional threads of God 
and humanity were seen as intimately entangled; you can’t pull on one without affecting the 
other. One of the major theological innovations of the era, dubbed “New Haven theology,” 
endeavored to retool Calvinist orthodoxy so as to make it amenable to human freedom. 
Continuing the theological tradition of New England divines like Samuel Hopkins and Timothy 
Dwight, New Haven theology introduced liberal and humanistic factors into what it believed to 
be an excessively deterministic theology that sanctioned spiritual apathy and the vicarious 
punishment implicit in Christ’s sacrifice.158 
The major proponent of New Haven theology and fellow founder of Yale Divinity 
School, the theologian Nathaniel W. Taylor helped voice the revisionist challenge to Calvinist 
                                                             
158 Samuel Hopkins was a disciple of Jonathan Edwards, and Timothy Dwight - eighth president of Yale - 
was his maternal grandson. For where New Haven theology sits in the history of liberal theology in 
America and its influence on later liberal preachers like Horace Bushnell, see Gary Dorrien’s The Making 
of American Liberal Theology (111-57). See also Douglas A. Sweeney’s excellent history of the impact of 





orthodoxy. A reinterpretation of moral depravity and a defense of man’s inherent freedom 
concerning his own salvation, Taylor’s 1828 sermon “Concio ad Clerum” is noteworthy less for 
its Latin title - not uncommon at the time - than the pun of using concio, a noun meaning 
“address” but also a verb meaning “I provoke” - which, despite the intention behind the title, did 
manage to provoke unease among the established clergy. The elision from noun to verb 
suggestive in concio proves to be the central theme of the sermon, as Taylor’s theological 
revisioning entailed transforming the orthodox doctrine of depravity from an unchanging 
theological absolute to a matter of choice, from a compulsive nature to an act of volition. In other 
words, from a subject to a predicate.  
 Contrary to some of his opponents (like Dod), Taylor wasn’t rejecting the totality 
of depravity, but only how the doctrine could be made to square with individual 
volition.159 The first line of attack was to assert the moral responsibility of individual 
sinners. Taylor argued that humans’ moral depravity does not “consist in a sinful nature, 
which they have corrupted by being one with Adam, and by acting in his act” (5). Flatly 
rejecting the imputation of sin as irrational, New Haven theology by the same stroke 
made one’s moral state determinable not by the action of another consignable to all 
persons through all time, but by an individual’s particular voluntary actions.160 
The orthodox conception of sin as being caused by a preexisting sinful nature is, 
according to Taylor, logically untenable.  Moral depravity cannot “consist in any 
disposition or tendency to sin, which is the cause of all sin,” adding that “that which is 
the cause of all sin, is not itself sin. The cause of all sin itself sin! Whence then came the 
first sin?” (7). This reductio ad absurdum allows Taylor to avoid a tautology, but more 
importantly it makes our understanding of sin inseparable from action, tendency, 
disposition, its process of coming into being. By denaturalizing sinful nature and hitching 
                                                             
159 Taylor and other proponents of New Haven theology were frequently lumped together under the 
denigrating rubric of Arminianism, a recurrent accusation against religious dissidents. Drawn from the 
writings of the Dutch Reformed theologian Jacobus Arminius, this theology emphasized the adequacy of 
atonement for all and humans’ ability to resist sin.  
160 It has been noted that Taylor’s New Haven Theology was heavily influenced by the Congregationalist 
theologian Samuel Hopkins’s so-called “New Divinity,” which explicitly denied the justice of imputed 
guilt: “[t]he children of Adam are not answerable for his sin, and it is not their sin, any farther than they 





the meaning of sin to sinful practice, Taylor is able to make the essence of sin 
constitutive of its practical effects. Moral responsibility rests exclusively in an 
individual’s choice to sin.  
Taylor concluded that “moral depravity” - according to Reformed theology, a 
critical aspect of our essential nature - “is man’s own act, consisting in a free choice of 
some object other than God, as his chief good” (8). Finney agreed: “[a] change of 
heart...is to prefer a different end” (“Sinners” 11). No longer a congenital innateness we 
are helpless to get rid of, depravity is made inseparable from volition. As such, “Concio 
ad Clerum” is a major marker of the rise of individualism, but it also marks an ongoing 
philosophical and theological tradition of making ontological essences (like moral 
depravity) incomprehensible apart from the actions that manifest them.161 Because it’s 
impossible for God to be the author of sin, and because sin can’t be a part of some 
preexisting nature, the only logical outcome for Taylor is that sin is a voluntary choice, 
an action: “there is no such thing as sinning without acting” (24). And Taylor is quick to 
embrace the authority of the source he claims gave him his enabling logic: “President 
Edwards.”162  
                                                             
161 The consequences of propounding such theology, broadly referred to as “New School,” were not 
merely imaginary. The Presbyterian theologian and minister Albert Barnes was brought before his 
presbytery in 1836 and charged with heresy for repudiating the imputation of Adam’s sin. Though he 
wasn’t convicted, it was a reminder to proponents of the New School that conservative-minded elders 
wielded considerable punitive power. Even the famed Lyman Beecher wasn’t impervious to charges of 
heresy, when he was brought before the Cincinnati Presbytery. See the report that the Presbytery 
requested Beecher publish to clarify his theological positions, Views in Theology (vii-ix). For Finney’s 
account of the Barnes trial, see Lectures on Revivals (271, 276). For the Presbyterian minister James 
Waddel Alexander’s reflections on the trial, see Forty Years’ Familiar Letters (166). See also Ahlstrom 
(467) and Hambrick-Stowe (125).  
162 Published by his great-grandson Sereno Edwards Dwight in 1829, Edwards’s ten-volume Works was 
the source for Taylor’s logic about the relationship between essences and actions, specifically Freedom of 
the Will, which he partially quotes. Edwards’s original words are “[i]f the Essence of virtuousness or 
commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the Nature of the dispositions or acts of 
mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their Cause, then it is certain it lies nowhere at 
all” (190). Edwards’s distinction between the nature of a disposition and its cause is meant to argue that 
we cannot be held blameworthy for the “vice of a vicious act of will” if it arises from an extra-human 
cause, with which we properly have nothing to do.  
Taylor and Finney weren’t the only one coopting Edwards’s sacred name to prove or disprove 
theological arguments. Lyman Beecher and Asahel Nettleton’s anti-new measure epistolary exchange 





It’s unclear exactly when and to what extent Finney absorbed Taylor’s thought. 
(The three times his Memoirs mentions Taylor have nothing to do with intellectual 
exchanges.) But despite the lack of biographical information, Finney seems to have 
adopted the practical equivalence of being and action wholeheartedly:  
 
[w]hat is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. [..] Sin is not mere 
negation, or a not willing, but consists in willing self-gratification. [...] Sin 
must be voluntary…. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that 
sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin. 
(ST 127) 
 
“Sin is not mere negation,” Finney asserts, flatly rejecting the Augustinian notion of evil 
as privation of the good. Nor does sin consist in a sinful nature imputed to us by Adam, 
consisting as it does “in willing self-gratification.” And Finney manages to bypass the 
logical quandary of suggesting sin has a positive, created substance by saying it “consists 
in willing.” Finney’s final, uncompromising insistence that “there is either no sin, or there 
is voluntary sin” explodes any notion that sin exists as some metaphysical nature 
preceding our volitional acts.  
“Taylor’s true successor” (453), as Frank Hugh Foster called him, Finney adopted 
this Blackstonian aspect of New Haven theology, writing that “those who hold that sin is 
an essential and inseparable part of our nature...is to talk nonsense.. [...] This cannot be a 
crime, since the will has nothing to do with it” (ST 262). More precisely, “[d]esires that 
do not result in choice and action are not virtuous. Nor are such desires necessarily 
vicious. They may arise involuntarily in the mind...but while they produce no voluntary 
act, they are no more virtuous or vicious than the beating of the pulse” (394).163 The 
                                                             
Two Walk Together” sermon on the grounds that it provokes the enthusiasm made notorious by the 
excesses of a figure like James Davenport (44-45). And Tyler Bennet, a stalwart Congregationalist critic 
of New Haven theology, used Edwards to refute Taylor’s notion of moral action. 
163 A critic of New Haven Theology - or as he called it, “Practical Pelagianism” - Samuel Baird wrote that 
Finney “was the first preacher who adequately attempted to employ the theology of New Haven, in its 
practical relations” (217). Nevin judged that “Finneyism is only Taylorism reduced to practice, the 
speculative heresy of New-Haven actualized in common life” (114). Wright remarked that “[w]hen 





blameworthiness of a particular act is justifiable only by its manifestation in action. In 
other words, as it was for Taylor, so for Finney, sin was in the sinning. 
 Hitching volition to sin had profoundly liberating effects for potential converts, as 
did the rise of voluntarism more generally. But this liberation came with a cost. As I 
pointed out in the last chapter, the practical identification of the is and the does implies 
that individuals themselves are solely responsible for anything deemed sinful in their 
actions, to the exclusion of other contributing factors. Neither Finney nor Taylor 
suggested the possibility that sin, in addition to being a choice, could be the result of 
cultural or environmental factors. This noticeable gap in their psychology perhaps has a 
historical explanation, existing as they did before the rise of sociology. But, more likely, 
in their strenuous effort to repudiate the volitional enervation implicit in Calvinist 
orthodoxy, Finney, Taylor, and other New Light revivalists interpreted the significance of 
sin as confined to individual practical choices.  
Taylor and Finney’s major contributions to the evangelical proximity to Jamesian 
pragmatism were theological, and they were certainly influenced by intellectual strands 
that came before them, like Common Sense philosophy and Edwardsean psychology.164 
Recall my argument in chapter one that Edwards’s atom served as his figure for the 
practical equivalence of being and action. In “Concio ad Clerum,” we can see how 
Protestant theology continued its migration into pragmatic territory. Because under the 
doctrine of moral responsibility sinners could not be imputed Adam’s transgression, and 
because it is a theological absurdity to say God could be the author of sin, Taylor and 
Finney were led into the pragmatic attitude of constituting sin by its actions, of 
practically identifying the is and the does. 
 
                                                             
influences then radiating from Dr. Taylor, of New Haven, who was then the great advocate of the self-
determining power of the human will” (179).  
164 One of these sources was the Congregationalist pastor and Edwards disciple Joseph Bellamy, who 
argued that it is morally untenable to punish someone for someone else’s crime. His dismantling of the 
imputation of Adam’s sin was a strong influence on Taylor, who quotes him directly (8). See also 






The Pragmatics of Finney’s “New Measures” 
 
The revival fairly started, the most excitable were soon on the anxious seat. There we learned the 
total depravity of human nature and the sinner’s awful danger of everlasting punishment. [...] 
Having brought you into a condition of profound humility...in the depths of your despair you 
were told that it required no herculean effort on your part...to be reconciled to God…. The way 
to salvation was short and simple.  
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Eighty Years (41-2) 
 
Finney’s revivalism was often - derisively - called “New Measures” revivalism, referring to the 
controversial means, such as the protracted meeting and the anxious bench, he used to spur 
consent in willing converts. What mattered to Finney was that these measures be pragmatic ones 
sensitive to changing psychological conditions. “As sure as the effect of the measure becomes 
stereotyped, it ceases to gain attention, and then you must try something new” (LR 173). 
Finney’s use of the word “stereotyped” is apt, because the age of mass media and politics was 
coming to shape Americans’ interactions with worlds beyond their local communities.165 
Instrumentalizing the emergent interest in print media and mass politics, Finney was unashamed 
about citing his inspirations:  
 
What do the politicians do? They get up meetings; circulate handbills and 
pamphlets; blaze away in the newspapers; send their ships about the streets on 
wheels with flags and sailors...all to gain attention to their cause and elect their 
candidate. [...] They know that unless there can be an excitement it is vain to push 
their end. I do not mean to say that their measures are pious, or right, but only that 
they are wise, in the sense that they are the appropriate application of means to the 
end. (LR 172)  
                                                             
165 What tends to get lost in histories of print media in America was its originally religious dimensions. As 
David Paul Nord points out, “[b]y the late 1820s, the evangelical publishers had become leading 
innovators of printing technology and national business organization, and the millennial dream of 
reaching everyone with books and tracts seemed imminent” (6-7). See also Candy Gunther Brown’s The 






This all sounds like pragmatism tout court, a case of nineteenth century realpolitik. But Finney’s 
adoption of this political pragmatism shouldn’t be seen in isolation from its deeply pious 
character. Finney doesn’t simply import the means of political cynicism for the sake of achieving 
the effect of exciting parishioners to a sense of God. A revival requires the “right use of the 
constituted means;” whatever effects are aimed at, there is nevertheless a “right use” in the 
deployment of means. 
To instrumentalize participants’ thirst for novelty, revivalists promoted zones of 
consistently sustained attention in which the stream of experience may eventually hit upon - or 
be hit upon by - a spiritual truth, thereby igniting the moment of consent to God’s offered grace. 
Finney cautioned ministers facilitating an “awakened sinner” that “[w]henever you have reason 
to believe that a person within your reach is awakened, do not sleep till you have poured in the 
light upon his mind, and tried to bring him to immediate repentance. Then is the time to press the 
subject with effect. If that favorable moment is lost, it can never be recovered” (LR 155). 
This understanding of human attention as something that needed to be consistently 
stimulated became the underlying logic of one of Finney’s more controversial new measures: the 
protracted meeting.166 The Methodist itinerant Peter Cartwright described such a meeting at the 
famous Cane Ridge revival in Kentucky 1801, where  
 
seemingly unexpected by ministers or people, the mighty power of God was 
displayed in a very extraordinary manner; many were moved to tears, and bitter 
and loud crying for mercy. The meeting was protracted for weeks. Ministers of 
almost all denominations flocked in from far and near. The meeting was kept up 
by night and day. [...] Hundreds fell prostrate under the mighty power of God, as 
men slain in battle. (33-34) 
 
What stands out in Cartwright’s relation is the meeting’s ecumenical spirit - “almost all 
denominations flocked in.” Believers in search of an awakening were encouraged to prolong 
                                                             
166 Controversial, because it was not uncommon for these protracted meetings to run over into business 
hours, threatening the flow of commerce. Though Finney didn’t invent the protracted meeting, his name 





their attendance, “for weeks” if necessary.167 Implicit in Finney’s dismissal of form and 
“stereotyped” duties, nowhere is there any attempt to impose predetermined discipline or 
hermeneutics on the directness of participants’ experiences. God very much acts through 
parishioners, whose embodied experiences furnish the evidence of successful conversions. 
Pragmatically accepting the fundamental capriciousness of experience, Finney and many new 
measures revivalists like the Baptists Jacob Knapp, Jabez Swan, and Albany’s Presbyterian 
Edward Norris Kirk orchestrated zones of revival around the cultivation of sustained attention.168 
As affectionate outpourings, these emotional effects became the evidence by which the 
“power of God” could be ascertained. New Light revivalists sought to keep parishioners’ 
faculties at a heightened pitch of awareness, whereby the coveted moment of divine influx could 
be captured, initiating conversion “by the truth made effectual by the Holy Spirit” (LR 318). A 
revival becomes the critical experimental testing ground for the production of appreciable effects 
that could determine within a reasonable degree a believer’s salvific status. But spiritual lassitude 
was an inescapable pitfall even for the most fervent of believers: “the fact is that in a revival the 
Christian’s heart is liable to get crusted over, and lose its exquisite relish for divine things” (269). 
The effects of instantaneous conversion do not provide a lifelong inoculation against the 
mundane challenges that threaten it - spiritual apathy, distraction, lapses of memory, slackened 
conviction.169 Effectively canceling the metaphysical nature of the Calvinist doctrine of the 
irresistibility of grace - by which grace, once had, could never be lost - antebellum revivalist 
                                                             
167 The “proper” way to start or continue a revival was a frequent topic of debate among theologians and 
lay practitioners. Modern historians have tended to focus largely on secular explanations of revivalism. 
Nathan O. Hatch, for example, explains that nineteenth century religious movements “took shape around 
magnetic leaders who were highly skilled in communication and group mobilization” (4-5), while 
“[i]ncreasingly assertive common people wanted their leaders unpretentious, their doctrines self-evident 
and down-to-earth, their music lively and singable, and their churches in local hands” (9). While such 
explanations tell us about the human actors, what accounts like Hatch’s miss is the very real historical 
belief that revivals were to a large extent works of God, a belief often shared by clerical authority and 
laypeople alike.  
168 Knapp related that, throughout Calvinist-influenced areas of New England, “Sunday schools, 
missionary enterprises, and protracted meetings could find no place” (39). For Kirk’s adoption of Finney-
esque revival strategies, see Johnson and Wilentz’s The Kingdom of Matthias (71-6).  
169 Finney’s lecture on the same subject published in the December 1840 issue of The Oberlin Evangelist 
stipulated that “[t]his confidence, whatever may be its foundation, cannot of itself secure the soul against 
falling into sin and hell” (201). A conviction of one’s personal holiness, no matter how assured, is no 





conversion makes grace provisional on the enduring actions of the truly converted, actions that 
continuously manifest the spiritual condition of the agent. In other words, the lifelong vigilance 
encouraged by revival practitioners respected the fact that the stream of experience is not exempt 
from its embeddedness in struggle simply because a doctrinally-based “reward” had been 
achieved.  
Finney’s conversion model depended on a psychology in which human attention required 
a sustained effort to capture the unpredictable moment when the Holy Spirit fills the mind. By 
positioning the sinner in the path of an oncoming Spirit, the eventual moment would strike when, 
as Finney learned from his own conversion, consent would be granted to receive the “offer of 
Gospel salvation” (Memoirs 11). That notion should remind us how close evangelical practice 
was to Jamesian psychology, since James’s will functioned on virtually identical, if less 
explicitly religious, terms:  
 
[c]onsent to the idea’s undivided presence, this is effort’s sole achievement. Its 
only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind. And for this there is 
but one way. The idea to be consented to must be kept from flickering and going 
out. It must be held steadily before the mind until it fills the mind. Such filling of 
the mind by an idea, with its congruous associates, is consent to the idea and to 
the fact which the idea represents. (PP 1169) 
 
It would be oversimplistic to call James’s will a secularized version of Finney’s. The language of 
consent, the sustained attention to a particular idea, and the sensation of being filled recalls the 
plenary inspiration of the Holy Spirit. One may try to replace every instance of “idea” in the 
James passage with “the Holy Spirit” to transform it into a Finney-esque psychology, but that 
would be missing the point, a mere verbal distinction, James might say: “effort’s sole 
achievement” is in the capture of “consent to the idea and to the fact which the idea represents.” 
This wasn’t only theoretical for James. The principle, in fact, on which Principles is based 
testifies to that basic caprice that artistic style would have to meet. As F.O. Matthiessen 
observed, though James believed that “[s]tyle is not my forte,” he nevertheless “realized 
instinctively that he must develop artistic skills of presentation if he was to fulfill his aim of 





himself to be’” (James Family 350-51). Finney’s revivalism and James’s writing style operate, in 
other words, on the same principle.   
But perhaps the most iconic feature of antebellum revivalism, and certainly one reason 
why historians typically refer to Finney’s methods as pragmatic, is the anxious bench. If “[t]he 
way to salvation was short and simple,” as Stanton tells us it was, it made sense that this 
emotionally conductive implement of revivals should be as well. A simple chair or wooden seat, 
unadorned so as to keep attention on the immediate experience of converts, the anxious bench 
was reserved for those especially concerned about their spiritual condition. Placed at the front of 
the congregation, and so in full view of onlookers, the anxious bench was intended not to 
assuage individuals’ anxieties, but to amplify them, generating a psychological crisis that would 
instigate the treasured act of voluntary consent to the urgings of the Spirit. Seeking to agitate the 
affections by sessions of prolonged exhortations to the sinner, practitioners of the anxious bench 
vigorously pursued the effects of spiritual contrition, to “publicly g[i]ve their hearts to God” 
(Memoirs 238), as Finney put it.170 
In keeping with Finney’s loyalty to experienceable facts, the anxious bench didn’t 
attempt to standardize conversion, but was instead a necessary result of the way the human mind 
works. “The design of the anxious seat is undoubtedly philosophical, and according to the laws 
of mind” (LR 253). The “laws of mind” to Finney included the fundamental capriciousness of 
experience, the responsiveness to plain and simple motivations to action, the excitability of the 
affections. If the pragmatic verification of a sincere conversion required the individualized 
manifestation of effects, new measures like the anxious bench were designed to draw them out. 
What was important was that the measures function as tentative heuristics, disposable whenever 
they exhausted their capacity to make practical differences in the conversion process. Whitney 
Cross put it, “[s]uch devices were deliberately adopted, because experience showed that they 
                                                             
170 Finney’s penchant for affective sermonizing was known to shake even the sternest of congregants. 
Describing the sudden plunge into repentance by a Finney sermon of “General J.D. Cox,” “a cool man, a 
brave man, not given to hysterics, Cochran writes, “[v]arious efforts have been made to define this power. 
Some writers call it ‘psychic influence’; some, the ‘power of suggestion.’ Some say he had ‘personal 
magnetism’; others, a ‘high hypnotic potential’” (71). Suggestions of clandestine mind-control, of course, 





worked. Their use does not itself prove that the perpetrators were hypocrites or scoundrels” 
(182). 
Yet some did think practitioners of the anxious bench were nothing but hypocrites and 
scoundrels. The bench was an easy target for critics who associated it with contemporaneous 
trends in quack medicine, deceptive business practices, mesmeric manipulation, and female 
exploitation. To its critics, the anxious bench was hardly more than a cheap stage prop for the 
manipulation of intense, over-sentimentalized outbursts that didn’t produce sincere conviction, 
much less demonstrate the workings of the Spirit. In his widely read anti-new measure tract The 
Anxious Bench (1843), the theologian John Williamson Nevin deplored its “solemn tricks for 
effect” (28). But for Finney and like-minded revivalists, effects were precisely the point, and 
powerful affections extracted from stony hearts provided valuable evidence of grace. To Nevin, 
you couldn’t reverse the chain of causality by instigating effects. As we’ve seen, however, 
Finney reversed conventional Enlightenment epistemology, by placing volition first in the chain 
so that affections could be generated and shaped by acts of will. 
 Despite Finney’s emphasis on the unmediated experience of conversion, some 
parishioners failed to see a distinction between the raw experience of consenting to holy 
surrender and the material objects that facilitated it. One commentator observed that “[m]any 
seem to think that sinners cannot be converted except by the instrumentality of protracted 
meetings and anxious seats” (“Anxious Bench”). Though the simple, unformulaic design of 
protracted meetings and the anxious bench were intended to facilitate a direct experience issuing 
in consent, parishioners seemed at times to miss the message. If we take this anonymous voice at 
its word, it tells us that some parishioners at least were searching for a form that would mediate 
their conversion, and incidentally that they failed to see the pure functionality of Finney’s 
pragmatic methods. The emphasis on unmediated experience of voluntary consent to the Spirit 
seemed always in danger of sliding back into an orthodox preoccupation with forms and 
measures.  
 Curtis D. Johnson has recently challenged a scholarly consensus about antebellum 
revivalism that he refers to as the “protracted meeting myth” (350), arguing that, while the 





vaunted efficacy – by figures like Finney and modern historians – has been largely overstated.171 
And for all its energetic scouring for the psychological markers of conversion, James D. Bratt 
challenges the scholarly notion of antebellum revivalism as a “success story of popular 
Protestantism” (68). This isn’t to say, however, that the pragmatic attitudes driving them waned 
in their efficacy or failed to maintain their epistemological value. Despite the statistical evidence 
for widespread backsliding and failed conversions, it was still possible for revivalists, 






[W]hat was heresy in [Finney’s] generation turned out to be orthodoxy in the next. 
 William G. McLoughlin, Modern Revivalism (65) 
If we assume that much of the nineteenth century in America was dominated by theological 
liberalism, then McLoughlin would be right.172 Finney represented a growing trend in American 
theology and philosophy that emphasized the freedom of the human will, the value of human 
                                                             
171 Johnson’s statistical data on antebellum New York Baptists suggest that protracted meetings were far 
more popular than they were effective at solidifying pious behavior. Johnson attributes the discrepancy to 
the “aura of success” that fed into images of their efficacy, that “churches found [them] to be a useful 
supplement to an awakening on the verge of happening or that had already begun,” and that “parents who 
feared their children would leave their parental home before finding God felt a particular urgency in 
supporting meetings that promoted immediate salvation” (373-77).  
172 Historian Paul E. Johnson shared McLoughlin’s view that Finney’s revivalism shifted orthodoxy 
considerably: “[w]ithin a few years free agency, perfectionism, and millennialism were middle-class 
orthodoxy” (Shopkeeper’s 5), another instance in which American revivalism was interpreted as a 
decisive break with past beliefs. There are certainly reasons to trust in the dominance of a liberal 
Protestant theology, though I would add its hegemony should be understood within specific contexts 
rather than assuming its monolithic cultural command. While I agree that revivalism had a significant 
impact on some aspects of religious thought in America, some twentieth century historians have tended to 
unquestionably assume the simplicity of revivalism’s role in such transformations in antebellum 
economics, politics, and religion. For a useful history of the German- and Scottish Common Sense-





experience and its variability, and the personalization of religious practice - all tenets of what 
historians broadly characterize as features of evangelicalism. This isn’t to say that contrary 
voices were silenced; far from it - “[i]f revivalism was ‘everywhere’ in the antebellum United 
States, then anti-revivalism was too” (78), as James Bratt points out.173 Nor would many of those 
voices have considered what Finney said and did as anything other than heresy. At the same time 
as resisting the suggestion of celebrating his liberalizing of Protestantism, I’ve also tried to keep 
in mind Finney’s Calvinist legacy, which like Edwards he never fully surrendered, even as his 
theological refinements seemed to orthodox eyes to detonate the very foundations of the true 
Christian religion.  
 So when McLoughlin made the unequivocal claim in his introduction to Finney’s 
Lectures on Revivals that the book “clearly marks the end of two centuries of Calvinism and the 
acceptance of pietistic evangelicalism as the predominant faith of the nation” (vii), the sentiment 
strikes me as less adequate a description than an exultation in Calvinism’s decline, which was 
historically much more complex and nowhere near as conclusive as McLoughlin made it out to 
be. I’ve mentioned before in this chapter that there is good reason to claim Finney as one of the 
most important figures in the shaping of modern liberal Protestantism and evangelicalism. But 
these are terms that should be used with caution, as Finney’s liberalization of orthodox 
Calvinism was neither an unqualified embrace of individual identity nor a complete rejection of 
traditional Calvinist doctrines. In the generation that came of age after Finney’s most famous 
revivals - in which an explosion of Spiritualist belief systems dedicated themselves to finding the 
common denominator between science and religion, and in which James struggled, like his 
revivalist predecessors, to develop a philosophy that could respect the epistemological value of 
unmediated and idiosyncratic experience while avoiding the idealist abstractions of rationalism - 
we’ll see that Calvinism continued to influence the ways American intellectual culture addressed 
problems of philosophy and of faith.   
I have attempted to show that certain attitudes common to Jamesian pragmatism can be 
identified in some liberal strains of antebellum revivalism. A less-than-salient figure in 
                                                             
173 See also Bratt (72-77) for the discursive strategies anti-revivalists used to discredit the pro-revivalists. 
Bratt expresses an impatience with scholarly accounts like Timothy L. Smith’s Revivalism and Social 
Reform (1957) that treat revivalism as a “tale of progress and triumph for the Wesleyan impulse, glossing 





discussions of the history of pragmatism, Finney sought to instill these attitudes in his 
parishioners, altering evangelical practice and in the process contributing to the emergent interest 
in the practical as epistemologically valid. As we’ll see, Finney’s innovations in human 
psychology and religious experience - his postmillennialism and justifications for an active will - 
helped to stimulate social reform movements of which the nineteenth century had no shortage. 
But as Perciaccante points out, “it is misleading to conclude that ‘Finney-ite’ Arminian 
revivalism produced the reform impulse” (Perciaccante 112). Though there were wide areas of 
overlap between revivalism and social reform, it’s much more complex than McLoughlin’s 
observation that “the social outlook implicit in Finney’s theology was the Christian counterpart 
of Jacksonian democracy” (Modern 100), if only because Finney had few good things to say 
about Jackson or the individualism that his presidency inspired.174  
It’s also worth considering to what extent Finney is culpable in our modern 
understanding of what constitutes “faith.” Paul Tillich has observed that one of the modern 
misinterpretations of faith is its identification with mere feeling or emotion (38-9). Anti-new 
measure revivalists concerned with the adulteration of true religion by powerful emotions 
expressed discomfort with the affectional disorderliness it seemed logically to produce. With the 
rise of the secular sciences throughout the nineteenth century, the more science could reduce 
religion to mere feeling, the less cultural authority religion could yield and the more privatized it 
became. The massive influence an affection-driven revivalism had on evangelical practices 
perhaps contributed inadvertently to the retreat - coerced or self-imposed - of religion into 
spheres more private and localized. If Tillich is right to argue that the association of faith with 
mere feeling assisted in the marginalization of faith, we might consider the ways in which not 
just Finney, but other proponents of affection-driven revivalism had a hand in making “heart 
religion” susceptible to a psychological discourse that attempted to secularize it, explain it away 
as physiological or mental aberrance.175 If it is argued that powerful emotions constitute true 
                                                             
174 Finney’s major complaints toward Jackson were the president’s treatment of indigenous groups and the 
failure to act decisively on the issue of southern slavery. See Hambrick-Stowe for a more nuanced and 
biographically sound assessment of Finney’s relationship to politics in the 1820s and 30s: “[i]n 1828 
Finney was definitely no Jacksonian” (88-93). 
175 Of course, such a consideration would require a more penetrating look at the relationship between 





religious expression, science can - and often did - explain religion as a mere disorder of feeling, 
responsive to proper therapy, and not at all as a system of sincerely held beliefs that provided 
“rules for action” (Pragmatism 23), or as Tillich famously described faith: “a total and centered 
act of the personal self, the act of unconditional, infinite and ultimate concern” (8; my emphasis).  
Finney’s embrace and productive utility of uncertainty was also an important motivator in 
the liberalization of Protestant religious expression. Credited as a fundamental feature of 
modernity, uncertainty was seen by leaders like Edwards and Finney not only as an exclusive 
condition of our fallen state that could be rectified by the twin epistemological tools of reason 
and revelation, but as a productive category that opened conversion models to an enormous 
variety of individual experimentation. Doctrine and the regulation of practice suffered as a result. 
It’s simple, then, to see why the rise of fundamentalism was also an assertion that there were 
right and wrong ways to practice religion, and that salvific certainty was in fact possible. 
 Finney’s role in evangelicalism seems to have had another unforeseen effect. By 
pluralizing religious experience on the basis of the intrinsic availability of the Holy Spirit to 
individual agents, Finney not only continued a tradition enshrined by the Anne Hutchinson’s 
adherence to immediate revelation, but also participated in the further liberalizing of Protestant 
culture, a phenomenon H. Richard Niebuhr famously parodied: “[a] God without wrath brought 
men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a 
cross” (Kingdom 193).176 Niebuhr’s memorable jab to liberal optimistic progressivism reflects a 
persistent conservative criticism of liberal Protestantism and its unholy alliance with modernism, 
as being so loose in its doctrines, so flexible in its criteria of salvation, and so lax in its 
acceptance of who is really a Christian that it doesn’t even qualify as true religion. 
Pondering the future of the relationship between social reformism and “Modern 
Philosophy” in his New Views of Christianity, the many-times-over convert Orestes Brownson 
                                                             
chapter, however. My use of the word “secularization” here is provisional, as I reserve a more focused 
discussion of the relationship between the sacred and the secular for the epilogue.   
176 Niebuhr published that in the 1930s, which signals the extent to which liberal Protestantism has been 





envisioned a union of thought and action virtually Emersonian in its implications.177 The 
“inspiration” for reform associations in 1836 America, Brownson believed,  
 
is...at this moment, apparently blind, but it and Modern Philosophy tend to the 
same end. They have the same truth at bottom. [...] The philosophy will explain 
and enlighten the inspiration. They who are now mad for associations will 
comprehend the power which has moved them...and they will give to the 
philosopher in return zeal, energy, enthusiasm…. In this country more than in any 
other is the man of thought united in the same person with the man of action. [...] 
The time is not now distant when our whole population will be philosophers, and 
all our philosophers will be practical men. [...] [H]ere every idea may be at once 
put to a practical test, and if true it will be realized. (91-2)  
 
“[I]n this country more than in any other,” philosophical thought and practical application will be 
reconciled, philosophy granting sight to inspiration and inspiration granting energy to 
philosophy. Though Brownson can seem like an idealist here (the prophecy of an America full of 
practical philosophers is particularly noteworthy), his assumption that philosophy and 
practicality exist independently of one another was not, as I’ve shown at the beginning of this 
chapter, an unusual perspective. The upshot of this augured collaboration of abstract thought and 
practical action, for Brownson and James alike, is that the truth of an idea is inseparable from its 
manifestation: “every idea may be at once put to a practical test, and if true it will be realized.” 
 Brownson’s prophecy even has a messiah. He speaks of the “one man” who is “a more 
perfect type of the synthesis of Eclecticism [i.e., the panoply of voluntary associations] and 
inspiration than any one else” (93). He’s talking about the famed Unitarian preacher William 
Ellery Channing. But my guess is that he could as well have been speaking about William James, 
whose complicated relationship to his father Henry James Sr.’s bouts with spiritual experience 
and faith in the religious sectarian maelstroms of antebellum America will be the subject of the 
next chapter. These struggles with changing theological tides and science’s attempts to explain 
                                                             
177 Brownson is notorious for his haphazard odyssey through antebellum Protestantism. Born into a strict 
Congregationalist home, he was eventually baptized into the Presbyterian church, only to leave the church 
to become a Universalist pastor, then a Unitarian one, published his New Views while a member of the 
Transcendentalist Club, and converted to Catholicism in 1844, a move many in his former circles 





religious experiences issued in what amounted to pragmatism’s “synthesis,” its deliberate 
function as a mediator among seemingly incompatible points of view. The intellectual elements 
we have seen in Jonathan Edwards, Charles Grandison Finney, and the variety of figures 
discussed thus far, will continue to be shaped and reshaped in the life of William James, leading 
































The Pragmatic Attitudes of Henry James Sr, William James, Swedenborg, and the Unitarians 
 
All my intellectual life I derive from you…. What my debt to you is goes beyond all my power of 
estimating, - so early, so penetrating and so constant has been the influence.  
 
William James to Henry James Sr, 1882 (LWJ, 1 219) 
 
[Y]ou must not leave me till I understand a little more the value and meaning of religion in 
father’s sense.... It is not the one thing needful, as he said. But it is needful with the rest. 
 
   William James to Alice Howe Gibbens, 1883 (Perry 323) 
 
 
Introduction - Conversion Experiences of William and Henry James Sr 
 
Though it can be tempting to exaggerate the critical usefulness of William’s words to his father 
and wife, they do broach the question as to how Henry James Sr’s thinking influenced that of his 
son.178 Joan Richardson was right when she pointed out that “[p]ragmatism’s identifying notion 
that truth happens to an idea did not spring fully formed and ready to do intellectual battle from 
the head of Peirce or James” (2). Nor did it spring fully formed from the head of Henry James, 
Sr, but, as this chapter attempts to show, his theological writings had a significant impact on his 
son’s articulation of pragmatism. This chapter will make the case that the theory of experience in 
                                                             
178 Throughout this dissertation I have used “James” to refer to William James. Obviously, for the 
purposes of this chapter, I will resort to using William and Henry Sr’s first names. In the fourth chapter, I 





Henry’s Swedenborgian theology as well as the contemporaneous Unitarian conception of the 
divine exerted considerable influence on how William justified his own pragmatic logics. 
Because both Henry and William were sensitive to the epistemological value of experience 
unmediated by conceptual categories or traditional hermeneutics, like Finney’s their firsthand 
experiences with the preternatural provide the justification for a pragmatic approach to belief. 
This is not a chapter that tries to claim that William got his pragmatism wholesale from his 
father, but a chapter about the ideological proximities between Henry’s Swedenborgianism and 
liberal Unitarianism and such logics as they underpin William’s burgeoning pragmatism. I begin 
with a comparison of what seem to me to be clear cases of Henry and William’s reports of their 
conversion to radically new states of mind, what Andrea Knutson would call their “conductive 
imaginaries.”179 
Both Henry and William resisted their fathers’ attempts to determine their vocations. 
Both suffered physically throughout their lives and waged extensive intellectual endeavors to 
understand the meaning of that suffering. Early in life, a barn fire led to the amputation of 
Henry’s right leg, an injury that left him with phantom pain for the remainder of his life; William 
suffered from eye, stomach, and back problems, and a heart ailment that ultimately killed him. 
Both had little patience for Hegel or philosophical abstractions seemingly undiscoverable in 
human experience. Both felt in their own way that western philosophy, like many things in the 
nineteenth century, was in desperate need of reform.180  
And both said things like this: 
Henry: “Deprive a man of self-mastery or the arbitrament of his own actions...and 
you destroy his morality. He may kill you, or do what he will...because you have 
                                                             
179 I have briefly discussed Knutson’s work in relation to Jonathan Edwards in chapter one. As a 
reminder, Knutson defines a “conductive imaginary” as “a conscious space organized, or that self-
organizes, around the dynamics and tensions between emergent and stored up truth, uncertainty and 
certainty, and perception and objects perceived” (4).   
180 In his 1863 work Substance and Shadow, Henry announced that “[p]hilosophy...has plainly reached a 
crisis in her history” (97-98). While William’s proposed solution to the problem differs from his father’s, 
where they agree is that philosophy must take into account human interests, positively affirming the value 
of human life and intellect. It is not enough to be skeptical, as Peirce in 1868 would argue in his rejection 
of Cartesian doubt (a rejection William shared wholeheartedly): “[w]e cannot begin with complete doubt. 
We must begin with all the prejudices that we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy” 





previously debauched his moral instincts, or robbed him of his moral growth, and 
consequently inaugurated purely brute relations between you” (NE 24).  
 
William: “Man’s chief difference from the brutes lies in the exuberant excess of 
his subjective propensities…. Had his whole life not been a quest for the 
superfluous, he would never have established himself as inexpugnably as he has 
done in the necessary. [...] Prune down his extravagance, sober him, and you undo 
him” (WB 131-132).  
 
What these passages share is a desire for self-determination unhampered by social constraints.181 
Their mutual appreciation for raw, unbridled interiorities is telling. “Nature,” William writes, “is 
but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs into the more” (PU 286), adding, 
“[w]ithout too much you cannot have enough, of anything” (316). Both understood escape from 
external constraints and an embrace of intuitive self-mastery not as a dereliction of social duty or 
hedonistic abandon, but as an act of liberation that propelled one out of the ordinary flux of 
quotidian things, chasing the superfluous for whatever could be termed “true.” 
 For both, then, the “true” was best sought in the unrestrained immediacy of experience, 
directly felt and prior to rationalistic or deductive modes of explanation or description. Their 
shared respect for such prerationalized experience shaped their remarkably similar crises of faith. 
These experiences contain key themes that help to illuminate the ways in which what father and 
son experienced resonated with traditional spiritual conversion narratives, even as they appear 
divested of any explicitly religious content.182 In an episode that William would quote at length 
                                                             
181 This emphasis on spontaneity - as opposed to strict discipline - as the path to proper uprightness and 
moral goodness was popularized by Amos Bronson Alcott’s experimental Temple School (see 
Dahlstrand, Ch. 5). The pedagogical strategy of fostering an environment of experimental freedom for the 
student was the status quo in the James household. “I desire my child,” Henry wrote, “to become an 
upright man, a man in whom goodness shall be induced not by mercenary motives as brute goodness is 
induced, but by love for it or a sympathetic delight in it. And inasmuch as I know that this character or 
disposition cannot be forcibly imposed upon him, but must be freely assumed, I surround him as far as 
possible with an atmosphere of freedom” (NE 99). For a useful discussion of the antebellum shift from a 
pedagogy of corporal punishment to one of “disciplinary intimacy” based on love and affection, see 
Richard Brodhead’s Culture of Letters, Ch.1. 
182 For a reading that considers the Bunyanesque and Swedenborgian influences of Henry’s spiritual crisis 





in Literary Remains, Henry divulged his spiritual “vastation.”183 Its depiction of a soul in the grip 
of “abject terror” would not have been out of place in William’s Varieties: 
 
One day...towards the close of May, having eaten a comfortable dinner, I 
remained sitting at the table after the family had dispersed, idly gazing at the 
embers in the grate, thinking of nothing, and feeling only the exhilaration incident 
to a good digestion, when suddenly - in a lightning flash as it were - ‘fear came 
upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to shake.’ To all appearance it 
was a perfectly insane and abject terror, without ostensible cause, and only to be 
accounted for, to my perplexed imagination, by some damnèd shape squatting 
invisible to me within the precincts of the room, and raying out from his fetid 
personality influences fatal to life. The thing had not lasted ten seconds before I 
felt myself a wreck, that is, reduced from a state of firm, vigorous, joyful 
manhood to one of almost helpless infancy. (SRF 44-45) 
 
Beginning in a state of physical and intellectual passivity, “idly gazing at the embers,” “thinking 
of nothing,” Henry aligns his narrative with spiritual autobiographies that allegorize such 
passivity as a flagging in spiritual vigilance.184 Cognitive engagement suspended, his 
“family...dispersed” along with the moral and spiritual support grid they represent, Henry is 
rendered vulnerable to the intrusion of otherworldly menace. Even within the apparent hallowed 
sanctity of the domestic hearth, physical isolation signifies spiritual jeopardy. In the sudden and 
inexplicable rupture of the stream of consciousness, the mundane animal satisfaction of 
                                                             
183 Vastation is Swedenborg’s word for individual spiritual anguish or the laying waste of corrupt 
institutions in preparation for conversion. See Arcana Caelestia, Vol. 1: “[b]efore...they can be elevated 
into heaven, their evils and falses must be dissipated, and this dissipation is called vastation” (244). Henry 
applied this term to his own experience after conversing with an anonymous Swedenborgian 
correspondent (SRF 49-50).  
184 See Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, in many ways the Protestant ur-text for conversion: “[n]ow about 
mid-way to the top of the hill, was a pleasant arbour, made by the Lord of the hill, for the refreshing of 
weary travellers. [...] Thus pleasing himself a while, he at last fell into a slumber, and thence into a fast 
sleep, which detained him in that place until it was almost night” (46). In The Redeemed Captive, Rev. 
John Williams implied the success of a Mohawk assault was due to colonists’ inattention: “not long 
before break of day, the enemy came in like a flood upon us; our watch being unfaithful” (10). This trope 
of physical slumber allegorized as spiritual lethargy has a biblical precedent in Matthew 26: 40-41, when, 
finished with his prayers in Gethsemane, Jesus comes upon his disciples who had been charged with 
keeping watch: “[a]nd he cometh unto the disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What, 
could ye not watch with me one hour? Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed 





functioning bowels is shattered by an “abject terror” whose utter disconnection from any prior 
event signals its supernatural provenance. “In a lightning flash” - a common metaphor among 
revivalists for the precipitous influx of the Holy Spirit - Henry is thrust from the tranquil and 
familiar hearth into uncanny supernaturalism and epistemological chaos.  
Having no “ostensible cause,” the experience transcends the natural order, taking place, it 
seems, “only” in Henry’s “perplexed imagination.” Even his attempt to “[account]” for the terror 
resists rational clarity. The conflicting description of the figure as “squatting” yet “invisible” is 
less a slip of descriptive continuity than a sign that the shape is imperceptible within the 
boundaries of rational sensation. Recalling Milton’s Death, a “shape” knowable only through 
tortuous linguistic ambiguity, “[i]f shape it might be call’d that shape had none/ Distinguishable 
in member, joynt, or limb,/ Or substance might be call’d that shadow seem’d,/ For each seem’d 
either” (II. 667-70), Henry’s phantasmagoric episode forcefully overturns his sensory and 
intellectual manifold. Like Job, whose utterance he quotes directly, Henry is given all the 
torment without the why; unlike Job, this suffering leads not to a penitential reconciliation with 
the divine, but to psychic diminution.185 If the scientific naturalism of his day posited nature and 
human consciousness as inherently inclined toward organic growth and maturation of types, 
Henry’s preternatural experience exerts an opposite force, reverting him to a state of “helpless 
infancy.” 
In “The Sick Soul,” perhaps the most agonized lecture in the Varieties, William relates a 
story similar to his father’s. Citing an example of “[t]he worst kind of melancholy,” James is coy 
about the source: “for permission to print...I have to thank the sufferer” (159-60). The sufferer, of 
course, is James himself. 
 
Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits 
about my prospects, I went one evening into a dressing-room in the 
twilight...when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning...a horrible fear 
                                                             
185 The invocation of Job 4:14 is characteristic of the elder James’s relationship with Christianity. In 
Literary Remains, William reports that “it was a strange thing to see him, when in a depressed mood, 
murmur the psalms of David to himself by the hour” (73). Unlike his son, Henry was more deeply 
situated in the religious tradition that saw biblical texts as spiritual panacea in times of need and provided 





of my own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an 
epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-haired youth with 
greenish skin, entirely idiotic...with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the 
coarse gray undershirt, which was his only garment, drawn over them inclosing 
his entire figure. He sat there like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian 
mummy, moving nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. 
This image and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other. 
That shape am I, I felt, potentially. [...] After this the universe was changed for 
me altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of 
my stomach…. It was like a revelation; and although the immediate feelings 
passed away, the experience has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings 
of others ever since. It gradually faded, but for months I was unable to go out into 
the dark alone. (VRE 160-61)  
 
William occupies a double liminality of twilight and a dressing-room - i.e., a place where one 
exchanges one wardrobe for another in a time when day passes into night. Just as Henry’s 
passivity was the occasion for supernatural intrusion, so William’s passing from one state to 
another - day to night, day clothes to evening dress - becomes the psychological site of sudden 
and exquisite fear.  
Both of these experiences feature institutions (the home and the asylum) that have 
transformed from havens intended to be psychologically recuperative to epistemologically 
ambiguous zones penetrable by uncanny visitations. While Henry’s ambiguously shaped visitor 
is an external antagonist to physical and spiritual vitality, William’s seems at times to pose a 
kind of psychic unification, couched in a linguistic construction that muddles subject/object 
distinctions: “[t]hat shape am I.” Like his father’s “damnèd shape,” William’s “image of an 
epileptic patient” is there and not there, yet “real” in the sense of producing felt responses in 
William. “Like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy,” the patient, half nude and 
not fully human, exists at the uncanny nexus of animal and human, not identical to William’s 
fear but assimilated to it at the moment of his realization that he shares a fundamental nature 
with it.  
 In both of these cases, the influx of sudden fear is initially a kind of pure experience: 
unmediated and prerationalized, whose origins are as unaccountable as the mental images they 
provoke. As sudden as the fear is the mind’s attempt to make sense of it, summoning in both 





experienced by revival participants - such as Elizabeth Stanton’s prolonged illness following her 
Finney-induced terror - the intense and irresistible inflow of powerful emotions is the engine of a 
literal catastrophe that becomes the occasion for life-changing action.186 Incapable of being 
interpreted away or written off as some meaningless aberrance, William interprets the fear for its 
usefulness. And though he appears in part traumatized by that fear - “for months I was unable to 
go out into the dark alone” - it is a fear that, by its cultivation of sympathy “with the morbid 
feelings of others,” encourages social interaction. He cannot go out alone.187 
 Both of these accounts follow recognizable parameters of spiritual conversion narratives, 
which, according to Courtney Bender, “build authority and authenticity by omitting social ties, 
limiting precultural knowledge, and emphasizing emotion” (67). Free of hermeneutical 
intervention, both experiences stand outside the realm of cultural interpretation and are products 
of an immediate terror that blurs the boundary between inner subjectivity and objective “reality.” 
Perhaps most significantly, they’re also mined for their practical effects. Henry mentions the 
experience has “no ostensible cause,” but its origin is far less important than its “proper upshot:” 
“a most important change operating in the sphere of my will and understanding” (SRF 48), 
converting Henry to the Swedenborgian notion “that a new birth for man...is the secret of the 
Divine creation and providence” (50).  
A similar valuation of experience not in terms of origin but practical effects was true for 
William. The practical upshot of his experience gave him the warrant with which to claim that  
 
[i]n civilized life...it has at last become possible for large numbers of people to 
pass from the cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genuine fear. 
Many of us need an attack of mental disease to teach us the meaning of the word. 
[...] The atrocities of life become ‘like a tale of little meaning tho’ the words are 
strong’; we doubt if anything like us ever really was within the tiger’s jaws, and 
conclude that the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry for the 
chambers in which we lie so comfortably at peace with ourselves and with the 
world. (PP 1034) 
                                                             
186 I’m using “catastrophe” in its etymological sense of a sudden turn. Henry also refers to his experience 
as “my catastrophe” (SRF 48).  
187 Significantly, at the very moment William relates his own experience in Varieties, he directs readers 






Securely isolated from “the atrocities of life” - in “chambers” not unlike the one his father found 
himself in - we fail to apprehend the meaning of words intended to represent or convey 
experience. Implicitly, then, civilized life provides comforts, but at the cost of divorcing us from 
the “genuine” parts of experience - the unmediated exposure to life’s less pleasant prospects and 
our heroic going to meet it. “The history of our own race,” William told the YMCA in 1895, “is 
one long commentary on the cheerfulness that comes with fighting ills” (WB 47). We may read 
of such “atrocities” but our understanding of them would always be secondhand; their practical 
utility, as real as a “tale of little meaning.” We’ve already seen the implications of failing to 
secure an immediate experience in Edwards and Finney and their mutual insistence that 
language, while having heuristic potential, is no substitute for immediate experience. In Henry 
and William, as well, we see two major tenets of pragmatism come to the fore: the primacy of 
prerationalized particulars of experience as valid evidence, and a preoccupation with the 
practical effects of experience as epistemologically valid.  
Recall, then, that one of the most important goals for revivalists in leading a convert to an 
immediate experience of the Holy Spirit was the concurrent provocation to action. When the 
philosophy student of both William and Josiah Royce, George Santayana, suggested that, “if we 
could substitute reading for experience, the problem of evil would disappear,” William 
responded, “[i]ndeed it would…. The reader is not the sufferer, he only knows the suffering took 
place. The horror for him is matter of information, not of immediate feeling” (“Notebook 
4513”).188 Meaning without feeling is as good as meaningless, to put it bluntly. Having no 
immediate feeling or direct experience, this exchange suggests, doesn’t compel us to action; i.e., 
what to do about the problem of evil apart from speculating about it.  “[T]he meaning of the 
word,” its potential meaning, William argues, is inseparable from the experience that actualizes 
it. This relationship between actuals and possibles is fundamental to our psychology: “[e]very bit 
of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self...and the actual in it is continuously one 
                                                             
188 See also Dewey’s very similar understanding of the problem of evil in A Common Faith, a problem 
that has “haunted theology in the past and that the most ingenious apologetics have not faced, much less 
met. If these apologists had not identified the existence of ideal goods with that of a Person supposed to 
originate and support them - a Being, moreover, to whom omnipotent power is attributed - the problem of 





with possibles not yet in our present sight” (PU 289). Peirce agreed, and drew his conclusion 
explicitly from William’s father: “the true solution of the problem of evil is precisely that of 
[Henry’s] Substance and Shadow…. The real is composed of the potential and actual together” 
(James Family 138).189 The ability to see beyond painted tapestries requires something more than 
secondhand accounts or scholarly knowledge; it requires direct experience. For those invested 
with an immediate experience of evil, Santayana suggested, evil would cease to be a merely 
metaphysical problem and become one susceptible to and calling for human amelioration. For 
Edwards’s generation, the cost of a direct experience with the evils of the world heightened the 
possibility of spiritual corruption by malevolent forces; for William, direct experience equips us 
with the cognitive tools to confront and, hopefully, overcome such evils.  
 This emphasis on the primacy of direct experience with all its capricious intensities, 
“multitudinous beyond imagination” (Pragmatism 13), marks Henry and William as heirs to a 
liberal Protestant tradition whose principal exponents include Friedrich Schleiermacher and 
Swedenborg, the latter of whom I contend is a major player in the development of pragmatic 
logics as they emerge in Henry’s theology. Pervasive in the complex spiritual marketplace of 
nineteenth century America, the pragmatic attitudes peculiar to the more liberal forms of 
evangelical Protestantism helped reconfigure the meaning of religious experience around not 
doctrines or creeds, church membership, or regional affiliations, but direct individual experience 
based in the affections and radically empirical in how it “build[s] authority and authenticity,” to 
quote Bender. For revivalists, proponents of Spiritualism and related alternative religious 
movements, and Jamesian pragmatism, action is built on the affections, desires, interests, human 
variability, and the unpredictable flux of experience. It was this openness to experimenting with 




                                                             
189 I’m trusting Matthiessen’s scholarship here. Though Peirce does refer to Substance and Shadow as 
providing the “everlasting solution” to the problem of evil (CP V:287), Matthiessen, however, does not 
cite this quotation, nor have I been able to locate it in any of Peirce’s Collected Papers, edited by 





The Nineteenth Century Swedenborgian Reception in Context 
 
In her Modern American Spiritualism, the English spiritualist Emma Hardinge recounts the 
expulsion of Elizabeth D. Schull from Oberlin’s First Congregational Church, for “unchristian 
conduct,” which included “breaking covenant with this church” and “heresy in denying the 
cardinal doctrines of the Bible” (384-85). Schull was only one of many antebellum parishioners 
making the exodus from traditional denominations to a spiritual marketplace encouraging 
individuals’ experimentation with a variety of alternative modes of belief. As Robert Fuller 
points out, though revivalism had somewhat flagged by the 1830s, “[t]his is not to say that 
revivalism’s experimental thrust thereafter disappeared, but that it drifted even further beyond 
the confines of denominational affiliation” (81). Beyond the pale of affiliation for Schull lay the 
immediate contact with spiritual realities: “I believe God commissions my angel friends as 
ministering spirits to commune with me, and I have tangible evidence of their presence” (Taves 
181). Schull was a particular example of an expanding trend following the revivals of the 1820s 
and 30s, a trend broadly referred to as spiritualism, but one that also included a plurality of 
experimental methods of contact with trans-empirical realities: mesmerism, animal magnetism, 
mind-cure, theosophy, to name a few.190 The nineteenth century was, as John Lardas Modern put 
it, characteristic of “an unprecedented potentiality of responses to and habituations of something 
conceived of as the religious” (2). 
 Fuller’s phrase “experimental thrust” is apt, considering spiritualism’s core 
epistemological commitment to an important cognate of “experiment:” experience. The more 
unmediated, the more personal and idiosyncratic, the greater likelihood of its status as viable 
evidence. Parlor séances in which the departed would appear to loved ones, clairvoyants 
preternaturally attuned to the spirit realm, and books penned via automatic writing by long-dead 
figures like Thomas Paine were just some of the phenomena that fascinated both believers and 
skeptics. What all these phenomena shared was a commitment to direct experience as valid in 
                                                             
190 “Spiritualism,” like “revivalism” before it, was a baggy term whose definition depended on the person 
using it. Unsurprisingly, detractors tended to lump spiritualism in with mesmerism, mind-cure, etc., while 
proponents of individual practices didn’t always make the same assumption. For a discussion on the 
interrelation of popular psychology and popular religion in the Anglo-American nineteenth century, see 





itself, potentially supplemented by rationalism or metaphysics, but by no means requiring them. 
By cultivating a kind of sanctification of sense, spiritualism and related practices constructed, to 
use Joan Richardson’s phrase, “environments of fact” (2) in which direct, prerationalized 
experience could be quarried for practical spiritual truths.  
As such, spiritualism and other alternative movements both indicated a shift in and called 
for a need to reorient the parameters of staid Enlightenment epistemologies. The mass cultural 
intrigue in movements like spiritualism, mesmerism, mind-cure, faith healing, and 
Swedenborgianism demonstrated that certain experiences – clairvoyance, visions of the afterlife, 
bodily possession, automatic writing – demanded a criterion of truth-seeking and -telling that 
could no longer be satisfied by Cartesian dualism, Enlightenment rationalism, traditional 
empiricism, or western metaphysics.191 It may – and did – sound counterintuitive to juxtapose the 
apparently incommensurable epistemologies of faith and science, but this was precisely the effort 
made by spiritualist leaders like James M. Peebles, Emma Hardinge, and George Bush, and 
physicians like Joseph Buchanan and Charles Caldwell.192 Later in the century, Helena 
Blavatsky’s Theosophical Society based its teachings on the “twin truths” (xi) of science and 
religion. In the same year, Mary Baker Eddy’s Science and Health asserted that “[t]he divine 
Principle of healing is proved in the personal experience of any sincere seeker of Truth” (x). As 
we saw with Edwards and Finney, immediate experience was the key to the (hoped for) 
reconciliation of the stubbornly dissociated fields of science, philosophy, and religion.193 
                                                             
191 For a discussion of the wide variety of Protestant-influenced healing movements of the nineteenth 
century, see Heather D. Curtis’s “‘Acting Faith:’ Practices of Religious Healing in Late-Nineteenth-
Century Protestantism” in Practicing Protestants (137-58). 
192 In the 1840s and 50s, Joseph Buchanan attempted to found “neurological anthropology, an eclectic 
discipline that would unite psychology, physiology, culture, and religion” (Fuller 67), while Charles 
Caldwell, primary founder of the modern Louisville Medical Institute, argued that all that would need to 
be done for religion and phrenology to be conceptually united was to remove from religion “its false 
doctrines and teachings, superstitions and extravagances” (Fuller 63).  
193 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this kind of epistemological reorientation was seen by some to challenge 
proper Baconian scientific inquiry. By many of its practitioners, however, spiritualism was never taken to 
be anti-intellectual or anti-scientific. On the contrary, many considered the variety of spiritualist practices 
to be one with the spirit of science and ancillary to its progress. As Ann Taves puts it, “Spiritualism 
articulated a ‘religious naturalism’ that claimed common ground with both science and religion” (166). 
John Buescher agrees that spiritualism sought to reconcile science and religion by providing “a 
connection between Heaven and Earth that was real in substance and detail, not just in the imagination or 





Exchanging a widely held Old Testament conception of God whose presence can be situated 
terrestrially within a temple or a meetinghouse for the Peterine conception of converts as “lively 
stones” who will “[build] up a spiritual house” (KJV 1 Peter 2:5), religious practitioners endorsed 
the view that believers, as walking shekinahs, could potentially have immediate access to the 
divine independent of place or time.  By suturing the practice of religion to life as it is lived, and 
making the measure of one’s spiritual status commensurate with one’s actions, they provided the 
methodological foundations for a pragmatic way of living.  
The reshaping of epistemological standards occurred at both the popular and institutional 
levels, and its haphazard journey to pragmatism saw both converts and critics. Spiritualist organs 
like The Spiritual Telegraph (1852-60) and The Banner of Light (1857-1907) popularized 
individual testimonials of otherworldly experiences as well as experiments conducted to 
investigate them. Formed in 1882 in London by the psychologist Edmund Gurney, the poet and 
philologist Frederick W. H. Myers, the medium Stainton Moses, and others, the Society for 
Psychical Research was a broad transatlantic effort to investigate various parapsychological 
phenomena. Its American branch, formed in 1884, saw membership from the researcher Richard 
Hodgson, the Christian philosopher Josiah Royce, and, more to my interest, William James, who, 
in his presidential address to the Society in 1896 signaled that parapsychological phenomena had 
dealt a crushing blow to Lockean sensory epistemology. To James, these phenomena, “subtract 
presumptive force from the orthodox belief that there can be nothing in any one’s intellect that 
has not come in through ordinary experiences of sense” (EPR 131). These phenomena as well as 
his own episode of a sudden and “horrible fear of my own existence” were potential proofs that 
the human sensorium was vulnerable to incursions that could not be explained by traditional 
sensory epistemology. In the welter of antebellum religious pluralism and practical 
experimentation came the eighteenth century Swedish polymath and seer, Emanuel Swedenborg.   
Swedenborg’s impact on nineteenth century transatlantic evangelical Protestantism is no 
secret to historians of religion. Sydney Ahlstrom, Peter Williams, and more recently Leigh Eric 
Schmidt all recognized the degree to which Swedenborg helped reimagine the epistemological 
                                                             
said, in Swedenborgian fashion, “[t]he true meaning of spiritual is real” (“Worship” 169). It was only a 
matter of how certain evidence was understood that tended to marginalize spiritualism (and like-minded 





value of religious experience almost immediately from when his first religious texts began 
appearing in the 1740s.194 However, despite a handful of occasional interventions by Paul 
Jerome Croce, Eugene Taylor, and Josephine Donovan, Swedenborg’s legacy has tended to 
occupy little more than brief mention. F.O. Matthiessen, for example, noted the Swedenborgian 
influence on Emerson’s reflections of poetic language and on Henry James Sr’s notion of 
selfhood in American Renaissance, but didn’t go much further than that.195 Whitney Cross spoke 
of Swedenborgianism’s “great, if rather vague synthesis of all the more liberal religious 
doctrines,” but in its relationship to antebellum revivalism said “it served here merely as a 
catalytic agent” (343). A reconsideration of revivalism’s proximity to Jamesian pragmatism, 
then, also asks us to reconsider Swedenborg’s role within the same constellation of 
developments. Here, I’d like to observe Swedenborg’s influence on the theology of Henry James 
Sr (a theology William followed closely and struggled to understand), taking seriously 
Emerson’s comment in the 1850s that “[t]his age is Swedenborg’s” (JMN 335).  
Swedenborg is largely known for undergoing a spiritual awakening in his 50s, whose 
effects continued until his death (which he accurately predicted to be March 29). Undergoing 
“mystic” transports over several years, he experienced firsthand a motley crowd of angels, 
demons, middling spirits, and freshly executed criminals, all occupying an intricate cosmology 
structured by a system of correspondences that, according to Swedenborg, we may all partake in 
depending on our capacity either for selfishness or selfless love. Needless to say, this cosmology 
and its epistemological implications hardly resembled the Swedish Lutheranism of his 
upbringing. Like Schleiermacher, Swedenborg maintained that true religion lay in an immediate 
                                                             
194 For Swedenborg’s wide-ranging appeal to a diversity of American religious fields, see Ahlstrom (483-
90). Leigh Eric Schmidt notes Swedenborg’s prominent role in the redefinition of modern mysticism, 
especially as it was experienced and practiced in the American nineteenth century (“Making” 283); see 
also his longer work on the topic, Restless Souls (44-47). For Swedenborg’s link to Neoplatonic 
philosophy and his influence on spiritualism, mesmerism, and Christian Science, see Peter Williams’s 
America’s Religions (310-14).    
195 In response to Emerson’s claim in “Poetry and Imagination” that “‘[t]he poet accounts all productions 
and changes of Nature as the nouns of language, uses them representatively, too well pleased with their 
ulterior to value much their primary meaning,’” Matthiessen explains that “[t]he representation he is 
thinking of is Swedenborg’s, the correspondence between the physical world of appearance and the real 
world of spirit” (40). Matthiessen also notes in passing that Henry James Sr’s “pungent combination of 
Swedenborg and Fourier” formed his determination “to break through the constrictions of self-hood into a 





and affectionate experience of divine things, not in ritualistic obeisance or credal observance.196 
Though he died in 1772, Swedenborg enjoyed vast posthumous attention from both religious and 
scientific figures. Nineteenth century ministers like George Bush, La Roy Sunderland, and 
Warren Felt Evans took him at his word.197 Emerson included him in his pantheon of 
representative men. The spiritualist Andrew Jackson Davis met his ghost.198 Henry James Sr 
used Swedenborg as a stick to beat the Calvinist Edward Beecher with.199 The 1858 edition of 
Encyclopedia Britannica lauded his “theosophic mysticism...remarkable for its apparent reality 
                                                             
196 See Schleiermacher’s highly influential definition of religious experience in On Religion: “[t]he 
contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite 
things…. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all 
doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in 
the Infinite and Eternal” (36). 
197 Some sources mention the first establishment of an American Swedenborgian church in 1790s 
Baltimore. At around the same time, Swedenborgian missionaries (such as John “Appleseed” Chapman) 
traveled throughout the eastern and midwestern states and territories distributing Swedenborgian texts. 
Boston’s Swedenborgian Church of North America was formally organized in 1817 and still stands today. 
The local historian Franklin B. Hough tells us that Swedenborgianism had an established presence in 
western New York in the 1820s (170). Despite its occasional detractors like Robert Baird, the new 
theology had a pervasive and influential presence in antebellum America. See Baird’s Religion in 
America: “[t]heir doctrines, which, the reader must be aware, are of Swedish origin, and have for their 
author Baron Emanuel Swedenborg, are a strange ‘amalgamation, [featuring] some of the most 
extravagant vagaries of mysticism. Their mode of interpreting Scripture is totally at variance with every 
principle of sound philology and exegesis, and necessarily tends to unsettle the mind, and leave it a prey 
to the wildest whimsies that it is possible for the human mind to create or entertain’” (567). It appears that 
Baird was quoting the Theological Dictionary of Rev. Charles Buck, published in London in 1833 (889), 
but the quote was also found in the Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (1099), edited by the Baptist 
minister John Newton Brown and published in 1837.  
198 During a magnetic trance, Davis reported having met two men: “[t]he smaller of the two men I knew 
was called Galen, a physician of considerable renown; and the more beautiful one was once known as 
Swedenborg, a Swedish philosopher and theologian” (The Magic Staff 248). 
199 Henry explicitly targeted the son of Lyman Beecher, Edward, in The Nature of Evil, but this was only 
one of his many Swedenborgian skirmishes against Calvinism. Throughout texts such as Substance and 
Shadow and Society the Redeemed Form of Man, he makes the case that Swedenborgianism is far better 
equipped to negotiate the relationship between the human and the divine than the spiritually enervating 
Calvinism. See for example this provocative stand: “I have no belief in God’s absolute or irrelative and 
unconditional perfection. I have not the least sentiment of worship for His name, the least sentiment of 
awe or reverence towards Him, considered as a perfect person sufficient unto Himself. [...] [A]ny bitch in 
fact who litters her periodical brood of pups, presents to my imagination a vastly nearer and sweeter 
Divine charm. What do I care for a goodness which boasts of a hopeless aloofness from my own 
nature…? And what do I care for a truth which professes to be eternally incommunicable to its own 
starving progeny…? [...] In short I neither can nor will spiritually confess any deity who is not essentially 





and comprehensiveness” (758). The representation of the afterlife in Elizabeth Phelp’s popular 
Gates Ajar series (1868-87) drew from Swedenborgianism, while the same has been argued for 
the local color writing of Sarah Orne Jewett (Donovan). At the time he was thinking about how 
to make our ideas clear, Peirce was simultaneously reading Swedenborg through Henry’s 
theology. Swedenborg’s belief in the intrinsic correspondence between matter and spirit and the 
doctrine that a thing’s ultimate meaning is linked to its utility were attractive to the elder James. 
Seeking a path out of what he considered the crushing cosmological rupture and debilitating 
determinism of his father’s Calvinism, Henry found in Swedenborg nothing short of a 
theological and practical savior.  
These historical examples warrant the question: to what extent is pragmatism indebted to 
certain elements of Swedenborgianism? Eugene Taylor made the case some time ago that Peirce 
absorbed a good deal of Swedenborgian thought, mainly through his conversations with Henry 
James Sr and multiple readings of the latter’s Substance and Shadow as well as his own readings 
of a core Swedenborgian text (still read today), Divine Love and Wisdom (“Peirce”). Taylor 
resists the assumption that pragmatism can be understood as a predominantly secular philosophy, 
appreciating the degree to which Transcendentalist and Swedenborgian strands directly 
influenced the thought of Peirce and William. Taylor is right to suggest that, for those “interested 
in the historical roots of pragmatism, it may mean that in addition to deriving pragmatism from 
the standard English and German sources, pragmatism, and consequently Swedenborgian 
thought, can also be seen in the more historically accurate context of its own time” (“Peirce”).200 
Is there a link, for example, between the pragmatic signification of use value and Swedenborg’s 
assertion that a true spiritual “image does not appear when [correspondences] are viewed in their 
forms, but it appears when they are viewed in uses” (AW 176)? Is there a way in which 
Swedenborg’s correspondence doctrine altered conceptions of truth in nineteenth century 
American philosophy and evangelical practice? Addressing these questions lies with 
Swedenborg’s absorption and rearticulation in antebellum Protestantism, the ways in which his 
writings were used to justify spiritualist and related phenomena, and Henry James Sr’s leg.  
                                                             
200  Taylor would briefly suggest the incorporation of Swedenborg’s doctrines of use and rationality into 
Peircean pragmatism (“Swedenborgian Roots”). While he poses some interesting correspondences 
between Swedenborg’s theology and American pragmatism, I want to take several of these interesting 







Correspondences Between Matter and Spirit 
 
Mr. Henry James is the only man who has sunk his shaft into the depths of Swedenborg’s mind - 
the only man who has dug out a secret treasure of thought worthy to be kept. 
     Octavius B. Frothingham, “Swedenborg” (609) 
 
Following his amputation, Henry James Sr would be dogged throughout his life by what the 
nineteenth century physician Silas Weir Mitchell dubbed phantom limb. Reflecting on her 
correspondence with Henry, the suffragist Julia Ward Howe recalled him saying, “‘I lost a 
leg...in early youth. I have had a consciousness of the limb itself all my life. Although buried and 
out of sight, it has always remained a part of me’” (325). The consequences were not simply 
physical, however. James biographer Howard Feinstein provocatively observes that “[t]he 
amputation made him acutely aware of...the puzzling relationship between body and spirit, 
between material substance and spiritual reality” (41). Henry’s lifelong ordeal was instructive for 
its deeper implication that the realm of spirit was not, as Calvinism tended to hold, beyond 
human apprehension.201 By the same token, the Swedenborgian tenet that spiritual truths are 
embedded in natural facts, though “buried and out of sight,” the obliteration of material 
substance did not cancel the eternal spiritual reality they symbolized. Because for Swedenborg, 
the ultimate reality was spiritual, Henry’s “maimed aftermath” (19), to use Sarah Covington’s 
phrase, provided the symbolic logic that physical existence was in fact not amputated from 
spiritual truths. 
                                                             
201 Though even in Calvinist contexts, material and spiritual interpenetration wasn’t unheard of. The witch 
trials of Andover and Salem, Massachusetts, for example, remain as preeminent examples of the 
precarious borderland between the material and spiritual and the consequences of transitioning between 
them. My point here is that Swedenborg posed a correspondence theory in which humans could actively 





 So when Henry came to learn of Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, he 
discovered a comprehensive system that demonstrated an intrinsic connection between the 
material and spiritual. In The Animal Kingdom, Swedenborg explained that 
 
[i]n our Doctrine of Representations and Correspondences, we shall treat of both 
these symbolical and typical representations, and of the astonishing things which 
occur, I will not say in the living body only, but throughout nature, and which 
correspond so entirely to supreme and spiritual things, that one would swear that 
the physical world was purely symbolical of the spiritual world. (451) 
 
Henry adopted Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences because it maintained that the natural 
world is best understood not as a world of scientific naturalism or of Comtean positivism, but as 
a vast landscape of embedded eternal realities that only required to be read by spiritually attuned 
minds. Refuting Hume’s implication that empirical details are fundamentally independent of one 
another and so can only be understood in their discrete forms, Swedenborg renders the apparent 
disconnectedness and incoherence of the phenomenal world potentially intelligible on 
experiential grounds.  
What stands out for Henry is just that unqualified appeal to direct experience, 
Swedenborg’s candid self-authorization of his claims. “It is exclusively these facts of spiritual 
observation and experience...which produce the effect in question…. For this is what 
Swedenborg never does, namely, reason about the things he professes to have learned from 
angels and spirits” (SRF 65). Swedenborg captivates not merely because of his robust 
intellectualism, but because the evidence he offers derives principally from unintellectualized 
experience, which for Henry is, without contradiction, the most effective conduit to the intellect: 
“no books address the reader’s intellect so much through the heart as these of Swedenborg do” 
(66). His appeals to a pure experience would be lost on readers who “regard Swedenborg as a 
sort of intellectual tailor, whose shop they have only to enter, to find whatsoever spiritual 
garments their particular nakedness craves” (66-7). Chiding what we today might call “cafeteria 
Christians” for their consumerist, pick-and-choose attitude toward religion, Henry lauded 






Henry continues his economic metaphor. Those of “unsympathetic hearts” (66) who enter 
the shop of the “intellectual tailor,” 
 
when they find, as every one among them is sure to do who has any faculty of 
spiritual discernment, that there are absolutely no garments made up, but only an 
immense sound of the shearing of sheep and the carding of wool and whirling of 
wheels and the rattling of looms and the flying of spindles, and that every forlorn 
wight who would be spiritually clad must actually turn to and become his own 
wool-grower, weaver, and tailor, the great majority of course go away disgusted, 
and only those remain whose vocation for Truth is so genuine as to make any 
labor incurred in her service welcome if not pleasant. (67) 
 
Henry’s point isn’t so much that contemporary church-goers are spiritually inept (though he did 
feel that way about some, especially the Unitarians), but that true religion is a personal venture 
that demands putting its substance, its intellectual content, into practice. Getting religion is less 
about going to church and putting on the forms – “garments” – than it is immersing oneself in 
sensorially active engagement (the “immense sound of shearing,” “carding,” “whirling,” and 
“rattling”), and labor - in sum, the direct experience - of fashioning the garment yourself.202 The 
lesson of Swedenborg’s offer of unintellectualized spiritual experience is that the significance of 
religion rests not in its formalism or tradition, but in its personalization and utility for individual 
lives. 
But Henry’s analogy goes deeper than the likeness between the crass materialism of 
antebellum industry and religious consumerism. Anyone “who has any faculty of spiritual 
discernment” will find that underlying the phenomenal experience of the manufacturing process 
                                                             
202 Henry is thinking here of Unitarianism, and he was very critical of what he took to be its emphasis on 
rationalism and its subordination of divinity to mere cultural refinements: “Unitarianism, or 
Rationalism...denied the supernatural, or hierarchical element in the church...and resolved the church into 
a refined or cultivated natural good. It denied the Divinity of its founder, turning him into a man of 
extraordinary natural endowments merely” (NE 344). Nearly two decades later, his opinion had not 
warmed: ”[t]he whole Unitarian movement in the church was a development of the church’s latent 
spiritual stupidity and senility, no longer able indeed spiritually to discern between its right hand and its 





of a garment lies its spiritual reality.203 And this isn’t simply a penetration of spiritual sight 
disclosing supernal design that leaves the phenomenal veil behind, but a recognition of the 
entanglement between the material and spiritual. “The spiritual universe cannot exist without a 
natural universe, in which it can produce its effects and uses” (TCR 62), Swedenborg insisted. 
Going beyond earlier theories of correspondence between the material and spiritual worlds, 
Swedenborg linked them not only via perceptible effects, but via the practical use a spiritual 
reality has in the natural world. 
Henry was exposed to this pragmatic doctrine at a young age, when he served as a 
proofreader for Boston’s Christian Examiner, a paper that in 1826 published Sampson Reed’s 
Observations on the Growth of the Mind, the Swedenborgian-influenced tract that had so 
captivated the Transcendentalists.204 Rejecting what it saw as Lockean passivity, Reed’s tract 
favored an epistemology that endorsed active engagement with the world and appreciated its 
complex nature as conjoined matter and spirit. Observations elaborated a key Swedenborgian 
lesson, one that Emerson would quote in his essay on Swedenborg, one that would prove 
illuminating for the mature Henry, and one that would radically inform the structure of his son’s 
pragmatic method: what a thing is or can be is linked directly to its utility. One of Swedenborg’s 
“golden sayings,” according to Emerson, was “[t]he perfection of man is the love of use” (RM 
126). 
But it isn’t immediately apparent what Henry or Emerson meant by “use.” Swedenborg 
himself said that “[u]se is to perform one’s office and to do one’s work rightly, faithfully, 
sincerely, and justly,” adding that “what is really meant in the Word by the good of charity, 
                                                             
203 Henry makes much of this tailoring conceit, and it’s likely he was also considering Thomas Carlyle’s 
Sartor Resartus (1833-34) and its imagined philosopher Diogenes Teufelsdröckh. The work explores “the 
grand Tissue of all Tissues, the only real Tissue…quite overlooked by Science – the vestural Tissue, 
namely, of woollen or Cloth; which Man’s Soul wears as its outmost wrappage and overall; wherein his 
whole other Tissues are included and screened, his whole Faculties work, his whole Self lives, moves, and 
has its being” (4).  
204 On order of his father, Henry enrolled - not without reluctance - in Union College under Eliphalet Nott, 
president of the college, pro-revivalist, and Finney correspondent. For reasons that biographers have left 
to conjecture, Henry absconded from Union to Boston, finding work as a proofreader for the city’s 
Christian Examiner, an influential liberal Protestant periodical that frequently published editorials by 
Unitarian luminaries like William Ellery Channing, Noah Worcester, and Henry Ware, Jr. For the 
complex financial, familial, and intellectual reasons why Henry decided to escape from Union College, 





which are called ‘good works,’ also ‘fruits,’ [is] uses” (Synnestvedt 49). Seeming to defend a 
kind of justification by works, Swedenborg suggested that uses are the nonfungible actions 
performed by specific offices - the wool-growers, weavers, and tailors, the individual-specific 
vocations of Henry’s spiritual garment shop. Specific use is the manifestation of spiritual reality; 
or put in pragmatic terms, practical differences manifest conceptual significance. This pragmatic 
realism is why Peirce suggested that Christ’s apothegm in Matthew 7:20, “by their fruits ye shall 
know them,” marked him as the first pragmatist.205 It’s also why, at the end of Literary Remains, 
William invoked the very same gospel moment when he asked, “[m]ust not the more radical 
ways of thinking...appeal to the same umpire of practice for corroboration of their more 
consistent views? [...] By their fruits ye shall know them” (119; my emphasis). Practical effects 
are the umpires who call the validity of conceptual pitches and swings to determine their status 
as knowledge.  
And the meaning of knowledge is what’s at stake here as well. Quoting at length a sketch 
of Enlightenment sensory psychology, by which knowledge is constituted by the interplay of 
“two factors, a knowing subject, and an external world,” Henry goes on to denounce the whole 
system as a “corpus delicti,” and sets out to “prove this elaborate pedantry a pure superfluity, so 
far as the fact of knowledge is concerned” (SS 287-88).206 “Doubtless,” Henry continues, this 
                                                             
205 While discussing his “third grade of clearness of apprehension,” otherwise known as the pragmatic 
maxim, Peirce paused to give credit where it was due: “[b]efore we undertake to apply this rule, let us 
reflect a little upon what it implies. It has been said to be a sceptical and materialistic principle. But it is 
only an application of the sole principle of logic which was recommended by Jesus; ‘Ye may know them 
by their fruits,’ and it is very intimately allied with the ideas of the gospel.” (CP V:402, n. P2). 
206 Henry quotes from the German philosopher-theologian Albert Schwegler’s survey A History of 
Philosophy in Epitome. Schwegler sums up Kantian epistemology this way: “[a]ll knowledge is a product 
of two factors, a knowing subject, and an external world. Of these two factors the latter furnishes our 
knowledge with experience as the mater, and the former with the conceptions of the understanding as the 
form, through which a connected knowledge - or synthesis of our perceptions in a whole of experience - 
first becomes possible. If there were no external world, then there would be no phenomena; if there were 
no understanding, then these phenomena which are infinitely manifold would never be brought into the 
unity of a notion, and then no experience were possible. Thus while intuitions without conceptions are 
blind, and conceptions without intuitions are empty, knowledge is a union of the two, since it requires that 
the form of the conception should be filled with the matter of experience, and that the matter of 
experience should be apprehended in the net of the understanding’s conceptions” (287). Henry repudiates 
this description of knowledge as inimical to true spiritual understanding, and James would detect in the 
“understanding” an intervening third term artificially constructed to hold the empiricist universe - “a set 





Enlightenment-era, scientific understanding of knowledge poses “such a predicament as you put 
a coat in, logically, when you mention a tailor and a piece of cloth” (288). Returning to the 
imagery of tailoring and Swedenborg’s doctrine of use, Henry refutes the traditional 
subject/object epistemological paradigm: 
 
[e]very coat of course logically pre-dicates a tailor and a piece of cloth, but you 
convey a very inadequate notion of the actual garment by enumerating these 
purely constitutional elements of it. [...] I am free to admit that the tailor and the 
cloth are necessary data of the coat, are logically implied in its constitution: but 
this sort of knowledge is purely scientific as interesting only the tailor and 
manufacturer, and not philosophic as interesting all mankind. (288) 
 
In this metaphor, the tailor and cloth represent sense data; the assembled coat, knowledge. This 
knowledge, though, “is purely scientific,” useful only to tailors and manufacturers unconcerned 
with the “philosophic” interest, which Henry equates with a spiritual understanding of the 
coat/knowledge. As a philosopher,   
 
I do not ask what makes the garment, i.e. what elements enter into its material 
constitution; but only what creates it…. The coat itself or spiritually, i.e. in the use 
or power it exerts, is something very different and superior to the material 
elements which go to constitute it…. The coat when truly conceived...causes both 
the tailor and the piece of cloth to disappear in the bosom of its own unity or 
individuality, whence they never reappear…. [...] But obviously the coat is not 
merely a visible existence, it possesses also an invisible or spiritual BEING in that 
distinctive use or power which it exerts over other existence, and which 
accordingly constitutes its true individuality, its distinctive personality or 
discrimination from all other things. (SS 288-89).207 
                                                             
207 This episode is in close parallel to an anecdote Henry tells in his “Letter on Incarnation” (1874): “I 
remember a little boy once saying to his father at dinner-table: ‘Father, you say that God is pure spirit or 
life, and consequently that he alone is or lives in all existence. Now I want to know if He is in this chicken 
on my plate?’ Yes, the father replied, beyond all doubt He is there, as the specific use or power of that 
flesh to nourish you. ‘Very well then,’ said the little sceptic, hastening to cram his mouth with chicken, ‘If 
God is in this chicken which I am eating, then I am now eating God.’ Oh no, again replied the father, I did 
not say that God was materially in the chicken as its very flesh, for then He, like the flesh itself, would be 






The emphasis here on fruits over roots can’t be understated. What renders a thing distinctive is 
its unique “use or power.” “Truly conceived,” the coat will be seen by a kind of second sight as it 
is, which is to say, as it does. Its constituent parts, its origin as a created thing, vanishes in its 
superior function (keeping one warm in a New England winter). Its true significance, what gives 
it being, is not the process or skill that gives it material existence; Henry argues, rather, that its 
true being - its hidden but discoverable eternal essence, what he esoterically calls its 
“individuality” - is in the particular use for which it was made, a use which cannot be assumed 
by other objects, for to do so would be to render such objects pragmatically identical. As 
Jamesian pragmatism would assert time and again, what constitutes a thing’s truth is not its 
origin or link to tradition, but its practical utility in lived experience.208  
We can see, I’m arguing, that Henry adopted pragmatic attitudes in his revision of 
Calvinist theology and interpretation of Swedenborg. Importantly, though, this isn’t to suggest 
that Henry’s project was merely a theological version of Jamesian pragmatism. Whereas 
William’s philosophy emphasized experienced particulars that made a difference in individual 
lives, the aim of Henry’s theology was always fixed on the life to come and the eternal nature of 
the human soul. Though he used pragmatic attitudes, such as an insistence on the use value of 
spiritual concepts, Henry’s theology remained in esoteric spaces that even his son sometimes 
considered too abstract to be practically useful.   
Though he thought that Henry’s Secret of Swedenborg was “altogether out of harmony 
with the spirit of this age” (“Review” 433), Peirce did, however, summarize Henry’s distinction 
between appearance and being in a way that would become crucial to the pragmatic method: “to 
be without being manifested is a kind of being which does not differ from its negative, but is a 
meaningless form of words. Thus, it is of the very essence of being that it shall come forth into 
appearance, of the very essence of God that he shall create” (434). Being is being because being 
                                                             
208 This focus on fruits over roots didn’t come without its moral quandaries. In Melville’s “The Paradise 
of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids” (1855), for example, blithe ignorance of the roots of commercial 
production results in wanton decadence for the bachelors in “paradise,” and economic disenfranchisement 
for the maids of “tartarus” who produce their male consumers’ lineaments. Nor was the moral dilemma of 
southern slavery lost on the consumers of the north, who benefited directly from southern cotton, 





- of which God is the prime exemplar - creates. The rest is verbiage. This, recall, was Edwards’s 
conclusion in the Dissertation Concerning the End: the end for which God created the world is 
solely for the manifestation of his glorious being.209 “A meaningless form of words,” what has 
no practical manifestation, has, in William’s phrase, no cash value, no intellectual or spiritual 
currency that satisfies our material or spiritual needs and points us toward action. And if that 
divine impulse to create is read as an expression of abundant love - which it was - we come to 
the proximity between a universe conceived in and sustained by divine affection and a logic of 
pragmatic justification for action. 
Because affections, for Henry, were what held together the relationships between 
individuals and between God and Creation, a connection threatened by the rationalizing forces of 
industrialization and the hyperempirical stance of positivism. What he found in Swedenborg’s 
“doctrine of natural ultimates” was a system that could challenge what he saw as science’s 
misguided interpretation of nature as a realm existing unto itself, operating according to eternal 
laws indifferent to human interests and values: 
 
[t]his is all that Swedenborg means by his doctrine of natural ultimates as 
incidental to spiritual creation. It is a doctrine which...not only accounts for 
Nature...but brings the dread and formidable spiritual world into our own 
keeping...by harnessing it and taming it down to the phenomena of men’s familiar 
natural history. (SRF 239-40)210 
                                                             
209 See chapter one of this dissertation. “If it be fit, that God’s power and wisdom, &c. should be 
exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these 
exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as 
to the above purpose, as if they were not” (DCE 21). I am not posing an equivalence here, because 
Edwards and Peirce inhabited very different cultural contexts, but I do argue that their sharing of this 
pragmatic attitude illuminates the intellectual history I am developing.  
210 “Ultimates” is another Swedenborgian term that begs clarification. In Swedenborg’s writings, 
ultimates are the terminal points of divine creation - in concrete terms, “all and each of the things of the 
mineral kingdom” in which “lie concealed the end and also the beginning of all the uses which are from 
life (AW 31). In a broader sense, though, “the Ultimate of Creation is the Natural World, in which is the 
terraqueous Globe with all Things upon it” (LJ 9). The doctrine of ultimates, then, knits the divine to the 
material universe by a causal logic (which, incidentally, constitutes Swedenborg’s response to causal 
skepticism): “[f]rom the...Order of Creation it may appear, that such is the Chain of Connection from first 
to last, that all together form a Unity, wherein what is prior cannot be separated from what is posterior, 
just as the Cause cannot be separated from the Effect, nor consequently the Spiritual World from the 






Whereas “modern science affirms that all natural existence is constituted by some primary 
natural substance, say protoplasm, and that there is an end of the matter” (241), Swedenborg 
“accounts” for nature by familiarizing it, “bring[ing] it into our own keeping,” while 
simultaneously divesting the spiritual world of its supernatural (non-human) qualities. This 
“taming down” of the natural and the spiritual isn’t the ethic of rationalized instrumentalism for 
commercial gain, but a spiritualized engagement that renders the potentially alien and inhuman 
familiar and useful for human interests. Henry’s central point is that modern science’s positing of 
a “primary natural substance” undergirding existence is in principle no different from a spiritual 
world that exists only supernaturally: neither has any real, practical significance for human 
interests and uses.211 Both, in other words, operate outside the realm of human experience. 
Swedenborg was a game changer for Henry because he provided the crucial link between the 
remote immutability of the natural and spiritual worlds, a link accessible via intimate human 
experience.  
 To nineteenth century ears, the claim that one could immediately experience the spiritual 
world evoked mysticism. “Mystic,” as Emerson called Swedenborg, though, might be a little 
misleading.212 Swedenborg argued that it was possible to have “genuine visions...or sights, of 
those things which really exist in another life, and which are nothing but real things” (AC 291). It 
was a matter not of a new faculty implanted in the mind - which Edwards also insisted did not 
constitute his sense of the heart - but of the native capacity of our common faculties to perceive 
uncommon things. Henry extended this naturalist assertion to argue against the rationalist view 
                                                             
211 The concept of “substance” has a storied history in western philosophy. While some idealists 
postulated an ultimate reality they would often refer to as “substance,” in the empiricist tradition (namely 
Locke and Hume) it wasn’t taken for granted that we have a distinct idea of it. In Some Problems of 
Philosophy, in one of his many enfilades against the rationalists, William James pragmatically analyzes 
“substance” out of its conceptual obscurity (121-28).  
212 In “The Poet,” Emerson writes that “Mysticism consists in the mistake of an accidental and individual 
symbol for an universal one” (Essays 233-34), which becomes his central criticism of Swedenborg in 
Representative Men: “Swedenborg...failed by attaching [himself] to the Christian symbol, instead of to 
the moral sentiment, which carries innumerable christianities, humanities, divinities, in its bosom” (135). 
What makes Swedenborg a mystic for Emerson is the seer’s “theological determination” (134-5), a 






of the moral universe - i.e., that good and evil exist as objective, transcendent realities. He 
followed the same principle that such realities are only meaningful insofar as they have to do 
with human life: 
 
good and evil, heaven and hell, are not outgrowths or accidents of the human 
personality by any means, but necessary constituents of human nature itself…. 
[...] They have no distinctive supernatural quality nor efficacy whatever. [...] They 
are purely subjective appearances, vitalized exclusively by the created 
imperfection, or the uses they subserve to our provisional moral and rational 
consciousness. (SRF 251-52)  
 
The core idea here is one shared by pragmatism, that the significance of things is intrinsically 
bound to their practical use. They are activated, “vitalized exclusively,” by how they can be used 
to serve our “provisional moral and rational consciousness.” When William quoted this passage 
in its entirety in Literary Remains, he called it, as he did most of his father’s writing, “abstract” 
(83). But Henry’s turn away from supernaturalism in favor of provisional human interests would 
be mirrored by his son’s sustained emphasis that pragmatism is a method that respects those 
interests above merely intellectual concerns. “It is by the interest and importance that 
experiences have for us,” William said, “by the emotions they excite, and the purposes they 
subserve, by their affective values...that their consecution [sequencing] in our several conscious 
streams...is ruled” (ERE 151).  
 Henry’s distaste for supernaturalism informed his idiosyncratic conception of God as a 
“divine being” or, in Swedenborg’s terms, “the “Divine-Natural Humanity.” (More will be said 
on that last phrase.) What is wrong with Christianity, Henry argued, is its insistence on the divine 
being’s “rigidly supernatural quality” (SRF 331). Henry relates God’s “relative perfection” (i.e., 
not his absoluteness or infinity) to how that conception shapes the way we behave: “the practical 
lesson to be derived from it [that a humanized God merits our reverence] is that God is not 
willing to be had in reverence of men for His absoluteness and infinity, but only for His relative 
perfection: in that being rich and of incomparable renown He yet makes Himself poor and of no 
repute that we through His destitution may become rich and powerful” (332). Henry is of course 





Christ. A God willing to renounce divinity (even if temporarily), assuming a corporeal form that 
suffers, merits awe and practical devotion in ways that transhuman features like infinity and 
omniscience don’t. It was, as the Unitarian minister George Ripley pointed out, Christ’s direct 
experience of human suffering that made the Incarnation vital for nineteenth century social and 
individual reform: “[t]he Infinite Majesty of God is softened and brought down to the perception 
of man, as it is exhibited in Him who possessed our nature and who knew our infirmities” (44). 
A critical component of Henry’s theology - as it will be for the postbellum Social Gospel 
movement - the suffering of Christ, his direct experience of evil out of love for humanity, 
highlights the ways in which the palpable affections have become the point of contact between 
the human and divine. 
Henry insists that the nature of a self-humbling and affectionate God isn’t just a 
theological nicety, but makes a practical difference. In a telling if obscurely reasoned and 
overstuffed sentence, Henry continues:  
 
when He who is the acknowledged top of all perfection...thus renounces His 
absoluteness, renounces every patent right He has to our regard...and consents like 
any unprivileged person, like any honest workingman, diligently to sue out His 
title to our allegiance in the court of every man’s equitable judgment, it is high 
time for us to learn that a man is in the long run only so much as he does, that 
there is no such thing as a chronic excellency - as an absolute or fossil perfection - 
ever practicable either to man or God, and that our only chance therefore for 
immortality lies in no stored-up capital of goodness and truth we possess, but in 
the acute life or character we daily witness in putting all our accumulations of 
goodness and truth out to active use. (SRF 332-33) 
 
It was the divine’s consent, the doing, that substantiates “His title to our allegiance.” In Henry’s 
logic, God’s voluntary consent to assume human form ratifies a justification by works that 
teaches “a man is in the long run only so much as he does.” This is Henry’s “practical lesson” - 
that the way we achieve immortality is, as it was for Finney, not by a static, “chronic” reverence 





“put to active use,” constitutes our salvific status.213 Just as Milton could not “praise a fugitive 
and cloistered virtue...that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race” 
(45), no “stored-up capital of goodness” will have any real, practical meaning if it lies 
unmanifested.214  
 In a nod to Edwards, Henry’s critique of a “chronic excellency” reminds us that questions 
about the nature of divinity were not far from how pragmatic attitudes were articulated. In 
Edwardsean theology, “excellency” is “[the] consent of being to being” (SPW 336), or the 
relational aspect of one thing in Creation to another – in other words, a consideration of its “true 
nature” as it relates to its surroundings, not to some rationalist or metaphysical “substance.” To 
use one of William’s favorite figures, excellency in this passage is understood in its living 
relation, an evolutionary image signaled as well by Henry’s “fossil perfection.” Unlike a fossil, 
the significance of something excellent, in this sense, is linked to its interactions with 
surrounding forces, experiences, and its ability to change. It might not be too much of a stretch to 
say that, like truth, excellency happens to an idea.      
Henry elaborated this Swedenborgian emphasis on intimate divinity in works like The 
Secret of Swedenborg and Society the Redeemed Form of Man, both of which William cited 
extensively in Literary Remains. For both, it squared with their shared disdain for the 
transempirical absolute of the rational idealists, deeply influencing their understanding of the 
connection between feeling and action. Since the Absolute is not a thing that experiences mortal 
                                                             
213 Throughout his life, Henry maintained the view that “when orthodoxy commends God...to our rational 
reverence and affection, under the guise of a...melodramatic being so essentially heartless as to live for 
untold eternities without feeling any desire for companionship; so essentially irrational that it cost him no 
effort of thought to summon the universe...;: I repugn the instruction…” (SS 73).  
214 This subordination of private and individual piety to public morality and action will become the 
centerpiece of the theological ethics of the Social Gospel movement, which begins to emerge around the 
1870s as a response to mass urbanization, Christian sectarianism, and civic indifference to poverty. 
Walter Rauschenbusch, one of the movement’s key players, argued in his highly influential Christianity 
and the Social Crisis against preaching an emphasis on cloistered virtue to the exclusion of a socialized, 
public morality. In his defense of the Israelite prophets championing public morality, Rauschenbusch 
quotes the Scottish theologian George Adam Smith: “‘[c]onfine religion to the personal, it grows rancid, 
morbid. Wed it to patriotism, it lives in the open air, and its blood is pure’” (26). Rauschenbusch was 
slightly more moderate in his estimation; for the Israelite prophets, “[p]ersonal religion was chiefly a 
means to an end; the end was social” (29). We will see the ways in which this ethical reorientation 





suffering, it cannot understand it as humans do, nor does its ignorance of such trials move us to 
act emotionally or cognitively (which are distinct but mutually interlocked for Henry and 
William). On the contrary: “when philosophy identifies God with some abstract absolute the 
notion of helping him is ruled out” (320), observed the psychologist of religion George Coe in 
his Psychology of Religion. This is why, when Henry jettisoned so much of Christian orthodoxy, 
the Incarnation remained; it was that event that granted the divine a direct experience of human 
existence.215 It’s no wonder Henry was attracted to Job, who demanded to know of God, “Hast 
thou eyes of flesh, or seest thou as man seeth?” (KJV Job 10:4). Job’s complaint calls into 
question whether God’s omniscience includes knowing how his creatures experience the trials of 
living. For orthodox theists, simply citing God’s majesty settled the matter. But for liberal-
minded revivalists, many Swedenborgians, and the Jameses, this only begged the question, since 
the only claims that the insurmountable rift between divine knowledge and human life make on 
us are fearful awe or obedient adoration.  
 This revolt against the absolute was felt in other ways. The next section deals with the 
pragmatizing of human history and its relation to truth. A world and a history populated by 
human actors in a continuous state of becoming is, for the James’s, the only conception that asks 
for our sympathy. “As absolute,” James argued, “the world repels our sympathy because it has no 
history” (PU 47). Thus, the way to make the world meaningful for its inhabitants is to consider 
its own history, the record of its stream of consciousness collectively experienced by the human 
actors who give it form. Further, the affectionate bond of sympathy, we’ve seen and will 




                                                             
215 One of the reasons I’m arguing that Henry James Sr had a strong effect on the development of 
pragmatism is because of his insistence on an immanent God whose involvement with Creation justifies 
the meaningfulness of our actions. In this way, though under a different discourse, Henry achieved what 
Edwards - Newton and Whiston, too - would have understood to be the synthesis of God’s general and 





History as Process and the Pragmatic Conception of Truth 
 
Other world? There is no other world; here or nowhere is the whole fact. 
      Emerson to Sampson Reed, 1842 (JMN, VIII: 183) 
 
Emerson’s point to Sampson Reed was that we shouldn’t concern ourselves with worlds that 
aren’t “factual” for us - which was also Wittgenstein’s observation, when he opened his 
Tractatus with the deceptively simple sentence “[t]he world is all that is the case” (5). This 
insistence on the ultimate facticity of this and no other extra-experiential world is rooted in 
religious and philosophical efforts to reclaim terra firma for human experience. Henry saw no 
validity in theological abstractions except through the lens of a social humanism committed to 
promoting sympathy among its members. Space and time - more particularly nature and history - 
are incomprehensible outside the experience of human actors. Rather, Henry argues, our very 
spatial and temporal environments are functions of our experience.    
In The Secret of Swedenborg, Henry defended the Swedenborgian concept that nature and 
history were not created as absolutes separate from human existence. When we interpret them 
rightly, “space and time, or nature and history, have absolutely nothing to do with creation in its 
objective aspect...but only...as it exists to our infirm thought. They belong to it, not as a result, 
but as a process” (115). Nature and history’s sole function is to progressively reveal divine truth 
to rationally imperfect (but perfectible) human beings. And elsewhere, he continues insisting on 
his particular brand of a humanistic cosmology: “[t]here were no time and space prior to 
creation, simply because time and space are experiences of the finite mind...and so fall within 
creation not outside of it. They are constitutionally involved in all purely conscious or subjective 
existence; time having no meaning save to furnish a rational or relative basis - space a sensible 
or finite basis - to such existence” (SS 69). Henry’s rendering of space and time as not objective 





individual experiences leads him to posit process over closed system, possibility over universal 
once-and-for-all dogmatisms, practical effects over origins.216   
Another advantage of Swedenborg’s pragmatizing of history is that it liberates divine 
revelation from literalist demands that reduce its significance to historical confirmation of 
biblical prophecies. “All our diviners, whether devout or sceptical, hold nature and history to a 
final or absolute and independent significance; and thus find themselves compelled either to 
adjust revelation to cosmical order in a very crude irrational way, or else...to reject it altogether.” 
To Henry, treating nature and history as transhuman absolutes creates the need to “adjust 
revelation” to a cosmical order that is always in flux and under no compulsion to satisfy our 
literalist hopes.217 “Swedenborg,” Henry continues, “leaves [nature and history] valid only as 
furnishing a basis of divine knowledge consonant with the ever-growing requirements of the 
human heart and understanding” (SoS 87). At once evolutionist and humanist, Henry’s reading of 
this Swedenborgian conception of nature and history as subservient to divine revelation both 
eluded the disconfirmation of prophecy and fostered a pragmatic attitude that truth can be made 
amenable to the unpredictable unfolding of historical events or the human experiences that 
disclose them. What Henry essentially gets out of Swedenborg here is a pragmatic conception of 
truth.218 
So whatever can be said to be the reality of space and time is not something existing 
independently of our experience. This isn’t the idealistic representation of truth’s assured 
                                                             
216 This redefining of creation as ongoing process unfolding in human experience would bolster the 
salvific logic of the Social Gospel movement. In terms reminiscent of Henry’s, the Boston pastor Philip 
Stafford Moxom in 1896 would argue that “the kingdom of God is not a new creation...but the world 
redeemed, purified, disciplined, and spiritualized…. There is no break in the continuity of God’s 
working” (64). Henry, then, was just early to a later and wider theological reorientation. 
217 The stakes in making what might seem like a trivial theological distinction were actually quite real. 
Nineteenth century readers would be reminded of the Millerites’ “Great Disappointment,” when history 
failed to fulfill William Miller’s prophecy that Christ would return to earth to usher in the millennium on 
October 22, 1844. Property was sold, families were abandoned, and hilltops swarmed with expectant 
believers. Ultimately, people were disappointed. Though they weren’t the only nineteenth century 
religious group who believed in an imminent Second Coming, the Millerites became a byword for 
religious lunacy and gullibility. 
218 This isn’t to say that Henry and William’s conceptions of truth are identical. William’s pragmatism 
was always grounded in a temporal reality in which truth was always revisable according to new data. 
Henry’s theology accepted temporal flux as a condition of spiritual life, but it never lost sight of a 





eternity: “[t]ruth is immortal,” Lydia Maria Child said, “[n]o fragment of it ever dies” (53). Nor 
is it - in contrast to the pluralistic Ishmael - Ahab’s version of truth, a yearned-for revelation 
objectively real and worth pursuing even unto one’s obliteration. When William outlined in no 
uncertain terms what truth looked like to a pragmatist, he did so in a way that asserted the 
primacy of process over closed and deterministic systems: “[t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant 
property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events” 
(Pragmatism 89). Capitalizing on the etymology of “fact” as referring to “doing” or “making,” 
William links truth to experience in a dialectical way. Rephrased in Henry’s theology, the “truth” 
of Creation is not a “stagnant property” of its prehuman, immemorial eventuality; its truth 
“happens” to it in dialogue with “the ever-growing requirements of the human heart and 
understanding.” By the same principle of Taylor and Finney’s practically identifying the essence 
of a thing with the process that gives it being, William makes truth commensurate with the 
process of its becoming.  
Contrary to the biblical literalism that emerged to challenge the historicism of European 
scholars, Henry refuted the idea that Creation was a historical event that precipitated time and 
space as we know it. “I may truly say that I no longer incline to regard creation as a physical act 
of God” (CLC 4), by which he means the significance of God is His workings - i.e., providence - 
on the human intellect (which for Henry is equivalent to the spiritual), an intellect that is always 
in a dialectical relationship with truth. Creation is significant not because it initiated the human 
drama, but because it continues to reveal the relationship between divinity and humanity. “The 
spiritual creation is not a work of God begun and accomplished in space and time. It is an infinite 
and eternal work, disclosing itself in space and time, or nature and history, without doubt, but 
deriving all its form and substance from the immediate divine presence and activity” (SoS 115). 
Or to use one of his favorite Swedenborgian images, “what we call human history is at bottom 
nothing else than a theatre of DIVINE REVELATION…” (SRF 174). 
And like a theater, space and time provide the stage on which the dramatis personae enact 







we are not now talking of any paltry fact of organic experience, or fact of sense, which can be 
scientifically probed or proved...but of a truth of men’s inward or regenerate nature exclusively, 
of their living or spiritual experience, of their soul-history as it were; a truth which as slowly 
flowered out of the suffering human heart, and which therefore appeals for its ratification in 
every mind solely to the man’s cultivated or disciplined affections. It is a truth which no amount 
of merely scientific culture, nor any ardor of ratiocinative acumen, will ever qualify a man to do 
justice to. In fact these things are very apt to disqualify men for the acknowledgement of spiritual 
or living truth. (SRF 421-22)  
 
The truths of “living or spiritual experience,” of a “soul-history,” appeal directly to and are 
ratified “solely” by the affections independent of “ratiocinative acumen.” To Henry, the 
realization of such truths demands an acumen rather of “cultivated or disciplined affections,” 
showing how far the Edwardsean-Schleiermacher-Swedenborgian conception of truth as rooted 
in immediate feeling penetrated the elder James’s theology. There is, furthermore, nothing said 
about the social or consensual dimension of truth, but only that which exists in relation to the 
individual. Henry was largely socialistic in his hopes for a common humanity in ways that his 
son wasn’t, but the emphasis on “spiritual or living truth” beginning its process of validation 
within private interiors with respect to one’s “soul-history” and not by scientific or rationalistic 
tests certified by consensus would shape William’s noticeably individualistic conception of 
pragmatic truth. Where Henry’s theology emphasized the spiritual brotherhood of enlightened 
citizens, William’s philosophy looked to more terrestrial sources for validation of truth.  
That’s not all in the passage that reflects a pragmatic spirit. The vagueness of this truth 
lingering throughout the passage functions as a pragmatic openness to the possibility of an 
infinite variety of individually discovered truths. An openness that was also true for William’s 
whole approach to the sciences: “[a]t a certain stage in the development of every science a 
degree of vagueness is what best consists with fertility” (PP 19).219 While the nineteenth century 
theme of uncertainty current in the sciences is almost always attributed to Darwin, elements of 
productive vagueness existed in evangelical theology well before and in close proximity to the 
thought of Henry and William James.  
                                                             
219 For an appreciation of William’s embrace of linguistic and logical vagueness as legitimate 
philosophical categories of investigation, see William J. Gavin’s William James and the Reinstatement of 





For William’s pragmatism, too, scientifically proven facts could not provide the kind of 
epistemological framework needed to account for experiences that seemed to transcend empirical 
criteria. In an address before the Society for Psychical Research in 1892, William demonstrated 
the extent to which the “exceptional facts” of trances, mediums, ghostly visitations, and visions 
exerted such force on what we can know as “truth:”  
 
[s]cience, so far as science denies such exceptional facts, lies prostrate in the dust 
for me; and the most urgent intellectual need which I feel at present is that science 
be built up again in a form in which such facts shall have a positive place. 
Science, like life, feeds on its own decay. New facts burst old rules; then newly 
divined conceptions bind old and new together into a reconciling law (EPR 100-
101).  
 
The incentive to develop an epistemology in accordance with the variability of human 
experiences led William to detach truth from its association with the Absolute or rationalist 
substance. Divesting theological concepts of their absolute status and resituating them as 
functional categories of the stream of human experience should remind us of the proximity 
between this crucial theological shift and William’s radical empiricism, which postulated - in 
outright defiance of faculty psychology - that consciousness was not itself a substance, but a 
function of the irreducible substratum of pure experience.220   
Henry and William’s emphasis on the affections as those things in which truth consists 
and which impel us to action more effectively than intellectual reasoning has important 
implications for pragmatism’s claims about what counts as truth and the justifications for our 
actions. If Edwardsean and Finneyesque revivalism and Swedenborgian theology assert that the 
nature of religion rested in human affections, the same could be said for Jamesian pragmatism, 
devoted as it was to the epistemological validity of individual feeling. The next section explores 
                                                             
220 See William’s “Does Consciousness Exist?” in Essays in Radical Empiricism. His answer to that 
question depends on what one means when one invokes “consciousness.” But as a substance or faculty 
existing in the mind, a kind of hub for sensory inputs, William’s response is an emphatic no. Our 
immediate experiences are the “essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to 





the precise relationship between William’s budding pragmatic logics and the humanism of 
Unitarian theology.  
 
 
Unitarianism According to William James - God as Love, Reflex Action, and the 
Pragmatics of Mind Cure 
 
You see that, although religion is the great interest of my life, I am rather hopelessly non-
evangelical, and take the whole thing too impersonally. 
 
William James to Henry Rankin (Letters, Vol II 58) 
 
Writing to Benjamin Waterhouse in June 1822, Thomas Jefferson trusted “that there is not a 
young man now living in the United States who will not die an Unitarian” (Writings 1459), 
repeating the same sentiment later that year to the theologian James Smith: “I confidently expect 
that the present generation will see Unitarianism become the general religion of the United 
States” (Randolph 360). What Emerson called a “corpse-cold” religion didn’t become as 
“general” as Jefferson expected, but its theology did become one of the most influential 
denominational and cultural forces of the American nineteenth century.221 Its core teachings of 
the primacy of human reason in biblical exegesis, the humanity of Christ, and its rejection of 
total depravity were logical extensions of the muscularization of human agency in antebellum 
                                                             
221 Formally established with Boston’s American Unitarian Association in 1825, Unitarianism was only 
one of the nineteenth century’s liberalizing movements that reinterpreted Christian doctrine in the decline 
of Calvinist orthodoxy. Having theological precedents in sixteenth century Europe through the writings of 
Michael Servetus (whom Calvin himself helped put to death), Unitarianism emerged at the turn of the 
nineteenth century largely through the influence of figures like the English dissenter Joseph Priestley, the 
Unitarian ministers William Ellery Channing and Henry Ware, Sr, and the Transcendentalist critic and so-
called “Unitarian Pope” Andrews Norton. For an exhaustive history of the role Unitarianism played in the 





evangelicalism. As Channing announced in 1819 at his ordination sermon for Jared Sparks 
(future Unitarian president of Harvard),  
 
[s]ay what we may, God has given us a rational nature, and will call us to account 
for it. We may let it sleep, but we do so at our peril. Revelation is addressed to us 
as rational beings. We may wish, in our sloth, that God had given us a system 
demanding no labor of comparing, limiting, and inferring. But such a system 
would be at variance with the whole character of our present existence. (28-9) 
 
Channing - who “owed more to the Awakeners than he was aware” (Niebuhr 152) - argues that a 
system encouraging practitioners to wait God’s time - i.e. Calvinism - is incompatible with our 
status as rational creatures. Rather revelation - the disclosure of God’s will to his creation - 
demands the free deployment of the rational faculty to compare, limit, and infer. Using the 
language of inclusivity (“we,” “us,” “our”), Channing universalizes the doctrine of election, 
making salvation a matter of human endeavor and not a part of a divine plan independent of our 
agency or experience. Rather than espousing a God who inscrutably determines our place in 
eternity, Channing describes him as a taskmaster demanding experiment and effort in the pursuit 
of spiritual goals, a God of labor Henry described as “a working God, grimy with the dust and 
sweat of our most carnal appetites and passions” (SoS vii).  
Unitarianism’s arrival into the American mainstream is usually signaled by the 1805 
election of Henry Ware Sr. (father of Henry Ware, Jr and Emerson’s mentor) to Harvard’s Hollis 
Chair of Divinity - up to this point a Congregationalist post in a Congregationalist college. (No 
orthodox Congregationalist would hold the post again until 1910.) The Unitarian-Emersonian 
Charles William Eliot would serve as Harvard’s president from 1869-1909, modernizing the 
school’s curricula based on pragmatic principles and rejecting established codes in favor of 
“practical education.”222 So when William arrived as an undergraduate at Harvard in the fall of 
                                                             
222 The very first paragraph of Eliot’s 1869 inaugural address leaves no ambiguity as to how thoroughly 
practicality had overturned theoretical concerns and disciplinary antagonisms: “[t]he endless 
controversies whether language, philosophy, mathematics, or science supply the best mental training, 
whether general education should be chiefly literary or chiefly scientific, have no practical lesson for us 
to-day. This University recognizes no real antagonism between literature and science, and consents to no 





1861 and began teaching appointments in the spring of 1873, Unitarian principles were firmly 
entrenched in the school and in many educated Boston families.223 A consideration of 
Unitarianism’s presence is significant because James delivered a lecture to the Unitarian 
Ministers’ Institute in 1881 in which he made the case that Unitarian theology was the best 
expression of what he was then beginning to formulate as pragmatism.   
In “Reflex Action and Theism,” published in The Will to Believe, William hailed the 
“eagerness which theologians show to assimilate results of science, and to hearken to the 
conclusions of men of science about universal matters” (112). His goal in the address was to “ask 
whether [the reflex action’s] influence may not extend far beyond the limits of psychology, even 
into those of theology herself” (113) - in other words, an effort of pragmatic mediation between 
reflex action - but science more broadly - and a theism that views God as synonymous with 
abundant love.224 Delivered six years after the appearance of Peirce’s essay “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear” (which William directly cites in the address), he makes no secret about its pragmatic 
orientation:  
 
[i]ndeed, it may be said that if two apparently different definitions of the reality 
before us should have identical consequences, those two definitions would really 
                                                             
and science do indeed conspire to promote the material welfare of mankind; but science no more than 
poetry finds its best warrant in its utility” (1).  
223 As Harriet Beecher Stowe vividly recalled, in a less than celebratory tone, “Calvinism or Orthodoxy 
was the despised and persecuted form of faith. It was the dethroned royal family wandering like a 
permitted mendicant in the city where it once had held court, and Unitarianism reigned in its stead. All the 
literary men of Massachusetts were Unitarian. All the trustees and professors of Harvard College were 
Unitarians. All the élite of wealth and fashion crowded Unitarian churches. The judges on the bench were 
Unitarian, giving decisions by which the peculiar features of church organization, so carefully ordained 
by the Pilgrim Fathers, had been nullified” (Life 57).  
224 What William referred to as the “fundamental and well established...doctrine of reflex action” (112-13) 
is less important to him in this essay than the reconciliation between science and religion he saw cresting 
on the American intellectual horizon. But for clarification, reflex action “means that the acts we perform 
are always the result of outward discharges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges 
are themselves the result of impressions from the external world, carried in along one or another of our 
sensory nerves. [...] There is not one [action] which cannot be remotely, if not immediately, traced to an 
origin in some incoming impression of sense. There is no impression of sense which, unless inhibited by 





be identical definitions, made delusively to appear different merely by the 
different verbiage in which they are expressed. (124) 
 
Using consequences as arbiters of practical significance, William asserts that unclear “verbiage” 
may expose philosophical disputes as delusive - the central claim of Peirce and William’s 
pragmatism. William says theology, but what he’s really interested in is theism - not -ology 
(“study”), but -ism (“practice”). As he says, “theism always stands ready with the most 
practically rational solution it is possible to conceive. [...] At a single stroke, it changes the dead 
blank it of the world into a living thou, with whom the whole man may have dealings” (127).225 
Theism’s postulation of a world bears the stamp of divine personability - the second person thou, 
not the impersonal neuter it - that energizes and makes practical action meaningful. The 
significance of action for people is predicated on their affectionate bond with “whatever they 
may consider the divine” (VRE 31). 
So even though William’s confession to his Unitarian friend Henry Rankin - that 
“although religion is the great interest of my life, I am rather hopelessly non-evangelical, and 
take the whole thing too impersonally” - sounds like the sobered objectivity of an agnostic 
philosopher of religion - which he was in many ways - he understood all too well the crucial role 
personality played in justifications for actions. It undergirded the whole philosophical endeavor: 
“[t]he history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a clash of human temperaments.” He 
added that even though “[o]f whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries...to 
sink the fact of his temperament,” personal bias is inescapable: “his temperament really gives 
him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises” (Pragmatism 6-7). 
William’s point is that personal temperament is not only inescapable, but it also modulates 
supposedly unbiassed philosophical conclusions. It’s not an accident that Unitarianism’s 
                                                             
225 See also William’s reiteration of this critical aspect of his theory of action in his later essay “The Will 
to Believe:” “[t]he more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as 
having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any 





emphasis on Christ’s humanity - as opposed to his divinity - his unique personality became the 
theological justification for Christians to act like Christians.226 
 William lauds the “champions of the Unitarianism of New England,” indicating why he 
believes Unitarianism’s doctrine of an affectionate God is uniquely suited to a pragmatic ethos. 
“A God who gives so little scope to love, a predestination which takes from endeavor all its zest 
with all its fruit, are irrational conceptions, because they say to our most cherished powers, There 
is no object for you” (126). William’s use of the word “irrational” is telling, because he also 
means “impractical;” here is the Channing-esque element. If, as Channing argued, our potential 
for disclosing God’s providential hand in earthly affairs and if action conducted toward that goal 
is a rational pursuit, any system that suppresses that effort (meaning doctrines like predestination 
and election) would not only be irrational, but at cross-purposes with God’s design. By 
extension, the rational faculty is rational to the extent that it is useful; it does not sit fixed within 
the confines of the merely thinking mind, but manifests in and distributes itself throughout the 
quotidian dealings of human life.  
 William’s address to the Unitarian Ministers’ Institute wasn’t simply congratulatory 
rhetoric. The question beneath the address is the same question under Henry’s revisionist 
theology of atonement: what does it mean to love or be loved by someone who died nearly 
nineteen centuries ago, in a place most have never been, for sins you yourself never committed? 
Reconceiving the divine as an immediate presence of love, and not as a theological doctrine 
remote from the living interests of living people, Henry and William participated in the liberal 
Protestant transformation of rigidly historicized absolutes into spiritually useful historical events, 
amenable to individuals’ present experiences.227 Today’s evangelical emphasis on believers 
                                                             
226 According to Unitarianism, Christ’s substitionary atonement - a payment for the debt of Adam’s sin - 
is an absurd doctrine since it reduces Christ’s personhood to a mere function in a transhuman divine 
scheme. Nor does Unitarianism hold to the patripassionist claim that God suffered in Christ’s body the 
way humans suffer. The logic here is simple: to be a good Christian it is incumbent to imitate Christ; 
however, if Christ is in fact divine (and his humanity merely for show), believers have no justification for 
heeding Christ’s command in Matthew 4:19 to “[c]ome, follow me.” In fact, to even attempt to imitate 
Christ would be tantamount to imitating God himself, an imitation that wasn’t lost on more conservative-
minded theologians who equated it with aspirations to divinity.  
227 Dewey’s pragmatism of faith also had an uneasy relationship with history, as it viewed adherence to 
historical traditions and dogma as characteristic of “religion,” and not necessarily expressive of the 
“religious” quality of genuine experience: “some views about the course of human history and personages 





having a personal relationship with Jesus is the logical conclusion of making the atonement not 
just theologically meaningful, but making it practically useful, in terms of affectionate closeness, 
for believers.    
As William talks about the relationship between God and human action, we’re reminded 
of his father’s repugning the instruction of a God “so essentially heartless” and “so essentially 
irrational” (SS 73). He follows his father’s logic closely here in making a direct connection 
between a theism that postulates a loving God involved in His creation and the meaningfulness 
of human action.228 By situating the meaningfulness of action in the affectionate bond one feels 
toward whatever constitutes their perceived reality, William sutured his pragmatic epistemology 
to liberal theism. The postbellum reformer Washington Gladden would come to the same 
conclusion when, recalling his young experience trying and failing to gain God’s favor, he wrote: 
“[t]o feel that, in spite of your best endeavors, you are alien and an outcast from the family of 
God is not encouraging to virtue; it tends to carelessness and irreverence” (Recollections 36). 
Just as his father rejected the impersonal deus absconditus of Calvinist theology, William 
justified his theory of action with the idea that we are fundamentally beings who respond to and 
live by affections: 
 
No other reason can be assigned why we should express ourselves to God in verse 
rather than in prose, and do it with music, but only, that such is our nature and 
frame, that these things have a tendency to move our affections. (38-9) 
 
 Consequently, love is also that which dissolves the subject/object distinction. William’s 
contemporary Freud added to the effort to overcome this Cartesian philosophical mainstay. 
Despite many of its questionable claims about religion, Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, 
                                                             
such persons, the result is that the more these ideas are used as the basis and justification of a religion, the 
more dubious that religion becomes” (Common 30).  
228 The theism William lauded in “Reflex Action” should be distinguished from its more rationalistic (i.e., 
non-empirical) variant. In A Pluralistic Universe, William critiqued “scholastic theism” along lines 
familiar in his earlier essay: “in scholastic theism we find truth already instituted and established without 
our help, complete apart from our knowing; and the most we can do is acknowledge it passively and 





I think, makes a useful observation on this head. Regarding the connection of love to the 
satisfaction of the pleasure principle, Freud writes that “this connection may lie in the remote 
regions where the distinction between the ego and objects or between objects themselves is 
neglected” (90). 
 From Edwards’s religious affections to Finney’s humanistic revivalism to James’s 
argument that a loving God who excites our affections is the condition for practical action, we 
can see a clear line in American intellectual history that knits affections to action in a variety of 
interpenetrating contexts. What doesn’t appeal to our affections doesn’t appeal to our wills. As 
William put it, “it seems to me that the only sort of union of creature with creator with which 
theism, properly so called, comports, is of this emotional and practical kind” (135), where 
“emotional” and “practical” are seen as mutually reinforcing. His contemporary, the Christian 
philosopher Eugene William Lyman, joined the Edwardsean choir in 1910 when he argued for a 
theological pragmatism: “[o]ur life of feeling is not a matter of metes and bounds…. It is the 
door of the soul through which the life of the Infinite can enter, it is the organ of divine 
knowledge” (64). Like Finney’s, William’s God is an immanent divinity whose affection for His 
creation is the motive force to which our feeling-based sensorium responds in kind.  
 If immanent, God is not, as orthodox Calvinism held, radically other from humanity. 
According to William’s logic as drawn from Unitarianism, the concept of God, to be meaningful, 
must exist in some relation to humans. William cannot conceive of God to be wholly other (a 
redefinition that also eliminates the possibility of obliterative theophanies) because meaning can 
only exist in some apprehensible relation. Despite Dewey’s less individualistic (that is to say, 
less Jamesian) approach to religious faith, this was a point on which he agreed: “[i]t is this active 
relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name ‘God’” (Common 51). William 
never says this (though at times it is implied), but this Unitarian-derived implication in 
pragmatism renders the absoluteness of the Calvinist God absolutely meaningless.  
These connections between practical use and the notion of God as love were highly 
influential in nineteenth century cure movements, with which William had direct contact. “The 
plain fact remains,” he wrote, “that the spread of the [mind cure] movement has been due to 
practical fruits, and the extremely practical turn of character of the American people has never 





systematic philosophy of life, should be so intimately knit up with concrete therapeutics” (VRE 
96). In a statement that would have horrified the orthodox, William argued that “[n]ot God, but 
life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion” 
(507). This way of seeing things tells us why William often preferred the German 
Weltanschauung to the English “philosophy;” the former refers to “worldview,” but also to a 
philosophy of life.  
The variety of mind-cure techniques became for William the occasion to consider the 
privately felt effects of alternative, extrascientific modes of healing and how these effects might 
justify these modes. When the Massachusetts legislature planned to introduce the “Medical 
Registration Act” in 1894, which would have regulated the practice of medicine and surgery, 
James opposed it in the Boston Transcript, defending alternative systems like Christian Science 
and mind-cure on the grounds that “their facts are patent and startling; and anything that 
interferes with the multiplication of such facts, and with our freest opportunity of observing and 
studying them, will, I believe, be a public calamity” (148). Left free of hermeneutical constraints, 
experiential facts will not only emerge in their fullest clarity, but - and this is the important point 
for William - their practical values could be fully manifested, evaluated, and justified.  
 The cultural change from denominational juggernauts like Calvinism that emphasized the 
productive capacity of sustained spiritual introspection to loosely defined spiritual movements 
paralleled the impetus to make philosophy and religion useful for life, to endow them with a 
Swedenborgian-esque spiritual use value. William’s interest in mind-cure wasn’t only 
intellectual; his biography is full of examples of how he considered overcoming his multiple 
ailments to effect an Emersonian transformation of genius into power. Annie Payson Call’s 
Power Through Repose, a book he reviewed positively after its publication in 1891 (Richardson 
311), makes active human power a practical result of theorizing an affectionate God. An 
acquaintance of William’s, Call spoke of the positive comfort of obedience to the laws of the 
body in ways that echoed Finney and Emerson’s repudiation of the supernatural: “it is no 
miracle, it is only natural” (84). Her central claim demonstrated as well as any the ideal of 







[a] man’s love is God’s love for the use for which he was made; a man’s power 
lies in the best direction of that use. This is a truth as practical as the necessity for 
walking on the feet with the head up. (85) 
 
The primary link between James and the religious movements percolating from the time of 
Edwards, the link that argues most compellingly that pragmatism is in no small way shaped by 
evangelical-Protestant logics, is this emphasis on action made meaningful by notions of God as 
love, free will, and spiritual use. Henry James Sr’s rejection of a heartless God who 
demonstrated no affection for his creation and Call’s equation of “man’s love” and “God’s love 
for the use for which he was made” were powerful influences on William as he was developing 





Pragmatism is in the air and everybody starts with it as a basis. I do not know how I shall escape 
the influence. 
       Virginia Robinson (Rosenberg 116) 
 
The student of philosophy to James R. Angell at the University of Chicago, Virginia Robinson 
wasn’t wrong about the pervasive influence of pragmatism in American academia. Perhaps 
unbeknownst to Robinson was that she was standing in the midst of a widespread cultural 
adoption of pragmatism that extended far beyond university walls, into Georgia backwoods, 
novelizations of Christ’s life, and squalid urban tenements. In the preceding sections, I have 
called attention to the ways in which certain intellectual elements and shifts at the intersections 
of American evangelicalism and philosophical pragmatism left their marks on the thought of 
William James. The primacy of direct experience, the conception of God as love, and the 
spiritualization of utility were highly influential in the development of and justifications for 





 As it sometimes is in our day, the nineteenth century endeavor to reconcile science and 
religion, faith and philosophy, experienced pushback from corners dismissive of faith for one 
reason or another: as a relic from mankind’s superstitious past, an epistemological dead zone 
unworthy of scientific study, or as a faculty that yielded potentially valid hypotheses but 
nevertheless should be subordinated to scientific confirmation. Such representations, then as 
now, not only distort the epistemological commitments of spiritual communities, but they tend to 
ignore the influence that belief can wield and has wielded on the shaping of cultural movements. 
Belief, to put it briefly, has its own epistemology, distinct from other ways of knowing. That 
pragmatism emerged at a time when transatlantic intellectual culture was beginning to appreciate 
religious experiences for the challenges they posed to conventional epistemologies is, I’m 
arguing, not just a historical coincidence. Psychologists like Edwin Starbuck, George A. Coe, 
James Bissett Pratt, and, of course, William James laid the groundwork for what would become 
the discipline of the philosophy of religion. Raised a Quaker, Starbuck underwent a spiritual 
conversion early in life, the effects of which led him to study religious experience from a 
psychological point of view. Coe - son of a Methodist minister who labored in the cinders of 
Finney’s burned-over district - dedicated himself to living a good Christian life with or without 
salvific certainty, revolutionizing American religious education in the process.229 A disciple of 
James, Pratt wrote extensively on the relation between religious experience and psychology in 
works such as The Psychology of Religious Belief, The Religious Consciousness, and Matter and 
Spirit. “Agnostic” is a misleading descriptor for James; “hopelessly non-evangelical,” as he 
described himself to Henry Rankin, is better. Nevertheless, at the end of his life, in the 
posthumously published Some Problems of Philosophy, James stayed faithful to faith: 
“[f]aith...remains as one of the inalienable birthrights of our mind” (225). What these figures and 
many like them shared was a commitment to understanding faith not as a psychological 
                                                             
229 At the beginning of his Psychology of Religion, Coe divulged his own experience with religion in a 
way that called back to Edwards and Finney’s frustration with standardized conversion models: “the 
chief incitement to seek mystical experiences came to me wrapped up in dogma, and the 
disappointment of my adolescence, when the promised and sought-for mystical ‘witness of the 
Spirit’ did not come, caused me to turn away from both the dogmatic and the mystical approach 





aberrance, not as a threat to the more “respectable” discipline of scientific inquiry, but as an 
epistemological phenomenon in its own right.  
By some accounts, though, the latter half of the nineteenth century was still viewed as a 
time of secularization, during which the substance of religion had grown stale and formulaic. In 
1907, Henry Adams described his experience growing up with New England religion in the 
following way (in the third person voice characteristic of his Education):  
 
Of all the conditions of his youth which afterwards puzzled the grown-up man, 
this disappearance of religion puzzled him most. [...] [H]e went through all the 
forms; but neither to him nor to his brothers or sisters was religion real. Even the 
mild discipline of the Unitarian Church was so irksome that they all threw it off at 
the first possible moment…. The religious instinct had vanished, and could not be 
revived, although one made in later life many efforts to recover it. (34) 
 
There’s a fair amount of cultural pessimism here (as there is throughout Education), 
though Adams might have been overstating the case. As this chapter has shown, it would 
be more accurate to say that “the religious instinct” had not so much disappeared as it 
transformed, explored new channels of religious expression responsive to individuals’ 
felt sense of what constituted a good life. Elizabeth Schull was one. John Humphrey 
Noyes, Andrew Jackson Davis, Margaret Fuller, and later figures like Julia Ward Howe, 
Horatio Dresser, and Ralph Waldo Trine were others. To some circles, “religion” had 
become synonymous with dogmatisms too formulaic and affectionately remote for those 
who believed access to the divine occurred through intense emotions and spontaneous 
visionary experiences. For the proponents of liberal evangelicalism, a practical piety 
would be needed to address the spiritual concerns of individuals occupying a rapidly 
changing and increasingly materialistic world.  
 In the ways that direct experience and action were reevaluated in religious and 
philosophical cultures in the early nineteenth century, and which influenced the formation 
and justification of Jamesian pragmatic claims, they also had a profound effect on the 
postbellum Social Gospel movement. A transdenominational and transatlantic 





efforts to improve urban conditions and refashion individuals in the image of Christ - 
history’s greatest moral teacher, and the only one worthy of emulation. This was the era 
of the “What Would Jesus Do?” movement, and it was an explicit attempt to produce 
practical effects in the here and now as a way of illuminating spiritual truths and, 
ultimately, establishing the kingdom of God on earth. Among its primary motive forces 
was the characterization of God as a loving God; as the so-called “father of the Social 
Gospel,” Washington Gladden understood it, “force and fear...are certainly among the 
lowest moral motives; the conduct which they inspire must be an inferior kind of 
conduct” (Recollections 61).  
Currently, the Social Gospel movement tends to get little attention outside the 
field of transatlantic religious history. Even some historians can be seen downplaying its 
influence. Even though as early as 1940 Charles H. Hopkins claimed that “America’s 
most unique contribution to the great ongoing stream of Christianity is the ‘social 
gospel’” (3), you’ll still find more recent historians like Robert Fuller saying that 
“although [the Social Gospel] never became a major force in American religious life, its 
very appearance testifies to the period’s increasing concern that faith be made relevant to 
the actual difficulties facing men and women in their daily lives” (165). Fuller was right 
about the second part, and my goal in the next chapter will be to show how he wasn’t 
quite right about the first. Though the Social Gospel was low on theological innovation, it 
did produce an extensive array of media - practical theologies, photojournalism, novels, 
etc. - that appealed to both educated elites and popular audiences, generating lasting 
cultural effects that helped shape what we call modernism and whose liberal, reformist 
ethos was the primary target of early twentieth century Protestant fundamentalism.230 
 Social Gospel leaders like Charles Sheldon, Jacob Riis, M.W. Howard, Jane Addams, 
Walter Rauschenbusch (grandfather to neopragmatist Richard Rorty), Edward Everett Hale, 
William T. Stead, and Mrs. (Mary Augusta) Humphry Ward understood spiritual meaningfulness 
to inhere in the production of concrete effects. The Topeka minister Sheldon, for example, used 
                                                             
230 Walter Rauschenbusch seemed late to the game when in 1917 - decades after the Social Gospel had 
already made its major contributions to Anglo-American culture - he wrote, “[w]e have a social gospel. 





novelistic narrative to link the justification of Christian value in imagining “what would Jesus 
do?” As sin is in the sinning, being a Christian meant behaving like one. The magic lantern tours 
of the New York reformer Jacob Riis exposed the realities of urban squalor, using a theory of 
correspondence to inculcate a double vision that would enable audience members to discern the 
spiritual realities signified by material facts. Everett Hale’s If Jesus Came to Boston, Stead’s If 
Christ Came to Chicago!, and Howard’s If Christ Came to Congress (all published in 1894), 
along with more theological works like William E. Blackstone’s Jesus Is Coming (1878), all 
sought to imagine the coming of Christ not merely an abstract or metaphysical truth, but as an 
immanent - and imminent - spiritual reality whose significance rested in its practical 
manifestation. Mrs. Humphry Ward’s popular Robert Elsmere (1888) joined dozens of 
postbellum tramping narratives that drew from the idea that spiritual lessons were best - perhaps 
only - garnered through direct experience of economic hardship or the physical suffering of 
others. One of the efforts to recover “the religious instinct,” as Adams put it, was to produce the 
spiritual truths of Christian belief in the lived realities of both believers and the spiritually lost. 
What, then, is the relationship between the postbellum emergence of pragmatism and the 
Social Gospel movement? The Social Gospel was built on an ethic of practical Christianity, an 
emphasis on Christ’s gentle love for humankind, and a Christian realism that resurrected the 
notion of spiritual realities embedded in material facts. With this broad sketch, I want to look 
closer at the ways in which the Social Gospel undertook a pragmatically-minded ethos, how it 
incorporated some of the intellectual elements we’ve seen articulated by Edwards, Finney, Henry 
James Sr, and William James, and how certain elements of pragmatic thought were not simply 
confined to the realm of philosophy, nor were exclusively derived from it. My ultimate claim in 
the final chapter is that it was during the Social Gospel that not only did American evangelical 





















The Pragmatic Attitudes of The Social Gospel 
 
 
It was an interesting period in which to exercise the function of the Christian ministry. The spirit 
of inquiry was in the air. [S]ome ancient traditions were challenged, and it was evident that the 
Christian world was getting ready for a forward movement. 
 
       Washington Gladden, Recollections (291)  
 
Nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the 
kingdom of God. And such were some of you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are 
justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of God. 
      
       1 Corinthians 6:10-11 
 
 
Introduction - The Social Gospel in the History of American Pragmatism 
 
When the Congregationalist pastor and Social Gospel leader Washington Gladden submitted for 
publication his Sunday evening addresses on the relation between Christian morality and 
American industry, his publisher Horace Scudder “hesitated over the title.” Gladden’s suggested 
title was Applied Christianity. Scudder “could not see the force of the adjective,” Gladden 
reported. “I tried to show him that the whole significance of the book was in that adjective; that 
the thing which the world needed most was a direct application of the Christian law to the 





unnecessary, perhaps even redundant. Whatever the case, this somewhat minor exchange tells us 
something critical about the movement known as the Social Gospel: that for postbellum America 
the practical part of Christian practice wasn’t as explicit as some thought it ought to have been. 
“[T]he function of the Christian ministry,” Gladden believed, was up for reappraisal.  
At the center of this anecdote about a simple adjective lies the epistemological foundation 
for what would be known as the Social Gospel movement. A transnational and 
transdenominational movement spanning from the 1870s to the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Social Gospel’s central goal was the application of Christian principles to a variety of 
socioeconomic crises: poverty, labor, immigration, temperance, and urban reform, to name a 
few. Indeed, for many Social Gospel reformers, the total reformation of society was at stake. In 
1921, Social Gospelers and professors Shailer Mathews and Gerald Birney Smith defined “social 
gospel” as “[t]he application of the teaching of Jesus and the total message of the Christian 
salvation to society, the economic life, and social institutions such as the state, the family, as well 
as to individuals” (416).231 Like Gladden’s “Christian law,” Mathews and Smith’s definition 
aimed at a homogeneous “total message,” taking literally Christ’s injunction that “whosoever 
shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all” (KJV James 2:10). 
Running the concentric gamut of human experience from “the state, the family, as well as to 
individuals,” and dedicated to the proposition that Christianity was logically compatible, if not 
synonymous, with American democracy and progress, the Social Gospel sought to make 
Christian morality a spiritually pervasive force in material affairs. By adopting the same logics 
that pragmatism mobilized to apply philosophical claims to human experience, the Social 
Gospel’s creed of applied Christianity joined postbellum efforts to transform theories and ideals 
into agents of practical change.  
The Social Gospel’s language of social crisis – as opposed to social question – exploited 
the immediacy of experience, summoning the etymology of “crisis” as calling for a decision. 
Whereas a question is suited to unhurried intellectual speculation, a crisis is a radical 
                                                             
231 Dean of Chicago’s Divinity School, Shailer Mathews occupied a prominent position against the 
premillennialist and fundamentalist movements of the early twentieth century, especially against the anti-
liberal J. Gresham Machen. Unlike Machen and others, Mathews argued that Christianity and Modernism 
were completely compatible. For Mathews’s role in the modernist-fundamentalist controversies of the 





intensification of time, a kind of kairos appealing to one’s sense of urgency and cultivates a 
responsiveness to experimentation for practical results. From its incipience in the 1870s, the 
Social Gospel’s primary goal was the pragmatic realization - via theology, literary, and 
photography - of social and economic crises as occasions for situating spiritual ideas within the 
realm of experience. Arriving on the East Coast of America, the Puritans of legend celebrated the 
longed-for building of God’s country here; the Social Gospel sought to fulfill the prophecy by 
building that country now.  
In the last chapter, I argued that the Swedenborgian theology of Henry James Sr had a 
significant impact on the pragmatisms of Charles Peirce and William James. His theology and 
these pragmatisms shared the idea that the primary significance or truth of a proposition rested in 
its practical consequences for human life. In this chapter, I’m suggesting that the concurrent 
emergence of the Social Gospel as a pragmatized evangelicalism was no accident. When James 
wrote in Varieties that “the religious question is primarily a question of life” (514), it was clear 
to him that religious belief wasn’t simply incidental to living, as it may have been for the patrons 
of Henry James Sr’s tailor shop, but bound up with it. The “nature of Christianity,” the gospel of 
labor minister Charles Stelzle agreed, “has to do with life.” And while, as I’ve pointed out in 
previous chapters, the apparently predetermined nature of Christian eschatology may seem to 
foreclose any logical commerce between the open-ended pluralism of pragmatism and the 
teleological orientation of Christian practice, it was their shared incentive to make hermeneutical 
systems appropriate to the irreducible flux of lived experience that made them ideological 
bedfellows. “For while the fundamental basis of Christianity must always remain the same,” 
Stelzle continued, it “cannot be limited to the ecclesiastical terminology of the theologian in the 
one case, nor to a narrow interpretation of life in the other” (80). The pragmatic ethos adopted by 
Social Gospel leaders - an ethos that shaped its understanding of the relationship between visible 
and invisible worlds, its emphasis on ethical action, how that action is linked to our beliefs, what 
experience means and how it can and should be mobilized for social good, and its Christian 
humanism - is the subject of this chapter.232 
                                                             
232 An emphasis on the actionable will of believers is a consistent theme in Social Gospel literature. The 
protagonist of the American Winston Churchill’s social Christian novel The Inside of the Cup, for 
example, encapsulates the reformist ethic required to inspire social change: “[t]he secret...lay in a 





Names like Shailer Mathews, Vida Dutton Scudder, J.S. Woodsworth, Caroline Bartlett 
Crane, Harris Franklin Rall, and Frank Mason North aren’t typically heard outside of studies on 
Social Gospel literature. Even so, they left a lasting impact on North American religion, 
philosophy, and politics. As Christopher Evans has shown, Christian socialists like J.S. 
Woodsworth and Stanley Knowles (both of whom began their careers as ministers) profoundly 
shaped the course of Canadian social politics, while the works of the Catholic priest and 
professor John A. Ryan and academic John R. Commons directly influenced the economic 
theories bolstering Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies (197-98).233 As Susan Curtis 
observes, Woodrow Wilson’s message of duty and self-sacrifice upon America’s entry into 
World War I was drawn directly from a Social Gospel vocabulary (191), while the language of 
early twentieth century muckraking exposés deployed a self-consciously evangelical language of 
sin and redemption to appeal to middle class sensibilities.234 During the Civil Rights movement 
of the 1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr credited the Baptist pastor Walter Rauschenbusch with 
granting American Protestantism “a sense of social responsibility” (440).235 So William McGuire 
King wasn’t being glib when he claimed that “the direction of modern religious thought in the 
United States was decisively shaped by the social gospel” (50), even as contemporary American 
Christianity tends to fall victim to stereotypes of obdurate conservatism and ideological 
parochialism.236 
                                                             
to action” (364). The theologian Harris Franklin Rall carried the Social Gospel ethos even as late as the 
1930s. Transcendence of the person, he argued, occurs “by the way of action” (79).   
233 For the line of descent from the economic theories of John R. Commons to the New Deal legislation 
enacted by his student Edwin E. Witte, see Cecilia Tichi’s Civic Passions, Ch. 2.  
234 For a detailed account of the uses of evangelical discourse in turn of the century muckraking journals, 
see Gorrell, Ch. 3. 
235 In spite of some crucial disagreements about what he felt was Rauschenbusch’s “unwarranted 
optimism concerning human nature,” King was open-handed about the Social Gospel leader’s influence 
on his “quest for a method to eliminate social evil:” “[i]n the early `50s I read Rauschenbusch’s 
Christianity and the Social Crisis, a book which left an indelible imprint on my thinking” (440).  
236 The descendants of the Social Gospel, the so-called “lay liberals” or “Golden Rule Christians,” 
continue to form a considerable portion of the religious mosaic in twentieth and twenty-first century 
America. In keeping with the pragmatic tradition cultivated by the Social Gospel, they are “best defined,” 
as sociologist Nancy T. Ammerman points out in Lived Religion in America, “not by ideology, but by 
practices. Their own measure of Christianity is right living more than right believing” (197). Ammerman 
notes that among the qualities defining Golden Rule Christianity are its belief that religion is best 





The Social Gospel is sometimes seen as synonymous with liberal Protestantism. But it 
would be misleading to situate the Social Gospel on a liberal/conservative or left/right spectrum. 
Its commitment to ecumenical reforms, its openness to philosophical humanism, and its 
receptivity to evolutionary science have rightfully categorized the movement along the lines of a 
progressively liberal Protestantism. However, its hope for a totalizing federal piety tended to 
ignore church/state separation, authorizing an exclusively Christian moral hegemony that raised 
questions about any commitment to religious pluralism. Indeed, the movement’s reticence 
concerning non-Christian belief systems within America and its silence as to what they might 
have to say about living according to Christ’s precepts recalls familiar nineteenth century 
pretensions to Protestant cultural supremacy.237 Many Social Gospel leaders were quite candid 
about inspiriting American government with an unambiguously Christian ethos, unruffled by any 
possible affronts to the Jeffersonian tradition. As John Hodder, the Social Gospel hero of The 
Inside of the Cup resolved, it was necessary “to bring Christianity into government, where it 
belongs” (324). At the same time, a towering Social Gospel figure like Josiah Strong – whose 
credentials were virtually unimpeachable among his peers – would cite Romanism, Mormonism, 
and socialism among the “seven perils” stultifying American progress. And when it came to 
political equality, even a fair-minded progressive like Washington Gladden had his limits: 
“[s]uffrage is not a natural right” (Luker 74). Though many of its adherents shared common 
goals, the Social Gospel’s multi-layered ideological commitments remind us to be wary of 
nuance in the often precarious imbrications that constitute large-scale historical movements.  
As historians like Ronald C. White, Jr. and Ralph Luker have forcefully argued, the 
Social Gospel was not predominantly a northern white evangelical movement. Luker notes that 
well-meaning but myopic interpretations of the movement have caused “historians to ignore its 
                                                             
commitment to Christ’s injunction to “love one another” (203-6). These were the features that constituted 
the practical aims of the Social Gospel.   
 
237 The silence of many Social Gospel leaders concerning the presence of Muslim, Jewish, indigenous, 
and other non-Christian religions is worthy of remark, especially considering figures like Walter 
Rauschenbusch functioned as ministers in ethnically heterogeneous areas like Hell’s Kitchen and the 
Lower East Side. Commentary from non-Christian groups on the Social Gospel are not very forthcoming, 
but would provide a fascinating alternative perspective on the movement’s seemingly unproblematic 





manifestations in black and Southern white churches alike” (3). Historical emphases on New 
England’s role in the shaping of American religious sensibilities, the view of Reconstruction 
South as politically and economically shattered (when it wasn’t being caricatured as 
ideologically retrogressive), and the salience in Social Gospel literature of northern and 
midwestern urban centers like New York, Boston, Rochester, St. Louis, and Chicago, helped 
contribute to what Luker has called “the astigmatism of the historians” (3). Figures like Harlan 
Paul Douglass, Ida B. Wells, Joseph C. Price, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Booker T. Washington often 
found themselves working alongside northern white reformists like Lyman Abbott, Charles M. 
Sheldon, Ellen Gates Starr, Benjamin Orange Flower, and Jane Addams.238 Such historical 
astigmatism, too, has led some to forget that the phrase “Social Gospel” itself began as the title 
of the utopian Christian Commonwealth Colony’s periodical, a magazine published in rural 
Georgia.  
The Social Gospel’s emphasis on the effects of faith, rather than its intellectual content, 
demonstrates just how proximate Jamesian thought was to the movement. In the final pages of 
his chapter on “Habit” in Principles of Psychology, James asserted that “[n]o matter how full a 
reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one’s sentiments may be,” one’s 
“character” remains unaffected. “Every time,” he continues, “a resolve or a fine glow of feeling 
evaporates without bearing practical fruit is worse than a chance lost” (129). Despite the volume 
of one’s “reservoir” of knowledge or feeling, fruits count, not roots. Gladden, who had witnessed 
western New York revivalism firsthand, agreed in terms that closely echoed James and Finney: 
“feeling is the glowing link which binds together thought and action. A feeling which originates 
in no definite thought, and results in no definite action, is good for nothing” (Being 10-11). Both 
pragmatism and the Social Gospel sought to vitalize the human will by fixing the significance of 
concepts to their practical effects. James’s closing thoughts on the formative qualities of habit 
leaves us with the lesson that you practically are what you do. One who inculcates the values of 
habitual “asceticism” and “self-denial in unnecessary things...will stand like a tower when 
                                                             
238 To take one prominent example, Virginia’s Hampton Institute (now Hampton University), founded and 
funded by both white and black Christian reformers, inspired one of its most famous students, Booker T. 
Washington, to structure Alabama’s Tuskegee Institute on the very same Social Gospel principles of civic 
education and practical labor. Du Bois, a well-connected figure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, studied under Royce and James, and corresponded with critics like Bliss Perry and theologians 





everything rocks around him, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the 
blast” (130). Just as the Social Gospel’s theological core hitched the justification of Christian 
values to their concrete manifestation in human experience, the pragmatist, James tells us, “turns 
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons” and 
“towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power” 
(Pragmatism 25). 
 This chapter is not an argument that Jamesian pragmatism directly fueled Social Gospel 
ideologies or vice versa. Rather, I’m arguing that these two concurrent historical phenomena 
were responses to theories of history as inherently progressive and whose teleological 
uncertainty incentivized an ethic of practical experimentation. It is rather easy to point out that 
both pragmatism and the Social Gospel were rigorously practical in their orientation to the 
world; an analysis of their shared logic and what a view of that commonality might tell us about 
the history of pragmatism, then, is the focus of this chapter. By locating pragmatic logics and 
attitudes within a predominantly Protestant evangelical context, viewing its manifestations in 
theology, literature, and photojournalism, I hope to show not only how American evangelical 
Protestantism and philosophy were in dialogue with one another, but to challenge the presumed 
secularity of Jamesian pragmatism.239 Demonstrating how pragmatic attitudes emerged 
throughout a series of Protestant-inspired texts and images will help reshape the way we think 
about the history of pragmatism and American Christianity.  
 
 
                                                             
239 At the same time, however, the spheres of pragmatism and the Social Gospel did sometimes overlap. 
Figures like the Harvard theologian Francis Greenwood Peabody, the Methodist socialist Harry F. Ward, 
and Deweyan sociologist Charles Horton Cooley provide biographical connections between theology and 
evangelicalism and philosophical pragmatism. Jurgen Herbst has observed that the ethical theology of 
Francis Greenwood Peabody was heavily influenced by his teacher Charles Peirce’s concept of synechism 
(the philosophical tendency to view things like space and time as continuous, not discrete). According to 
Doug Rossinow, Harry F. Ward’s adoption of practical ethics was directly related to “[h]is attraction to 
philosophical pragmatism” (66). Charles Horton Cooley, a student of Dewey’s, was one of many who 
identified Christianity with democracy: “[t]he democratic movement, insomuch as it feels a common 
spirit in all men, is of the same nature as Christianity. [...] An ideal democracy is in its nature religious, 
and its true sovereign may be said to be the higher nature, or God, which it inspires to incarnate in human 





A This-Worldly Theology of Process and the Abolition of the Absolute 
 
In the spiritual, as in the physical, God is the secret and source of life; phenomena, whether 
material or spiritual, are the manifestation of his presence; but he manifests himself in growth, 
not in stereotyped and stationary forms. 
      Lyman Abbott, The Evolution of Christianity (v) 
 
On some of the more speculative doctrines the social gospel has no contribution to make. Its 
interests lie on earth, within the social relations of the life that now is.  
Walter Rauschenbusch, Theology for the Social Gospel (31) 
 
 
In his examination of the Social Gospel, the twentieth century Dutch theologian Willem Visser ’t 
Hooft agreed with a contemporary that the movement “takes the idea of time seriously” (43). 
Like many areas of academic and popular culture at the time, the Social Gospel subscribed to a 
gradualist (or evolutionist) conception of history and natural phenomena. Unlike catastrophism, 
which argued that change occurs by sudden disruptions of otherwise stable continuums, 
gradualism contended that change – in nature and experience – could be accounted for by both a 
consideration of how an individual thing develops through time and in relation to accompanying 
phenomena. Relations, as James would agree, are just as important as the terms that separate 
them. Typified by Lyman Abbott’s assertion that God “manifests himself in growth,” and by 
Rauschenbusch’s exhortation that if “the Christian ideal of society is to come, - we must shift 
from catastrophe to development” (Theology 225), the Social Gospel argued that if we were 
going to capture the significance of a thing, we would need a knowledge of its processional 
unfolding in history and human experience.240 Histories trump essences. Because modern 
American Protestantism is not often associated with an almost Emersonian fascination with this-
worldly flux, metamorphosis, and ambiguity, understanding how the Social Gospel understood 
                                                             
240 Rauschenbusch said this in 1917, long after the major Social Gospel reforms had taken place. For 
some, it did raise questions about the viability of the movement, especially in the catastrophic wake of the 
first world war. True, as Donald K. Gorrell points out, “[s]ocial salvation and social awakening continued 





itself within the processes of time, and how its abolition of the absoluteness of theological 
concepts shaped its orientation toward truth and reality, will more thoroughly illuminate its 
connections to pragmatism. 
 As a result of its understanding of history as subject to human involvement, the Social 
Gospel is usually categorized as a postmillennial movement. The post- refers to the arrival of 
Christ after social ills had been cured, a change occurring not without the hand of providence, 
but, according to Social Gospel theology, crucially dependent on the active engagement of 
devoted Christians, whose pious actions would be instrumental in the melioration of earthly 
corruption.241 And melioration is very much the right word. “Meliorism,” James believed, “treats 
salvation...as a possibility. [...] [P]ragmatism must incline toward meliorism” (Pragmatism 125). 
What united the Social Gospel and pragmatism was their shared rejection of the determinism and 
epistemological inscrutability of the Calvinist doctrines of predestination, election, and absolute 
sovereignty, doctrines specifically oriented toward the life to come and its fundamental 
unknowability. By positing the terrestrialization of the kingdom of God, subject to the vagaries 
of human choice and possibility, and not its establishment in a supernal realm transcending 
human experience, Social Gospel reformers turned attention toward this world and its complex 
histories, a global orientation that Martin Marty has deemed the movement’s “cosmopolitan 
habit in theology” (17). As the progressive economist Richard T. Ely understood it, “Christianity 
is primarily concerned with this world, and it is the mission of Christianity to bring to pass here a 
kingdom of righteousness and to rescue from the evil one and redeem all our social relations” 
(Social Aspects 53).242 Rather than fixating on a transcendent world to come, “waiting God’s 
                                                             
241 For a discussion about the role of postmillennialism in the context of highly influential nineteenth 
century evangelical publishing societies like the American Tract Society and the American Home 
Missionary Society, see David Morgan’s Protestants and Pictures (29-34). In such circulations as the 
Christian Almanac, published by the New England Tract Society, careful calculation of publishing and 
readership statistics, the tracking of the progress of benevolent societies like the American Sunday School 
Union, and hagiographies of Protestant divines like Jonathan Edwards that - accurately or not - 
highlighted their auguries of American millennialism, helped confirm - or at least encourage - the 
postmillennial hopes of readers throughout the nineteenth century. 
242 The fixation on this world and not on that which is to come is a far cry from popular Christian 
devotion earlier in the century. As a not uninfluential point of contrast, Harriet Beecher Stowe defined the 
proper salvific frame of mind to her readers as “a state in which the mind is so bent and absorbed by the 
love of Christ, that all inducements to worldliness lose their power, and the mind becomes as indifferent 





time” for its conversion, Social Gospelers instrumentalized a this-worldly theology of process 
that would share with Christ’s atonement the work of radical social redemption.  
So it seems that the Unitarian minister and psychical researcher Minot J. Savage was 
overstating the case when he asserted that “[n]early all the present opposition to evolution comes 
from theology” (41). Rather, Social Gospel theology seemed more or less in accord with 
advancements in evolutionary science. An emphasis on process and metamorphosis over stasis 
and absolutes did produce a shift in staid theological ideas of the nature of reality and humanity’s 
place in it. Sounding strikingly like Henry James Sr, Gladden claimed that “[t]he work of 
creation is a continuous process, and so is the work of revelation. All that we call Nature is but 
the constant manifestation of the divine power; and the Spirit in whose image our spirits are 
fashioned...is here...as close to us as He ever was to any men in any age” (Recollections 426).243 
The claim that Creation is an ongoing process whose God is intimately involved in its 
progressive unfolding is not only a statement about God’s immanence but, as Gladden suggests, 
a subpoena for ethical reform in such a world. The closer God slides toward the “immanent” side 
of the immanent/transcendent spectrum, the logic goes, the more important – the more justifiable 
– become our “works” and their role in the shaping of our reality. After centuries of Calvinist 
doctrine repudiating the role of good works in relation to redemption, works themselves began to 
share in the process of how beliefs and ideas achieved the coveted status of justification.  
If Creation itself was subject to change by this immanence, it’s no surprise other 
doctrines would follow suit. The pragmatist theologian Eugene William Lyman, for example, 
demonstrated the extent to which even the core of Christian soteriology - Christ’s atonement - 
morphed in response to the subordination of timeless absolutes to their practical utility in human 
experience: “one of the gravest mistakes of theology,” he wrote, “has been to recognize 
                                                             
243 Recall one of Henry James Sr’s major points in The Secret of Swedenborg: “space and time, or nature 
and history, have absolutely nothing to do with creation in its objective aspect...but only...as it exists to 
our infirm thought. They belong to it, not as a result, but as a process” (115). As it was for Henry James 
Sr, the unmooring of Creation from a fixed historical moment entailed a novel system of ethics that 
helped spur Social Gospel reform. It also indicates the prescience James Sr’s demonstrated regarding 
theological mainstays. The evolutionist theologian Henry Martyn Simmons would write that “[w]e are 
learning to see all around us this more wonderful Genesis, this Creation infinite and eternal” (15). For 
James Sr and later theologians like Simmons and Savage, the concept of Creation was only meaningful in 





atonement not only supremely but exclusively in Christ’s death on the cross. But to limit 
atonement to a single event in history...is to narrow its power and to rob the faith in God’s 
Fatherhood of its deepest meaning. [...] It represents his forgiveness as a merely passive attitude, 
whereas it really is an active and seeking force” (Theology 195). Whereas conservative audiences 
criticized historicism for reducing Christ’s sacrifice to a secular act in secular history, Social 
Gospelers implicitly criticized it for stranding the atonement’s sacred meaning in a past whose 
historical fixity was less important than its remoteness from current human interests.   
The Social Gospel sought to pragmatize theological doctrines by subjecting them to the 
test of lived human experience, bringing to fruition James’s qualification that “[i]f theological 
ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true” (Pragmatism 35). What would 
establish the kingdom of God was not the faithful passivity of Bunyan’s Christian, but the pious 
readiness to action of Greatheart, who, faced with the menace of Giant Despair, resolved to 
“fight the good Fight of Faith” (282). Cultivating believers’ sense of themselves as existing 
within a progressively unfolding world whose God was immanent, Social Gospel leaders 
reconceived individual and social salvation as critically dependent, not on intellectual adherence 
to orthodoxies that made no appreciable difference in the world, but on effect-driven, future-
oriented, experience-tested pragmatic action.       
A revaluation of what it means to live in time, hence, is a crucial lynchpin in reassessing 
the historical coincidence of pragmatism and the Social Gospel. The idea that human experience 
is rooted not in psychical faculties but in an ongoing temporal flow - most memorable in James’s 
“stream of consciousness” psychology - eroded the apotheosization of the timeless, the eternal, 
the absolute, and the philosophical tendency to identify these qualities with divinity. The 
“timeless” is precisely what James doesn’t like about philosophical rationalism (and by 
extension, theological monism) because to him it means canceling future possibilities, making us 
ill-prepared to meet the uncertainties of a progressively unfolding history: 
 
[r]ationalists take it [the world] concretely and oppose it to the world’s finite 
editions. [...] It is perfect, finished. Everything known there is known along with 
everything else…. [...] Here all is process; that world is timeless. Possibilities 





impossible, and all that IS is necessary, the category of possibility has no 
application. (Pragmatism 116-17)244 
 
“Here” is pluralism, possibility; “there” – a place beyond our experiential reckoning – is 
rationalism, the determinism that threatens to cancel the potentials of human action. In his 
comparative study of religion and pragmatism, Lyman threw his hat into the Jamesian ring: 
“[m]y question is whether the notion that God is timeless does not tend to neutralize the religious 
and practical value of faith in his immanence” (Theology 18). To Lyman and other Christian 
reformers, it emphatically did. By emphasizing mutability as a fundamental condition of 
existence, pragmatism and the Social Gospel subjected human thought, knowledge, and action to 
temporal contingencies, endorsing an ethic of pragmatic adaptability to unforeseen vicissitudes 
whose shared goal was the progressive betterment of human life. This is not, as Leibniz said, the 
best of all possible worlds. It’s better because it isn’t the best. 
 James’s word “application” is an important one, since to effectively understand a thing, 
we must know how it has been applied in human experience. Most know the jurist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr’s 1881 maxim that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience” (5). Less pithy but equally pragmatic was Lyman’s argument that the future of 
theology lay unambiguously in pragmatic tests: 
 
[t]he method by which pragmatism tests and interprets truth is essentially 
historical. [...] We must study in history the spiritual trend which it represents, and 
the values which it has produced or destroyed, for only then shall we be able to 
see what it really signifies for us and to take the attitude toward it which will lead 
to the best results in the future. (Theology 54) 
 
                                                             
244 It needs to be said that the crux of James’s gripe is not with rationalism across the board, but its “over-
tender forms.” He protests against rationalism’s tendency to foreclose the practical utility of human 
experience, not against the idea that rationalistic claims are necessarily without pragmatic value: “I 
have...defended rationalistic hypotheses, so far as these re-direct you fruitfully into experience” 






It isn’t the absolute meaning of a concept, but the spiritual trend - the shifting eddies of effects it 
produces in lived history - that demonstrates “what it really signifies for us.” This novel 
emphasis on a concept’s exposure to historical flux and its importance for us in the present 
wasn’t lost on Rauschenbusch, who joined James and Lyman in his rejection of the timeless. 
Christ, Rauschenbusch argues, “was not a timeless religious teacher, philosophizing vaguely on 
human generalities. He spoke for his own age, about concrete conditions, responding to the 
stirrings of the life that surged about him” (Social Crisis 49). While this emphasis on “concrete 
conditions” would seem to suggest a kind of moral relativity, marooning Christ’s precepts in 
their biblical context, Rauschenbusch’s lesson is that we are ethically obligated to examine our 
specific historical conditions, suiting our actions to the world in which they are done.245 “That is 
in fact,” Rauschenbusch continues, “the process with every great, creative religious mind: the 
connection with the past is maintained and the old terms are used, but they are set in new 
connections and filled with new qualities” (57). Making the fluctuating quality of history and 
experience a condition of human life, Lyman, Rauschenbusch, and many Social Gospel leaders 
provided the logic for a pragmatic ethic that sought to make hitherto “timeless” and “absolute” 
spiritual values accountable to quotidian existence.  
So in this way, experience drives theory, not the other way around. “[I]t is religion,” the 
philosopher of religion Harald Höffding argued, “which is based on ethical ideas, and not...vice 
versa” since “[e]thical feeling develops in the struggle for life” (323). Ethical knowledge – 
knowledge specifically about action – comes from experience. One is schooled in ethics not in 
the seminary but in the direct confrontation with the uncertainties, irregularities, and the myriad 
struggles of life. “The content of religion always points back to life in the world of experience” 
(330), cycling our attention back to lived experience and averting the meandering vortices of 
theoretical speculation. Höffding’s sustained insistence that religion begins in this world and in 
this life and not in considerations of another beyond our experience coimplicates the human and 
                                                             
245 The assertion that moral precepts are not timeless but relative to their historical context was a common 
refrain in the period after evolutionary theory gained a foothold in the sciences and theology. Minot J. 
Savage, in the 1870s, for example, could accept with little reservation that “[t]his law of change and 
growth, which is true in all other things, holds also with equal force in matters of religion. The religious 
rites, institutions, and books of a people, are and must be the natural expression of that people’s religious 
thought and grade of civilization” (171). His argument that evil is merely a “maladjustment” of humanity 





divine realms, a Swedenborgian theory of correspondence that sanctifies our “ethical feeling,” 
providing, in James’s provocative phrase, a “moral equivalent of war.”  
 But a “struggle” indicates an uncertainty about the outcome. To Höffding, James, and 
Social Gospel leaders, it is precisely because the world is incomplete, because the bedrock 
condition of human experience is one of capricious uncertainty irremediable by appeals to 
timeless absolutes, that the world and its inhabitants exist in a state of improvisatory 
experimentation. Further, it is because these conditions of ambivalence gained currency in 
Protestant evangelicalism, psychology, and philosophies of religion that we can even have an 
ethical system at all. As Höffding put it, “[t]here can only be ethical striving as long as the course 
of the world is uncompleted” (248). In no accidental language, James too believed that open-
ended worlds lending themselves to our ethical elevation, if read aright, could “sanctify the 
human flux” (Pragmatism 121; my emphasis). Completed worlds driven by rationalist 
philosophies, in contrast, demand no ethical striving on our part, require no effort to perfect the 
things we find imperfect about the world.246  
But the subjection of religion and religious experience to the stream of time has other 
consequences. As psychologist George Coe saw it, our understanding of reality itself was up for 
reevaluation. In his chapter “Religion as Discovery,” Coe builds on his central thesis that religion 
is “a certain aspect, tendency, and process of values and valuations” (Psychology 229). “No 
atoms of mental life appear to you at all,” he writes, “but rather a continuous flow which has 
various aspects, of which the sensational is one” (16), adding that the reality with which mind 
deals is bound up with the interests and values that work for that mind. Coe’s Real, then, is the 
pragmatic real, in the sense that what is “true” is what “works” for us.247 For Coe, the real is a 
process of discovery, in all departments of human interaction, including religion: “[l]ike 
                                                             
246 James relates how he came to the conclusion that perfect, completed, Edenic worlds aren’t exactly 
conducive to heroic ideals or moral striving, and leave us more or less vulnerable in our confrontations 
with historical realities. Citing the “atrocious harmlessness” of his weeklong stay at the utopian 
community of Chautauqua Lake, James reflects on his “instinctive hostile reaction” to its “realization...of 
all the ideals for which our civilization has been striving” (Talks 173). What Chautauqua lacks for James 
is “the element of precipitousness,” that quality of uncertainty and risk that vitalizes the human will in 
“the everlasting battle of the powers of light with those of darkness” (174).     
247 This reconception of reality wasn’t confined to academic circles, but had real effects in Social Gospel 
reform. We’ll see more clearly how a Jamesian conception of the real and true became the guiding 





commerce, government, or education, religion is a process in which the real produces definition 
of itself” (232; my emphasis). What is real is not some empirically verifiable “out there,” a 
single destination to which properly reasoning minds may travel. Rather, what is real is a useful - 
even if tentative - attitude toward the world whose claim to veracity is entangled in the very 
process of its discovery as useful. 
Another critical part of the story has to do with the nature of the kingdom of God. In spite 
of their differences, the one concept that united virtually all Social Gospelers was a dedication to 
the kingdom as a this-worldly event precipitated (largely) by pragmatic human action. When 
Rauschenbusch tasked himself with articulating a theology for the Social Gospel, the kingdom 
stood out unequivocally as the sine qua non of the movement: “[t]his doctrine is itself the social 
gospel” (Theology 131). Such a theology would only be “valuable in so far as it grows out of 
action for the Kingdom and impels action” (Theology 141), taking as unambiguously as James 
that “[t]he truth of a thing or idea is its meaning, or its destiny, that which grows out of it” 
(“Notebook 4502”). The primary value is in effects, not origins. The theological innovation made 
by figures like Rauschenbusch was to subject the kingdom of heaven to the laws that govern 
earthly experience.  
But the question as to exactly what form this kingdom would take was left tantalizingly 
vague. Edward Bellamy’s fully utopianized Boston in his bestseller Looking Backward (1888), it 
seems, was an exception to the rule. The trend in both theology and literature, despite their 
shared commitment to the kingdom coming “on earth as it is in heaven,” was to leave the shape 
of that kingdom up to an ever-receding future. “It is for us,” Rauschenbusch augured, “to see the 
Kingdom of God as always coming, always pressing in on the present, always big with 
possibility, and always inviting immediate action” (Theology 141). Couched in the present 
continuous - “coming,” “pressing,” “inviting” - the kingdom emerges asymptotically, ever not 
quite, according to “the flow of history” (146). If this sounds vague, the vagueness is intrinsic to 
the Social Gospel’s theology of process. Like James’s “principled and deliberate fuzziness” 
(Philosophy 28), as Rorty describes it, the vagueness surrounding the Social Gospel kingdom 
aimed at a productive ambiguity that vitalized and directed practical action without stipulating a 
preconceived design. The kingdom would come, but - in the spirit of pragmatism, which “does 





Even in attempts to literalize the concrete installation of the kingdom on earth tended to stop 
short of actually showing readers its vision of a utopian apocalypse. The WWJD? experiment of 
In His Steps works well in Raymond, and later when it is replicated in Chicago, but the closest 
we get to seeing the kingdom is Henry Maxwell “[dreaming] of the regeneration of 
Christendom...a church of Jesus without spot or wrinkle” (302). Likewise, the rags-to-riches hero 
of Harold Bell Wright’s That Printer of Udell’s (1902), after becoming a model Christian, sets 
off from his midwestern home “to enter a field of wider usefulness at the national Capitol” (345), 
the last we see of him.  
The retention of ambivalence characteristic of Social Gospel narratives and preaching 
legitimated the continuation of, as Höffding put it, “ethical striving.” The incompleteness, the 
lack of closure, in these theological texts and narratives, however, is not due to any lack of 
imagination, but a pragmatic instrumentalization of vagueness that cultivated and sustained the 
conditions for ethical striving. The question I want to ask next is how the pragmatic attitudes that 
so influenced the this-worldly process theology of the Social Gospel found their way into 




From “What Shall I Do?” to “What Would Jesus Do?” – The Pragmatic Logics of the 
Homiletic Novel 
 
Where is the concerted effort of evangelical laymen, to set up gospel means in the deserted lower 
wards of this city? 
    James Waddel Alexander, The Revival and Its Lessons (180)   
 
“Hold on, Felicia!” the Bishop interrupted. “This is not an age of miracles!” 
“Then we will make it one,” replied Felicia.  






A thinly veiled likeness of Jane Addams, Felicia Sterling proposes to build a thinly veiled 
likeness of Hull House in Chicago and is met with incredulity by the well-meaning but short-
sighted Bishop Edward. Virtually always referred to as “the Bishop,” and thereby never letting 
readers forget he is a man defined by his clerical occupation, he has difficulty imagining 
Felicia’s settlement plan could be made a substantial reality. Against “the Bishop’s” reluctance 
to disturb the status quo, Felicia’s declaration that we will make this an age of miracles is 
impressive not only because it means humans are capable of wielding a power known only to 
God, but also because it sets out to make the word miracle substantial by subjecting it to 
experimental - experienceable - tests. Not the first of its kind, but a pattern-setter regardless, 
Charles Sheldon’s bestselling homiletic novel In His Steps incorporated pragmatic logics into its 
representations of social reform.  
The dialectical quality of spiritual truths espoused by Social Gospel theologians found a 
comfortable home in the form of what has recently been dubbed the social Christian, or more 
technically, the homiletic novel. A hybrid form that combined the conventions of the middle 
class novel with the homiletic realism of sermons, the homiletic novel incorporated the 
allegorical doubleness of William Langland’s fourteenth century Piers Plowman and Bunyan’s 
Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), the Christian bildungsroman framework of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
(1719) and Elizabeth Prentiss’s Stepping Heavenward (1869), the sentimental piety of Susan 
Warner’s The Wide, Wide World (1852), and the self-conscious focus on social reform in titles 
like T.A. Arthur’s Ten Nights in a Bar-Room (1854) and Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852).248 
As its name implies, the homiletic novel drew from sermonic techniques of inculcating spiritual 
                                                             
248 The social Christian novel’s indebtedness to earlier works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin has been observed 
by Robert Walker and Dewey Wallace in their introduction to Robert Wright Glenn’s pioneering work on 
the genre (xvi). Claudia Stokes, too, has identified the Protestant master plots structuring Stowe’s 
domestic fiction (Ch. 3). It should be added, though, that the imitatio Christi is an as-powerful device in 
both Uncle Tom’s Cabin as well as much postbellum social Christian fiction. It is Tom’s ability to imitate 
Christ so well that validates his status as a man and, by extension, the abolitionist argument that slavery is 





lessons and urging believers to apply those lessons to and justify them in their lived 
experiences.249 
The homiletic novel also inherited from texts such as these the Scottish Common Sense 
appeal to affection as the wellspring of action. The interlocking of the affections and the will – a 
connection central to Edwards’s Religious Affections – informed sentimental and homiletic 
novels’ insistence that right action came from the right stirring of affections. These genres, then, 
provide insight into a strain in thinking about human psychology that informs popular novels as 
well as pragmatic justifications for action.  
The applicability - as opposed to the mere learning - of spiritual doctrines had always 
been intrinsic to Protestant homiletic composition. The sixteenth century Protestant reformer 
William Perkins, in his Arte of Prophesying (1592), a widely read guidebook on sermon writing, 
stressed four key sections of effective sermon composition: biblical text, interpretation of the 
text, exegesis, and application of the spiritual lesson. Dramatizing the “application” portion of 
this widespread Protestant model, the homiletic novel sought to train readers to transform 
Christian principles into living practice, repudiating the claim that the novel is, as Lukácz put it, 
an “epic of a world that has been abandoned by God” (88). Rather, as we’ll see, homiletic novels 
were often sagas of worlds ready and waiting to be saturated by the Spirit. 
 The principal method of achieving this saturation point, the imitatio Christi sought to 
discipline individuals’ behavior by radically modeling it on that of Christ. Nothing new in the 
history of western Christianity, the imitatio Christi provided the central ethical system in such 
devotional manuals as Thomas á Kempis’s fifteenth century Imitatio Christi, Luke Milbourne’s 
gloss of that foundational text, The Christian Pattern Paraphras’d (1696), and John Wesley’s 
                                                             
249 Ian Watt’s argument that the novel is constituted by a “formal realism” and whose origin is linked to 
the rise of a middle class have been and still are central to theories of the novel. More recent accounts of 
the American nineteenth century novel, such as those of Gregory Jackson, Dawn Coleman, and Claudia 
Stokes have questioned secular interpretations of the form, offering alternative views that appreciate the 
role of religious - largely Protestant evangelical - culture in its creation and reception. Jackson makes a 
compelling case for this largely unrecognized literary mode in his essay “‘What Would Jesus Do?’” (641-
42). See also Stokes’s argument that, for many sentimental women writers like Catharine Sedgwick and 
Susan Warner, “the novel was a kind of sacred text, just as capable of effecting conversion as the Bible 





The Christian Pattern (1735).250 Resurrecting this heuristic for postbellum audiences, Gladden 
explained that “the Christian life is the life of Christ, copied just as fairly as we are able to copy 
it” (Being 25). The imitatio Christi heuristic central to homiletic novels like Charles Sheldon’s In 
His Steps and Churchill’s The Inside of the Cup aimed at providing readers with a criterion of 
ethical action based in the lived experience of Christ. Hitching the veridicality and justification 
of Christian belief to Christian conduct, the homiletic novel participated in and contributed to a 
long tradition in American philosophy and theology of the practical identification of theory and 
practice, the is and the does.  
Popularly known as the “What Would Jesus Do?” movement, this late nineteenth century 
recovery of the pre-Reformation imitatio Christi discipline adopted a pragmatic logic that 
sourced the primary value of belief in the pious actions of individuals. Commonly thought to be 
a late twentieth century invention, popularized by WWJD? wristbands and bumper stickers, the 
WWJD? movement has it roots in the last decade of nineteenth century America.251 In such 
works as William T. Stead’s If Christ Came to Chicago! (1894) and - most explicitly - in 
Sheldon’s In His Steps (1896), readers were invited to consider what shape the world would take 
if Christ’s precepts were pragmatically applied. The homiletic novel capitalized on the 
association of the middle class form with private, immersive reading to obliterate sin from where 
it most effectively hides - the human heart. Progressive Boston pastor Philip Stafford Moxom put 
it simply when he said that “[t]he salvation of society is the salvation of the individual” (66). 
Renouncing the self that pursued individual gain and inhabiting a selfless Christic paradigm, 
practitioners could tailor their individual action to their heterogeneous conditions. 
 Inspired by other Social Gospel novels like Ward’s Robert Elsmere (1888), the minister 
and homiletic novelist Charles Sheldon deliberately pursued unmediated experiences of 
socioeconomic hardship, tramping through the slums surrounding his Topeka congregation. 
                                                             
250 For a compact yet comprehensive history of Thomas á Kempis’s signature work, and the enduring 
legacy of the imitatio Christi heuristic, see Magill (40).  
251 Nor was the movement isolated to exclusively religious cultures. Its reach becomes more impressive 
when we consider that it was the Democrat Al Gore - not the self-professed Christian Republican George 
W. Bush - who, when a Tennessee Baptist church couldn’t decide whether to allow a visiting woman 
bishop to preach, asked the male preacher “What would Jesus do?” The woman bishop delivered the 





Accepting a call to minister in the city, Sheldon reflected in his Life on how his experience left 
him feeling disconnected from the lives of the city’s working class: “I felt the isolation of the 
preacher and the minister from the great world of labor. What did I know of it except the little 
experience I had had on a farm as a boy? [...] It was another world” (82). Seeking the antidote to 
this state of epistemological isolation and donning a set of old, shabby clothes, Sheldon enacted 
the pragmatic identification of reality with the process of its discovery.252 So immersed in the 
realities of his surroundings, these experiences even assumed for him a kind of virtual reality: 
“[a]s night came on I had an uncanny feeling that the thing I was trying was somehow real” (84). 
Sheldon’s personal experience would become a common theme in the theology of the Social 
Gospel, as it was for pragmatism - that the reality or truth of a thing is intimately bound to our 
acting on it. As Gladden put it, “[i]f you want to know the certainty of these things, you must put 
them into practice” (Being 96). For Sheldon, the putting into practice of what it means to be 
impoverished made it real to the extent of subverting personal identity, producing an experience 
that was practically indistinguishable from that of the economically downtrodden of Topeka’s 
slums. It also made possible the epistemological bridge necessary for an effective imitatio 
Christi.  
 Eric Schocket has argued that “if the aim of the middle-class investigator is to map...the 
mysterious realm of the working and lower classes, then such an easy transition from observer to 
participant exposes...the fragile border between the two” (119). Sheldon’s pursuit of the direct 
experience of the other half exposes the unstable - hence permeable - borderland between classes 
and social groups, putting to proof James’s claim that “[b]y experimenting on our ideas of 
reality, we may save ourselves the trouble of experimenting on the real experiences which they 
severally mean” (ERE 61). The distinction between “observer” and “participant,” to use 
Shocket’s language, is in this system conceptual, a functional overlay placed on the irreducible 
substrate of experience.253 For James, gleaning usable truths from secondhand experimentation - 
                                                             
252 These direct, immersive experiences led Sheldon to extend principles of Christian stewardship to the 
city of Topeka, especially in neighboring Tennesseetown, at the time an enclave for Great Exodus black 
populations. For an incisive examination of Sheldon’s contributions to social Christianity in Topeka and 
his participation in the city’s neighborhood improvement programs, see Cox (144-51). 
253 This is in keeping with James’s wider argument that most of what Enlightenment psychology 





such as tramping through Topeka’s slums - is possible because observers may transcend those 
conceptual distinctions to plumb the aquifer of fruitful experience.  
Sheldon’s homiletic novel In His Steps begins accordingly in the fraught borderland 
between middle class respectability and the denizens of the social cellar. The novel’s opening 
epigraph, taken from 1 Peter 2:21, prescribes that, “because Christ also suffered for you, leaving 
you an example, that ye should follow his steps” (7). The scripture also forms the subject of the 
Sunday morning sermon the main character, Rev. Henry Maxwell, can’t quite get done in the 
novel’s opening scene. Distracting him is the unexpected arrival at his front door of a vagrant 
looking for work, whom Maxwell politely turns away (8-9). In a moment of modern theoxenia, 
the opening action - a spurned wanderer in search of relief, on a Friday no less - clearly echoes 
the ethical implications central to the story of Mary and Joseph.254 The opening scene contrasts 
the theological formalism of sermon writing with the practical opportunity to do real Christian 
action in the here and now - an opportunity Maxwell doesn’t, at least for now, recognize. This 
lack of recognition, of seeing, exploits the irony of a minister failing to allay another’s suffering 
while writing a sermon about suffering. In His Steps frames the practical consequences of 
putting theological and theoretical formalism above the actual problems of the world - problems 
that are literally at your front door.255 
 Homeless, around thirty years old, tramping for “three days” (15) through the fictional 
city of Raymond, the nameless vagrant appears as a less-than-subtle avatar of Christ (or 
Lazarus). Arriving at Maxwell’s Sunday service, he finds “the large building was filled with an 
audience of the best-dressed, most comfortable-looking people of Raymond” (10). Though 
“tolerably familiar with this sort of humanity out on the street” (14), the parishioners’ reaction to 
                                                             
substrate of experience itself. “I mean only to deny that the word [consciousness] stands for an entity, but 
to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function” (ERE 3).  
254 If the biblical overtones weren’t already obvious, Mary is the name of Maxwell’s wife.  
255 The Social Gospel’s legacy of social justice can be seen in several cities across the globe - such as 
Detroit, Buffalo, Toronto, Dublin, and Rome - in the form of Homeless Jesus art pieces. The brain child 
of Canadian artist Timothy Schmalz, each bronze sculpture installation features a hooded and faceless 
effigy lying on a bench, usually outside a church. Named “Jesus,” yet faceless, the sculptures foster an 
identification of the homeless and needy with Christ, embodying the scriptural admonition that 
“[i]nasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me” (KJV 





the “stranger” is stupefied inaction. Taking on the role of educator, the vagrant commands the 
audience’s attention “as if the whole congregation had been a small Bible class,” putting to them 
a practical question about Christ’s teachings: “[w]hat did He mean when He said: ‘Follow me?’” 
(15). Reflecting Gladden’s complaint that “[a] keen theological argument would have been 
interesting, but...it hardly ever touched life in the remotest way” (Recollections 33), the vagrant’s 
request is essentially for practical clarity, conceiving what the consequences would be if Christ’s 
precept were actualized in human experience - the central tenet of Peircean and Jamesian 
pragmatism. With this arresting intrusion into the bastion of spiritual comfort and material 
respectability, the vagrant’s line of pragmatic questioning testifies that to understand what Christ 
meant by “Follow me,” one who claims to believe in the precept must seek its significance in its 
practical results.  
Inspired by the experience of witnessing the vagrant fatally succumbing to physical 
exhaustion, Maxwell pledges himself and invites willing members of his congregation to adhere 
to a Christian “standard of action,” “for an entire year, not to do anything without first asking the 
question, ‘What would Jesus do?’” (24). In their day to day lives, individuals must navigate 
ethical uncertainties by following this “standard of action” that affixes the significance of 
principles or claims to their concrete results. By allotting a set interval of a year in which to 
assess the concrete results of a radical imitatio Christi, WWJD? - not what he thought, or what 
he said - enacts what amounts to a pragmatic experimentation of Christian principles.256 The 
subjunctive mood intrinsic to WWJD? functions on the same logic as Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, 
that in order to capture a thing’s significance, we must “[c]onsider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (31). WWJD?, thus, 
called for practitioners to imaginatively inhabit a zone of hypotheticals whose consequences, if 
                                                             
256 Sheldon’s was by no means an isolated attempt to pragmatize Christian conduct. Published two years 
before In His Steps, British journalist William T. Stead’s exposé If Christ Came to Chicago! asked 
readers to consider, “[i]f Christ came to Chicago what would He wish me to do?” (443). And several 
other texts from the period, such as M.W. Howard’s If Christ Came to Congress (1894), Edward Everett 
Hale’s If Jesus Came to Boston (1895), Ira Cardiff’s atheistic parodies of the trope, If Christ Came to New 
York and What Would Christ Do about Syphilis? (1930), even modern-day diet books like Don Colbert’s 
What Would Jesus Eat? (2002), invited readers to imagine what Jesus would do if he returned to find the 





acted upon, would be clear and actionable to us. If James is right to claim with Peirce that “our 
beliefs are really rules for action” (Pragmatism 23), then imagining what Jesus would do 
amounts to pragmatically conceiving what effects such action would produce.  
 So as James was articulating pragmatism for philosophical audiences, evangelical fiction 
devised its own in the application of Christian principles to lived experience. As Sheldon read 
the chapters of his novel from his Topeka pulpit, he was asking his congregation to think 
pragmatically: knowledge of Christ and his teachings and how to effectively manifest them in the 
social world requires their acting out. Real knowledge, by extension, does not come from 
passivity. “There is no knowledge without action,” the practical theologian Harris Rall opined. 
“No one can really know who remains simply an onlooker” (79).257 By adjusting the immersive 
qualities of novel reading to the pragmatic logic of the imitatio Christi heuristic, the homiletic 
novel precludes the possibility of passive reading, exposing as Erin Smith puts it, “the 
porousness of the boundaries between literature and life for good Christian readers” (194). 
Cultivating pragmatic attitudes of real-world Christian action, the literary became a powerful 
tool in not only putting scripture’s money where its mouth is, but in quelling the forces of moral 
inertia that proved the major obstacle to the coming of Christ’s kingdom. 
Even so, the WWJD? experiment dramatized in In His Steps reveals the limits of 
applying Christian principles to social problems. Despite George Herron’s claim that “the 
business man who fails to be a little Christ to the world has made a disastrous and irreparable 
business failure” (24), the novel’s experiment in applying WWJD? to capitalism suggests a 
reinscription of the very economic abuses and shortcomings it tries to mitigate. Following to its 
logical conclusion Christ’s direction in Matthew 19:21 to “go and sell that thou hast, and give to 
the poor,” the heiress Virginia Page’s settlement house plan nearly puts her on the brink of 
indigence, threatening to place her in the very position of those she is trying to assist. This is the 
concrete result of the test of applying practical Christianity to capitalism, two systems that the 
                                                             
257 What hasn’t received as much scholarly attention is the way in which Social Gospel theologians like 
Rall contravened attitudes of passivity that issued in no new or useful knowledge, advocating for a 
results- and purpose-driven faith. When Rorty identified the Deweyan and Whitmanesque “participatory 
Left” - as opposed to the politically effete “spectatorial Left” - as the position necessary to “achieving our 
country,” he could have just as easily cited the Social Gospel attitude of participatory faith (of whom he 





editor of the Daily News Edward Norman discovers to be utterly incompatible: “[t]here is no 
question with me now...that a great many men would lose vast sums of money under the present 
system of business if this rule of Jesus was honestly applied” (140). To the experimental idealism 
of In His Steps, however, the stark incompatibility suggested between unregulated capitalism and 
pragmatized Christianity reveals the limitations of implementing a totalizing Christianity within 
an areligious economic system. When, as Rauschenbusch argued, you subscribe to the maxim 
that “‘[b]usiness is business’ [...] life is cut into two halves, each governed by a law opposed to 
that of the other, and the law of Christ is denied even the opportunity to gain control of business” 
(313). The novel is conscious enough of the problem to make Edward Norman say what he does, 
but it’s not as imaginative in finding a way out of it. 
Almost not as imaginative. Felicia’s father, a man of business who calls the WWJD? 
movement “very impracticable” (207), is introduced in chapter twenty-one. He is quickly 
dispatched hardly twenty pages later, serving as a critic of transplanting small-town idealism to 
urban economy. Learning “certain speculations” demolished his fortune, and rather than face the 
inevitable prospect of financial destitution, Mr. Sterling takes his own life (the salvific 
consequences of which are not hard to imagine). According to the novel’s post-mortem account, 
“[i]t had all rested on a tissue of deceit and speculation that had no foundation in real values” 
(230). That language of “speculation” vs. “real” isn’t accidental, and the fact that Mr. Sterling 
meets his end isn’t because he questions the practicality of the WWJD? movement, but because 
he is so wedded to the fantasy of unreal value promised by unregulated capitalism. An 
illustration of Christ’s rule that “[y]e cannot serve God and mammon” (KJV Matt. 6:24), the 
cautionary tale of Mr. Sterling’s demise - however heavy-handed it strikes us - is also an 
illustration of the consequences of trying to live according to mere speculation rather than by 
“real [cash] values.”  
 The pragmatic logic of the homiletic novel sought to reconnect readers with the “concrete 
facts and joys and sorrows” of life, the “struggle for life,” as Höffding put it, that is the 
wellspring of our ethics. By extension, disconnection from the real and its struggles is 
tantamount to moral alienation. E.A. Smith cleverly points out that of the twelve characters who 
take the WWJD? pledge, the Judas of the group turns out to be Jasper Chase (203). Why Jasper, 





directly to his vocation. Failing to secure the affections of Rachel, another WWJD? pledge, 
Jasper uses the novel form to construct a self-affirming reality better suited to his amorous 
proclivities: “the heroine of Jasper’s first novel had been his own ideal of Rachel, and the hero in 
the story was himself” (106). Fabricating alternative realities divorces Jasper not only from the 
fact of unreciprocated affections and their practical consequences, but more importantly from the 
social realities of the novel, the only available zone of legitimate pragmatic action. The homiletic 
novel, then, recapitulates a longstanding nineteenth century criticism of religious fiction, that it 
doesn’t, in C.W. Andrews’s estimation, “produce a Christian character, as nearly conformed to 
the pattern given by our blessed Redeemer, and as well fitted to perform its part in the actual 
world” (6; my emphasis). Jasper’s sin lies not only in denying Christ by failing to adhere to the 
WWJD? pledge, but in denying the actual world of experience. His self-idealization - hence, 
self-idolization - condemns Jasper to a practical hell. Alone, and having completed the last 
chapter of his novel, “[i]t grew darker in his room” (178).     
The homiletic novel emerged as a means to vitalize human volition against the forces of 
social determinism and, to use James’s phrase, the “moral holidays” rationalized by laissez-faire 
capitalism, rigorous individualism, and a hardlined Darwinism that desiccated the possibilities of 
human agency, if it didn’t cancel them outright.258 These kinds of determinisms were explicit in 
works like Stephen Crane’s Maggie (1893), whose young heroine succumbs tragically to the 
social forces around her, signaling not only the infirmity of human volition but the utter 
inconsequentiality of Christian virtue. The final words of the novella, spoken by Maggie’s 
mother after learning of her daughter’s demise, “'[o]h, yes, I’ll fergive her! I’ll fergive her!’” 
(78), is a parody of Christian forgiveness as mawkish and ineffectual in inciting practical 
solutions to real social problems. In Frank Norris’s McTeague (1899), unnamed and irresistible 
                                                             
258 This determinism was what Jane Addams couldn’t stomach about Marxism (Knight 89), with its 
implications of inevitable and violent class conflict. To Addams’s pragmatic mind, virtually all conflict 
was a verbal issue; conflict arose from latent misunderstandings. It was a distaste shared by James in 
many of his relentless execrations against Hegel and his arguments against the exclusive adoption of 
rationalistic philosophies. In Pragmatism, to take one example, James contrasts empiricism (which he 
clearly favors) with “a rationalistic philosophy that may indeed call itself religious, but that keeps out of 
definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows” (13). Rationalism’s avoidance of “concrete 
facts,” according to James, and its insistence on determinism and foreordained teleologies make it ill-
suited to address the real problems of human agents, such as those confronted by the progressives of the 





forces propel its increasingly inebriated and homicidal central character to a final confrontation 
with an irrevocable and abysmal destiny. Dubbed naturalism, the genre did not tend to view 
human experience, as the Social Gospel and pragmatism did, as a fruitful reservoir of edifying 
and redemptive lessons, but wrestled with the possibility of life’s inexplicable mercilessness and 
proneness to forces as indifferent as they are inexorable. Pragmatism and the Social Gospel’s 
tendency toward salutary problem-solving and their shared antipathy to determinism, also run 
counter to naturalism’s often observed repetitiveness, what Jennifer Fleissner calls its “stuckness 
in place” (9) and what Sara Blair has termed its “aesthetics of arrest” (35). For the pragmatic 
ethics of the Social Gospel, it was imperative that social conditions could transcend such 
historical cyclicity and experiential arrest. James’s admonition that “[t]he hell to be endured 
hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world 
by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way” (PP 130) grants us a degree of 
volition hardly reconcilable within a naturalistic universe.259   
It’s not surprising then that other homiletic novels framed their dramas as conflicts 
between progressive ministers and deterministic defenders of the status quo. Not written as a 
series of sermons but nonetheless at its most energetic when at its most sententious, the 
American Winston Churchill’s 1913 homiletic bestseller The Inside of the Cup follows other 
homiletic novels in their promotion of a pragmatic ethic as the key to establishing the kingdom 
of God on earth. Largely unread today, Churchill’s novel is nonetheless a key piece of evidence 
linking pragmatism to Social Gospel reform. (Indeed, the novel’s neglect is likely part of the 
reason the relationship between the two movements has remained underexplored.) The narrative 
                                                             
259 I pause here to highlight conventional descriptions of postbellum American literary history as 
characterized by genres like naturalism and realism. The table of contents of James Nagel and Tom 
Quirk’s American Realism Reader (1997), for example, organizes literary selections into “Regionalism 
and Local Color,” “Realism,” and “Naturalism.” This kind of periodizing tends to turn a blind eye to 
religious bestsellers like Lew Wallace’s Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ (1880) and Harold Bell Wright’s 
That Printer of Udell’s (1902), which frequently employed the same literary strategies associated with 
writers like Stephen Crane, Theodore Dreiser, and William Dean Howells. Though admittedly I treat 
naturalism broadly here, the genre does in fact make certain claims about “reality” that homiletic novels 
do not. I am, in fact, sympathetic to Lee Clark Mitchell’s argument in Determined Fictions that “[t]he 
naturalists...did not simply substitute a mechanistic determinism for the assumed agency by the realist 
novel. In far more searching endeavors, they depicted the ways in which ‘agency’ itself is constructed 
only after the fact, made up as we go along in the stories we tell about the moments of our lives” (xi). 
James’s arguments about habit formation (and its not insignificant religious language of heaven and hell), 





follows John Hodder, an orthodox minister whose direct experience with lower class vice and 
upper class corruption in his midwestern parish results in his conversion to a self-consciously 
pragmatized Christianity. His practical homiletics condemned as “‘[s]heer Unitarianism, 
socialism, heresy’” (372), Hodder nevertheless emerges victorious as the exemplary reformist 
minister fully infused with the pragmatic spirit.260 The Inside of the Cup, I argue, makes 
profoundly visible the idea that the attitudes driving the Social Gospel were pragmatic ones and 
rested on quintessentially Jamesian logics.  
A major reason this is true is because the novel mentions James and pragmatism by 
name. Hodder, it turns out, is a bonafide Jamesian (and part Roycean) convert: he cites James’s 
essay “Is Life Worth Living?” (276), talks about Varieties at dinner parties (275), 
unconditionally accepts Myers’s and James’s theory of the subconscious (289), pragmatically 
analyzes the Trinity (in an episode clearly drawn from Peirce’s pragmatic analysis of 
transubstantiation in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (30-31)), adheres to Josiah Royce’s 
Christian humanism as a theory of social salvation (277), and – faithful James disciple that he is 
– rejects “the Church for her subservient rationalism” (508).261 Hodder conceives of religion in 
ways that reflect a reading of religious experience a là Höffding and James’s Varieties: 
“[r]eligion, he began to perceive, was an undertaking, an attempt to find unity and harmony of 
the soul by adopting, after mature thought, a definite principle in life. If harmony resulted, - if 
the principle worked, it was true. Hodder kept an open mind, but he became a pragmatist so far” 
(275-6). Defining religion not as “dogged clinging to the archaic speculations of apologists, 
                                                             
260 Charles H. Hopkins points out that “[t]he seedbed in which the ideological roots of social Christianity 
found themselves most at home was Unitarianism” (4). Unitarianism’s openness to religious 
ecumenicalism, scientific advancements, the Higher Criticism of the Bible, its receptivity to a variety of 
religious experiences, and its emphasis on the love of God and the humanity of Jesus were powerful 
factors in its influence on postbellum reform. For Unitarianism and the Social Gospel, denominational 
affiliation and doctrinal observance became less important than the Christian action that took real effect in 
the world.   
261 In his effort to overcome his spiritual turmoil, Hodder finds relief in the Christian humanism of Royce. 
“It was Royce, who, in one illuminating sentence, solved for him the puzzle, pointed out whence his 
salvation had come. ‘For your cause can only be revealed to you through some presence that first teaches 
you to love the unity of the spiritual life…. You must find it in human shape’” (277). Like many Social 
Gospelers, Hodder would locate salvation less in the providence of God than in the pious actions of 






saints, and schoolmen” (275), but with active “undertaking,” Hodder concludes with the 
Jamesian pragmatist that ethical action begins in - because of - an uncompleted, pluralistic world 
conducive and responsive to our ethical striving. Hodder embarks on an “uncompromising 
experiment” (471) that asks, as the Raymond parishioners had, “WWJD?” – except in his case 
we ought to suppose that the “J” could also stand for James.  
A major part of the drama of The Inside the Cup is the conflict between traditional claims 
of truth and more pragmatic ones. Hodder’s pragmatic conception of truth, that ”[t]ruth might no 
longer be identified with Tradition” (363), threatens to undermine not only the conservative 
ethos of many of his parishioners, but the financial status quo zealously defended by the town’s 
laissez-faire man of capital and fervent individualist, Eldon Parr. (The trouble is compounded by 
Hodder’s romance with Eldon’s socialist daughter Alison, who eventually undergoes conversion 
to the minister’s gospel of social work.) Hodder’s is a gospel of utility that defines the terms of 
one’s salvation according to one’s usefulness: “[t]o those who knew, there was no happiness like 
being able to say, ‘I have found my place in God’s plan, I am of use.’ Such was salvation” (369). 
Quintessentially pragmatic, Hodder’s logic forms the structure of his new theory of belief: 
“[t]here was no such thing as belief that did not result in act” (276). 
That last statement is also a claim about the pragmatic conception of reality. Whatever 
one may say about the validity of their beliefs, the roots of those beliefs are meaningless without 
their fruits. Another way to think about Hodder’s claim is that only those beliefs that issue in 
action merit induction in any description of what one can legitimately call reality. The novel’s 
title, from Matthew 23:25, is an extended diatribe against hypocrisy - behavior that is all about 
the insincerity of action and the willed mystification between an inner and an outer self. The text 
is essentially about what it means to perceive reality. “Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, 
hypocrites!,” Christ rails, “for ye make clean the outside of the cup and of the platter, but within 
they are full of extortion and excess.” It is when the “blind Pharisee, cleanse[s] first that which is 
within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be clean also.” Perception of the real 
isn’t simply a matter of seeing that which is external to you, but of purifying the very faculty of 
sight, calibrating it according to practical reality rather than merely theorized views of the world.  
Like Sheldon’s tramping expeditions across Topeka, Hodder’s experience with the 





conversion. Scrupulously avoided by the wealthy parishioners of the city, Dalton Street becomes, 
like most scenes of urban squalor in Social Gospel literature, a zone of homiletic realism: a place 
– the direct experience of whose socioeconomic neglect, uncertainties, and struggles – which is 
the very occasion for the possibility of conversion.262 Meeting the impoverished tenement-
dwelling Garvins, Hodder undergoes a scene of realism that literally rewrites his sensory 
manifold: “for months afterward particular smells, the sight of a gasoline stove, a certain popular 
tune gave him a sharp twinge of pain. The acid distilling in his soul etched the scene, the sounds, 
the odours forever in his memory” (155). This psychological rewriting highlights the crux of 
Social Gospel conversion: if realism requires our taking account of materiality by mixing our 
values and interests with them - as James thinks it does - Hodder’s conversion proceeds along the 
same lines by “[transforming] a mere knowledge of these conditions into feeling” (222). Feeling, 
which in a radically empirical universe, has just as much claim as anything to an account of 
reality by the differences with which it makes in the world. In a way, the permeability of the 
human sensorium by a compulsively real “out there” recapitulates revivalism’s climactic 
conversion scene, in which hesitant believers, humbly succumbing to the influx of the Holy 
Spirit, certify the reality of their conversion by the intensity of their feeling. 
Like its revivalist forbears, the Social Gospel taught that conversion was achieved not by 
intellectual assent but by direct experience. The heightened particularity of Hodder’s conversion 
scene recalls the detailed empiricism of sociological exposés like Walter Swaffield’s:  
 
We are brought face to face with a great need. Need brings responsibility and 
responsibility fruits in duty. Duty to face the need in all its horror; to go if 
necessary in and out of the dark alleys, the darker rooms, breathe the foul, damp 
air, touch the dirty, slimy walls, look into the faces of those who are our brothers 
and sisters, listen to the story of wrongs unrighted…. Duty to go to these spirits in 
prison, as Christ did before us” (673).  
                                                             
262 The Social Gospel’s representation of impoverished urban spaces as potential sites of moral uplift 
challenges contemporaneous views of the city as having an inherently corrosive force on character. The 
anticlimactic finale of Dreiser’s Sister Carrie (1900), for example, reinforced perceptions of the city as 
toxic to individual morality while bemoaning the loss of what Susan Moeller has called “the myth of rural 
purity” (5). Josiah Strong would argue the city, rather than being the epicenter of material progress, 
economic trade, and architectural prestige, was an intensifier of social dangers such as unchecked 






According to Swaffield, a sensorially unmediated experience - breathing, touching, listening - 
“fruits in duty,” almost by necessity. Allowing the social underworld to permeate his senses, 
becoming literally a part of his identity, Hodder executes the Social Gospel’s model of 
conversion to practical action. Homiletic novels and, as we’ll see, the photojournalism of Jacob 
Riis, encouraged a direct, tactile engagement with the lived experiences of the needy, an 
engagement that would incite conversion to the only available justification for belief: action. As 
readers of homiletic novels were encouraged to do, Hodder internalizes the incontrovertible 
realism of the social underworld, garnering valuable knowledge that is not simply conceptual, 
not simply a Lockean mental representation, but functionally identical to the lived experience of 
socioeconomic outcasts. Hodder becomes the exemplary Social Gospel minister, who, as 
progressive economist John R. Commons explains, “should be a student of social science,” but 
“he should find the facts by personal contact” (Social Reform 13-14). 
Hodder’s conversion from theological passivity is, then, a conversion to a one-to-one 
correspondence between his sight and reality: “[h]is had been the highroad of a fancied security, 
from which he had feared to stray, to seek his God across the rough face of nature, from black, 
forgotten cañons to the flying peaks in space. He had feared reality. He had insisted upon gazing 
at the universe through the coloured glasses of an outworn theology, instead of using his own 
eyes” (251). Hodder inverts the Emersonian formula of “[a]s I am, so I see” (Essays 259) into 
“as I see, so I am.” Viewing actual human suffering - and not the doctrinal adherence to an 
“outworn theology” - as the occasion for seeking God, Hodder represents the Social Gospel’s 
commitment to transforming society by insisting that human sight be pragmatically focused on 
actual human facts and values. Abolishing the “pure ancestral blindness” (Talks 175) - the 
blindness of vaunted doctrinal “purity,” of inherited tradition, of outmoded solutions to ancient 
problems long since resolved - requires a direct confrontation with the conditions of the here and 
now. Hodder’s conversion to a practical Christianity and his conversion to pragmatism are one in 
the same.263 Whereas revivalist conversion emphasized the heightened emotional experience of 
                                                             
263 Compare the conversion of Reverend Northmore in Elizabeth Neff’s Altars of Mammon (1908): “God 
is not wrath - that was the old barbaric idea before love was known, and we must slough it off. [...] 





an individual believer with the Holy Spirit as certification of one’s salvific status, Hodder’s 
conversion is to a gospel of power, the salvific verification of which lies its practical utility for 
social good. To the anxiety-ridden question of generations of doubting Christians – “How do I 
know I am saved?” – the Social Gospel conversion model offered a pragmatic response: you 
know by acting.  
Like that of his counterpart Henry Maxwell, Hodder’s narrative, despite its triumphal 
optimism for the coming kingdom, ends in the same state of eschatological deferment. Hodder’s 
marriage to Alison, the daughter of his spiritual foil Eldon Parr, closes the romance plot of the 
novel, but theological closure remains suspended. “Nothing could be more insipid and senseless 
than the orthodox view of the hereafter,” Alison proclaims, newly converted to Hodder’s 
pragmatic Christianity. “I am talking about a scheme of life here and now” (225). Hodder sees 
nothing at the end of the novel, but what he hears is “the cry of a new and wider vision of his 
task” (510). In this way, Hodder - and Sheldon’s - understanding of the kingdom follows the 
pragmatic logic of Peirce, that “the guiding power of a myth or symbol...must be conceptually 
‘vague’ if it is to guide rational development” (Bellah 201-2). By its own vagueness, the 
kingdom invites experimental, pragmatic human action. This lack of certainty in pragmatism is 
literalized in homiletic novels in the form - or rather the absence of a form - of the promised 
kingdom, whose indefinitely asymptotic becoming urges believers to never cease working 
toward its inevitable arrival.    
As the foregoing look at two homiletic novels suggests, part of the reason the connections 
between the Social Gospel and pragmatism tend to be missed in histories of postbellum 
American culture is because Social Christian novels are often overlooked in literary studies. 
Their translucent religiosity, political heavy-handedness, and overt moralism also don’t help 
attract contemporary - and often secular - readers whose literary sensitivities have been tuned to 
things like stylistic nuance, generic experimentation, and ideological ambivalence. The novels’ 
almost unconditional adoption, too, of the “sentimentalism” of earlier mid-century novels 
doesn’t conform to conventional expectations of postbellum literature as dominated by hard 
realism (think Henry James or Stephen Crane). The literary concerns of canonical writers like 
                                                             
broadly, an affectional connection to whatever we deem to be greater than us - as an incentive to practical 





Emerson, Hawthorne, Melville, or Whitman are often not the concerns of homiletic novelists, 
whose aims tend to be the moral muscularization of readers and their conversion to a Christian 
worldview that tends to be problematically silent about its relation to democratic pluralism and 
commitment to religious liberty.  
What the pragmatic logic of homiletic novels shows, however, is that even if they don’t 
share the complex literary symbolism or the teleological openendedness of a Hawthorne or a 
Melville, they do share the Emersonian ambition “to realize...the transformation of genius into 
practical power” (Essays 262). Their transformation was one of feeling into practical power, 
again highlighting the ways in which the Common Sense tradition informed the tradition of 
pragmatized evangelicalism I have been exploring. More, homiletic novels – of which the 
bestsellers In His Steps and The Inside of the Cup are a spare sample – demonstrate a level of 
doctrinal experimentation that did, in fact, resonate with a nineteenth century readership. When 
we think about the phrase “American literature,” a consideration of the homiletic novel would 
expand our understanding of the complex landscape of American literary history.264 More 
importantly, it would ask us to rethink the ways in which the novel itself is sometimes seen as a 




Consecrating the Camera – The Pragmatic Logics of Jacob Riis’s Urban Photojournalism 
 
 [A]s the Bible becomes more lifelike, it becomes more social. We used to see the sacred 
landscape through allegorical interpretation as through a piece of yellow bottle-glass. It was 
very golden and wonderful, but very much apart from our everyday modern life. 
Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (209) 
 
                                                             
264 The same can be said for transatlantic literature more broadly. It’s true that England, for example, has 
its share of reform literature. William Booth’s In Darkest England (1890) and Jack London’s non-fiction 
works like The People of the Abyss (1903) are two prominent examples. To what extent these reflect 





For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood 
by the things that are made. 
         Romans (KJV 1:20) 
 
Writing in the 1890s, the sociologist and philosopher John H.W. Stuckenberg sounded a familiar 
nineteenth century complaint when he asserted that “[e]mpty speculation on divine subjects has 
lost its force; mere theories are recognized as having no regenerative power…. The whole weight 
of the age is an emphasis on the demand for Christian Realism.” Arguing that “[t]he ethical era 
has succeeded the aesthetic” (Age 164), Stuckenberg links perception of the real with 
regenerative action that couldn’t be brought about by contemplation of “mere theories.” For truth 
and power to be made manifest, the real must be taken account of. We must look at life, not 
“through a piece of yellow bottle-glass,” as Rauschenbusch put it, but as it is, focusing not on the 
polished surfaces, but on the unembellished inside of the cup. 
So James agreed. Nonplussed at being accused of “deny[ing] the existence of realities 
outside the thinker,” James wrote to Dickinson Miller that he was unequivocally “a natural 
realist” (LWJ, 2 295). Pragmatism, he insists, using the well-known illustration of spilled beans 
on a table, hitches the meaning of those realities to how we use them. So long as one “takes 
account” of the beans, such an account “is neither false nor irrelevant” (295). What James 
means, then, by “natural realism” is an account of reality that has undergone some degree of 
human involvement.265 As we saw with Coe and homiletic novels, “reality” is incomprehensible 
without a knowledge of how it is mingled with human interests and feelings. “Compared with 
this world of living individualized feelings, the world of generalized objects which the intellect 
contemplates is without solidity or life” (502), James concluded at the end of Varieties. 
 Yet the tendency to see James as rigorously subjectivist has dogged the reception of 
pragmatism since its inception. Michael Slater cites Rorty as one major reason why this occurred 
                                                             
265 Compare James’s letter to Dickinson Miller to Dewey’s logically similar argument about the nature of 
rightness: “[r]ight is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others 
impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account” (327). Dewey’s 
point is that our notion of “Right” rests on the same logic as does James’s notion of the “Real.” We do 
not, they both say, behave within the constraints of transhuman principles of morality or reality, but 





(654).266 But recent writers on pragmatism like Slater and Hilary Putnam have made the case that 
James was, in fact, a realist in the sense that James believed in a world that existed independent 
of human interaction; such a world just had no significance for us. “James’s pragmatic account 
of truth,” Slater writes, “presupposes metaphysical realism” (659). Putnam likewise argues that, 
despite the “antirealist elements in James’s philosophy” (141), he wants to “return to a 
standpoint close to what he calls the ‘natural realism’ of the common man” (145). All of this is to 
put forward the idea that, for James and Social Gospelers, you could only start talking about the 
“real” when human actors were present to interact with it. Why this is important is because the 
Social Gospel subscribed to a Christianized pragmatic realism of its own, one that emerged, as 
we saw, in theology and literature, but also in the use of photojournalism. One of the key features 
of the relationship between pragmatism and American Christianity was their shared 
understanding of what was justified as real. For the real to be effective as an agent of change, it 
needed to be experienced directly, and like James’s spilled beans, taken account of.267 
 This act of taking account of a thing is the first step in making it real in the pragmatic 
sense. The journalist and social reformer Jacob Riis provides us with a good test case for 
understanding how this urban reformist realism adopted pragmatic attitudes. A Danish immigrant 
who experienced firsthand the staggering degree of urban poverty in postbellum America, Riis 
eventually found work as a police reporter for the New York Tribune, frequenting notorious New 
York slums like the Five Points, Mulberry Bend, Bone Alley, and Bandits’ Roost, and the city’s 
several Potter’s fields (modern day Bryant Park, Madison Square Park, and Washington Square 
                                                             
266 It’s unclear to what extent Rorty is to blame for why pragmatism has been throughout the twentieth 
century associated with radical subjectivism. Rorty it seems was nothing if not a faithful pragmatist: 
“[t]he antiessentialist has no doubt that there were trees and stars long before there were statements about 
trees and stars. But the fact of antecedent existence is of no use in giving sense to the question, ‘What are 
trees and stars apart from their relations to other things - apart from our statements about them?’” (58). In 
true pragmatic fashion, Rorty locates the meaning of things in their relation to human accounts of them, 
not in some ontologically transhuman “antecedent existence” containing an ultimate unchanging truth.  
267 It was this connection between an account of the real and practical action that informed not just 
homiletic novels and Jamesian pragmatism, but legal efforts to spur social reform. In her Work-Accidents 
and the Law (1910), the suffragist and lawyer Crystal Eastman employed a similar method in linking 
vivid portrayals of workers’ lives to reforms in workers’ safety. Compiling as many records on injured 
workers as possible, holding interviews with affected families and friends, Eastman and her associates 
“set out to complete each story,” the intent being “to enrich the statistical story with some 






Park). Hand-drawn sketches of urban poverty supplied magazine readers with some idea of how 
the other half lived, as the close and poorly lit confines of New York tenements, alleyways, and 
saloons were often too dark for the photographic technology available at the time. When in the 
late 1880s magnesium powder became available for flash photography, Riis took advantage of 
the technology to illuminate the darkest corners of what, for many, were invisible – unknown, 
unaccounted, and hence unreal – spaces (nearly blinding himself and twice setting fire to a 
house).268 Published in 1890, Riis’s immensely popular exposé How the Other Half Lives 
revealed to audiences the hitherto invisible world of the social cellar, using visible accounts of 
the real to inspire practical action.269  
The advantages of the pragmatic model weren’t immediately obvious to Riis. When he 
decided to give up writing editorials and go into preaching, his friend, the Reverend Ichabod 
Simmons pleaded, “‘No, no, Jacob...not that. We have preachers enough. What the world needs 
is consecrated pens.’ Then and there I consecrated mine” (Making 135). Eventually, he would 
come to consecrate his camera, bringing to active duty the “Christian Realism” Stuckenberg so 
strenuously called for. Whether he understood it in such terms, Riis found himself, like Gladden, 
reappraising what the function of the Christian ministry meant for believers.  
 Consecrating the camera, it turned out, depended on a pragmatic logic. As he put it in his 
bestselling autobiography The Making of an American, “I do not want [photography] explained 
to me in terms of HO2 [sic] or such like formulas, learned but so hopelessly unsatisfying. I do not 
want my butterfly stuck on a pin and put in a glass case. I want to see the sunlight on its wings as 
it flits from flower to flower” (266). Like Emily Dickinson’s cautionary “Split the Lark - and 
you’ll find the Music - [..] Now, do you doubt that your Bird was True?,” Riis, in true pragmatic 
                                                             
268 For his first awkward and perilous foray into the burgeoning world of flash photography, see Riis’s 
autobiography The Making of an American (264-71).  
269 Just as the homiletic novel’s purpose was to provide immersive virtual experiences that would vitalize 
the action of readers, Riis’s photorealism was intended to - and was successful in - producing real change 
in urban conditions. According to Riis, Theodore Roosevelt - at the time a member of the New York 
Board of Commissioners - upon reading How the Other Half Lives, left a card at Riis’s office reading, “I 
have read your book, and I have come to help” (Theodore 131). Soon after, tenements were torn down 
and replaced with more habitable structures and police lodging houses were outlawed as a direct result of 
Riis’s exposés. In the literary field, one member of Riis’s 1892 Ocean Grove lantern slide lecture was 
Stephen Crane, who then, as Sara Blair has argued, incorporated the theme of arrest into his fiction, most 





fashion, measured the “truth” of a thing by its approximation to lived experience. What would 
give in James’s phrase a “satisfactory relation” (Pragmatism 28), what is true and what works is 
not a sterilized index of a concept’s interior logic, but the ways in which it is woven into human 
interests. It sounds like less of a coincidence, then, when James used the same chemical formula 
to discuss the way we understand water:  
 
[w]hen a chemist tells us that two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen combine 
themselves of their own accord into the new compound substance ‘water,’ he 
knows...that this is only an elliptical statement for a more complex fact. That fact 
is that when H2 and O...get into closer quarters...they affect surrounding bodies 
differently: they now wet our skin, dissolve sugar, put out fire, etc., which they 
didn’t in their former positions. (PU 187) 
 
This is one of those passages that gets pragmatism thrown in with nominalism (“only an 
elliptical statement for a more complex fact”), though what’s more interesting and more 
historically relevant is that a shift in chemical identity is tantamount to a shift in molecular 
behavior brought on by its relation to other things. An instantiation of the theory that what a 
thing is is what a thing does. Jonathan Edwards’s atom - whose identity is inseparable from its 
solidity - returns to us nearly two centuries later. If anything, Riis’s casual analogy of an 
inanimate practice (the chemistry involved in photography) with a living thing (“my butterfly”) 
illustrates, as does Holmes’s “life of the law,” the pragmatist’s subordination of conceptual 
distinctions to raw, concrete experience, what James has called in many places the irreducible 
principle of the “continuity of experience.”270  
 Like the Social Gospel theologians and reformists who leavened their philosophies of 
social change with pragmatic logics, Riis understood the relationship between ethical action and 
                                                             
270 See, for example, James’s emphasis in Pragmatism that “the pragmatic method, in its dealings with 
certain concepts, instead of ending with admiring contemplation, plunges forward into the river of 
experience” (57). James would later elaborate the philosophical role of experience in his chapter on “The 
Continuity of Experience” in A Pluralistic Universe: “[e]very examiner of the sensible life in concreto 
must see that relations of every sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, 
are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are, and that conjunctive relations are just as 
true members of the flux as disjunctive relations are” (280). This, he goes on to say, is the epistemological 





“truth” along the same lines. Echoing the spiritually-inflected language of Rauschenbusch’s 
maxim that “work reveals,” Riis writes, “what are we that we should think ourselves always 
right, or, lest we do wrong, sit idle all our lives waiting for light? The light comes as we work 
toward it” (Making 325). Playing on “light” as “truth” - a play he would repeat throughout his 
career - and refusing to wait for light in very much the same way Finney refused to wait God’s 
time, Riis makes the definition of reality inextricable from the process that brings it about. Riis’s 
language of revelation as a process of human striving toward truth makes human action a crucial 
component in the construction of what we call truth and reality.  
 While conducting his magic lantern tours throughout American cities, Riis was well 
aware of the ideological differences of his various audiences, and he shaped his photographic 
content accordingly. As Gregory Jackson has shown, some of Riis’s photographs - especially 
those shown to religious audiences - promoted a spiritual second sight that could “[oscillate] 
between the material and spiritual, the immanent and transcendent” (244). This oscillation, I 
would add, did not allow viewers’ attention to rest on such binaries, conceptual distinctions 
actively discounted in pragmatism’s conception of truth and reality. Rather, Riis’s 
photojournalism encouraged a pragmatic attitude of redirecting viewers’ attention to the world of 
experience. Individual and social salvation would be proportionate to the degree to which Riis’s 







Figure 1: Ice-coated House (burned) in Crosby Street, 1896 
 
One of Riis’s most well-known photos, “Ice-coated House (burned) in Crosby Street, 
1896,” captures the remains of a lower Manhattan building.271 The title “Ice-coated House” and 
the fact the building had been burned through calls upon the dual imagery of a recognizably 
                                                             
271 My selection of images and their titles come from Bonnie Yochelson’s catalogue of Riis’s 
photography, Jacob A. Riis: Revealing New York’s Other Half. Yochelson notes that the building may 
have been the Metropolitan Hotel, which closed the same year it was destroyed (Revealing 292). 
However, Riis’s choice to call it a “House” summons imagery of the nineteenth century home as a 
microcosm of the nation, impelling viewers to reflect on the susceptibility of Victorian domesticity to 





Dante-esque hellscape. To the left of the frame stands an indiscriminate crowd while a spectral 
shape to the right - blurred by Riis’s deliberate manipulation of exposure times - stands aloof 
from the group.272 Human actors occupy ambiguous positions while the exterior buildings 
remain, in more ways than one, frozen in time. Almost blending together as one, the crowd to the 
left would be a familiar sight in cities prone to labor strikes and food lines, but they also signify 
the masses outside of Christ’s fold, marginalized spatially as they are spiritually - those whose 
desperate indigence gives the lie to Horatio Alger’s mythology of self-reliant perseverance. The 
ghostly remains of the building mirror the spiritual remnant of the crowd, both icons of the decay 
of an urban environment transformed into a literal hell on earth. Hell, like heaven, is no longer 
understood to be a zone beyond human experience, but whose reality can be apprehended 
directly in the here and now. As Kate Marcy, the convalescing inebriate and former prostitute of 
The Inside of the Cup, asks, “‘Hell’s here - isn’t it?’” (259).  
 The image’s one-point perspective does more than shepherd our gaze to the burned-out 
building. The clarity of the foreground buildings, untouched by contiguous destruction, indicates 
a level of attentive upkeep (even the enforcement of New York City’s progressive housing codes 
of the time) that clearly wasn’t shown toward the centerpiece of the photo, a kind of leering 
ghost of things to come for surrounding structures. As the image draws us spatially from the 
soundness of urban architecture to the specter of its potential destruction, it also draws us 
temporally, from the comfort and security of present health to the eventual certainty of corporeal 
dissolution. Put another way, Riis’s “Ice-coated House,” in effect, functions as a visual memento 
mori.   
Imagining the spatial and temporal immediacy of integrity and ruin, the image invites 
viewers to consider the precarious hair’s breadth illusorily separating action from consequence. 
                                                             
272 In calling attention to the deliberateness of some of Riis’s photography, I’m challenging the view of 
Riis as both a hopeless amateur and his photography as demonstrating a natural and spontaneous 
engagement with the “real,” approaching it with what Peter Burke has called an “innocent eye” (19). One 
of his biographers, Alexander Alland, Sr, for example, has likened Riis’s photos to “children’s drawings - 
spontaneous, uninhibited, honest. Like things in nature, the people who are his subjects fall into place by 
themselves and create a visual harmony that at once makes us aware of their reality and of the truth they 
project” (13). This rosy overstatement somehow misses the fact that Riis, more often than not, requested 
his subjects to occupy certain poses, rearranged furniture in some indoor shots, and, in several of his 





Dissolving any real distinction between the material and spiritual, concrete action and 
consequence, Riis’s image enacts a pragmatic conception of reality that links perception of that 
reality to action. “[A] drawing would not have been evidence of the kind I wanted” (Making 
267), he writes, because “if you can only make the others see, will they do” (293). It is seeing, 
not speculation or rational argumentation or realist description, that produces the conditions for 
doing. As in the imitatio Christi framework, the key to doing is to embody the sensible 
personhood of Christ. Acquainting his audiences with a direct experience of the real, Riis closes 
any temporizing gap that may obtain between action and its consequences. Even the titles of 
many of his photographs reinforce the sense that there is no actual barrier between seeing and 
doing. They often included references to their specific locations (“in Crosby Street,” “in Jersey 
Street”), suggesting the possibility that seeing for yourself is always available. 
 Riis repeated similar strategies in other photos intended for religious, largely Christian 
audiences. Another image, “Italian Mother and Her Baby in Jersey Street,” depicts an Italian 
mother holding a swaddled infant in her lap. As in the image of the burned out house, quotidian 
aspects of life - the stuff of secular literary realism - are given a spiritual trimming. Deliberately 
staged by Riis as a scene of urban poverty, the Italian mother sits gazing heavenward in the 
posture of a Renaissance Madonna. The “ladder” to the left - in all likelihood used as a drying 
rack or bedframe - coupled with the photo’s low angle give the illusion of a basement, evocative 
of the social cellar hidden - buried, in the scene’s oscillation between the womb of the mother 
and the tomb she occupies - beneath the street surface latticed with tenements, dives, and lodging 
houses. To the right, a door ajar connects this subterranean cube with an even deeper 
underworld, suggesting a labyrinthine network of squalor honeycombed beneath the audience’s 







Figure 2: Italian Mother and Her Baby in Jersey Street, 1888-1889 
 
Suspended above the mother’s head is a straw boater hat, emblematic of the heavenly 
aureole adorning the heads of sacred figures, especially Mary, in Christian iconography. The 
deliberate absence of any paternal figure only lends to the image’s representation of virgin 
maternity, here ensconced, literally and metaphorically, at the bottom of the social ladder. By 
drawing an unmistakable association between Marian devotion and urban poverty, the image 
encouraged reform-minded audiences to heed Christ’s admonition in Matthew 25:40 that 
“[i]nasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto 
me,” the Social Gospel’s central statement on vicarious responsibility. Imagining the urban poor 
as theoxenic personations of Christ, the photo imagines no real distinction between spiritual and 
material registers in its pragmatic attempt to transcend such rationalistic binaries that James 
thought so toxic to American philosophy.  
 The “Italian Mother,” like the “Ice-coated House,” visualizes the Pauline scripture that 
“invisible things...are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” We could also 
say that the realization by Riis’s photojournalism of the invisible other half is the necessary 
condition for their being understood – taken account of – in the experiences of viewers. By 





”[r]eturning...into experience” (52) of potentially abstract concepts - human suffering and human 
dignity, for example - argued by James to be central to pragmatism.   
 
 
Figure 3: Baby in a Slum Tenement, 1888-1895 
 
First published in 1895, “Baby in a Slum Tenement” depicts an unsupervised toddler 
“standing with its back against the public sink in a pool of filth that overflowed on the floor” 
(Peril 135). As in “Italian Mother,” Riis repeats the overhead suspension of deceptively trivial 
objects - except in this case, not a halo but a broken faucet hangs impendingly as an icon of the 
squalor ironically providing both the amenities of “home” as well as the potential agents of the 
toddler’s demise.273 The deployment of irony – an expression of two simultaneous yet distinct 
                                                             
273 Legitimate fears of diseases like cholera and dysentery justified the association of urban water supplies 
with contamination. Though advancements had been made in New York City’s water supply (notably 
since the cholera outbreaks of 1832 and 1866), Riis’s own investigation revealed lingering traces of 






meanings at once – functions here visually as the binaries of light and dark, innocence and 
depravity, material and spiritual are fused into a single experienced and experienceable reality. 
As Riis had done in “Ice-coated House,” the manipulation of exposure times ruptures the 
scene and its central figure into their material and spiritual registers, a ghosting effect nearly lost 
in the image’s halftone reproduction to the right. A spectral reminder of the precarious health and 
the staggering mortality rates of tenement youth, the child loiters innocently within the liminal 
space between light and dark, engaged in the infantile attitude of thumb-sucking - a paltry 
therapeutic compensation for the absence of clean water and mother’s milk.274 The tonal 
blending of the toddler’s body with those of its surroundings visually reinforces the reformist 
argument that environment, not individual volition or racial background, primarily shapes 
character. Barely visible but for a hand and blurred face, the man and resident spirit swallowed in 
darkness only drives home the point that the conditions of youth may ossify into the vices of 
adulthood. Seen metaphorically, the photo follows to its logical conclusion the result of what 
Riis called “the deadly inertia in civic life” (Making 251), pragmatically conceiving of the value 
of moral and economic individualism and its effects in human experience.275 
Playing with the ambiguity of the possessive pronoun “Its,” Riis’s image multiplies the 
image’s hermeneutic layers. Reducing the toddler to the neutered impersonal, the possessive 
“its” connotes not ownership, but the toddler’s – its – utter incapacity for such. “It” is also the 
playground of the tenement hallway: “It is only playground,” an irony exploited in the 1895 
                                                             
274 For Riis’s own perception of just how shocking these rates were in places like New York’s Mott Street 
Barracks and other lower Manhattan tenement housing areas, see The Battle with the Slums: “the infant 
death-rate of the Barracks that year [1888] was 325 per 1000. There were forty babies, and one in three of 
them had to die” (123). Babies, apparently, were also important factors in tenement housing lighting 
codes. As Riis reports, “an order was issued defining darkness to the sanitary police: if the sink in the hall 
could be made out, and the slops overflowing on the floor, and if a baby could be seen on the stairs, the 
hall was light; if, on the other hand, the baby’s shrieks were the first warning that it was being trampled 
upon, the hall was dark” (Battle 91). It was evidently a common enough problem that housing code 
committees made stumbling over infants a yardstick of acceptable living conditions.  
275 My claim here is not that Riis’s photo demonstrates an undiluted pragmatism, but that demonstrating 
the logical conclusions of certain interests deployed experientially is something a pragmatist would do in 






halftone reproduction.276 The publication history of the photo summons the association of the 
playground and the kindergarten as spaces of citizen-building, the pedagogical training grounds 
in which lifelong characters are forged. What is distinctively pragmatic about Riis’s photography 
of infant neglect and tenement depravity is the representation of the consequences of that familial 
and social neglect in the apparition of the adult marginal to the central focus of the image. Like 
the dispossessed crowd and gutted ruins of “Ice-coated House,” the figure in “Baby in a Slum 
Tenement” prefigures the future consequences of socioeconomic neglect. In both, as well, a 
difference in space is a difference in time.   
One of the drawbacks of this spiritualized realism, however, is its liability to be missed 
entirely. Despite the (mostly) faithful rendition of “Italian Mother” by magazine illustrator and 
painter Kenyon Cox in the adjoining image, the straw boater/halo is the one detail he leaves out, 
indicating the degree to which the spiritual register of these images can be - and were - 
overlooked. For reasons known only to Cox, his image drops the Marian iconography 
deliberately orchestrated by Riis for Christian audiences. What to Cox and secular readers might 
have seemed straightforward depictions of urban squalor and decay were, in fact, highly nuanced 
representations incorporating homiletic and pragmatic logics.277 That Cox had done a drawing of 
the photo adds another layer of remove from the photographic medium’s emphasis on the power 
of realism to engage viewers in a direct experience of as-yet unknown spaces. As we saw in the 
halftone reproduction of “Baby in a Slum Tenement,” spiritual layerings are easily lost in 
translation. 
                                                             
276 As Yochelson notes about this image, Riis “never described it,” yet two other publications exploited 
the irony of describing this scene as a “playground.” Respectively, the Evening Sun and Review of 
Reviews titled the image “The Baby’s Playground” and “A Child’s Playground, Into Which the Sunlight 
Had Never Penetrated” (251). 
277 This is not to say that all of Riis’s photos were deliberately staged or that they made ample use of 
Christian iconography. The fact is that many of his audiences were religious, and the spiritual imagery in 
his photos would not have been lost on them. It is known that Riis often presented his magic lantern 
lectures in religious settings like Finney’s old church, New York City’s Broadway Tabernacle, and 
Charles H. Parkhurst’s Plymouth Church, providing New Yorkers with virtual experiences of poverty and 







Another reason why Riis’s deliberate spiritual inflections can be missed is the assumption 
that the intent behind photography is to provide viewers with an objective transcription of reality 
“out there.” As June Howard put it over thirty years ago - and as many would agree today - “[t]o 
claim that image or word simply records true facts, simply represents reality...uses the 
appearance of truth to guarantee an illusion” (15). If it is assumed that Riis’s sole purpose was to 
merely “show” audiences scenes of poverty, the homiletic overtones in these images become 
little more than ornamentation, if they are even considered at all. Michael Davitt Bell’s argument 
that we should understand postbellum realist ideas, not in their attempts at some ideal mimesis of 
an objective world, but in “the function of these ideas” (4) is a much more useful orientation that 
enables us to view Riis’s Christic-pragmatist photojournalism in the spirit in which it was 
intended.278 Rather than using truth to guarantee an illusion, or using realistic particularities to 
divert attention to some transcendent world to come, Riis’s photojournalism is grounded in a 
pragmatic realism aimed at converting individuals to action.  
 For these and similar reasons that we saw with Finney and Swedenborg, it would change 
our understanding of American pragmatism to see figures like Riis as participants in the history 
of its development as a set of attitudes toward the world and its problems. Even the fate - or what 
Sara Blair might call the “afterlives” - of Riis’s photographs tells us that he thought of them as a 
pragmatist might. Recovered from the attic of his Richmond Hill home years after his death, a 
box of negatives and lantern slides shed light on the photographs that Riis always intended to use 
as a lantern - an object “letting in the light,” as he put it.279 How they ended up there can be 
gleaned by Riis’s own admission, that “I had a use for [photography], and beyond that I never 
went” (Making 265). Notwithstanding their aesthetic and historical value for us, the photographs 
ceased to have a “cash value” for Riis in the same way Charles Finney’s anxious bench had a 
purely practical utility to effect conversions. Their historical conditions exhausted, the problems 
they were intended to address (mostly) solved, the photographs as material objects had reached 
                                                             
278 Indeed, the function of religious or spiritual ideas, as opposed to their ontological or transcendent 
meaning, became of interest to philosophers and sociologists of religion in the twentieth century. The 
sociologist Robert Bellah, to take one prominent example, wrote that “[i]t is not now so much the 
substance of that which it is claimed is transcendent as the function of the claim itself that is of interest” 
(196).    
279 For the laborious - and somewhat humorous - narrative about the rediscovery of Riis’s photographs, 





their pragmatic expiration date. What mattered most to Riis about the photographs was how they 






In 1925, long after the heyday of Social Gospel reform, the American missiologist Daniel J. 
Fleming spoke warmly of the pragmatic spirit being brought to bear on Christianity: 
 
the most effective popular apologetic on the mission field has passed from origins 
to consequences, from roots to fruits. [...] More and more the people of the world 
are applying Christ’s test to Christianity - ‘By their fruits ye shall know them.’ It 
is to this test of life that Christianity is increasingly being brought. In so far as we 
regard the function of Christianity to be the transformation of life upon the earth 
into a kingdom of righteousness and not merely a means for saving a small 
remnant of humanity into a state of future bliss people will view Christianity 
objectively and subject it to a pragmatic test. (Whither Bound 67). 
 
It’s significant that Fleming throughout tends to see no distinction among “Christ’s test,” “this 
test of life,” and a “pragmatic test.” Like Peirce before him, Fleming suggests that Christ’s 
dictum, “[b]y their fruits ye shall know them,” as well as his emphasis on “the function of 
Christianity,” anticipated the central tenet of pragmatism well before the method had a name. 
Binding the only significant knowledge of a concept to its actionable consequences in 
experience, the pragmatists and Social Gospelers drew from the same set of logics and attitudes 
that both movements considered the most effective tools for building better individuals and a 
better world. Seen from the perspective of the Social Gospel, pragmatism becomes part of a 
much broader shift in cultural attitudes emergent throughout the nineteenth century in disciplines 
and institutions deemed either secular or religious, and not exclusively from the origin points of 





pragmatism as developing from largely - if not exclusively - secular sources (even, admittedly, 
against James’s own account) cannot be maintained with the same assurance as it has in the past, 
that American Protestant evangelical culture has had a significant role in its history. 
 This has been the story of how William James developed pragmatism within a matrix of 
scientific and religious debates whose history stretches back to Edwards. The liberalization of 
Protestant evangelicalism, the apotheosis of direct experience over inherited doctrine, and the 
humanism inherent in pragmatism - among other cultural factors beyond the scope of this 
dissertation - helped fuel a conservative backlash that led to efforts to abolish liberal ideologies 
and install more fundamentalist approaches to religious practice and social policy. In a complete 
rejection of the postmillennialism that fueled the Social Gospel and liberal evangelicalism more 
broadly, the theologian and major architect of American Fundamentalism Cyrus I. Scofield wrote 
in 1910 that “the true mission of the church is not the reformation of society” (26). Indeed, for 
some the proper response to the pluralism of modernity was, as Jonathan J. Edwards observes, to 
establish a “‘true church,’ defined...by common commitment to a set of definable norms for 
belief, practice, and communication.” In this sense, Fundamentalism “is a particular response 
within modernity to a problem of modernity - the need to maintain associational commitments in 
the context of pluralism” (xi-xii).280 
While the Social Gospel incorporated pragmatic logics, those logics were not confined to 
collective social relief, nor to what was the unifying mission of the movement: the establishment 
of a terrestrial kingdom of heaven. One of the legacies of postbellum Christian pragmatism is the 
concomitance between individual commercial success and one’s salvific status. Represented in 
such works as advertising executive and congressman Bruce Barton’s The Man Nobody Knows 
(1925), this muscular Christian pragmatism advocated individual (virtually masculine) vigor and 
business acumen as qualities becoming not only of a good capitalist, but a good Christian. Barton 
tells his readers to “[p]ragmatically study the man, Jesus Christ and his methods from the 
                                                             
280 As the name implies, Fundamentalism aimed at returning to the fundamentals of the Christian faith. It 
was a direct response to what it saw as the “flattening” of the spiritual life spurred by a variety of “liberal” 
developments like Darwinism, modernism, pluralism, and the decline of prayer. See Rick Ostrander, “The 
Practice of Prayer in a Modern Age: Liberals, Fundamentalists, and Prayer in the Early Twentieth 






perspective of your life. Thoughtfully apply His methods to your real life situations and 
circumstances” (vi). The representation of Christ as a self-made and tireless business dynamo 
espoused in muscular Christianity is reminiscent less of Churchill or Sheldon’s pragmatic 
minister than Franklin’s practical man of business, indicative of pragmatism’s connotative shift 
from James’s sophisticated method of justifying beliefs to an association with unscrupulous 
materialism and ego-driven profiteering. In some ways, then, the capitalist Mr. Sterling of The 
Inside of the Cup died for nothing. In direct reaction against what it felt to be excessive attention 
to social work and an insipid feminization of Christ, muscular Christianity was but one 
manifestation of the conservative backlash against the liberal Protestantism of the Social Gospel, 
a backlash that, with variation, to be sure, continues today.281  
Despite the pervasive impact of mass religious movements in the period, late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century transatlantic academic thought leaned toward a secular 
historiography that tended to be as dismissive of religious belief as it was triumphal about a 
coming golden age of secular progress. Evolutionist models like J.G. Frazer’s monumental The 
Golden Bough (1890-1915) - whose authority Bronislaw Malinowski unquestionably accepted - 
justified a historical narrative in which religious belief is but one (primitive) phase on the path to 
a secular scientific enlightenment (62-3).282 Available in English translations beginning in 1930, 
Max Weber’s seminal 1905 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism reiterated the 
narrative of religious belief’s subsumption within a capitalist and decidedly secular economy, a 
subsumption we also see repeated in Ian Watt’s literary theory by Robinson Crusoe’s 
“unconvincing...tributes to the transcendent” (81). And much of what Freud had to say about 
religion as an atavistic depository of illusions and infantile fantasies of an all-powerful patriarchy 
                                                             
281 It almost goes without saying that modern Pentecostalism and Fundamentalism have their roots in the 
religious contestations of which the Social Gospel played no small part. Theologians of the early 
twentieth century, like Reinhold Niebuhr (despite his later liberal leanings) and John Gresham Machen 
were influential in the rise of a neo-orthodoxy that challenged what they felt was a liberal Modernism 
incompatible with true Christian belief. As Machen put it, “the liberal attempt at reconciling Christianity 
with modern science has really relinquished everything distinctive of Christianity” (7).  
282 Bronislaw’s anthropology rests heavily on Frazer’s Golden Bough, especially its theory of “primitive 





relegated religious expression and belief to a less-than-subordinate roles in history. Ideally, it 
seemed, they wouldn’t even exist when everything else finally made it to Canaan.283    
 Despite mid-twentieth century interventions like that of Herbert W. Richardson’s Toward 
an American Theology, contemporary academics have tended to repeat such assumptions about 
secularization.284 Historians like Susan Curtis and Martin Marty have argued that the effect on 
religion caused by the Social Gospel’s proximity to mass culture led to a secular cooptation of 
many of its religious ideals, a simple case of historical irony that misses the ways in which 
religiosity in America persisted after the Social Gospel. Despite what the academics John R. 
Commons, Richard T. Ely, and Charles Horton Cooley said about sociology, economics, and 
democracy, respectively, it has become common to view these and other institutions as 
predominantly secular, the presence of religious belief being extraneous to an understanding of 
history or culture, a cosmetic undeserving of serious scholarly study.285 More recently, Ann 
Douglas’s highly influential The Feminization of American Culture (1977), based a large part of 
its argument on a “secularization of faith” (21) that she pinpoints with the rise of antebellum 
Unitarianism, an argument that David Morgan rightly shows to be a distortion of Protestant 
                                                             
283 In the less-than-optimistic opening to The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud was explicit about what 
he called “the most important item in the psychical inventory of a civilization,” its “religious ideas,” 
which for him were tantamount to “illusions” (18), “fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent 
wishes of mankind” (47). In fairness to Freud, he does eventually clarify that “[a]n illusion is not the same 
thing as an error” and that [w]hat is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes” 
(48). (Illusion means the same in German and English.) But even with the caveat, the use of “illusion” to 
refer to religious ideas risks repeating the secularist stigma of religion and belief as essentially delusive 
mental phenomena, especially when Freud himself claimed that “we may compare them...to delusions” 
(50) 
284 In 1967, Richardson pointed out that “the emergence of public atheism in the modern world cannot be 
explained as the mere terminus of an historical process that is tending toward an ultimate irreligion,” 
adding for good measure: “[i]t is ironic that the secular theologians, who talk constantly about the 
historical nature of man, should propose a theory of history that results from their ideological 
commitments rather than from a study of history itself” (4).  
285 See Charles Hopkins’s The Rise of the Social Gospel (167). The open religiosity of early sociologists 
and other scientists, as well as the establishment of sociology departments in theological schools, makes 
even more inexplicable certain claims about secularization like Gerhard Lenski’s that “from its inception 
[sociology] was committed to the positivist view that religion in the modern world is merely a survival 
from man’s primitive past, and doomed to disappear in an era of science and general enlightenment” 
(Hadden 587). A much more historically accurate depiction comes from American sociologist Robert 
Bellah: “[e]very theology implies a sociology (and a psychology, and so on) and every sociology implies 





visual culture during the same period.286 Rather than a “secularization,” Morgan argues, “the 
media of the new mass culture became part of the practice of belief” (39). Morgan’s view, which 
I’m inclined to think more productive, attempts to do away with an excessive reliance on a 
sacred/secular binary and the myopic historiographies derived from it.  
The foregoing list of late nineteenth and twentieth century examples of what has come to 
be known as the secularization thesis are what Charles Taylor has referred to as “subtraction 
stories” (Secular 22) - myths that assume a process of and attempt to explain secularity as the 
gradual removal of religious elements from a broader culture. We saw with Kenyon Cox’s 
subtraction of the straw boater hat/halo how this can occur almost imperceptibly. But “stories,” 
indeed. For even as I write these words, we are witness almost daily to reminders that the often 
kneejerk association of secularization with progress has severe limitations, routinely and 
uncritically viewing any expression of belief as tantamount to cultural regression. We are also 
audience to the overtly religious motivations of those who actively try to reshape the world in 
their own ideological image.  
In the epilogue, I address these ideas in more detail. Questions of secularity, progress, 
belief, and what the role of these ideas play in American life and especially in American 
















                                                             









Those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do so at great peril. 
Peter Berger, Desecularization of the World (18)  
 
The Modern Conflation of the Sacred and “America” 
 
When Bill Clinton, alongside the director of the Human Genome Project Francis Collins, 
announced to America in 2000 the completion of the first complete map of the human genome, 
Clinton likened it to “the map that Meriwether Lewis had unfolded in front of President Thomas 
Jefferson in that very room nearly two hundred years earlier.” After citing the president whose 
name has become virtually synonymous with the “wall of separation between church and State” 
(510), Clinton went on to tell the nation “[t]oday...we are learning the language in which God 
created life. We are gaining ever more awe for the complexity, the beauty, and the wonder of 
God’s most divine and sacred gift” (Collins 2). If the overtly religious character of the 
announcement stoked controversy, it was overshadowed by what many saw as confirmation of 
scientific progress – a confirmation that, for some, disconfirmed the very discourse in which 
Clinton couched his celebratory address.   
But why should this matter? For one, it reminds us of the implicit identification of 
Christian belief with America itself, the almost imperceptible prestidigitation in sliding between 
the sacred and the secular. Or, rather, not a slide, because it’s not clear if there’s any real 
distinction between, for example, the secular politics involved in representing America and any 
religious justification of doing so. What William R. Hutchinson called “a non-established 
establishment” (82), this juxtaposition, in America at least, of a putatively secular and even-





not just coextensive but identical to “American values” should make us reconsider the historical 
assertions to America’s vaunted secularity.  
This secular-sacred conflation is in no sense unique to our own twenty-first century 
moment. The nineteenth century sisters Harriet Beecher Stowe and Catharine Beecher believed 
that “[t]he law of Christianity and of democracy...teaches that all men are born equal in rights, 
and that their interests and feelings should be regarded as of equal value” (200). There is perhaps 
no reason to suppose that, in writing Christianity next to democracy, the Beecher sisters were 
thinking of different things. The conflation is even more complete in the twentieth century 
evangelical firebrand Billy Sunday: “Christianity and Patriotism are synonymous terms” 
(McLoughlin, Modern 444). Charlie Chaplin’s closing salvo against fascism in the 1940 satire 
The Great Dictator was jarring to audiences because of its abrupt break of character and tone, 
not because it viewed New Testament Christianity as one with democracy and technological 
progress.287  
 Regardless of the degree of coherence, habitual associations have a way of effortlessly 
summoning one another. Calling democratic freedom a uniquely “Christian” value – as the 
                                                             
287 Throughout the film, Chaplin plays twin roles: Adenoid Hynkel, a satirical mock-up of Adolf Hitler, 
and a Jewish barber, who, of course, looks exactly like the dictator. In a case of mistaken identity, 
Hynkel/Hitler is captured by his own troops while the barber, assumed to be the fascist dictator, finds 
himself giving a rousing speech to the newly occupied people of Osterlich. Fiercely criticizing fascism, 
the barber explains to the crowd that “[i]n the seventeenth chapter of St. Luke it is written: ‘the Kingdom 
of God is within man.’ Not one man nor a group of men, but in all men! In you! You the people have the 
power. [...] Then, in the name of democracy, let us use that power. Let us all unite!”  
 Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini read Weber’s Protestant “worldly asceticism” as a historical 
case in which the religious/secular binary was conflated: “[a]s Weber observes, secularism’s freedom 
from religion was also freedom for the market. This market freedom was...tied to...the practice of 
‘worldly asceticism.’ Because worldly asceticism in its market form was only indirectly related to the 
religious…, it could form a practice at once secular and religious” (1). This is what Catherine Albanese 
means when she describes how an “ordinary religion” becomes “more or less synonymous with culture” 
(6), a conclusion also reached by the sociologists Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, in their work 
on mainline religion prior to the 1960s: “[s]o wedded were the liberal, mainline churches to the dominant 
culture that their beliefs, values, and behavior were virtually indistinguishable from the culture” (22). Nor 
was this lost on theologians of the time, as Herbert Richardson, glossing the German theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, notes: “[i]n American secularization, religion ceases to exist as a separate phenomenon 
because it seeks to embody itself fully in the state, science, business, and other worldly institutions by 
identifying its concerns wholly with theirs” (108). What Bonhoeffer originally said was “American 
secularisation derives precisely from the imperfect distinction of the kingdoms and offices of church and 





Beecher sisters and Chaplin do – does more than reinforce the arguable notion that America is 
Christian to the core; it ignores the possibility that democratic freedom can be associated with 
any other religion, giving credence to the dubious logic that if you are not Christian, you are not 
American.288 So when Arthur Schlesinger, Jr offers his antidote to what he considers the 
fractious impulses of the “cult of ethnicity” – an “assimilation process” that would “lead 
newcomers to an acceptance of the language, the institutions, and the political ideals that hold 
the nation together” (121)289 – it doesn’t occur to him how those ideals were and still are read as 
the covert influence of Christian hegemony.290 Muslims can proclaim their allegiance to 
democratic ideals and institutions all they want. But within a culture that routinely identifies 
“secular” America with sacred Christian principles, such professed loyalties may only marginally 
quell suspicion.291  
 Habitual associations summon their appurtenances as readily as they do their antitheses. 
The assumption that “secular” contradicts “religious” in some fundamental way has become so 
automatic as to be seen as self-evident. This “intuitive” contradiction is due more, I think, to the 
prevalence of triumphalist secularization narratives and (until recently) a lack of nuanced 
                                                             
288 My thinking here has to do with the arbitrariness of the association. Had it been Catholics who settled 
on the eastern coast of America to escape religious persecution, championed democracy in political tracts 
during the American Revolution, won senate seats and presidencies because of their unimpeachable 
devotion to religious freedom and tolerance, Catholicism - not Protestantism - would have become 
synonymous with democratic ideals.  
289 “[P]ressed too far,” Schlesinger writes, “the cult of ethnicity has had bad consequences…. The new 
ethnic gospel rejects the unifying vision of individuals from all nations melted into a new race. Its 
underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups, that 
ethnicity is the defining experience for most Americans, that ethnic ties are permanent and indelible, and 
that division into ethnic communities establishes the basic structure of American society and the basic 
meaning of American history” (16). Schlesinger wrote this in the early 1990s, and while the cultural 
landscape has certainly shifted since then, this is not a vision of American life most would be unfamiliar 
with.  
290 See for example Tracy Fessenden’s examination of the secularization thesis as it operates in America 
in Culture and Redemption: “[t]he co-implication of secularism and Reformed Christianity has 
meant...that Christian religious polemic could remain compatible with America’s vaunted history of 
religious liberty and toleration by being cast in strictly secular terms. [...] [A]n implicitly Christian culture 
puts pressure on all who make claims on American institutions to constitute themselves as religious on a 
recognizably Protestant model” (4).  
291 The current rise in fears about the “Islamicization of America” and the politically visible distrust of 
Muslim congress members give unfortunate proof that these suspicions are not confined to marginal or 





critique, rather than any kind of inherent contradiction.292 While this dissertation has focused on 
disclosing the intellectual connections between a brand of historically liberal Protestantism and 
pragmatism, its conclusions are necessarily implicated in the broader phenomena in modern 
America of the tortuous ambivalence between the sacred and the secular. This rethinking should 
make us seriously question what we in literary, historical, philosophical, theological studies 
mean when we say sacred or secular, and the explanatory value we get out of using them.  
Schlesinger’s proposed solution to thwart cults of ethnicity, at bottom, exposes a problem 
having to do with experience. Throughout this dissertation, I’ve insisted that Jamesian 
pragmatism’s underlying epistemology assumes the legitimacy of individual experience in all its 
variety. Schlesinger’s argument, however – that the experiences that we claim forge our 
particular identities or identification with a group – is an implicit claim that the privileging of 
individual experience has gone too far, is actually damaging to America’s political fabric. The 
nightmare for Schlesinger and the title of his book is the “disuniting of America,” a widespread 
splintering of multicultural group identities organized around racial, ethnic, class, political, or 
some other ideological interest, and not around “the historic theory of America as one people – 
the theory that has thus far managed to keep American society whole.” After over two centuries 
of validating individual experience, twentieth century intellectuals like Schlesinger called for a 
return to transexperiential doctrine and theory as culturally restorative against the various “cults” 
of experience.   
Schlesinger’s target, the “cult of ethnicity” classifies “all Americans according to ethnic 
and racial criteria” (16), but the same might be said about a “cult of experience,” those who 
value their own unique experiences – however “strange” they may seem to us – over 
commitments that would otherwise encourage social or political comity. Your belief that God 
sanctions polygamy is all well and good, but you shouldn’t be surprised to find federal troops on 
Deseret’s doorstep.293 Of course, we need not go as far back as the Mormons. The rain during a 
                                                             
292 The older Latin meaning of saeculum referred to an age, a generation, a period of earthly time. 
Originally, it could refer to those clerics and monks who performed sacred duties among the laity outside 
of the walls of seminaries or monasteries. The understanding of “secular” as distinct from “religious” 
seems to be a thirteenth century development (“secular, n2”). Its meaning as distinguished from, 
dismissive of, or logically antithetical to religion appears to be a modern invention (“secular 2-4”).  
293 From 1857-58, the United States federal government, under James Buchanan, engaged in armed 





president’s inauguration could be the blessing bestowed by a Christian God, but it means very 
little to others who hear nothing but white nationalist rhetoric and the coming erosion of minority 
protections in the inauguration speech. What matters here is that these are fundamentally 
incompatible versions of political reality that the appeal to a multicultural respect for difference 
or experience barely ameliorates, if at all.294 
There is no shortage of examples that demonstrate our current context as one primarily of 
experiential contestation and justification. We do, in fact, find ourselves living with the problems 
of a pluralistic openness to individual experience that this dissertation has explored in the 
pragmatic-evangelical proximities in Edwards, Finney, Swedenborg, and the Social Gospel. 
Which experiences count as valid, which ones belong to our idea of what America means or 
should mean, are questions we are still wrestling with. Schlesinger’s solution may have its 
complications, but his worry about disunification isn’t misguided. When the pluralistic respect 
granted direct experience is reoriented within group identity, it gives rise to an identity politics 
that can ossify group boundaries and eliminate the possibility of conversation to all except those 
who can be shown to belong to that group.295 In a very real sense, the historical liberal pluralism 
that was intended to democratize the value of experience gave rise to a politics of exclusion.296  
 
 
                                                             
with a view to curtail polygamy, the “Utah War” was resolved when Mormon leader Brigham Young 
agreed to terms of submission. 
294 I am not being prescriptive here. I am, however, noting the problematic implications of this 
dissertation’s findings, threading a way to what I believe is a more useful understanding of “secular.”  
295 Linda Nicholson locates the splitting off of identity politics from social justice movements in the 1960s 
and 70s as well as its tendency to generate exclusionary modes of group-centered values and goals. See 
Identity Before Identity Politics (1-5).  
296 Not that more conservative voices haven’t contributed to this exclusion. Insisting that, in America, all 
are equal and that racial divides are a thing of the past (as was repeated ad nauseam following Obama’s 
2008 election) has the direct effect of invalidating experiences that clearly demonstrate the disproportions 
in American life. (Think migrants and refugees, indigenous peoples, the homeless, and Black Lives 
Matter, to name a few.) The trouble, as William Hutchinson points out, is in figuring out “how to achieve 






The Disarticulation of Belief from Religion and Rethinking the Secularization Thesis 
 
Belief is one experience Schlesinger doesn’t talk about. It’s been an abiding assumption 
throughout this dissertation that belief – just as much as race, class, gender, what have you – is 
integral to the shaping of the histories we find ourselves in. I am not suggesting belief is a 
superior explanation of how the world is or should be, nor am I implying that radically secular 
perspectives like biologist Richard Dawkins’s or neuroscientist Sam Harris’s hope for an “end of 
faith” are positions totally unworthy of consideration.297 I’m saying the ground is a little more 
complex than the sacred/secular binary would make it out to be. I’m also saying that faith isn’t 
invalidated just because you’ve launched ironclad logic at it. What the strategy of intellectual 
attack towards religious belief has invariably shown is that faith under siege tends to become 
more convinced of its moral and intellectual exclusivity, if not superiority (and not less because 
some religions interpret “persecution” as evidence of their “chosen” status). The difference of 
understanding, surprising for the frequency with which it isn’t addressed, is the difference in 
what counts as evidence.  
 Take for example militant atheism, popularized by Dawkins, Harris, and the late 
journalist Christopher Hitchins. Dawkins is infamous for being unrestrained in his view about 
faith: “[f]aith, being belief that isn’t based on evidence, is the principal vice of any religion” 
(26). Harris, too, is turned off by faith for the same reason, due to what he calls “the 
extravagance of its claims and...the paucity of its evidence” (25). But what Dawkins and Harris 
don’t seem to consider, because they’ve already rejected it outright, is that the faithful often do 
understand certain experiences to be valid evidence. It seems that Dawkins, Harris, and those 
who share their views have fallen victim to what the theologian Paul Tillich called the 
“intellectualistic distortion of the meaning of faith,” and its “most ordinary misinterpretation” 
that faith is “an act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence” (30-31). The problem seems 
                                                             
297 Dawkins and Harris occupy the same kind of extreme position regarding the supremacy of reason over 
faith. Harris’s position has distinct secular Enlightenment echoes, if only because it sounds like he takes 
reason, properly used, to be incapable of error: “[r]eligious faith represents so uncompromising a misuse 
of the power of our minds that it forms a kind of perverse, cultural singularity - a vanishing point beyond 





to be that the interlocutors don’t agree as to what counts as evidence. In terms of ongoing 
intellectual conflicts, we aren’t far epistemologically from Edwards or Finney.  
But there’s one interesting conjunction Dawkins’s brand of atheism makes, because not 
only does it refute the claims of faith as valid evidence, but it seems to understand religion and 
faith to be in some way coimplicated - “faith” is a kind of “belief” that is “of” religion. How this 
semantic disarticulation of faith (or belief) from religion occurred is well beyond the scope of 
this epilogue, but the distinction matters for the way we understand the separability of faith, 
belief, and religion. One can reasonably claim to have (a) faith without subscribing to any 
particular religion. This separability, though, isn’t simply a passable quirk about certain folks’ 
faithful lives, but utterances of self-understanding and expression that get distorted or ignored 
when we lose sight of exactly what we mean when we refer to things like belief. As academics 
have tended to emphasize the roles of race, gender, and class in how we read history and practice 
cultural studies, my guess is that, by including belief, we may be able to break that trinity.    
Except, it might not be that easy, as Walter Benn Michaels tells us. “Like ideological 
affiliation but more radically, religious identity is very different from racial or cultural identity” 
(Trouble 174). What Michaels means is that belief cannot function on a liberal “cultural model” 
(173) of mutual respect that views all beliefs as equally valid, simply for the fact that certain 
beliefs make claims about the destinies of human life that are inherently unequal (and, in extreme 
cases, destructive to certain groups’ well-being). An ecumenical evangelical Christianity, for 
example, may do worlds of social and political good, but it finds itself at a loss if seriously 
questioned as to what happens to Jews or Muslims or anyone else who don’t accept Christ as 
their savior.298 
                                                             
298 Richard Rorty is more comfortable than I am in pointing out a logical possibility to this line of 
thinking. “We...drop the ideas of the Nature of Humanity and of the Moral Law, considered as objects 
that inquiry is trying to represent accurately or as objects that make true moral judgments true. So we 
have to give up the comforting belief that competing groups will always be able to reason together on the 
basis of plausible and neutral premises” (Truth and Progress 206). This is then a problem of sincerity, 
neutrality, objectivity, and conducting ourselves with the assumption that our interlocutors aren’t arguing 






This false equivalence between religion and belief was one of the key errors driving 
secularization theory.299 By associating religion with everything primitive, atavistic, delusory, 
and cynical, secularization narratives and their insistence on scientific empiricism could not view 
belief on its own epistemological terms. For many historians, anthropologists, and social 
scientists, however, the secularization thesis would seem to have been utterly disproven. “No one 
any longer holds the secularization thesis to be universally true” (10), declares Robert Orsi. In 
The Desecularization of the World, Peter L. Berger – once a believer that religion would be 
confined to highly local sects – adds that the “assumption that we live in a secularized world is 
false. The world today...is as furiously religious as it ever was” (2).300 Or Rodney Stark’s wry 
suggestion that “[a]fter nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophecies and misrepresentations 
of both present and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of 
failed theories, and there to whisper, ‘requiescat in pace’” (270).301  
Having ostensibly laid the secularization thesis to rest, some academics have proposed 
alternative ways of accounting for belief in a modern world seemingly at odds with its claims. 
One study that takes a global approach to the issue of secularization is Pippa Norris and Ronald 
                                                             
299 Bertrand Russell’s lecture to the National Secular Society in March 1927 stands as one of the more 
prominent examples of virtuosic condescension toward religion in the twentieth century. Russell explains 
why he isn’t a Christian - nor, he implies, why anybody should be - on purely intellectual and moral 
grounds. He cites the shortcomings of promised justice in Christianity (not a difficult thing to do in the 
first half of the twentieth century) (13-14), parodies the impracticality of Christ’s teachings (mentioning 
that a Christian like the current Prime Minister might not turn the other cheek if smote upon the other) 
(14-15), points out how history has disconfirmed the literal apocalypse prophesied by Jesus (16-17), and 
others. Strategies of intellectual and logical assault are Russell’s weapons of choice because he’s going 
after religion, not belief. Indeed, it’s unclear if he even makes a distinction between them. He never 
entertains the view that Christianity - or religion in general - might make better lives for individuals.  
300 See also Mark Lilla’s opening to The Stillborn God: “[t]here are legends about the course of history, 
full of grand terms to describe the process supposedly at work - modernization, secularization, 
democratization, the ‘disenchantment of the world,’ ‘history as the story of liberty,’ and countless others. 
These are the fairy tales of our time” (6).  
301 Theirs isn’t the consensus, however, as some scholars - especially in the sociology of religion - 
continue to defend the thesis, though on qualified terms. Steve Bruce has argued that a multiplicity of 
factors - such as structural and social differentiation, and social and cultural diversity - contributed to 
what he calls a “secularization paradigm” (Segal 414-20). But his propensity for causal arguments 
(“[d]iversity created the secular state” (420)), I think, is readily challenged by findings in modern 






Inglehart’s Sacred and Secular (2004). Self-consciously written in the wake of and as a direct 
response to 9/11, their study would have merited its ambitious goals of “updating” (4) the 
secularization thesis had its hypotheses not recapitulated the dubious explanations of 
secularization as “caused” by modernity. Norris and Inglehart’s conclusion is that secularization 
is rampant in modern countries because of what they call the two “axioms” of “existential 
security” (the sense that modern advances have minimized risks to physical and psychical life) 
and “cultural traditions” (the rewording of religious values in secular terms). “The main reason” 
they believe secularization is more prevalent in more secure nations “is that the need for 
religious reassurance becomes less pressing under conditions of greater security” (18). Belief is 
predominantly an effect of cultural insecurity.  
The “paradox,” as they call it, of the pervasiveness of belief in the modern world can be 
explained by the disproportion between secure countries and less-secure countries. There is more 
belief simply because there are more poorer countries than rich ones. That their study was 
published in 2004 is curious, since several of their hypotheses rest on generalized assumptions 
about the relationship between belief and economic/social/political stability. Religion is a 
response to economic stress, and secularization is what happens when “religious reassurance” is 
no longer needed. The effect of a study like Norris and Inglehart’s is that belief is reduced to a 
mere compensation for the failings of the state, implying that the fundamental condition of 
human life is secular and whose politics are religiously neutral. It doesn’t seem to occur to either 
Norris or Inglehart that people who are very well off in life can be extremely and sincerely 
religious.  
I highlight Norris and Inglehart specifically to point out that assumptions about religion, 
belief, and secularization have a way of creeping into even recent attempts to account for them. 
Part of the reason I’m arguing for belief as a historical force on par with race, class, and gender 
is because belief is not merely a mental phenomenon subject to secularizing forces, as Norris and 
Inglehart’s study suggests (nor is their position by any stretch unique). If we understand belief as 
separable from merely intellectual orthodoxies, not exclusively as coping responses to the 
manifold uncertainties of living, and not as stubborn atavisms or willful self-deceptions, we get 
closer to appreciating belief’s pervasive role in history and culture, its persistence as a human 





Charles Taylor offers one of the more nuanced approaches to rethinking secularization. 
His “third sense” of secularity, with which his magisterial A Secular Age is largely concerned, 
paves a middle way between the often uncompromising terms of secularization theses and 
notions of unbelief as inevitable responses to modernization and existential uncertainty. This 
secularity is a “change...which takes us from a society in which it is virtually impossible not to 
believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
among others” (3). Secularization for Taylor has less to do with the distinction between sacred 
and secular and more to do with the amplification of a field of possibilities. In this way, 
secularization isn’t the gradual diminishing of faith (significantly, Taylor doesn’t say “religion”), 
but its reconception as “one human possibility among others.”302 This egalitarian context in 
which faith becomes epistemologically open to experimentation (an openness that also requires a 
fair degree of social acceptability) is the reality where the practice of lived religion, bolstered by 
a pragmatic sense of the utility of faith for individual lives, finds its academic livelihood and, I’d 
argue, is the most useful context in which to think about belief and its future in academic life. It 
reminds us, to use John Lardas Modern’s phrasing, that “one’s identity becomes bound up with 
one’s relationship to the religious” (3).303  
 
 
Religion in the American University 
 
As the scholarly practice of lived religion shows, then, these issues are not separate from the 
intellectual spaces of American universities. But more often than not, the regnant ethos ranges 
                                                             
302 For all its nuance and respect for alternative forms of belief, though, Taylor’s definition implicitly 
repeats an assumption about the “impossibility” of past cultures to be anything but faithful, as if 
agnosticism or atheism were unthinkable categories for them but not for us. In the 1970s, Keith Thomas 
observed with a humanistic realism ahead of his time that “[n]ot enough justice has been done to the 
volume of apathy, heterodoxy and agnosticism which existed long before the onset of industrialism. Even 
the most primitive societies have their religious sceptics” (173). An account, in other words, that grounds 
historical analyses on heterogeneities of belief, rather than on a putative, “natural” distinction between the 
sacred and the secular does more justice to historical reality.  
303 Modern is using Taylor to offer a description of the American nineteenth century, but I would argue his 





from polite reticence to undisguised antipathy toward religion and belief. It was common 
knowledge to the mentor of one of my former professors of religion that he would “never get a 
job,” just as it was perplexing to one of my graduate student fellows why I was “wasting time 
studying religion. There’s so much more interesting stuff out there.” One doesn’t get very far 
with “the kind of hostility to religion that has characterized so many academics, especially in the 
humanities and social sciences” (Wolfe viii). One does, however, like my former mentor, get a 
job at a highly ranked university teaching religion, as one does, in fact, write a (hopefully) 
compelling dissertation about it.  
As dismissal doesn’t get us very far in understanding religion or belief, neither does 
subsuming them within grander, secular political narratives. As Tracy Fessenden points out, 
“[p]articularly in American literary studies, religion receives little attention except when it 
figures as crucial to a progressive, emancipatory politics” (2). The tendency to focus on or even 
canonize figures deemed nonreligious – or whose religious commitments remain ambiguous or 
muted – has the effect of not only rendering large portions of history invisible, but also 
characterizing the history we do see as either fundamentally secular or one well on its way to 
becoming so. We remember and celebrate, for example, Sojourner Truth’s Christian 
abolitionism, but not the role these beliefs had in her devotion to alleged murderer and self-
proclaimed apocalyptic prophet Robert Matthews.304 It’s telling, for another example, that even 
non-academics are familiar in some sense with the agnostic James, while his close friend the 
Christian philosopher Josiah Royce is often known only to specialists.305 What has in large part 
inspired the thinking behind this dissertation has been the idea that it is quite valuable to consider 
                                                             
304 For Baumfree’s history within the turbulent apocalyptic group headed by Robert “Matthias” Matthews, 
including her role in the murder trial that ultimately undid the patriarch, see Johnson and Wilentz’s 
Kingdom of Matthias.  
305 James might even be baffled to how history has remembered him and not his philosopher friend. 
Royce was an idealist, and so qualified for James’s intellectual ire. But even so, their relationship 
appeared to be conducted on terms of competitive amicability, or so James thought: “[w]hen I write, ‘t is 
with one eye on the page, and one on you. When I compose my Gifford lectures mentally, ‘t is with the 
design exclusively of overthrowing your system, and ruining your peace. I lead a parasitic life upon you, 
for my highest flight of ambitious ideality is to become your conqueror, and go down in history as such, 
you and I rolled in one another’s arms and silent (or rather loquacious still) in one last death-grapple of an 





figures like Finney and Swedenborg as participants in aspects of American history that we don’t 
immediately read as religious in nature.  
Still, attempts to exclude religion and belief, or find some way of curtailing their broader 
involvement do emerge. German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued that “[t]he liberal 
state must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an 
undue mental and psychological burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith.” 
Notwithstanding Habermas’s even-handedness when it comes to the inclusion of faith-based 
discourse in the public sphere of a liberal state, he nonetheless prioritizes “secular reasons.” 
“Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond the institutional 
threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries, and 
administrations” (9). Though Habermas grants that “[r]eligious traditions have a special power to 
articulate moral intuitions [and] this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate to 
transporting possible truth contents,” there are “institutional thresholds” that function as a “filter 
that...allows only secular contributions to pass through” (10). Ultimately, religious discourse may 
be permitted to enter political processes if they have undergone requisite “translation” (10-11) 
into - using a phrase that perhaps at one time was as unambiguous as Habermas intends it to be - 
“secular reasons.” On a practical level, this exclusionary model misses the possibility in some 
people of seeing no difference between religious and secular commitments (such as equating 
American nationhood with God’s providential majesty), or people whose religiosity would rather 
sacrifice the secular before ceding any faithful ground.306 More deleterious is the bald expulsion 
from institutions of anything having to do with faith. An academic culture that encourages the 
willing suspension of belief further marks these beliefs as superfluous to academic conversations 
or naturally unsusceptible to critical or historical analysis.  
 This exclusionary model rests on a secularization thesis that doesn’t deny the reality of 
religion, but marginalizes that reality to its “proper” sphere – the private. If understood to operate 
just fine independently of claims about eternal salvation and morality, the secular domain may 
thrive unperturbed by the inevitably partisan special interests of faith groups. This dynamic, as 
                                                             
306 In fairness to Habermas, his views on the role of religious belief in society have softened over the 
years. Philippe Portier has identified three stages in the evolution of Habermas on religion, the third of 
which “stressed that religion should not be limited to the private sphere. Rather, it should intervene in the 





Jakobsen and Pellegrini point out, was an effect of secular dominance: “within the traditional 
secularization narrative, any religion, if not completely privatized, does become configured as 
antimodern and dangerous” (11). From the secular side, religion is seen with distrust. The 
religious side, interestingly, didn’t necessarily counter with distrust, but tended to reinforce the 
very model that excluded it. The privatization of belief, while it can be read as a kind of 
persecution or social neglect, can and is sometimes read as enabling the preservation of 
cherished beliefs, protected from the corrosive effects of modernity and secular humanism.  
 But there is value in integrating religion and belief in our academic conversations. Robert 
A. Segal’s opening to The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion argues that “religion is 
best deciphered when it is connected to as much of the rest of human life as possible,” adding 
that “religion does not thereby lose its distinctiveness” (xviii). My argument is that the aim to 
preserve the “distinctiveness” (the “sacred” character even) of religion, while inviting its 
connection to “the rest of human life” isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. If we view the 
university space as existing, not separate from, but on a continuum – psychologically, 
emotionally, ethically – with life, there seems to be little justification for asking students, 
whether we’re aware we’re doing it or not, to leave their beliefs at the door.307 
It’s beyond this dissertation to tackle the roles of media bias, the insensitivity or 
obliviousness of political or social leaders, the impact of internet trolls anonymous or otherwise, 
conspiracy theories, and elementary education in the gross misrepresentations of belief, but our 
current world is no stranger to their pernicious effects. When students assume a posture of 
assurance in denying religious belief (or as one of mine memorably put it, “just brainwashing”), 
my immediate response is that you aren’t obligated to agree, like, or even respect others’ beliefs. 
                                                             
307 There have been challenges to exclusionary models of the role of religion in society. The English 
cleric and academic Martyn Percy argues that the “salt” of faith  
 
is a social nutrient. That said, however, there are many within faith communities who see 
their ‘salt’ as being contained, either through their own separatist choice, or because of 
their perception of the apparent marginalization of religion by contemporary culture. In 
contrast, I hold that many aspects of Western society remain unavoidably saturated, 






But a posture of understanding – understanding the history of a belief, its appeal to believers, and 
its effects on non-believers – is one step in the right direction. I’m inclined to agree with Mark U. 
Edwards, Jr that “[o]ne’s religious affiliation ought not to be an “autobiographical footnote” 
(Jacobsen 81). Those groups central to diversity committees and cultural studies, who have made 
significant progress in academic and cultural representation in the past decades, know all too 
well what it is to be a footnote.  
Simplest solutions may be the way to go. Describing the abiding interpersonal ethic in 
their small-group faith session, one Catholic put it, “[n]o one is to preach and no one is to teach. 
We’re only there to share, and whatever’s said is acceptable. You don’t have to believe it, but 
you have to accept...that that person believes it, and that’s fine” (Wolfe 16). In focusing 
exclusively on the “experiences of [individuals] in their solitude” (VRE 31), James was perhaps 
more prescient than he may have thought. Recognizing the faithful commitments of the believing 
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